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The Intuitive Criterion
The intuitive criterion is a technique for equilibrium refinement in signaling games. It aims to reduce possible outcome scenarios by restricting the possible sender types to types who could obtain higher utility levels by deviating to off-the-equilibrium messages, and to types for which the off-the-equilibrium message is not equilibrium dominated. Background A signaling game is a game in which one player ("sender") has private information regarding his type. He sends a signal ("message") to the other player ("receiver") to indicate his type. The receiver then takes an action. Both the signal and the receiver action can affect both players' utilities. A ''perfect Bayesian equilibria, Perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE)'' in such a game consists of three elements. * A ''sender strategy'' - a function from the sender type to a signal that maximizes this type's utility given the receiver strategy. * A ''receiver belief'' - a function from the signal to a probability distribution over ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Equilibrium Refinement
In game theory, a solution concept is a formal rule for predicting how a game will be played. These predictions are called "solutions", and describe which strategies will be adopted by players and, therefore, the result of the game. The most commonly used solution concepts are Economic equilibrium, equilibrium concepts, most famously Nash equilibrium. Many solution concepts, for many games, will result in more than one solution. This puts any one of the solutions in doubt, so a game theorist may apply a refinement to narrow down the solutions. Each successive solution concept presented in the following improves on its predecessor by eliminating implausible equilibria in richer games. Formal definition Let \Gamma be the class of all games and, for each game G \in \Gamma, let S_G be the set of strategy profiles of G. A ''solution concept'' is an element of the direct product \Pi_2^; ''i.e''., a function F: \Gamma \rightarrow \bigcup\nolimits_ 2^ such that F(G) \subseteq S_G for al ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Signaling Game
In game theory, a signaling game is a type of a dynamic game, dynamic Bayesian game.Subsection 8.2.2 in Fudenberg Trole 1991, pp. 326–331 The essence of a signaling game is that one player takes action, the signal, to convey information to another player. Sending the signal is more costly if the information is false. A manufacturer, for example, might provide a warranty for its product to signal to consumers that it is unlikely to break down. A traditional example is a worker who acquires a college degree not because it increases their skill but because it conveys their ability to employers. A simple signaling game would have two players: the sender and the receiver. The sender has one of two types, which might be called "desirable" and "undesirable," with different payoff functions. The receiver knows the probability of each type but not which one this particular sender has. The receiver has just one possible type. The sender moves first, choosing an action called the "sign ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Perfect Bayesian Equilibria
In game theory, a Bayesian game is a strategic decision-making model which assumes players have incomplete information. Players may hold private information relevant to the game, meaning that the payoffs are not common knowledge. Bayesian games model the outcome of player interactions using aspects of Bayesian probability. They are notable because they allowed the specification of the solutions to games with incomplete information for the first time in game theory. Hungarian economist John C. Harsanyi introduced the concept of Bayesian games in three papers from 1967 and 1968: He was awarded the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences for these and other contributions to game theory in 1994. Roughly speaking, Harsanyi defined Bayesian games in the following way: players are assigned a set of characteristics by nature at the start of the game. By mapping probability distributions to these characteristics and by calculating the outcome of the game using Bayesian probability, the r ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Probability Distribution
In probability theory and statistics, a probability distribution is a Function (mathematics), function that gives the probabilities of occurrence of possible events for an Experiment (probability theory), experiment. It is a mathematical description of a Randomness, random phenomenon in terms of its sample space and the Probability, probabilities of Event (probability theory), events (subsets of the sample space). For instance, if is used to denote the outcome of a coin toss ("the experiment"), then the probability distribution of would take the value 0.5 (1 in 2 or 1/2) for , and 0.5 for (assuming that fair coin, the coin is fair). More commonly, probability distributions are used to compare the relative occurrence of many different random values. Probability distributions can be defined in different ways and for discrete or for continuous variables. Distributions with special properties or for especially important applications are given specific names. Introduction A prob ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Bayes' Theorem
Bayes' theorem (alternatively Bayes' law or Bayes' rule, after Thomas Bayes) gives a mathematical rule for inverting Conditional probability, conditional probabilities, allowing one to find the probability of a cause given its effect. For example, if the risk of developing health problems is known to increase with age, Bayes' theorem allows the risk to someone of a known age to be assessed more accurately by conditioning it relative to their age, rather than assuming that the person is typical of the population as a whole. Based on Bayes' law, both the prevalence of a disease in a given population and the error rate of an infectious disease test must be taken into account to evaluate the meaning of a positive test result and avoid the ''base-rate fallacy''. One of Bayes' theorem's many applications is Bayesian inference, an approach to statistical inference, where it is used to invert the probability of Realization (probability), observations given a model configuration (i.e., th ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Cho In-Koo
