Great Leader (concept)

''Juche'', officially the ''Juche'' idea, is a component of Kimilsungism–Kimjongilism, the state ideology of North Korea and the official ideology of the Workers' Party of Korea. North Korean sources attribute its conceptualization to Kim Il Sung, the country's founder and first leader. ''Juche'' was originally regarded as a variant of Marxism–Leninism until Kim Jong Il, Kim Il Sung's son and successor, declared it a distinct ideology in the 1970s. Kim Jong Il further developed ''Juche'' in the 1980s and 1990s by making ideological breaks from Marxism–Leninism and increasing the importance of his father's ideas.
''Juche'' incorporates the historical materialist ideas of Marxism–Leninism but also strongly emphasizes the individual, the nation state, and national sovereignty. ''Juche'' posits that a country will prosper once it has become self-reliant by achieving political, economic, and military independence. As Kim Jong Il emerged as Kim Il Sung's likely successor in the 1970s, loyalty to the leader was increasingly emphasized as an essential part of ''Juche'', as expressed in the Ten Principles for the Establishment of a Monolithic Ideological System.

''Juche'' has been variously described by critics as a quasi-religion, a nationalist or fascistic ideology, and a deviation from Marxism–Leninism.

Etymology

''Juche'' comes from the Sino-Japanese word (shinjitai: ), whose Japanese reading is ''shutai''. The word was coined in 1887 to translate the concept of ' in German philosophy ( subject, meaning "the entity perceiving or acting upon an object or environment") into Japanese. The word migrated to the Korean language at around the turn of the century and retained this meaning. ''Shutai'' went on to appear in Japanese translations of Karl Marx's writings. North Korean editions of Marx used the word ''Juche'' even before the word was attributed to Kim Il Sung in its supposedly novel meaning in 1955.

In contemporary political discourse on North Korea, ''Juche'' has a connotation of "self-reliance", "autonomy", and "independence". It is often defined in opposition to the Korean concept of ''Sadae'', or reliance on the great powers. South Koreans use the word without reference to the North Korean ideology.

The ideology is officially known as ''Juche sasang'' () in Korean and the ''Juche'' idea in English. ''Juche sasang'' literally means " subject idea" and has also been translated as ''Juche'' thought or Jucheism. Adherents of ''Juche'' are sometimes referred to as "Jucheists".

Development

Official statements by the North Korean government attribute the origin of ''Juche'' to Kim Il Sung's experiences in the Down-with-Imperialism Union during Korea's liberation struggle against Japan. However, the first documented reference to ''Juche'' as an ideology dates to 1955, when Kim Il Sung delivered a speech titled " On Eliminating Dogmatism and Formalism and Establishing Juche in Ideological Work." The speech promoted a political purge similar to the Yan'an Rectification Movement in China. It became known as the "''Juche'' speech" and is considered one of Kim Il Sung's most important works.

Western scholars generally agree that Hwang Jang-yop, Kim Il Sung's top adviser on philosophy, was responsible for the conceptualization and early development of ''Juche''. Hwang rediscovered the ''Juche'' speech sometime in the late 1950s, when Kim Il Sung, having established a cult of personality, sought to develop his own version of Marxism–Leninism and solidify his position in the Workers' Party of Korea (WPK). Hwang expanded upon the meaning of ''Juche'' and rewrote Korean communist history to make it appear as though Kim Il Sung had been the WPK's leader since its inception. Andrei Lankov, a Russian scholar of Korean studies, argues that the first reference to ''Juche'' as an ideology was on 14 April 1965, when Kim Il Sung gave a speech in Indonesia titled "On Socialist Construction in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the South Korean Revolution" (). Lankov posits that the 1955 speech "used the word in a different meaning" and that ''Juche'' was adopted as the "basic ideological principle of North Korean politics" only after the 1965 speech.

'' On the Juche Idea'', the principal work on ''Juche'', was published under Kim Jong Il's name in 1982. In North Korea it serves as "the authoritative and comprehensive explanation of ''Juche.''" According to the treatise, the WPK is responsible for educating the masses in the ways of ''Juche'' thinking. ''Juche'' is inexorably linked with Kim Il Sung and "represents the guiding idea of the Korean revolution". Although ''Juche'' is rooted in Marxism–Leninism, it is not merely a creative application of the ideas of Marx and Lenin to Korean conditions. Rather, it is a "new phase of revolutionary theory" and represents "a new era in the development of human history". Kim Jong Il also criticized the Korean communists and nationalists of the 1920s for their "elitist posture", saying they were "divorced from the masses".

