Proposals For The United States To Purchase Greenland

Since the 19th century, the United States has considered, and made, several attempts to purchase the island of Greenland from Denmark, as it did with the Danish West Indies in 1917. There were notable internal discussions within the U.S. federal government about acquiring Greenland in 1867, 1910, 1946, 1955, 2019, and 2025, and acquisition has been advocated by American secretaries of state William H. Seward and James F. Byrnes, privately by Vice President Nelson Rockefeller, and publicly by President Donald Trump, among others. After World War II, the United States secretly offered to buy Greenland; there was public discussion about purchasing the island during Trump's first term in 2019 and again after Trump's 2024 reelection, as part of his American expansionism policy. In May 2025, Trump stated that he could not rule out a U.S. annexation of the island.

While Greenland is an autonomous territory within the Kingdom of Denmark, Greenlandic and Danish authorities have publicly asserted Greenland's right to self-determination and stated that Greenland is "not for sale". Many Greenlanders support independence, and many Danes see the historical ties with Greenland as an integral part of Danish national identity.

The United States has long viewed Greenland as vital to national security. In the early 20th century, it included Greenland among several European possessions in the Western Hemisphere to preemptively seize and fortify in the event of a threatened attack on the US. During World War II, the US invoked its Monroe Doctrine and occupied Greenland to prevent use by Germany following the German occupation of Denmark. The US military remained in Greenland after the war, and by 1948, Denmark abandoned attempts to persuade the US to leave. The following year, both countries became members of the NATO military alliance. A 1951 treaty gave the US a significant role in Greenland's defense, and, about 1953, construction began on Thule military base, now known as Pituffik Space Base, located in northwest Greenland. The US military frequently takes part in NATO exercises in Greenlandic waters.

Greenland

Political status

Greenland is an autonomous territory within the Kingdom of Denmark.*
*
* In 1953 Denmark formally added what was then its colony to the kingdom. The Greenlandic government has authority over Greenland's internal affairs such as the economy, social services, and infrastructure, while Denmark is responsible for the island's foreign affairs, defense, citizenship, currency, and monetary policy. The Danish Supreme Court is the final court of appeal.

Under Danish law, Greenlandic independence is possible at any time based on the Self-Government Act of 2009, after a referendum in Greenland and approval by the Danish parliament. Others question this, arguing that an amendment of the Danish Constitution is required. Denmark has sovereignty over Greenland; private land ownership does not exist. Any agreement to allow for independence would transfer sovereignty from Denmark. The Greenlandic government declared in February 2024 that independence is its goal, and independence is expected to be the most important issue at the April 2025 Greenlandic general election. Due to its status as a former colony, some commentators have argued that under international law Greenland has, separate from the 2009 law, right of self-determination and could make a unilateral declaration of independence.

The position of the Danish government is that it is up to Greenland to decide its own future, and that Denmark would respect a Greenlandic referendum on independence. The Danish government reluctantly agreed in 2017 to finance two new airports, replacing potential Chinese investors, even though the investments sought by the island are viewed as preparing for independence. Greenland gives Denmark a role in the Arctic; it is a member of the Arctic Council and as one of the five Arctic littoral states, a signatory to the Ilulissat Declaration.

Icelandic scholar Gudmundur Alfredsson said that the island should consider Denmark one of several competitors for it, and that the United States or Canada might provide more funding. Rasmus Leander Nielsen of the University of Greenland said that Greenlanders have discussed since the 1980s creating a compact of free association (COFA) with Denmark after independence, and that some have suggested a COFA with the United States instead. Several Pacific nations with populations similar in size to Greenland have COFAs; current Greenlandic Minister of Foreign Affairs Mininnguaq Kleist visited the Cook Islands, affiliated with New Zealand, in 2006.

