162nd Rifle Division (Soviet Union)

The 162nd Rifle Division was originally formed as an infantry division of the Red Army in August 1940 in the Kharkov Military District, based on the ''shtat'' (table of organization and equipment) of the previous September. At the start of the German invasion in June 1941 it was in Lubny, Poltava Oblast, and was quickly sent to the front as part of Western Front's 19th Army. After first counterattacking in an effort to retake Vitebsk it was forced to fall back toward Smolensk. During August and into September, now as part of 30th Army, it took part in several counteroffensives against German 9th Army in the Dukhovshchina area in an effort to retake Smolensk, but these were ultimately unsuccessful while costing the division considerable strength. At the start of Operation Typhoon in October the 162nd was located at the boundary of the two Soviet armies in well-prepared positions, but was struck with overwhelming numbers of infantry, tanks, and aircraft. With one regiment quickly encircled the remainder were shouldered away to the north and east. Soon pocketed with the remains of two other divisions the 162nd managed to reach Soviet-held territory in the Kalinin region late in the month, but in November was disbanded to supply replacements for other units.

A new 162nd was designated in January 1942 in the Ural Military District based on a 400-series division that had begun forming the previous month. In March it moved to the Reserve of the Supreme High Command where it was assigned to the reformed 28th Army, soon part of Southwestern Front. In mid-May the Army formed part of the Front's northern shock group in the offensive to retake Kharkiv; while the 162nd was initially in second echelon it was soon brought up to the front line and attacked near Vesele on May 18 without any lasting success. Following this offensive the division was transferred to 38th Army and was under this command in late June when the German summer offensive began. Twice encircled over the following weeks it failed to escape across the Don River in any numbers and was disbanded in late July.

The final 162nd began as the Central Asian Rifle Division of the NKVD in November in the Central Asian Military District. It retained the name "Central Asian" as an honorific. Early in the new year it, and five similar divisions, were transferred to the Red Army and formed as the new 70th Army. The Army was soon assigned to Central Front, where it joined the advance toward Oryol in late February and March 1943, but proved ineffective due to low standards of training and leadership. It did not see much combat in the Battle of Kursk, being largely confined to second echelon, but advanced into eastern Ukraine in September as part of 65th Army, where it won a battle honor. In October it entered eastern Belarus and in the November fighting for Rechytsa it was awarded the Order of the Red Banner. It battled through the winter in this general area, gradually advancing eastward, before being moved south in February 1944 to join 1st Ukrainian Front. After reaching its new Front, as part of 13th Army, the 162nd advanced to the vicinity of Brody, where it would remain for several months. In the early stages of the Lvov-Sandomierz offensive in July it assisted in taking this objective, then moved into southeast Poland, playing a leading role in forcing the Vistula and holding the bridgehead on its west bank. Following this success the division was pulled into reserve and moved to the north, briefly rejoining 65th Army before returning to 70th Army, now in 2nd Belorussian Front. During the Vistula-Oder offensive in 1945, as part of 47th Rifle Corps, it broke through to the lower Vistula and then into eastern Pomerania, where several of its subunits won decorations, including for the capture of Gdańsk. Following a rapid redeployment the 162nd helped lead its Front into central Germany north of Berlin. Shortly after the German surrender it was also awarded the Order of Suvorov, but was disbanded in July.

1st Formation

The division first began forming on July 16, 1940, at Artyomovsk in the Kharkov Military District. Its order of battle on June 22, 1941, was as follows:
* 501st Rifle Regiment
* 627th Rifle Regiment
* 720th Rifle Regiment
* 605th Light Artillery Regiment
* 634th Howitzer Artillery Regiment
* 141st Antitank Battalion
* 473rd Antiaircraft Battalion
* 241st Reconnaissance Battalion
* 187th Sapper Battalion
* 400th Signal Battalion (until October 18, 1941)
* 194th Medical/Sanitation Battalion
* 21st Chemical Defense (Anti-gas) Platoon
* 3rd Motor Transport Battalion
* 136th Field Bakery
* 169th Field Postal Station
* 119th Field Office of the State Bank
Col. Nikolai Fyodorovich Kolkunov was appointed to command on the day the division began forming, and he would remain in this post for the duration of the 1st formation. As of June 22 it was part of 25th Rifle Corps, along with the 127th and 134th Rifle Divisions, and was already on the move, by rail, to join the 19th Army at Cherkasy. From here the Army commander, Lt. Gen. I. S. Konev, was ordered north to the Vitebsk area, to join Western Front. Between July 7 and 10 the 162nd offloaded north of Smolensk.

