Chinese nuclear weapons program

The People's Republic of China has developed and possesses weapons of mass destruction, including chemical and nuclear weapons. The first of China's nuclear weapons tests took place in 1964, and its first hydrogen bomb test occurred in 1966 at Lop Nur. Tests continued until 1996, when the country signed the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), but did not ratify it. China acceded to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) in 1984 and ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in 1997. Since 2020, China has been wielding a nuclear triad, alongside three other countries.

The number of nuclear warheads in China's arsenal is a state secret. There are varying estimates of the size of China's arsenal. The ''Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists'' and the Federation of American Scientists estimated in 2025 that China has a stockpile of approximately 600 nuclear warheads, while the United States Department of Defense put the estimate at more than 600 operational nuclear warheads, making it the third-largest in the world.

In 1964, China adopted a policy of no-first-use (NFU), which it continues to have as of 2025. Some of its nuclear forces are reported to have moved toward a launch on warning (LOW) posture in the early 2020s.

Nuclear weapons

History

Mao Zedong referred to nuclear weapons as a paper tiger which, although they would not determine the outcome of a war, could still be used by great powers to scare and coerce. In 1946 comments to American journalist Anne Louise Strong, he stated, "The atom bomb is a paper tiger which the US reactionaries use to scare people. It looks terrible, but in fact it isn't. Of course, the atom bomb is a weapon of mass slaughter, but the outcome of a war is decided by the people, not one or two new types of weapon."

During the Korean War, the U.S. Eisenhower administration pursued the New Look policy through which nuclear weapons would be viewed as a "virtually conventional" force. The Eisenhower administration's threats during the First Taiwan Strait Crisis to use nuclear weapons against military targets in Fujian province prompted Mao to begin China's nuclear program. Mao favored China's development of nuclear weapons because "In today's world, if we don't want to be bullied by others, we should have atomic weapons by all means." While Mao did not expect to be able to match the large American nuclear arsenal, he believed that even a few bombs would increase China's diplomatic credibility. As a result of the Anti-Party Group incident in the Soviet Union, Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev's position within the Eastern Bloc became insecure for a time, thus necessitating the support of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and Mao. The CCP subsequently traded its support for Khrushchev for Soviet technology of nuclear weapons. The Agreement on New Technology for National Defence was later signed in October, which promised Soviet support for Chinese development of nuclear weapons.

Mao's attitude toward nuclear weapons sometimes strained relations with the Soviet Union, which regarded his statements as cavalier, particularly his 1955 assertion that:

Construction of uranium-enrichment plants in Baotou and Lanzhou began in 1958, and a plutonium facility in Jiuquan and the Lop Nur nuclear test site by 1960. The Soviet Union provided assistance in the early Chinese program by sending advisers to help in the facilities devoted to fissile material production and, in October 1957, agreed to provide a prototype boosted fission weapon, missiles, and related technology. The Chinese, who preferred to import technology and components to developing them within China, exported uranium to the Soviet Union, and the Soviets sent two R-2 missiles in 1958.

That year, however, Khrushchev told Mao that he planned to discuss arms control with the United States and Britain. China was already opposed to Khrushchev's post-Stalin policy of peaceful coexistence. Although Soviet officials assured China that it was under the Soviet nuclear umbrella, the disagreements widened the emerging Sino-Soviet split. In June 1959, the two nations formally ended their agreement on military and technology cooperation, and in July 1960, all Soviet assistance with the Chinese nuclear program was abruptly terminated and all Soviet technicians were withdrawn from the program. As the Soviets backed out, Chinese officials realized that they had to develop hydrogen bomb technology without any Soviet assistance and would need to begin the work immediately, without waiting for successful results from a fission bomb.

In 1961, Premier Zhou Enlai articulated China's rationale for its conventional and nuclear military strategies, stating, "Once we have missiles and nuclear weapons, we can then prevent the use of missiles and nuclear weapons; if we don't have missiles, the imperialists can use missiles. But to face combat, we still need conventional weapons."

According to Arms Control and Disarmament Agency director William Foster, the American government, under the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, was concerned about China's nuclear program and studied ways to sabotage or attack it, perhaps with the aid of Taiwan or the Soviet Union, but Khrushchev was not interested. China conducted its first nuclear test, code-named 596, on 16 October 1964.