The North Korean government issued a decree on 8 July 1997, the third anniversary of the death of Kim Il Sung, declaring the adoption of the ''Juche'' calendar. The promulgated regulations regarding its use in August, and the calendar entered public usage on 9 September, the Day of the Foundation of the Republic. Gregorian calendar dates are used for years before 1912 while years after 1912 (the year of Kim Il Sung's birth) are called "''Juche'' years". The Gregorian year , for example, is "''Juche'' " as − 1911 = . When used, "''Juche'' years" are often accompanied by the Gregorian equivalent, i.e. "''Juche'' , " or "''Juche'' ()".

Core principles

The goal of ''Juche'' is to establish a self-reliant state that independently determines its political, economic, and military affairs. Kim Il Sung summarized the application of this objective to North Korea in a 1967 speech to the Supreme People's Assembly titled "Let Us Embody the Revolutionary Spirit of Independence, Self-sustenance and Self-defence More Thoroughly in All Fields of State Activity":

Political independence () is a core principle of ''Juche''. ''Juche'' stresses equality and mutual respect among nations, and argues that every state has the right to self-determination. Yielding to foreign pressure or intervention would violate the principle of political independence and threaten a country's ability to defend its sovereignty. This is in contrast to '' sadaejuui'' (), which advocates reliance on a great power. However, ''Juche'' does not advocate total isolation and encourages cooperation between socialist states. As Kim Jong Il writes in ''On the Juche Idea'': "Independence is not in conflict with internationalism but is the basis of its strengthening". Kim Il Sung acknowledged that it was important for North Korea to learn from other socialist states, in particular the Soviet Union and China, but did not want to follow their examples dogmatically. He said the WPK must "resolutely repudiate the tendency to swallow things of others undigested or imitate them mechanically", attributing North Korea's early success to the WPK's independence in policymaking.

# Economic self-sufficiency () is required to achieve political independence, according to adherents of ''Juche''. Kim Il Sung believed that excessive foreign aid threatened a country's ability to develop socialism, which only a state with a strong, independent economy could build. In ''On the Juche Idea'', Kim Jong Il argues that a state can achieve economic self-sufficiency only when it has created an "independent national economy" based on heavy industry, as this sector will drive the rest of the economy. He also emphasizes the importance of technological independence and self-sufficiency in resources., but says that this does not rule out "economic cooperation" between socialist states.

Military self-reliance () is also crucial for a state to maintain its political independence. To accomplish military self-reliance, states must develop a domestic defence industry to avoid dependence on foreign arms suppliers. Kim Jong Il argued that it was acceptable for socialist states to receive military aid from their allies but that such aid would be effective only if the state was militarily strong in its own right.

''Juche'' in practice

Diplomacy

North Korea maintained close relations with the Soviet Union and China during the Cold War, having emerged from Soviet occupation and a war it fought alongside Chinese communists. However, North Korea also opposed what it viewed as Soviet and Chinese attempts to interfere in its postwar affairs. For example, a failed challenge to Kim Il Sung's leadership in 1956 led to a purge of pro-Soviet and pro-Chinese elements from the WPK. North Korea rejected the de-Stalinization efforts of Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev but avoided taking sides during the Sino-Soviet split.

North Korea was admitted to the Non-Aligned Movement in 1975 and has since presented itself as a leader of the Third World, promoting ''Juche'' as a model for developing countries to follow.

National survival has been seen as a guiding principle of North Korea's diplomatic strategy. As countries in the Eastern Bloc collapsed and introduced market reforms, North Korea increasingly emphasized ''Juche'' in both theory and practice. Even amid economic and political crises, North Korea continues to emphasize its independence on the world stage.