Cho or CHO may refer to: People * Chief Happiness Officer * Chief Heat Officer Surnames * Cho (Korean surname), one romanization of the common Korean surname * Zhuo (), romanized Cho in Wade–Giles, Chinese surname * Cho, a Minnan romanization of the Chinese surname Cao () * Chō, the romaji for the uncommon Japanese surname derived from the Chinese Zhang (Kanji ) ** Cho U (born 1980), Taiwanese ''go'' player who romanizes his name in the Japanese fashion ** Chō (born 1957), Japanese actor and voice actor ** Fujio Cho (born 1937), Japanese chairman ** Isamu Chō (1895–1945), Japanese lieutenant general Characters * Cho Hakkai, the Japanese name for ''Zhū Bājiè'' or "Pigsy", a character in the 16th-century Chinese novel, ''Journey to the West'', by Wu Cheng'en ** Cho Hakkai (Saiyuki), the same character in the manga and anime series ''Saiyuki'', based on the novel Given name * Cho Ramaswamy (1934–2016), Indian actor and writer * Cho, a Burmese given name me ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
David M
David (; , "beloved one") was a king of ancient Israel and Judah and the third king of the United Monarchy, according to the Hebrew Bible and Old Testament. The Tel Dan stele, an Aramaic-inscribed stone erected by a king of Aram-Damascus in the late 9th/early 8th centuries BCE to commemorate a victory over two enemy kings, contains the phrase (), which is translated as " House of David" by most scholars. The Mesha Stele, erected by King Mesha of Moab in the 9th century BCE, may also refer to the "House of David", although this is disputed. According to Jewish works such as the '' Seder Olam Rabbah'', '' Seder Olam Zutta'', and '' Sefer ha-Qabbalah'' (all written over a thousand years later), David ascended the throne as the king of Judah in 885 BCE. Apart from this, all that is known of David comes from biblical literature, the historicity of which has been extensively challenged,Writing and Rewriting the Story of Solomon in Ancient Israel; by Isaac Kalimi; page 3 ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Divine Equilibrium
The Divine Equilibrium is a refinement of Perfect Bayesian equilibrium in a signaling game In game theory, a signaling game is a type of a dynamic game, dynamic Bayesian game.Subsection 8.2.2 in Fudenberg Trole 1991, pp. 326–331 The essence of a signaling game is that one player takes action, the signal, to convey information to anot ... proposed by Banks and Sobel (1987). One of the most widely-applied refinements is the D1-Criterion. It is a restriction of receiver's beliefs to the type of senders for whom deviating towards an off-the-equilibrium message could improve their outcome compared to the equilibrium payoff.The Intuitive and Divinity Criterion: Interpretation and Step-by-Step Examples Felix Munoz-Garcia, Ana Espinola-Arredondo, Journal of Industrial Organization Education. Volume 5, Issue 1, Pages 1–20, ISSN (Online) 1935-5041, DOI: 10.2202/1935-5041.1024, March 2011 In addition to the restriction suggested by the intuitive criterion, the divinity criterion co ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Pooling Equilibrium
A pooling equilibrium in game theory is an equilibrium outcome of a signaling game. In a signaling game, players send actions called "signals" to other players. These signals are based on privately held information, which is not known to others in the game. These actions do reveal a player's "type" to other players, who then choose their strategies accordingly. In a pooling equilibrium, all types of a given sender send the same signal. Some senders represent their true type, while others correctly mimic the type of others, having no incentive to differentiate themselves. As a result, the receiver acts as if they have received no information, maximizing their utility according to their prior The term prior may refer to: * Prior (ecclesiastical), the head of a priory (monastery) * Prior convictions, the life history and previous convictions of a suspect or defendant in a criminal case * Prior probability, in Bayesian statistics * Prio ... beliefs. See also * Separating equ ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
In game theory, a Bayesian game is a strategic decision-making model which assumes players have incomplete information. Players may hold private information relevant to the game, meaning that the payoffs are not common knowledge. Bayesian games model the outcome of player interactions using aspects of Bayesian probability. They are notable because they allowed the specification of the solutions to games with incomplete information for the first time in game theory. Hungarian economist John C. Harsanyi introduced the concept of Bayesian games in three papers from 1967 and 1968: He was awarded the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences for these and other contributions to game theory in 1994. Roughly speaking, Harsanyi defined Bayesian games in the following way: players are assigned a set of characteristics by nature at the start of the game. By mapping probability distributions to these characteristics and by calculating the outcome of the game using Bayesian probability, the r ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Separating Equilibrium
In signaling games, a separating equilibrium is a type of perfect Bayesian equilibrium where agents with different characteristics choose different actions. See also *Signaling games *Pooling equilibrium *Cheap talk In game theory, cheap talk is communication between players that does not directly affect the payoffs of the game. Providing and receiving information is free. This is in contrast to signalling (economics), signalling, in which sending certain mess ... References Game theory equilibrium concepts {{gametheory-stub ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Signalling Games
In game theory, a signaling game is a type of a dynamic Bayesian game.Subsection 8.2.2 in Fudenberg Trole 1991, pp. 326–331 The essence of a signaling game is that one player takes action, the signal, to convey information to another player. Sending the signal is more costly if the information is false. A manufacturer, for example, might provide a warranty for its product to signal to consumers that it is unlikely to break down. A traditional example is a worker who acquires a college degree not because it increases their skill but because it conveys their ability to employers. A simple signaling game would have two players: the sender and the receiver. The sender has one of two types, which might be called "desirable" and "undesirable," with different payoff functions. The receiver knows the probability of each type but not which one this particular sender has. The receiver has just one possible type. The sender moves first, choosing an action called the "signal" or "mess ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