Battle of Vitebsk

By late on July 9 forces of 3rd Panzer Group had created a serious breach in the Red Army's defenses around Vitebsk. The front commander, Marshal S. K. Timoshenko, ordered Konev to counterattack to restore the situation despite the fact his Army was not yet assembled. The 162nd took part in the counterattack the next day, which faltered after two days of heavy fighting due to the lack of coordination and reserves. By nightfall on July 12 both motorized corps of the Panzer Group were over the Dvina River and fanning out around Vitebsk. By the end of July 13 the 162nd and 134th were moving into the area east of Smolensk, but the remainder of 19th Army was strung out along the poor roads between that city and the area east of Vitebsk. 25th Corps was fighting in a salient east of Orsha which had been formed by XXXIX and XXXXVI Motorized Corps pushing toward Smolensk. Timoshenko continued to attempt to retake Vitebsk with counterattacks that included the 162nd as late as July 16, but these made no progress at all. Adding to the turmoil, the commander of the Corps, Maj. Gen. S. M. Chestokhvalov, had been captured on July 13.

Battle of Smolensk

Timoshenko was not immediately aware that Army Group Center had taken Orsha and had completed an encirclement of Western Front's forces north of the Dniepr River, east of that city and west of Smolensk. The elongated pocket contained most of 20th Army, what remained of two mechanized corps, and five divisions of 19th Army, including all of 25th Corps, for a total of 20 divisions of several types. However, the rapid advance had taken a toll of the German forces as well, with the 18th Panzer Division, as an example, holding blocking positions with only 12 operable tanks on strength. Furthermore, German infantry divisions were still well to the rear. At 2000 hours on July 18 Timoshenko issued an operational summary to the ''STAVKA'' which stated, in part, that 19th Army was "withdrawing in disorder", and the 162nd was pulling back to the Nelidovo region, having escaped from the encirclement, and was now being subordinated to 30th Army. Following this, Colonel Kolkunov was brought in front of a military tribunal. He was accused of having, on July 13, ordered the division's communications equipment buried in the ground, and effectively destroyed, when this measure "was not required by the combat situation..." He was given a five-year suspended sentence but remained in command.

At 2000 hours on August 3 Timoshenko reported on Western Front's efforts to break through to relieve the still trapped 20th and 16th Armies near Smolensk. The 162nd had been re-subordinated to 19th Army, which was "attacking across its entire front", and the division was reported as being "concentrated in the Vadino region." By August 5 the combined remaining forces had escaped across the upper Dniepr to Western Front's positions, albeit at considerable cost. Konev's Army attacked again "against stubborn enemy resistance" starting at 0700 on August 7 and the 162nd was reported as havingBy this time some 50,000 men of 16th and 20th Armies had escaped from the pocket. Also by this time most of the Front's rifle divisions had only 1,000 - 2,000 personnel on strength, with far fewer "bayonets" (riflemen and sappers).

Dukhovshchina Offensives

As of August 8 the divisions of XXXIX Motorized Corps which had been facing 30th Army had been relieved by the infantry divisions of 9th Army's V Army Corps. These divisions were very hard pressed to parry the attacks of this Army and 19th Army east and northeast of Dukhovshchina. In the wake of these assaults the commander of Army Group Center noted "9th Army was also attacked; the day before yesterday the Russians broke through as far as the 5th Division's artillery positions." The chief of staff of OKH, Col. Gen. F. Halder, noted on August 11 in regard to these attacks:Timoshenko's new plan, as submitted to the ''STAVKA'' around noon on August 15 was "to destroy the enemy grouping in the Dukhovshchina region" with shock groups consisting of 30th Army on the north flank and 19th Army on the south. The 162nd, which had returned to 30th Army, and 91st Rifle Divisions were initially assigned a covering role on a front between Markovo and Potelitsa, some 24-38km north of Yartsevo.

