US biological warfare program

The United States biological weapons program officially began in spring 1943 on orders from U.S. President Franklin Roosevelt. Research continued following World War II as the U.S. built up a large stockpile of biological agents and weapons. Over the course of its 27-year history, the program weaponized and stockpiled the following seven bio-agents (and pursued basic research on many more):

*''Bacillus anthracis'' (anthrax)
*''Francisella tularensis'' (tularemia)
*'' Brucella'' spp (brucellosis)
*''Coxiella burnetii'' ( Q-fever)
*Venezuelan equine encephalitis virus
*Botulinum toxin (botulism)
* Staphylococcal enterotoxin B
Throughout its history, the U.S. bioweapons program was secret. It was later revealed that laboratory and field testing (some of the latter using simulants on non-consenting individuals) had been common. The official policy of the United States was first to deter the use of bio-weapons against U.S. forces and secondarily to retaliate if deterrence failed.

In 1969, President Richard Nixon ended all offensive (i.e., non-defensive) aspects of the U.S. bio-weapons program. In 1975 the U.S. ratified both the 1925 Geneva Protocol and the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC)—international treaties outlawing biological warfare. Recent U.S. biodefense programs, however, have raised concerns that the U.S. may be pursuing research that is outlawed by the United Nations.

History

Early history (1918–1941)

Initial interest in any form of biological warfare came at the close of World War I. The only agent the U.S. tested was the toxin ricin, a product of the castor plant. The U.S. conducted tests concerning two methods of ricin dissemination: the first, which involved adhering the toxin to shrapnel for delivery by artillery shell, was successful; the second, delivering an aerosol cloud of ricin, was proven less successful in these tests. Neither delivery method was perfected before the war in Europe ended.Smart, Jeffery K.
Medical Aspects of Chemical and Biological Warfare
': Chapter 2 – History of Chemical and Biological Warfare: An American Perspective,
PDF
p. 14), ''Borden Institute'', Textbooks of Military Medicine, PDF via Maxwell-Gunter Air Force Base. Retrieved January 3, 2009.

In the early 1920s suggestions that the U.S. began a biological weapons program were coming from within the Chemical Warfare Service (CWS). Chief of the CWS, Amos Fries, decided that such a program would not be "profitable" for the U.S. Japan's Shiro Ishii began promoting biological weapons during the 1920s and toured biological research facilities worldwide, including in the United States. Though Ishii concluded that the U.S. was developing a bio-weapons programs, he was incorrect. In fact, Ishii concluded that each major power he visited was developing a bio-weapons program. As the interwar period continued, the United States did not emphasize biological weapons development or research. While the U.S. was spending very little time on biological weapons research, its future allies and enemies in the upcoming second World War were researching the potential of biological weapons as early as 1933.

World War II (1941–45)

Despite the World War I-era interest in ricin, as World War II erupted, the United States Army still maintained the position that biological weapons were, for the most part, impractical. Other nations, notably France, Japan and the United Kingdom, thought otherwise and had begun their own biological weapons programs.Garrett, Laurie. ''Betrayal of Trust: The Collapse of Global Public Health'',
Google Books
, Oxford University Press, 2003, pp. 340–41, (). Thus, as late as 1942 the U.S. had no biological weapons capabilities. Initial interest in biological weapons by the Chemical Warfare Service began in 1941.Croddy, ''Weapons of Mass Destruction'', p. 303. That fall, U.S. Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson requested that the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) undertake consideration of U.S. biological warfare. He wrote to Dr. Frank B. Jewett, then president of the NAS:

Because of the dangers that might confront this country from potential enemies employing what may be broadly described as biological warfare, it seems advisable that investigations be initiated to survey the present situation and the future possibilities. I am therefore, asking if you will undertake the appointment of an appropriate committee to survey all phases of this matter. Your organization already has before it a request from The Surgeon General for the appointment of a committee by the Division of Medical Sciences of the National Research Council to examine one phase of the matter.

In response the NAS formed a committee, the War Bureau of Consultants (WBC), which issued a report on the subject in February 1942. The report, among other items, recommended the research and development of an offensive biological weapons program.

The British, and the research undertaken by the WBC, pressured the U.S. to begin biological weapons research and development and in November 1942 U.S. President Franklin Roosevelt officially approved an American biological weapons program. In response to the information provided by the WBC, Roosevelt ordered Stimson to form the War Research Service (WRS).Moreno, Jonathan D. ''Undue Risk: Secret State Experiments on Humans'',
Google Books
, Routledge, 2001, pp. 44–46, (). Established within the Federal Security Agency, the WRS' stated purpose was to promote "public security and health", but, in reality, the WRS was tasked with coordinating and supervising the U.S. biological warfare program.Zilinskas, Raymond A. ''Biological Warfare'',
Google Books
, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder, Colorado: 2000 pp. 228–30, (). In the spring of 1943 the U.S. Army Biological Warfare Laboratories were established at Fort (then Camp) Detrick in Frederick, Maryland.Ryan, Jeffrey R. and Glarum, Jan F. ''Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: Containing and Preventing Biological Threats'',
Google Books
, Butterworth-Heinemann, 2008, p. 14, (). Guillemin, Jeanne. ''Biological Warfare'', p. 63.