Economics

After the devastation of the Korean War, North Korea began to rebuild its economy with a base in heavy industry, with the aim to become as self-sufficient as possible. As a result, it developed what has been called the "most autarkic industrial economy in the world". North Korea received economic aid and technical assistance from the Soviet Union and China, but it did not join Comecon, the communist common market. In the 1990s, it had one of the world's lowest rates for dependence on petroleum, using hydroelectric power and coal instead of imported oil. Its textile industry uses vinylon, known as the "''Juche'' fiber", which was invented by a Korean and is made from locally available coal and limestone. The history of vinylon often features in propaganda that preaches the virtues of technological self-reliance. North Korea had 10,000 CNC machines in 2010. The first domestic homemade CNC machine was introduced in 1995, and in 2017 it had around 15,000 machines.

Commentators have often pointed out the discrepancy between the principle of self-sufficiency and North Korea's dependence on foreign aid, especially during its economic crisis in the 1990s. The pursuit of economic autarky has been blamed for contributing to the crisis. On this view, attempts at self-sufficiency led to inefficiency and to the neglect of export opportunities in industries where there was a comparative advantage.

Defence

The Korean People's Army is one of the largest on earth and has developed its own nuclear missiles. It produces UDMH fuel for liquid-fueled missiles and Tumansky RD-9 Turbojet engines, which power the Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-19 and Shenyang J-6. CNC machines produce missiles and centrifuges. North Korea's propaganda since the Korean War has contrasted its military autonomy with the presence of U.S. forces in the South.

International outreach

Kim Il Sung believed that ''Juche'' principles could be applied outside of Korea. He promoted ''Juche'' to the Third World as an anti-imperialist ideology and, in particular, the antithesis to U.S. imperialism. Albanian communist leader Enver Hoxha, who was critical of other communist leaders he regarded as having abandoned Marxism–Leninism, described Kim Il Sung's attempts to spread ''Juche'' in the Third World as "pretensions" done in collaboration with Titoists, U.S. imperialists, and Soviet and Chinese social imperialists.

North Korea began organizing international seminars on ''Juche'' in 1976. The inaugural International Scientific Seminar on the ''Juche'' Idea took place in Antananarivo, Madagascar, from 28 to 30 September 1976 under the sponsorship of the Democratic Republic of Madagascar. Many prominent party and government officials, public figures, representatives of revolutionary and progressive organizations, scientists and journalists from more than 50 countries attended. Malagasy president Didier Ratsiraka expressed sympathy and support for North Korea while giving the seminar's opening speech. In 1978, the North Korean government established the International Institute of the ''Juche'' Idea (initially the International ''Juche'' Research Centre) in Tokyo to supervise international ''Juche'' study groups' activities. Tribute plaques from these groups are contained in the Juche Tower in Pyongyang.

A faction within the South Korean student movements of the 1980s embraced ''Juche'' as an alternative to the country's political system. It came to be known as the ''Juche'' faction or ''Jusapa'' () for short.

''Juche'' has been adopted or studied by a number of far-left and far-right organisations outside of Korea. The Black Panther Party of the United States studied ''Juche'' during the 1960s and 1970s. The Nepal Workers' and Peasants' Party declared ''Juche'' to be its guiding idea in 2016. The Rural People's Party, an affiliate of the neo-Nazi Satanist group Order of Nine Angles, reportedly adheres to ''Juche'' and has connections with North Korean officials. The neo-Nazi terrorist organisation Atomwaffen Division also promotes ''Juche''.

Related concepts

''Songun''

''Suryong''