The operational directive set the goal of encircling and destroying the German 106th, 5th, and 28th Infantry Divisions and 900th ''Lehr'' Regiment through concentric attacks with two shock groups, the northern consisting of the 30th Army's 242nd, 251st, 107th Tank and 45th Cavalry Divisions, and by now the 162nd as well. The Army was to protect its right flank toward Bely with the 250th Rifle Division, penetrate the German defense and then commit the mobile forces to encircle the objective from the west. The attack sector was 17km wide from Markovo to Staroe Morokhovo, from 38km to 55km north of Yartsevo. The 162nd, which had the support of two battalions of the 542nd Cannon Artillery Regiment and other supporting units, was to attack with its main forces in the direction of Gordienki, Sechenki, and Maloe Repino, with the main objective to reach a line from Khadobuzha to Staroe Selo, and then continue the attack toward Ponomari. The attack was to be preceded by a 45-minute artillery preparation beginning at 0900 hours on August 17. The shock group faced the German 106th Infantry, which was holding a sector roughly 16km wide. During August 16 the 162nd was reported as having improved its jumping-off positions by reaching the area some 18-20km southeast of Staroe Morokhovo.

Maj. Gen. V. A. Khomenko, the Army commander, launched his attack on time, despite not all of his forces having managed to reach their jumping-off points. Several units were fed in piecemeal, which in some instances worked to their advantage, since the artillery preparation had done more to alert German units than it accomplished in causing damage. While 19th Army managed to penetrate the German tactical defenses throughout its sector, 30th Army achieved far more limited results due to intense machine gun and mortar fire, backed by effective artillery fire on most sectors. Most of the 162nd, in common with the 251st and 242nd, only advanced from 150m-400m, with the left wing regiment of the 162nd running up against a German strongpoint at Losevo, but the 107th Tanks, in cooperation with another regiment of the division, was successful in penetrating the defensive line and exploited roughly 4km deep, capturing a strongpoint at Karpovo. For several hours heavy fighting went on with reserve battalions of the 106th Infantry, which may have been reinforced by infantry of the 35th Infantry Division and tanks of 900th Lehr. These launched several unsuccessful counterattacks, but the Soviet advance was halted at Karpovo. At 2000 the Front reported that these counterattacks had "left 200 ermanbodies on the battlefield." Meanwhile, the 91st and 50th Rifle Divisions of 19th Army, just to the south, had torn a large hole in the defenses of the right wing of 161st Infantry Division.

The Army attempted to resume its offensive at 0900 on August 18, but Khomenko's evening report reveals very little progress:Overall, although 19th Army continued to make some gains, the 30th could not say as much. In addition, German reserves, such as the 35th Infantry, were arriving in the sector. Although the 162nd and the 107th Tanks managed to cover another 2km on August 19, the remaining divisions stalled against heavy resistance, and the belated arrival of the reinforcing 244th Rifle Division did nothing to assist because it had not yet regrouped after its long approach march. The 45th Cavalry was now committed to exploit the limited success of the 162nd. Under the pressure of the offensive the German 9th Army had no choice but to call on the only available reserve, the 7th Panzer Division.

Army Group Center began its counterstroke on August 20. By noon 7th Panzer was concentrated north of Losevo with roughly 110 tanks (mostly Panzer 38(t) types), preparing to strike the right flank of 19th Army. This attack drove into the heart of the Army's antitank defenses and was driven off with significant losses. Meanwhile, 30th Army maintained its offensive pressure as best it could; Khomenko reported that the 162nd and 251st Divisions were fighting fiercely to widen the penetration in the Pochinoi 2 and Shelepy sector. The next day, as the dogfight with 7th Panzer continued, Timoshenko decided that, since it appeared that 30th Army's attacks were going nowhere, it would be more useful to transfer its fresh forces (45th Cavalry and 244th Rifle) to 19th Army's sector; on August 22 he permitted Khomenko to take a day to rest and refit. 19th Army resumed the attack on August 23 and 30th Army recorded some minor gains, with the division taking Hill 218.7 and Pochinok and then fortifying its positions while preparing to develop its success overnight with small reconnaissance and specialized detachments. However, by the end of the day word had reached Timoshenko that 22nd Army, which was supposed to be advancing south of Velikiye Luki, was in fact facing defeat from the forces of 3rd Panzer Group moving northward.