In 1966, Chinese leadership established a new branch of the People's Liberation Army, the Second Artillery, to operate nuclear missiles. China's first thermonuclear weapon test occurred on December 28, 1966. China's last nuclear test was on July 29, 1996.

During the Cold War, China relied on concealment of its nuclear forces as the primary mechanism for their survivability. Beginning in 1996, China has increasingly relied on the mobility of its land-based nuclear forces as a means of survivability.

In 2023, satellite open-source intelligence showed evidence of drilling shafts in Lop Nur where nuclear weapons testing could resume.

Size

In 2025, the ''Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists'' and the Federation of American Scientists estimate that China has over 500 nuclear warheads.

In 2025, the United States Department of Defense estimated China possesses more than 600 operational nuclear warheads. The same year, United States Strategic Command indicated that China has equipped more nuclear warheads on its ICBMs than the United States (550 according to the New START treaty). In 2025, the Defense Intelligence Agency reported that China has approximately 300 missile silos and is estimated to reach at least 1000 operational warheads by 2030.

Nuclear use policy

China's policy has traditionally been one of no first use while maintaining a secure second-strike capability. Following its first test in 1964, China stated that it would "never at any time or under any circumstances be the first to use nuclear weapons." It also implemented centralized command and control arrangements for nuclear weapons so that they could not be used without orders from top leadership. The 1975 ''General Combat Regulations for a Combined Army'' stated, "at any time, under any circumstances, we will absolutely not use nuclear weapons first, only when the enemy uses them first, will we, according to the order of the supreme command, then use this kind of weapon to resolutely counterattack."

During the Cold War, China developed a neutron bomb but refrained from deploying tactical nuclear weapons on delivery systems such as gravity bombs or artillery. In peacetime, it has traditionally stored nuclear warheads separately from their launching systems.

From 1986 to 1993, debates in China addressed the role of China's nuclear forces in potential local wars. Chinese leadership doubted that a first-use posture was credible. After these debates, China decided to remain in a no first use posture. Jiang Zemin stated, "We develop strategic nuclear weapons, not in order to attack, but in order to defend. If people don't attack us, we won't attack them, but if people attack us, we must attack them."

From 2000 to 2006, PLA strategists and civilian strategists debated whether China should add conditions to its no first use policy. Some proponents of conditioning the no-first use policy pointed to the U.S. Bush administration's Nuclear Posture Review, which discussed U.S. nuclear weapons in the context of a "Taiwan contingency". Proponents of adding conditions contended that doing so would make China's nuclear deterrence more effective if a "Taiwan contingency" occurred. Ultimately, Chinese leadership rejected the idea of conditioning its no first use policy.

In the early 2020s, some of its nuclear forces are reported to have moved toward a launch on warning (LOW) posture. In 2024, the United States Department of State described China's no-first-use policy as "ambiguous". American defense analysts have contended that China is shifting away from a strict no-first-use strategy and toward a launch on warning (LOW) posture, which would allow it to retaliate upon the detection of incoming warheads without waiting for them to strike Chinese targets first. These concerns increased after China began to modernize and expand its nuclear arsenal in the early 2020s. The move was seen as a response to progress made in U.S. missile defense systems (such as the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense System and Terminal High Altitude Area Defense) and long-range precision strike abilities (such as Conventional Prompt Strike), which decreases the survivability of a Chinese second strike, as well as the possibility that American strategy may require nukes to compensate for the numerical disadvantage of its conventional forces overseas. There is debate among Chinese strategists regarding the merits and drawbacks of a LOW posture similar to that of Russia and the United States, and as of 2023 the bulk of China's strategic forces had not moved to a LOW posture.

China maintains an official no-first-use policy, which it continues to do so .

Nuclear proliferation

Historically, China has been implicated in the development of the Pakistani nuclear program before China ratified the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 1992. In the early 1980s, China is believed to have given Pakistan a "package" including uranium enrichment technology, high-enriched uranium, and the design for a compact nuclear weapon. China also received stolen technology that Abdul Qadeer Khan brought back to Pakistan and Pakistan set up a centrifuge plant in China as revealed in his letters which state "(1)You know we had cooperation with China for 15 years. We put up a centrifuge plant at Hanzhong (250km south-west of Xi'an). We sent 135 C-130 plane loads of machines, inverters, valves, flow meters, pressure gauges. Our teams stayed there for weeks to help and their teams stayed here for weeks at a time. Late minister Liu We, V. M. ice ministerLi Chew, Vice Minister Jiang Shengjie used to visit us. (2)The Chinese gave us drawings of the nuclear weapon, gave us 50 kg enriched uranium, gave us 10 tons of UF6 (natural) and 5 tons of UF6 (3%). Chinese helped PAEC akistan Atomic Energy Commission, the rival organization to the Khan Research Laboratoriesin setting up UF6 plant, production reactor for plutonium and reprocessing plant."