Defense

Greenland does not have its own military. As a territory of Denmark, the Danish military is responsible for Greenland's defense and the island is within the area overseen by the NATO military alliance. The Joint Arctic Command is the Danish military branch responsible for Greenland. In 2020, Denmark's Arctic Command had four ships, four helicopters, one maritime patrol aircraft, and six dogsled teams to patrol the island. The Danish military has personnel based at Nuuk, Kangerlussuaq, Daneborg, Station Nord, Mestersvig, Grønnedal, and a liaison detachment at Thule Air Base. Because of Greenland, it is among the few nations to have liaison officers at STRATCOM headquarters, Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska. In 2019, Denmark announced that it would spend a further billion to monitor Greenland. Denmark in December 2024 announced plans to build up its military presence in Greenland with more personnel, patrol ships, long-range drones, and upgrading an airport to handle Danish F-35 fighter aircraft. This followed American demands for more Danish defense spending, including by the first Trump administration.

Alex Gray, United States National Security Council chief of staff during the first Trump administration, said Danes "understand they don't have the ability to defend Greenland post independence". Denmark's active-duty military is smaller than the New York Police Department. The United States "accepted the legal obligation to defend against any attack" on Greenland in a 1951 treaty with Denmark. It has had bases there since the Second World War and has the largest military in the alliance. The 1951 Greenland Defense Agreement allowed the United States to keep its military bases in Greenland, and to establish new bases or "defense areas" if deemed necessary by NATO. The U.S. military could freely use and move between these defense areas, but was not to infringe upon Danish sovereignty in Greenland. The treaty gave the United States permanent jurisdiction over the defense areas of Thule, Sondrestrom and Narsarsuaq. As of 2025, the only U.S. military base in Greenland is Pituffik Space Base (formerly Thule Air Base). The 2004 Igaliku Agreement stated that Thule Air Base was the only U.S. defense area in Greenland and that the U.S. must inform Denmark and Greenland of any proposed changes. Thus, the U.S. cannot increase its military presence without consent from Denmark and Greenland. The American presence helps ensure Danish authority over the island, however, and allows it to spend less on defense while avoiding having foreign troops on Danish soil, a barter nicknamed the "Greenland map". In the summer, the 109th Airlift Wing of the New York Air National Guard also use Kangerlussuaq Airport to fly scientists and supplies to research stations across Greenland.

Greenlandic governments have said they seek to join NATO as an independent country, welcome increasing United States interest, and do not oppose American military presence if the island benefits from investments in jobs and infrastructure.

Economy

Greenland's annual GDP was $3 billion, 0.007% that of the United States. Its working-age population is estimated to decline by 16% by 2040. Denmark is by far Greenland's largest trade partner, receiving 55% of the island's exports and providing 63% of imports. it subsidizes Greenland with billion annually, up from billion in 2009. The island's largest private industry is fishing. Covering an area of 2,166,086 km², it has vast natural resources, including uranium, rare-earth minerals, and estimated 50 billion barrels of offshore oil and gas. Greenland has only one operating mine and little infrastructure, however; it has one commercial international airport, and no roads connect the 17 towns. One resident reported that flying from Nuuk to Qaqortoq, away, requires two planes over two days and is more expensive than flying to Copenhagen.

Forty-three percent of Greenlanders work for the government, compared to 15% in the United States. The island's per capita disposable income is the lowest in the Arctic other than Russia's, and less than one third that of the American state of Alaska, however, life expectancy of Alaskan natives is extremely low at 68 years, far lower than that of Greenlandic natives in Greenland, thereby suggesting that the wealth generated through mining and defense contracts in Alaska has not trickled down to the indigenous people of Alaska. Danish investors have little presence in Greenland, although one fifth of Greenlanders live in Denmark. Denmark has relinquished control over raw materials to the island, so has little interest in its resources. The island has one of the world's largest neodymium deposits, near Narsaq, but the Inuit do not have a history of mining so outside workers would be needed. Inuit Ataqatigiit won the 2021 Greenlandic general election, near Narsaq.