Despite this impending crisis, Stalin, the ''STAVKA'', and Timoshenko remained confident that their armies could collapse Army Group Center's defenses east of Smolensk, and so persisted in their offensive operations. During August 24 the 162nd, reinforced with two rifle regiments and 30 tanks, attacked in the direction of Shelepy and Zareche before noon, but without success. The 251st Division was committed at 1600 hours, and the two divisions jointly pushed into Sechenki (some 45km north of Yartsevo) at 1640, where fighting continued. This advance forced a German withdrawal from Gorodno and Krechets, "taking the livestock and population with them."

On August 25 Timoshenko directed Khomenko to continue protecting the Bely axis with at least two regiments of the 250th Division while preparing to continue the offensive with most of the rest of his forces. At 0145 hours Khomenko dispatched a warning order to his subordinates which included:Near the end of the day it was reported that the division was fighting to capture Hill 228.0 and Shelepy "against strong enemy resistance." This was part of a combined attack by the Army's five divisions on a 7km-wide sector against 106th Infantry Division which gained up to 2.5km and forced the German division back to its second defensive line. The assault resumed just past noon of the following day. The division was reported as fighting to capture Ivkino and Shelepy. Altogether, 30th Army forced the right wing of the damaged 106th Infantry to bend but not break, but at the cost to itself of 182 men killed and wounded. The heaviest fighting on August 28 occurred in the Shelepy area where the 251st and 162nd Divisions recorded advances of several hundreds of metres. The latter attacked toward Khomenki, and it reached the west slopes of Hill 228.9 with its right wing, while its left wing took an isolated building 1,000m southwest of Shanino. The Army lost another 453 men killed and wounded during the day. Khomenko issued orders for August 29 for the divisions to make a combined attack on Gorodno and to seize crossings over the Votra River. This would smash the right wing defenses of 106th Infantry. Just before midnight, Timoshenko gave further orders that, while continuing its attacks, 30th Army was to regroup during August 30–31 for a new general offensive.

Second offensive

On August 29 the division, in cooperation with 242nd and 250th Divisions, attacked but came up against heavy German fire, as well as fortifications in the form of barbed wire and minefields, halting the advance after minor gains. The following day it was ordered to capture Hill 230.3, Ploskoe, and, once again, Ivkino. In the process of regrouping, Khomenko formed a new shock group consisting of the 251st, 162nd and 242nd divisions, backed by the 250th and the artillery of 107th Tanks. Timoshenko, determined to carry out his design and press the advantages he had won, issued orders to Western Front to prepare to resume the offensive on September 1 after regrouping. 30th Army was directed to make its main attack toward Demidov, with the objective of reaching that place as well as Velizh by the end of September 8.

When the offensive officially resumed on September 1 the 162nd attacked toward Fomenki and Hill 230.3 without any success, falling back to its start line and bombarding German strongpoints for the rest of the day. During the day the Army lost 248 men killed and wounded. For the next day Khomenko ordered the division to consolidate on a narrow front overnight and then push "toward Shanino and Fomenki, while avoiding use of deeply echeloned combat formations, conduct a secondary attack toward Hill 229.1 and 241.2 together with 242nd RD, and conduct active demonstrative fires along the remainder of the front." Kolkunov's men again failed to advance. On September 3 the 162nd again attacked toward Ivkino but ran into heavy German fire resistance; overall 30th Army saw no success on this day. At 0230 hours on September 5 the division was ordered to withdraw into Army reserve, to be concentrated in the area of Lukashevo, Krapivnia, and Pochinok by September 6. In spite of this it went over to the attack again at 0800 with three other divisions, but this was unsuccessful at the cost of an additional 131 men. Finally, at 0335 on September 10 the ''STAVKA'' ordered Western Front to go over to the defense. The next day the division, in cooperation with the 251st, was ordered to firmly defend the Hill 228.0, Olkhovka, and Ilina Farm region (25–32km south of Chernyi Ruchei), with combat security positions along the Shelepy, Shanino Farm, 1,000m west of Sechenki, and western outskirts of Gorodno line to prevent German infantry and tanks from penetrating toward Savinka and Karpovo and protect the boundary with 244th Division.