Nuclear non-proliferation

Before the 1980s, China viewed arms control and nuclear non-proliferation regimes as mechanisms through which Western powers (particularly the U.S.) sought to restrain China. The Chinese government believed that the Treaty “ ervedthe interests of some States” and only favored the countries that already had nuclear weapons. Additionally, the Chinese government thought this Treaty was discriminatory since many countries were attempting to restrict and deprive nuclear weapons of a country that had only just tested them successfully, rather than countries like the U.S. or U.S.S.R., which have at least 100 times more nuclear weapons. Therefore, China chose not to join the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) at that time.

Beginning in the 1980s, China's policy and attitude toward nuclear weapons and the NPT had changed under the administration of Deng Xiaoping. Though China continued developing more advanced nuclear technology and weapons, by the 1980s, the country had indicated that it intended on accepting the terms of the NPT. China acceded to the treaty in 1992.

China was active in the six-party talks in an effort to end North Korea's nuclear program in the early 2000s. The six-party talks ultimately failed, and in 2006, China voted in favor of sanctioning North Korea for its nuclear program.

The field of nuclear security has become a well-established area of successful U.S.-China cooperation. In 2009, CCP general secretary Hu Jintao called for a bolstered arms control agenda at the United Nations General Assembly, joining United States President Barack Obama's earlier calls for a nuclear-free world. Precipitated by a 2010 Nuclear Security Summit convened by the Obama administration, China and the U.S. launched a number of initiatives to secure potentially dangerous, Chinese-supplied, nuclear material in countries such as Ghana or Nigeria. Through these initiatives, China and the U.S. have converted Chinese-origin Miniature Neutron Source Reactors (MNSRs) from using highly enriched uranium to using low-enriched uranium fuel (which is not directly usable in weapons, thereby making reactors more proliferation resistant).

China, along with all other nuclear weapon states and all members of NATO with the exception of the Netherlands, decided not to sign the UN treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, a binding agreement for negotiations for the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

China refused to join talks in 2020 between the U.S. and Russia on extending their bilateral New START nuclear arms reduction treaty, as the Trump administration requested. China's position is that as its nuclear warhead arsenal is a small fraction of the U.S. and Russia arsenals, their inclusion in an arms reduction treaty is unnecessary, and that it will join such talks when both U.S. and Russia has reduced their arsenal to near China's level.

The United States has a classified strategy called Nuclear Employment Guidance, updated by president Joe Biden in March 2024, reported to refocus U.S. nuclear deterrence strategy more toward China.

Delivery systems estimates

Miniaturization

China has made significant improvements in its miniaturization techniques since the 1980s. There have been accusations, notably by the Cox Commission, that this was done primarily by covertly acquiring the U.S.'s W88 nuclear warhead design as well as guided ballistic missile technology.

Land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles

Chinese strategy makes use of the country's large geographic area as a strategy to protect its nuclear forces against a theoretical first strike against the country. Nuclear missile units are dispersed and missile brigades are not located in the same places as the bases that command them. The nuclear forces are commanded by six missile bases located in Liaoning, Anhui, Yunnan, Hunan, Henan, and Gansu. Most of the nuclear forces are commanded by the three missile bases in the interior of the country (in Hunan, Henan, and Gansu).

China stores many of its missiles in huge tunnel complexes; US Representative Michael Turner referring to 2009 Chinese media reports said "This network of tunnels could be in excess of 5,000 kilometers (3,110 miles), and is used to transport nuclear weapons and forces." A People's Liberation Army newspaper calls this tunnel system an underground Great Wall of China.

Medium-range ballistic missiles

Approximately 55% of China's missiles are in the medium-range category, targeted at regional theater targets.