Although Greenlandic officials have approached dozens of Canadian and Australian mining companies, many are hesitant. The Kvanefjeld dispute may dissuade the American investors that the government also welcomes. Because of the lack of infrastructure, all mining projects are greenfield land and investors need to build new roads, ports, and power plants. the island has only two active mines: One for gold that is being commissioned, and one owned by Lumina Sustainable Materials for anorthosite. A ruby mine closed in 2024 after bankruptcy. Javier Blas of Bloomberg wrote in 2025 that "hyperbole around Greenland and commodities has a 50-year long history", noting that the island had never produced any petroleum and the attempt to mine iron ore ended in bankruptcy. A majority of possible mineral sites are north of the Arctic Circle; those south of the circle are mostly small, with Tanbreez among the exceptions. the United States only imported $190 million in rare earths; if prices rose, they could be obtained more easily from American and other deposits than from Greenland. Blas urged the United States to focus on the African copperbelt and elsewhere as more important.

"Investing in Greenland is not for the faint of heart", CEO Brian Hanrahan of Lumina said, stating that the anorthosite mine was more complex than any of the 270 worldwide sites he oversaw at another job. A 2014 report stated that replacing the Danish subsidy would require 24 large projects each costing billion, one opening every two years. As no investors existed for such projects, the report by 13 scholars said that Greenland would remain dependent on the subsidy for at least 25 years to maintain its welfare system. Minik Thorleif Rosing, one of the authors, in 2025 said that the situation had not changed: "Even if you had an unrealistically high rate of development of mineral resources, it would be unlikely to replace more than half the annual block grant from Denmark in any near future".

American goals of acquisition

Defense of the mainland United States

An acquisition of Greenland would give the United States control of an island that it sees as crucial to its defense. Reuters described Greenland in October 2020 as "a security black hole" for the United States and allies, and said its 27,000 miles (44,000 km) of coastline was difficult to monitor. "On several occasions since 2006, foreign vessels have turned up unexpectedly or without the necessary protocols, in waters that NATO-member Denmark aims to defend", the news agency reported. Detection of foreign vessels, including a Russian submarine, has often been by chance. A potential security threat are Russian ships believed to have the ability to tap undersea cables or sever them during a conflict.

A 2021 study by the RAND Corporation expressed concern that Greenland "could be seduced into Russia's or China's orbit" were it to attain independence from Denmark. Speaking in 2025, Rasmus Sinding Søndergaard of the Danish Institute of International Studies said that the United States had legitimate security concerns in Greenland that Denmark had persistently failed to adequately safeguard. Russia is much more capable of Arctic land combat than the United States, and Greenland may be vulnerable to invasion.

Control of the GIUK Gap

The United States views control of the GIUK Gap (Greenland–Iceland–UK Gap), as critical to the maritime defense of the Eastern United States, and unimpeded access to Greenland as necessary for control of the gap. A wartime priority of the United States is to "close the gap", or prevent an adversary navy from exiting the Norwegian Sea and approaching the United States. In 1957, the United States led Exercise Strikeback, the largest peacetime naval exercise in history, focused on stopping an aggressive "Orange Fleet" from transiting the gap, which was to be accomplished by means of a naval blockade involving hundreds of warships. During much of the Cold War, the importance of closing the gap was to prevent Soviet SSBNs from sailing to within firing range of Washington, D.C. and New York City.

With the improvement of Soviet—and, later, Russian—missile ranges, the importance of gap control lessened, however, again became a priority in the early 21st century as the threat of hybrid warfare increased. Russia increased naval activity there, as part of greatly expanding its Arctic presence. It has increased cooperation with China, which wants a Polar Silk Road. NATO annually undertakes exercise Northern Viking and in 2024, involved the United States Sixth Fleet, the Standing Naval Forces, the Icelandic Police and Icelandic Coast Guard, focused on responding to a threat against the integrity of the gap.

Security of air approaches

Greenlandic airspace is considered by the United States as vital to the air defense of itself and Canada. The United States has demanded Denmark provide better airspace surveillance over Greenland and, in 2022, a study by RAND suggested integrating Greenland into the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) as a means of mitigating the inadequacies of Danish air defenses.

Stability of space defense programs

Contemporary military operations have become dependent on polar-orbiting satellite. According to ''SpaceNews'', addressing the matter of Greenland, "any satellite in a polar or sun-synchronous orbit, such as those in critical communications, imagery and weather monitoring constellations, requires an Arctic ground station for consistent tracking, telemetry, and control throughout every revolution". The United States Space Force base in Greenland, Pituffik Space Base, is one of only two Arctic facilities available to the United States, the other being Clear Space Force Station in Alaska. The potential loss of Pituffik Space Base following the independence of Greenland would leave the United States with no redundancy and, according to ''SpaceNews'', "have serious consequences for both a future conflict and business as usual in orbit".