Kimilsungism–Kimjongilism

Socialism of Our Style

Analysis

Criticisms

Critics have called ''Juche'' a nationalist ideology and a departure from Marxist–Leninist principles. American Koreanist Brian Reynolds Myers argues that ''Juche'' has more in common with Japanese fascism and ultranationalism than Marxism–Leninism.: " Brian Myers has led this school, which argues that North Korea is a misunderstood racist state based on Japanese and German fascist forms from the early twentieth century. It rallies its citizens through aggressive race-based nationalism (the defence of ''minjok''), defends the racial 'cleanliness' of Korea in a big intrusive world, insists that ethnic Koreans of other nationalities are still Koreans, and routinely uses racist language in its diplomacy. On top of this, it is one of the most highly militarised states in the world. Racism plus hypermilitarism looks a lot more like fascism than communism.": " he Sovietshad a problem: There wasn't really a leftist intelligentsia or officialdom to draw upon. So the Soviets ended up recycling in many of the Koreans who'd been a part of the Japanese fascist project in Korea.... 'Almost all intellectuals who moved to Pyongyang after liberation had collaborated with the Japanese so some degree,' the historian B.R. Myers writes in his book ''The Cleanest Race: How North Koreans See Themselves and Why It Matters''." Korean political scientist Suh Dae-sook argues that Kim Il Sung did not explain the difference between socialist patriotism, which he said he supported, and nationalism, which he said he opposed. Suh also criticized Kim Il Sung's initial conceptualization of ''Juche'', saying that he had failed to explain how Marxism–Leninism had been applied to Korean conditions. American historian Derek R. Ford, by contrast, emphasizes the continuity between Marxism–Leninism and ''Juche'', and credits ''Juche'' as the guiding principle that allowed North Korea to survive the collapse of the Eastern Bloc.

American historian Charles K. Armstrong argues that North Korea may appear "Stalinist in form" but is "nationalist in content". Shin Gi-wook similarly argues that "there is no trace of Marxism–Leninism or the Stalinist notion of nationhood" in North Korea, and its government instead stresses the importance of the Korean people's blood, soul, and national traits, echoing earlier Korean nationalists such as Sin Chaeho, Yi Kwangsu, and Choe Namson. Shin believes that the key difference between Marxism–Leninism and ''Juche'' is that the latter places ideology above materialism; the vocabulary of family lineage and nationalism is retained and given primacy over class struggle, while social distinction and hierarchy are supported instead of a classless society and egalitarianism.

A few critics have dismissed the idea that ''Juche'' is an ideology altogether. Myers argues that ''Juche'' cannot be described as a true political ideology because it does not have an underlying belief system, while Alzo David-West calls it "meaningless on logical and naturalistic grounds". American political analyst Robert E. Kelly argues that ''Juche'' exists solely to protect the Kim family's monopoly over political power in North Korea. However, Myers dismisses the idea that ''Juche'' is North Korea's leading ideology, regarding its public exaltation as designed to deceive foreigners. He argues that it exists to be praised and not actually read. Based on his experience living in North Korea, Swiss businessman Felix Abt calls Myers's arguments "shaky" and "questionable". Having seen the extent to which North Korean university students actually believe in ''Juche'', Abt says it is "rather absurd" to call it "window-dressing" for foreigners. American historian Bruce Cumings and Professor of International Relations Christoph Hartmut Bluth similarly argue that ''Juche'' is not mere rhetoric, but rather an ideal of self-reliance that North Korea has attempted to implement.

Comparisons to other ideologies

''Juche'' has been compared to Ba'athism, an Arab nationalist ideology that advocates the establishment of a unified Arab state based on socialism and national self-reliance. South Korean political commentator Park Sang-seek argues that Syrian Ba'athism in particular has rhetorical similarities to ''Juche'', but the latter has a stronger ideological basis.

American economist Benjamin Zycher, writing for the conservative thinktank American Enterprise Institute, opined that the political ideology of Donald Trump shares similarities with ''Juche''. In particular, he noted that both Trump and ''Juche'' advocate a policy of isolationism and autarky.

Comparisons to religion

A number of scholars have compared facets of ''Juche'' to those of preexisting Korean religions. Jung Tae-il argues that certain elements of Christianity, Cheondoism, and Confucianism were appropriated by and incorporated into ''Juche''. Korean cultural anthropologists Byung Ho Chung and Heonik Kwon liken the commemorations of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il to Confucian ancestor worship. Ju Jun-hui similarly contends that Korean shamanism influenced ''Juche'', comparing the ecstatic state experienced in a shamanic ritual (''gut'') to the enthusiasm and fervor North Koreans display for their supreme leader. Armstrong accordingly calls ''Juche'' a quasi-religion.: "Among observers outside of North Korea, opinions about the 'ruling ideology' of ''juche'' range from the view that ''juche'' is a complete sham, merely disguising the Kim family despotism, to those who see it as a quasi-religion more or less believed by a majority of the population."