Operation Typhoon

The constant attacking had been costly in more than manpower. On September 20 Kolkunov reported that the division had on strength 32 heavy machine guns, 39 light machine guns, 12 45mm antitank guns, a mix of eight 76mm cannon and regimental guns, eight 122mm howitzers, three antiaircraft guns, and nine antitank rifles (which were only beginning to arrive at the front). The shortages even included the KS fuel used to make Molotov cocktails.

The front west of Moscow was generally quiet through the balance of September as Army Groups Center and South focused on the encirclement and destruction of Southwestern Front east of Kyiv. Konev was promoted to the rank of colonel general on September 11 and took command of Western Front the next day. By the end of the month 30th Army was defending a 66km-wide sector with four divisions; 19th Army remained on its left (south) flank. General Khomenko correctly determined, due to the terrain, that the Kaniutino axis was likely where the main German attack would come. At the expense of a critical weakening of the Army's other sectors the 162nd was moved from reserve to deploy on this flank in two echelons on a frontage of only 6.5km, with one regiment of the 242nd also in the first echelon. The 251st Division was designated as the Army's reserve, backed by 107th Tanks (now redesignated as 107th Motorized Rifle) in Front reserve. Although the ''STAVKA'' believed the main German attack would come along the SmolenskVyazma highway, in fact it would be aimed at the 19th/30th Army boundary. According to plan, the boundary was to be covered by the fire of Khomenko's artillery battalions.

Khomenko decided to fire a preemptive artillery bombardment between 11.00 and 11.30 hours on October 1 in an effort to disrupt the German forces which, by then, were clearly massing against his left flank. The ravines in front of the 162nd's positions, which were sheltering German infantry, came under particular attention. While Khomenko's headquarters claimed significant damage had been inflicted, a good deal of the Army's available ammunition was also expended. Operation Typhoon began at 0530 hours on October 2, following a 45-minute artillery preparation, and the Army boundary was struck by 3rd Panzer Group and 9th Army as Khomenko expected. While the overall attack front was up to 45km wide the main breakthrough sector was only 16km wide. Overall, the Kaniutino axis was attacked by four German corps consisting of 12 divisions, including three panzer divisions (460–470 tanks) and one motorized division, simultaneously. The first echelon of the 162nd faced up to four regiments of infantry with approximately 200 tanks and some 100 aircraft in support, "hanging over the defense", suppressing strongpoints and artillery emplacements. At 13.30 the 30th Army headquarters reported that the 501st Rifle Regiment and the 897th Regiment of 242nd Division were "fighting in encirclement." Later in the day 9th Army reported an intercepted radio message from Khomenko to Konev's headquarters stating that the division had been forced to retreat by tank forces on both sides of Krapivnia. At 14.35, up to 40 German tanks were detected roughly 15km behind the front line.

Due to the 162nd having been concentrated in two echelons a gap of 1.5km between it and 19th Army's 244th Division was being covered by a single reconnaissance platoon. This Army, now led by Lt. Gen. M. F. Lukin, was relying on 30th Army to cover the boundary; his 244th was spread along a 13km-wide sector. This gap included good terrain for tanks and the breach of the Soviet lines was quickly expanded to the left and right. By the end of this first day the German forces had penetrated the defenses of the first echelon divisions at the inter-army boundary up to 15km in depth, and Konev was demanding that Khomenko restore the situation. At 1630 hours the latter issued his own order which stated in part:The two divisions were to destroy the German units that had broken through, prevent further expansion of their lodgements, and restore the positions of the 162nd. Not only were these orders unrealistic, but the commitment of the 251st and 107th Motorized was delayed and piecemeal. Not only did the counterattack fail but the line of defense along the Vop River