On 9 January 2025 U.S. Rep. Mike Haridopolos issued a statement supporting U.S. acquisition of Greenland on grounds of space security, commenting "it's a critical part of ensuring our nation's security now and in the future ... America cannot afford to cede an inch in space or the Arctic". Earlier, in July 2024, United States Army Lt. Gen. Thomas Carden—commenting on the deployment of military space assets—described the Arctic as "the shortest and least defended threat vector to North America".

Offensive basing

In addition to again permanently basing USAF fighters and bombers on Greenland, the United States might station long-range missiles there, similar to its plans in western Europe.

Access to natural resources

The United States may gain access to vast amounts of natural resources including petroleum and rare minerals. The United States Geological Survey estimates 17.5 billion barrels of offshore crude oil and 4.19 trillion cubic meters of natural gas. The island has the largest deposits of rare-earth elements outside China. Two thirds of the planet's fresh water outside Antarctica are frozen in Greenland, and its rock flour has unusually strong ability for soil regeneration and direct air capture of carbon.

Experts predict that 5% of global shipping could use Arctic shipping routes by 2050. Climate change may, by 2030, make the Northern Sea Route the first of the routes to be ice-free, linking the Atlantic and Pacific oceans and making Greenland's resources more accessible. The Northwest Passage is or four days shorter from the US east coast to Asia, and US west coast to Europe, than the Panama Canal; such routes are three fifths of traffic through the canal. The first commercial ship traversed the passage in 2013, saving $200,000; ten did so in 2024, and the passage may be open four months of the year by the end of the 21st century.

Size of territory

Impressed by the size of the island, Trump stated, "Look at the size of this. It’s massive. That should be part of the United States." Speaking with his security advisor he expressed thoughts that its acquisition would be a great real estate deal.

If Greenland became part of the United States, the U.S. would become the second-largest country in the world by area, after Russia (displacing Canada). It would be the largest territorial acquisition in American history, slightly larger than the Louisiana Purchase.

History

Early claims on Greenland

Paleo-Eskimo peoples had been living in Greenland periodically from around 2500 BC. Norsemen began settling the uninhabited southern part of Greenland from the 10th century AD. In 1261, the Norse settlements in southern Greenland accepted Norwegian overlordship. These colonies died out in the 1400s, but Norway's territorial claims to Greenland continued to be asserted by Denmark–Norway after the union of the Danish and Norwegian realms in 1537. Beginning in 1721, missionaries and traders from Denmark–Norway began recolonizing southern Greenland. In 1775, Denmark–Norway declared Greenland a colony. When Denmark and Norway separated in 1814, Greenland was kept by Denmark under the Treaty of Kiel.Cavell (2008), pp. 433ffDörr (2004), pp. 103ff Denmark began trying to colonize all of Greenland in the 1880s, and declared sovereignty over the whole island in 1921.

The United States could have challenged Denmark's claim to Greenland. Much of northern Greenland had not been mapped when the Kiel treaty was signed in 1814. During the Polaris Expedition of the early 1870s, American Charles Francis Hall was the first outsider to see northwest Greenland, decades before Denmark's first permanent settlement in the northwest in 1909. From 1886 to 1909, American Robert Peary was the first outsider to explore far northern Greenland and claimed much of the area for the United States.

Despite the Treaty of Kiel, Norway had long used the east coast of the island and objected to the 1921 Danish declaration. It stated that a 1924 agreement between the two countries did not endorse Danish sovereignty over the whole island, and in 1931 claimed eastern Greenland as Erik the Red's Land. A 1933 International Court of Justice ruling recognized Danish sovereignty over the whole island. Norway abided by this ruling, though briefly renewed its claim during the Quisling regime in the 1940s.