Presence of a sacred leader

The ideology teaches that the role of a Great Leader is essential for the popular masses to succeed in their revolutionary movement because without leadership they cannot survive. This is the foundation of Kim Il Sung's cult of personality. The personality cult explains how the ''Juche'' ideology has endured, even during the North Korean government's undeniable dependence on foreign assistance during its famine in the 1990s. The concept of a "sacred leader" in ''Juche'' as well as the cult around the Kim family has been compared to the State Shinto ideology of Imperial Japan, in which the Emperor was seen as a divine being.

Through the fundamental belief in the essential role of the Great Leader, Kim Il Sung has become the "supreme deity for the people" and the ''Juche'' doctrine is reinforced in North Korea's constitution as the country's guiding principle. The parallel relationship structure between Kim Il Sung and his people and religious founders or leaders and their followers has led many scholars to consider ''Juche'' a religious movement as much as a political ideology. However, those familiar with cults posit that ''Juche'' bypasses the tenets of religion completely and instead meets the criteria of a totalitarian cult.

''Juche'' emphasis on the political and sacred role of the leader and the ensuing worship by the popular masses has been critiqued by various Western Marxists, who argue that the North Korean proletariat has been stripped of its honor, and call the cult of personality non-Marxist and undemocratic.

Rituals

The religious behavior of ''Juche'' can also be seen in the perspectives of the North Korean people through refugee interviews from former participants in North Korea's ritual occasions. One pertinent example is the Arirang Festival, a gymnastic and artistic festival held in the Rungrado 1st of May Stadium in Pyongyang. All components of the festival, from the selection of performers, mobilization of resources, recruitment of the audience, and publicity for the show have been compared to facets of a national religious event.

The Arirang Festival has been said to show the power of the North Korean government to arrange a form of religious gathering. It has done so by "appropriating a mass of bodies for calisthenic and performative arts representing the leader as the father and his faithful followers". The festival's effectiveness in transforming its participants into loyal disciples of ''Juche'' seems to originate from the collectivist principle of "one for all and all for one" and the ensuing emotional bond and loyalty to the leader. According to accounts of refugees who were recruited to mass gymnastics, the collectivist principle is nurtured by physical punishment such as beatings and more importantly the organization of recruits into small units, whose performances were held accountable by larger units. The festival's ritual components of collectivism serve to reinforce a "certain structure of sociality and affect", establishing Kim Il Sung as the "father" in both the body and psyche of the performers.

Familism

American historian Charles K. Armstrong argues that familism has transformed itself into a kind of political religion in the form of ''Juche''. With the emergence of ''Juche'' as North Korea's guiding political principle since the 1960s, the familial relationship within the micro-family unit has been translated into a national, macro-unit, with Kim Il Sung representing the father and the North Korean people his children. ''Juche'' is thus based on the language of family relationships with its East Asian or neo-Confucian "resonances of filial piety and maternal love".

Armstrong also argues that North Korea has transferred the "filial piety of nationalism in the family of the leader himself" by positioning Kim Il Sung as the universal patriarch. He argues that while the official pursuit of the ''Juche'' ideology in the 1960s signalled North Korea's desire to separate from the "fraternity of international socialism", the ideology also replaced Stalin as the father figure with Kim Il Sung. In effect, North Korea's familial nationalism has supplanted the "rather abstract, class-oriented language of socialism with a more easily understandable and identifiable language of familial connections, love and obligations".

After attaining significant positions in the WPK and military in the early 1980s, Kim Jong Il transformed the personality cult surrounding Kim Il Sung into a family cult and became the heir apparent. Armstrong calls this a "family romance", a term Sigmund Freud used to describe "the neurotic replacement of a child's real parents with fantasy substitutes". Kim Il Sung's consecration as the "Great Father" has been strengthened by the development of the North Korean family romance with the language, symbols, and rituals associated with familism.

See also

* Ilminism, political ideology of South Korea's first president, Syngman Rhee
* ''Juche'' faction, a political faction within South Korea's student movements
* Kim Il Sung bibliography
* Kim Jong Il bibliography
* Kim Jong Un bibliography
* National communism
* Revisionism (Marxism)

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{{Authority control

Communism in North Korea
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Economy of North Korea
Far-left politics in Asia
Government of North Korea
Ideology of the Workers' Party of Korea
Isolationism
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Korean nationalism
Korean philosophy
National communism
Nationalism in Korea
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State ideologies
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