DF-3A

DF-21

The DF-21A, China's first road-mobile medium range ballistics missile, was first deployed in 1991.

DF-26

The DF-26 is a dual-capable nuclear-conventional intermediate range ballistic missile. It is road-mobile and its payload can be switched from a conventional weapon to a nuclear weapon mid-conflict. It was announced in 2016, but may not have become fully operational until 2018.

Tactical cruise missiles

CJ-10

YJ-62

Long-range ballistic missiles

The Chinese categorize long-range ballistic missiles as ones with a range between 3000 and 8000 km.

China "keeps most of its warheads at a central storage facility in the Qinling mountain range, though some are kept at smaller regional storage facilities."

DF-4/CSS-3

The Dong Feng 4 or DF-4 (also known as the CSS-3) is a long-range two-stage Chinese intermediate-range ballistic missile with liquid fuel (nitric acid/UDMH). It was thought to be deployed in limited numbers in underground silos beginning in 1980. The DF-4 has a takeoff thrust of 1,224.00 kN, a takeoff weight of 82,000 kg, a diameter of 2.25 m, a length of 28.05 m, and a fin span of 2.74 m. It is equipped with a 2,190 kg nuclear warhead with 3,300 kt explosive yield, and its range is 5,500 km. The missile uses inertial guidance, resulting in a relatively poor CEP of 1,500 meters.

Intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs)

DF-5A/CSS-4 Mod 2

DF-31/CSS-10

The Dong Feng 31 (or CSS-10) is a medium-range, three stage, solid propellant intercontinental ballistic missile developed by the People's Republic of China. It is a land-based variant of the submarine-launched JL-2.

DF-41/CSS-X-10

The DF-41 (or CSS-X-10) is an intercontinental ballistic missile believed to be operational. It is designed to carry multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRV), delivering multiple nuclear warheads.

Nuclear cruise missiles

The US DoD estimated in 2006 that the PRC was developing ground- and air-launched cruise missiles that could easily be converted to carry nuclear warheads once developed.

DH-10

The DongHai 10 (DH-10) is a cruise missile developed in the People's Republic of China. According to ''Jane's Defence Weekly'', the DH-10 is a second-generation land-attack cruise missile (LACM), with over 4,000 km range, integrated inertial navigation system, GPS, terrain contour mapping system, and digital scene-matching terminal-homing system. The missile is estimated to have a circular error probable (CEP) of 10 meters.

CJ-10

The ChangJian-10 (Long Sword 10) is a cruise missile developed by China, based on the Hongniao missile family. It has a range of 2,200 km. Although not confirmed, it is suspected that the CJ-10 could carry nuclear warheads. An air-launched variant (named CJ-20) has also been developed.

HongNiao missile family

There are three missiles in this family: the HN-1, HN-2, and HN-3. Reportedly based on the Kh-SD/65 missiles, the Hongniao (or Red Bird) missiles are some of the first nuclear-capable cruise missiles in China. The HN-1 has a range of 600 km, the HN-2 has a range of 1,800 km, and the HN-3 has a range of 3,000 km.

ChangFeng missile family

There are two missiles in the Chang Feng (or Long Wind) family: CF-1 and CF-2. These are the first domestically developed long-range cruise missiles for China. The CF-1 has a range of 400 km while the CF-2 has a range of 800 km. Both variants can carry a 10 kt nuclear warhead.

Sea-based weapons

The submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) stockpile of the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is thought to be relatively new. China launched its first second-generation nuclear submarine in April 1981. The navy currently has a one Type 092 ''Xia'' class SSBN at roughly 8000 tons displacement. A second Type 092 was reportedly lost in an accident in 1985. The Type 092 is equipped with 12 JL-1 SLBMs with a range of 2150–2500 km. The JL-1 is a modified DF-21 missile. It is suspected that the Type 092 is being converted into a cruise missile submarine.

The Chinese navy has developed Type 094 ballistic missile submarine; open source satellite imagery has shown that at least two of these have been completed. This submarine will be capable of carrying 12 of the longer ranged, more modern JL-2s with a range of approximately 14,000 km.

China is also developing the Type 096 submarine, claimed to be able to carry up to 24 JL-3 ballistic missiles each. Some Chinese sources state that the submarine is already undergoing trials.