1867 proposal

In 1867, United States secretary of state William H. Seward negotiated the Alaska Purchase from the Russian Empire. He that year considered the idea of United States annexation of both Greenland and Iceland an idea "worthy of serious consideration". Robert J. Walker, like Seward an advocate of American expansionism, submitted to Seward a report by the United States Coast Survey that the secretary of state had requested on the two islands. The government published the report
''A Report on the Resources of Iceland and Greenland''
Peirce 1868). Seward wanted to encourage Americans to support a potential purchase offer, so the report very positively described Greenland's "unusual healthfulness" and large amounts of fish, game, and minerals. Annexation would also encourage Canada—between American territory to the east and west—to join the United States, the report predicted.

In 1868 negotiations by the secretary for purchasing both Greenland and Iceland from Denmark for $5.5 million in gold were reportedly "nearly complete" but Seward made no offer, probably because Congress did not approve a treaty to acquire the Danish West Indies. President Andrew Johnson was very unpopular with Republicans in Congress, and although Seward was also a Republican, his association with Johnson made passing his proposals unlikely.

1910 proposal

A proposal for acquisition of Greenland was discussed within the American government in 1910 by United States ambassador to Denmark Maurice Francis Egan. As suggested by Danish "persons of importance" who were friends of Egan, the United States would trade Mindanao and Palawan for Greenland and the Danish West Indies; Denmark could then trade Mindanao and Palawan to Germany for Northern Schleswig. Denmark regained Northern Schleswig from Germany after the German defeat in World War I following the 1920 Schleswig plebiscites.

Treaty of the Danish West Indies

Another American attempt to buy the Danish West Indies failed in 1902, this time because the Danish parliament did not pass the treaty. During the First World War, the United States again wanted to buy the Danish West Indies. Denmark wanted the United States to recognize the Danish claim over the whole of Greenland. United States secretary of state Robert Lansing proposed that the two issues be combined. Denmark sold the Danish West Indies to the United States, which were renamed the United States Virgin Islands and made an unincorporated territory of the United States. After the treaty, Lansing issued a declaration affirming the U.S. "will not object to the Danish Government extending their political and economic interests to the whole of Greenland".

John Douglas Hazen proposed at the Imperial War Conference that the British Empire buy Greenland for Canada to prevent the United States from acquiring it. The Imperial War Cabinet in 1917 declared that even a friendly nation obtaining Greenland would be undesirable to the empire and especially to Canada, and that the empire should obtain a right of first refusal for the island from Denmark when possible. According to Tom Høyem, Britain in 1917 secured a right of first refusal from Denmark, although it is unclear "if Høyem’s interpretation of the document could withstand legal scrutiny".

Since 1823 the United States has, in the Monroe Doctrine, opposed expansion of foreign sovereignty in the Americas. Lansing's declaration was an exception to the doctrine, and influenced other countries. In 1919, Denmark asked other nations to recognize its sovereignty over Greenland. Britain reiterated on behalf of Canada in September 1920 that it should be consulted before any sale; France, Japan, Italy, and Sweden had no reservations. The United States formally opposed the reservation, telling Britain that "The United States government is not disposed to recognize the existence in a third government of a right of pre-emption to acquire this territory if the Danish Government should desire to dispose of it and accordingly reserves for the future consideration what position it may take in the event of a specific proposal for such a transfer". Denmark formally declared sovereignty over all of Greenland in 1921. Norway renewed a claim to Erik the Red's Land in 1931, but two years later the Permanent Court of International Justice ruled against the country, finding that the claim had been transferred to Denmark in 1814.Cavell (2008), p. 434

Peary encouraged the United States to assert its claim to Greenland, believing that not doing so violated the Monroe Doctrine. He wanted to purchase the island for mineral wealth and to avoid foreign bases that would, as air and sea technology improved, threaten his country. During World War I, the United States decided that obtaining the Danish West Indies to defend the Panama Canal was more important, but in the 1920s General Billy Mitchell, advocating for expanding American air forces, wanted American bases on Greenland and Iceland.

