Rahbari Shura

The Leadership Council of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, also translated as the Supreme Council (, also referred to as the Inner Shura), is an advisory council to the Supreme Leader of Afghanistan. The supreme leader convenes and chairs the council at his sole discretion. He has ultimate authority and may override or circumvent it at any time. It played a key role in directing the Taliban insurgency from Quetta, Pakistan, which led to it being informally referred to as the Quetta Shura at the time.

During the Taliban insurgency, a consensus-based decision model was used among members of the Quetta Shura. After the 2021 return to power of the Taliban, Supreme Leader Hibatullah Akhundzada centralized power and began to communicate mostly through his three deputies. In March 2023, Oxford Analytica reported that he had not convened the Leadership Council for several months, instead consulting the local Kandahar provincial council of clerics for advice.

Powers and duties

The council is the supreme governing body of the Taliban and the Government of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. It functions under a consensus decision-making model, and is chaired by the supreme leader. The Leadership Council appoints the supreme leader in the event of a vacancy. Under the first supreme leader, Mullah Omar, the role of the council was purely advisory, but an agreement to rule by consensus was formed upon the contentious appointment of Akhtar Mansour as the second supreme leader. However, the supreme leader may still override or circumvent the council at any time—the consensus model is merely a convention.

Current Shura (2021-present)

There are approximately 30 members. The following bodies make up the Leadership Council:

* Border Commission
* Commission for Agriculture, Livestock, Ushr and Zakat
* Commission for Cultural Affairs
* Commission for Financial Affairs
* Commission for Preaching and Guidance, Recruitment and Propagation of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice
* Commission for Prevention of Civilian Casualties and Complaints
* Commission for Prisoners’ Affairs
* Commission for Training, Learning and Higher Education
* Commission of Military Affairs
* Department for the Affairs of Needy, Orphans and Disabled
* Department of Power Distribution
* Economic Commission
* Guidance and Invitation Commission
* Health Commission
* Institutional Commission
* Intelligence Commission
* Leadership Office
* Mining Commission
* Political Office (formerly Commission for Political Affairs)

Quetta Shura (2002–2020)

After the United States invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 and the end of the Taliban government, ten men who had held positions in the government formed a Council of Leaders (''Rahbari Shura'') in May 2002. They consisted of eight veteran high ranking (i.e. elite) commanders originally from the southern area of Afghanistan, another hailing from Paktika, and another from Paktia. The Shura was subsequently increased in number, during March 2003, to 33 individuals. During October 2006, the Consultative Council (''majlis al-shura'') was formed, comprising a number of advisors to 13 core members.

Directing the insurgency in Afghanistan

According to retired General of the United States Army Stanley A. McChrystal, the Quetta Shura was directing the Afghani Taliban insurgency. In a report to President Obama in 2009, he stated that it posed the greatest threat to his troops. He said, "Afghanistan's insurgency is clearly supported from Pakistan. The Quetta Shura conducts a formal campaign review each winter, after which Omar announces his guidance and intent for the following year." Americans wanted to extend the drone strikes into Balochistan.Strategic Balochistan becomes a target in war against Taliban
The Guardian, 2009-12-21

In September 2009 US ambassador to Pakistan Anne W. Patterson said, "In the past, we focussed on Al-Qaeda because they were a threat to us. The Quetta Shura mattered less to us because we had no troops in the region, now our troops are there on the other side of the border, and the Quetta Shura is high on Washington’s list."

Funding from Persian Gulf region

The Taliban leaders raise money from wealthy Persian gulf donors and direct operations in south Afghanistan.Taliban Haven in Pakistani City Raises Fears
The New York Times, 2009-02-09 According to Lt. Gen. David Barno, the retired former commander of American forces in Afghanistan "The Quetta Shura is extremely important, they are the intellectual and ideological underpinnings of the Taliban insurgency."

Support from Pakistani intelligence

American officials believe that the Quetta Shura gets support from parts of Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), as some of its senior officials believe that leaders such as Omar would be valuable assets if the Taliban were to regain power after a withdrawal of U.S. forces from Afghanistan.
According to Abdul Rahim Mandokhel, a Pakistani senator from Zhob in northern Balochistan. "The whole war in Afghanistan is being launched from here," he said. He accused Pakistan's intelligence agencies of carrying out a "double" policy. "One thing is clear: the area is being used for cross-border offences," he said.

A report by the London School of Economics (LSE) claimed to provide the most concrete evidence yet that the ISI is providing funding, training and sanctuary to the Taliban insurgency on a scale much larger than previously thought. The report's author Matt Waldman spoke to nine Taliban field commanders in Afghanistan and concluded that Pakistan's relationship with the insurgents ran far deeper than previously realised. Some of those interviewed suggested that the organization even attended meetings of the Taliban's supreme council, the Quetta Shura. A spokesman for the Pakistani military dismissed the report, describing it as "malicious".

Pakistani relationship

Statement

American and western officials have long complained that Pakistan has ignored the presence of senior Taliban leadership in Quetta and done little to address this situation. Pakistani authorities have denied the existence of such an organization in Pakistan. However, statements by US officials have led to fears that US would launch drone strikes on Quetta.Fear grows of US strikes in Balochistan
, Dawn, 2009-10-12 Jehan Zeb Jamaldini, senior vice president of Balochistan National Party was quoted as saying that Omar and his 2nd and 3rd tier leadership were around Quetta and would be targeted by the US.Prime Minister of Pakistan Imran Khan rejected the allegations of having Quetta Shura in Pakistan. He said these are just baseless allegations by our enemies. He added that Pakistan is not spokesperson for Taliban. If anyone has queries ask the Taliban directly.

Acknowledgement

In December 2009 Pakistani government for the first time acknowledged the existence of Quetta Shura. The Defence minister of Pakistan, Ahmad Mukhtar acknowledged the presence of Quetta Shura but stated that security forces had damaged it to such an extent that it no longer posed a threat.

On 23 November 2012, when Pakistan released nine senior Taliban leaders, commentator Ali K. Chishti described a statement from the Pakistani government as its first acknowledgment of the existence of the Quetta Shura.

Arrests

In February 2010, in a possible change in Pakistani policy, several members of the Quetta Shura were detained at various locations in Pakistan.
Top Taliban leader Abdul Ghani Baradar, who ran the Shura, was captured in Karachi in a joint operation by Inter-Services Intelligence and Central Intelligence Agency. He had reportedly gone to Karachi to meet other Shura leaders who had moved to this city in recent months. A few days later two more members of the Quetta Shura, Abdul Kabir

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