Nuclear bomber force

China's bomber force consists mostly of Chinese-made versions of Soviet aircraft. The People's Liberation Army Air Force has 120 H-6s (a variant of the Tupolev Tu-16). These bombers are outfitted to carry nuclear as well as conventional weapons. While the H-6 fleet is aging, it is not as old as the American B-52 Stratofortress. The Chinese have also produced the Xian JH-7 ''Flying Leopard'' fighter-bomber with a range and payload exceeding the F-111 (currently about 80 are in service) capable of delivering a nuclear strike. China has also bought the advanced Sukhoi Su-30 from Russia; currently, about 100 Su-30s (MKK and MK2 variants) have been purchased by China. The Su-30 is capable of carrying tactical nuclear weapons.

China is alleged to be testing new H-8 and Xian H-20 strategic bombers which are either described as an upgraded H-6 or an aircraft in the same class as the US B-2, able to carry nuclear weapons.

Fractional orbital bombardment system

In 2021, following tests by the China Academy of Launch Vehicle Technology, United States Secretary of the Air Force Frank Kendall III stated that China was developing and testing a fractional orbital bombardment system (FOBS). In May 2025, the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency released a report stating that China will have nuclear-capable missiles operating as part of a FOBS by 2035.

Missile ranges

Image:Maximum Ranges for China’s Conventional SRBM Force.png, Maximum Ranges for China's Conventional SRBM Force (2006). Note: China currently is capable of deploying ballistic missile forces to support a variety of regional contingencies.
Image:PLA ballistic missiles range.jpg, Medium and Intercontinental Range Ballistic Missiles (2007). Note: China currently is capable of targeting its nuclear forces throughout the region and most of the world, including the continental United States. Newer systems, such as the DF-31, DF-31A, and JL-2, will give China a more survivable nuclear force.
Image:Surface-to-Air Missile Coverage over the Taiwan Strait.png, Surface-to-Air Missile Coverage over the Taiwan Strait (2006). Note: This map depicts notional coverage provided by China's SA-10, SA-20 SAM systems, as well as the soon-to-be acquired S-300PMU2. Actual coverage would be non-contiguous and dependent upon precise deployment sites.

Biological weapons

China is currently a signatory of the Biological Weapons Convention and Chinese officials have stated that China has never engaged in biological activities with offensive military applications. However, China was reported to have had an active biological weapons program in the 1980s.

Kanatjan Alibekov, former director of one of the Soviet germ-warfare programs, said that China suffered a serious accident at one of its biological weapons plants in the late 1980s. Alibekov asserted that Soviet reconnaissance satellites identified a biological weapons laboratory and plant near a site for testing nuclear warheads. The Soviets suspected that two separate epidemics of hemorrhagic fever that swept the region in the late 1980s were caused by an accident in a lab where Chinese scientists were weaponizing viral diseases.

US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright expressed her concerns over possible Chinese biological weapon transfers to Iran and other nations in a letter to Senator Bob Bennett (R-Utah) in January 1997. Albright stated that she had received reports regarding transfers of dual-use items from Chinese entities to the Iranian government which concerned her and that the United States had to encourage China to adopt comprehensive export controls to prevent assistance to Iran's alleged biological weapons program. The United States acted upon the allegations on January 16, 2002, when it imposed sanctions on three Chinese firms accused of supplying Iran with materials used in the manufacture of chemical and biological weapons. In response to this, China issued export control protocols on dual use biological technology in late 2002.

A biological program in China was described in a 2015 detailed study by the Indian Ministry of Defence funded Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses. It pointed to 42 facilities, some in the same compound, that had the capacity, possibly latently, of research, development, production or testing of biological weapons.

According to Nuclear Threat Initiative, no evidence of the program's existence has been officially released.

Chemical weapons

The People's Republic of China signed the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) on January 13, 1993, and ratified it on April 25, 1997.

China was found to have supplied Albania with a stockpile of chemical weapons in the 1970s during the Cold War.

See also

* 863 Program
* List of nuclear weapons tests of China
* List of states with nuclear weapons
* People's Liberation Army
* Project 596
* Taiwan and weapons of mass destruction
* Two Bombs, One Satellite
* Underground Great Wall of China

References

{{People's Liberation Army

1964 in military history
Military of the People's Republic of China
Nuclear program of the People's Republic of China
Weapons of mass destruction by country