Second World War

In 1939, United States secretary of state Cordell Hull's staff advised him not to offer to buy Greenland. United States secretary of war Harry Woodring said that the island was too far from American sea or air routes. Within one year, however, the German invasion of Denmark on 9 April 1940 showed the American government that Peary had been correct about Greenland's importance to the Arctic policy of the United States. Before World War II, the island was part of Rainbow 4, a contingency plan to deal with a siege of North America in which the United States was simultaneously attacked from every direction by every great power. In Rainbow 4, American forces would preemptively seize all Dutch, Danish, and French possessions in the western hemisphere—including Greenland—and garrison them to form a defensive perimeter around the United States. Its conquest of Denmark now gave Germany a strong legal claim to Greenland. Britain and Canada were also possible foreign occupiers.

Because of its proximity to mainland North America and being the only known significant source of cryolite, and German attempts to use the island during the North Atlantic weather war, the United States for the first time applied the Monroe Doctrine on European colonies in the North Atlantic Ocean. The US landed armed United States Coast Guard personnel from in Greenland to begin the occupation of Greenland. Prior to landing, the Coast Guardsmen were formally discharged from service and reconstituted as a force of "volunteers" to create a legal fiction that would avoid charges of an American invasion of the country, the United States being neutral and the Danish government not having agreed to the landing. On 9 April 1941 Hull and Danish Ambassador to the United States Henrik Kauffmann signed the "Agreement Relating to the Defense of Greenland". The American stated that defending Greenland was consistent with the Monroe Doctrine and Act of Havana of 1940. The United States Army began construction of Bluie West One in July 1941, the first of several bases. Kauffmann acted without the consent of his government, which considered the agreement to be void and recalled Kauffmann. He stayed in the United States, and after the war the Danish government again recognized "the good traitor" as ambassador to the country.

Post-War efforts to repatriate U.S. forces

At the end of the war, Denmark expected U.S. forces to exit Greenland and was taken by surprise when the United States indicated it had no intention of leaving. Over the next several years, Danish officials attempted, unsuccessfully, to convince the United States to leave the island. According to Jeroen van Dongen, a period of tension between the two countries followed as, despite its desires, "Denmark was clearly not in a position to force the USA to leave Greenland" nor did it have any means at its disposal to deny the U.S. access to the territory.

By spring 1948 Denmark gave up on persuading the Americans to leave. Part of why the country joined NATO, Trade Minister Jens Otto Krag wrote in his diary, was that since "the USA's ''de facto'' partial occupation of Greenland (which we do not possess the power to prevent)" would cause the Soviet Union to see his country as an American ally, Denmark should benefit from the relationship. Some Danes hoped that as a NATO member the United States would discuss Greenlandic issues multilaterally, or vacate the bases as Denmark was an ally, but such did not occur.

1946 proposal

In 1946 the Joint Chiefs of Staff listed Greenland and Iceland as two of the three essential international locations for American bases. During the creation of NATO, the two islands were seen as more important to American and Canadian defense than some Western European countries; Greenland is on the shortest polar route between Washington and Moscow, and about midway between the two cities.

In 1946, the United States offered Denmark $100 million ($ billion today) in gold bullion for Greenland. United States senator Owen Brewster said in November 1945 that he considered buying the island "a military necessity". The planning and strategy committee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff determined in April 1946 that acquiring the "completely worthless to Denmark" island was vital to the United States.

William C. Trimble of the State Department argued that while "there are few people in Denmark who have any real interest in Greenland, economic, political or financial", owning it would give the United States staging areas from which to launch military operations over the Arctic against America's adversaries. He suggested the $100 million price, and discussed an alternate offer of land in Point Barrow, Alaska. Had the Alaska trade occurred, from 1967 Denmark would have benefited from Prudhoe Bay Oil Field, the richest petroleum discovery in American history. Secretary of State James F. Byrnes made the $100 million offer on December 14, 1946, in a memorandum delivered to Danish foreign minister Gustav Rasmussen when he visited the United States.

