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Divine Equilibrium
The Divine Equilibrium is a refinement of Perfect Bayesian equilibrium in a signaling game In game theory, a signaling game is a type of a dynamic game, dynamic Bayesian game.Subsection 8.2.2 in Fudenberg Trole 1991, pp. 326–331 The essence of a signaling game is that one player takes action, the signal, to convey information to anot ... proposed by Banks and Sobel (1987). One of the most widely-applied refinements is the D1-Criterion. It is a restriction of receiver's beliefs to the type of senders for whom deviating towards an off-the-equilibrium message could improve their outcome compared to the equilibrium payoff.The Intuitive and Divinity Criterion: Interpretation and Step-by-Step Examples Felix Munoz-Garcia, Ana Espinola-Arredondo, Journal of Industrial Organization Education. Volume 5, Issue 1, Pages 1–20, ISSN (Online) 1935-5041, DOI: 10.2202/1935-5041.1024, March 2011 In addition to the restriction suggested by the intuitive criterion, the divinity criterion co ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
In game theory, a Bayesian game is a strategic decision-making model which assumes players have incomplete information. Players may hold private information relevant to the game, meaning that the payoffs are not common knowledge. Bayesian games model the outcome of player interactions using aspects of Bayesian probability. They are notable because they allowed the specification of the solutions to games with incomplete information for the first time in game theory. Hungarian economist John C. Harsanyi introduced the concept of Bayesian games in three papers from 1967 and 1968: He was awarded the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences for these and other contributions to game theory in 1994. Roughly speaking, Harsanyi defined Bayesian games in the following way: players are assigned a set of characteristics by nature at the start of the game. By mapping probability distributions to these characteristics and by calculating the outcome of the game using Bayesian probability, the r ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Signaling Game
In game theory, a signaling game is a type of a dynamic game, dynamic Bayesian game.Subsection 8.2.2 in Fudenberg Trole 1991, pp. 326–331 The essence of a signaling game is that one player takes action, the signal, to convey information to another player. Sending the signal is more costly if the information is false. A manufacturer, for example, might provide a warranty for its product to signal to consumers that it is unlikely to break down. A traditional example is a worker who acquires a college degree not because it increases their skill but because it conveys their ability to employers. A simple signaling game would have two players: the sender and the receiver. The sender has one of two types, which might be called "desirable" and "undesirable," with different payoff functions. The receiver knows the probability of each type but not which one this particular sender has. The receiver has just one possible type. The sender moves first, choosing an action called the "sign ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Jeffrey S
Jeffrey may refer to: * Jeffrey (name), including a list of people with the name *Jeffrey's, Newfoundland and Labrador, Canada *Jeffrey City, Wyoming, United States *Jeffrey Street, Sydney, Australia * Jeffreys Bay, Western Cape, South Africa Art and entertainment * ''Jeffrey'' (play), a 1992 off-Broadway play by Paul Rudnick * ''Jeffrey'' (1995 film), a 1995 film by Paul Rudnick, based on Rudnick's play of the same name * ''Jeffrey'' (2016 film), a 2016 Dominican Republic documentary film * Jeffrey's sketch, a sketch on American TV show ''Saturday Night Live'' *'' Nurse Jeffrey'', a spin-off miniseries from the American medical drama series ''House, MD'' People with the surname * Alexander Jeffrey (1806–1874), Scottish solicitor and historian * Carol Jeffrey (1898–1998), English psychotherapist, writer *Charles Jeffrey (footballer) (died 1915), Scottish footballer *E. C. Jeffrey (1866–1952), Canadian-American botanist *Grant Jeffrey (1948–2012), Canadian writer * He ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Joel Sobel
Joel Sobel (born 24 March 1954) is an American economist and currently professor of economics at the University of California, San Diego. His research focuses on game theory and has been seminal in the field of strategic communication in economic games. His work with Vincent Crawford established the game-theoretic concept of cheap talk. Education Sobel graduated with a B.S. in mathematics from the University of Michigan, in 1974. He went on to further study at the University of California, Berkeley, where he received an M.A. in economics and Ph.D. in applied mathematics in 1978. Career The University of California, San Diego (UCSD) appointed Sobel assistant professor of economics upon graduation from Berkeley. He was promoted to associate professor in 1984 and full professor in 1988, a year after receiving a Sloan Foundation Fellowship. He was awarded a Guggenheim Fellowship in 2006. He has served in an editorial capacity for a range of academic journals. He was associate ed ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Refinement (game Theory)
In game theory, a solution concept is a formal rule for predicting how a game will be played. These predictions are called "solutions", and describe which strategies will be adopted by players and, therefore, the result of the game. The most commonly used solution concepts are equilibrium concepts, most famously Nash equilibrium. Many solution concepts, for many games, will result in more than one solution. This puts any one of the solutions in doubt, so a game theorist may apply a refinement to narrow down the solutions. Each successive solution concept presented in the following improves on its predecessor by eliminating implausible equilibria in richer games. Formal definition Let \Gamma be the class of all games and, for each game G \in \Gamma, let S_G be the set of strategy profiles of G. A ''solution concept'' is an element of the direct product \Pi_2^; ''i.e''., a function F: \Gamma \rightarrow \bigcup\nolimits_ 2^ such that F(G) \subseteq S_G for all G \in \Gamma. Rati ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Signaling Game
In game theory, a signaling game is a type of a dynamic game, dynamic Bayesian game.Subsection 8.2.2 in Fudenberg Trole 1991, pp. 326–331 The essence of a signaling game is that one player takes action, the signal, to convey information to another player. Sending the signal is more costly if the information is false. A manufacturer, for example, might provide a warranty for its product to signal to consumers that it is unlikely to break down. A traditional example is a worker who acquires a college degree not because it increases their skill but because it conveys their ability to employers. A simple signaling game would have two players: the sender and the receiver. The sender has one of two types, which might be called "desirable" and "undesirable," with different payoff functions. The receiver knows the probability of each type but not which one this particular sender has. The receiver has just one possible type. The sender moves first, choosing an action called the "sign ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Intuitive Criterion
The intuitive criterion is a technique for equilibrium refinement in signaling games. It aims to reduce possible outcome scenarios by restricting the possible sender types to types who could obtain higher utility levels by deviating to off-the-equilibrium messages, and to types for which the off-the-equilibrium message is not equilibrium dominated. Background A signaling game is a game in which one player ("sender") has private information regarding his type. He sends a signal ("message") to the other player ("receiver") to indicate his type. The receiver then takes an action. Both the signal and the receiver action can affect both players' utilities. A ''Perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE)'' in such a game consists of three elements. * A ''sender strategy'' - a function from the sender type to a signal that maximizes this type's utility given the receiver strategy. * A ''receiver belief'' - a function from the signal to a probability distribution over sender types; the belief mus ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