The memorandum described the American position on what to do about the informal 1941 agreement made in 1941 by Kauffmann to station United States forces on Greenland. It suggested three alternatives: Two variations on the 1941 agreement—A 99-year lease on the existing American bases there, or the United States wholly taking over the defense of the island—or the purchase of Greenland. The United States preferred to purchase and believed that doing so was better for Denmark, as it would prevent criticism of American bases on Danish soil and save Denmark the cost of supporting Greenland. The American told the Dane that a sale "would be the most clean-cut and satisfactory".

"Our needs ... seemed to come as a shock to Rasmussen", Byrnes said. The memorandum indeed surprised the Dane; rumors at the time stated that the United States wanted to purchase Greenland, but the Danish government's position was that the United States would withdraw its troops, based upon language in the 1941 Kauffmann agreement that it remained in force "until agreement has been reached that current threats to the peace and security of the American continent have ended". The Danish government understood that the threats were the world war;
it did not know that the U.S. understood this to include postwar threats from the Soviet Union as well. Known as "Article X" of the Kauffmann agreement, the clause established that both sides would have to agree to ending it.

Rasmussen declined all three options, and returned to Denmark. He told United States ambassador Josiah Marvel, " ile we owe much to America I do not feel that we owe them the whole island of Greenland". The American offer surprised Rasmussen because of duplicity by Kauffmann, who with a friend at the United States Department of State advocated for an American presence in Greenland while not fully informing the Danish government. Kauffmann had minimized in his reports the importance of proposals of a takeover or purchase in the U.S. House of Representatives, saying that the idea was considered ridiculous by the U.S. government, when in fact it was not. He had also not conveyed important parts of a 1945 American proposal to keep its bases on the island after the war. Rasmussen visited Washington in 1946 expecting to annul the 1941 agreement, not understanding because of Kauffmann's duplicity why nothing had happened with the Danish government's previous overtures in that regard.

Reporting on the United States military's interest in purchasing it, ''Time'' in January 1947 stated that Lansing had erred in relinquishing the American claim to "the world's largest island and stationary aircraft carrier". The magazine predicted that Greenland "would be as valuable as Alaska during the next few years" for defense. ''Time'' observed that despite national pride "Denmark owes U.S. investors $70 million" while the country had a shortage of dollars, and rumors in Copenhagen stated that the price for the island would be $1 billion ($ billion today), or almost four times Denmark's aid from the Marshall Plan.

Selling Greenland might have made a return to Denmark's traditional neutrality easier, and would have provided funds the country greatly needed after the war. All Danish political parties rejected selling the island when they heard the rumors, however. Jens Sønderup said in a 1947 budget debate:

Rasmussen responded in the debate that the idea was absurd, and declared Denmark unwilling in any way to cede sovereignty over Greenland. The West Indies were only an investment to Danes, but from the Danish Golden Age of the 19th century they saw Danish overseas colonies in the North Atlantic, including Greenland, as part of their Viking history and national identity. The island was for Denmark similar to the British Raj for the United Kingdom, and Danes felt a paternalistic, "White Man's Burden"-like responsibility for its people. While Greenland did not contribute to the Danish economy, Denmark planned to expand trade and resource extraction there.

By offering to purchase Greenland, the United States told Denmark that it was not likely to ever leave. Denmark would not fully understand for another decade the island's strategic importance to the United States. The Danish government's own outlook on national security was more parochial, and did not extend to viewing Greenland as a part of that. The legal status of the 1941 arrangement was unsettled, with the United States still pressing for purchase and Denmark rejecting the offer, leaving matters at the ''status quo ante'' until the 1960s.

After the November 1947 Danish Folketing election, the new government of Hans Hedtoft continued and expanded Kauffmann's strategy of duplicity.
To the Danish public, it maintained that the United States would withdraw from Greenland as expected. To the United States the Hedtoft government stated that its own private position was that the American presence would remain. Its own private position was to persuade the United States to withdraw. Kauffmann likewise continued with his own personal agenda. The Danish government was not duplicitous on one point: It was not going to outright cede Greenland to a foreign power.

Marvel told Rasmussen that he should not do anything that would lead to the disclosure of anything that had transpired in Rasmussen's meeting with Byrnes. The Danish government kept the American interest secret from the public, as part of its own strategy. The 1947 offer was classified until the 1970s, and ''Jyllands-Posten

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