Though initially, under George Merck, the WRS contracted several universities to participate in the U.S. biological weapons program, the program became large quickly and before long it was under the full control of the CWS. By November 1943 the biological weapons facility at Detrick was completed, in addition, the United States constructed three other facilities - a biological agent production plant at Vigo County near Terre Haute, Indiana, a field-testing site on Horn Island in Mississippi, and another field site near Granite Peak in Utah. According to an official history of the period, "the elaborate security precautions taken t Camp Detrickwere so effective that it was not until January 1946, 4 months after VJ Day, that the public learned of the wartime research in biological weapons".

Cold War (1947–1969)

Following World War II, the United States biological warfare program progressed into an effective, military-driven research and production program, covered in controversy and secrecy.David R. Franz, D.V.M., PH.D.; Cheryl D. Parrott; and Ernest T. Takafuji, M.D., M.P.H.
"Chapter 19 – The U.S. Biological Warfare and Biological Defense Programs"
''Air University'', n.d. Production of U.S. biological warfare agents went from "factory-level to laboratory-level". By 1950 the principal U.S. bio-weapons facility was located at Camp Detrick in Maryland under the auspices of the Research and Engineering Division of the U.S. Army Chemical Corps.Whitby, Simon M. ''Biological Warfare Against Crops'',
Google Books
, Macmillan, 2002, pp. 104–08, 117, (). Most of the research and development was done there, while production and testing occurred at Pine Bluff, Arkansas, and Dugway Proving Ground, Utah. Pine Bluff Arsenal began production of weapons-grade agents by 1954.Zubay, Geoffrey L. ''Agents of Bioterrorism: Pathogens and Their Weaponization'',
Google Books
, Columbia University Press, 2005, p. 132, (). From 1952–1954 the Chemical Corps maintained a biological weapons research and development facility at Fort Terry on Plum Island, New York. Guillemin, Jeanne. ''Biological Weapons'', p. 96.Wheelis, Mark, et al. ''Deadly Cultures: Biological Weapons Since 1945'',
Google Books
, Harvard University Press, 2006 pp. 225–28, (). Fort Terry's focus was on anti-animal biological weapon research and development; the facility researched more than a dozen potential BW agents. From the end of World War II through the Korean War, the U.S. Army, the Chemical Corps and the U.S. Air Force all expanded their biological warfare programs significantly, especially concerning delivery systems. Throughout the cold war, the United States and the Soviet Union would combine to produce enough biological weapons to kill everyone on Earth.Judith Miller, Stephen Engelberg and William J. Broad
"U.S. Germ Warfare Research Pushes Treaty Limits"
''San Francisco State University'', 2001

At the trial of John W. Powell and two other defendants for sedition for reporting that the U.S. used biological weapons during the Korean War, the U.S. Attorney in the case, Robert H. Schnacke and the former Chief of the Special Operations Division at Ft. Detrick during the Korean War (and long-time U.S. Chemical Corps officer), John L. Schwab, entered sworn affidavits that the U.S. Army had the capability to use both offensive and defensive biological and chemical weapons "during the period from January 1, 1949 through July 27, 1953.... based upon resources available and retained only within the continental limits of the United States."

Another substantive expansion phase was during the Kennedy-Johnson years, after McNamara initiated Project 112 as a comprehensive initiative, starting in 1961. Despite an increase in testing, the readiness for biological warfare remained limited after this program. A 10 November 1969 report by the Interdepartmental Political-Military Group submitted its findings to the Nixon administration that the American BW capability was limited:

Field testing of the biological weapons was completed covertly and successfully with simulants and agents dispersed over wide, open areas. The first American large-scale aerosol vulnerability test, code-named Operation Sea-Spray, occurred in the San Francisco Bay Area in September 1950, using two types of bacteria, ''Bacillus globigii'' and ''Serratia marcescens'', and fluorescent particles. Bacillus species were chosen in these tests because of their spore-forming abilities and their similarities to ''Bacillus anthracis'', a causing agent of anthrax. ''S. marcescens'' was used because it is easily identifiable from its red pigment. In 1966, the New York City Subway was contaminated with Bacillus globigii in an attempt to simulate the spreading of anthrax in a large urban population. More field tests involving pathogenic species were conducted at Dugway Proving Ground, Utah and anti-animal studies were conducted at Eglin Air Force Base, Florida.

At the time, many scientists disagreed with the creation of biological weapons. Theodor Rosebury, who previously worked as a supervisor at Camp Detrick, issued a warning against the development of biological weapons during the cold war. In 1945, Rosebury left Camp Detrick during a period of time when scientists could publish the results of their research. Rosebury published ''Peace or Pestilence?'' in 1949, which explained his views on why biological weapons should be banned by world powers. By the time his book was available, publications were becoming more restricted and the extent of the Soviet threat of biological weapons was being overstated by Congress and the media. In 1969, Harvard biologist Matthew Meselson argued that the biological warfare programs would eventually hurt US security because potential enemy nations could easily emulate these weapons.

The general population remained uninformed of any breakthroughs concerning biological warfare. This included new production plants for anthrax, brucellosis, and anti-crop agents, as well as the development of the cluster bomb. The U.S. public was also unaware of ongoing studies, particularly the environmental and open-air experiments that were taking place. One of the more controversial experiments was conducted in 1951, when a disproportionate number of African Americans were exposed to the fungus ''Aspergillus fumigatus'', to see if they were more susceptible to infection. Some scientists reasoned that such knowledge would help them prepare a defense against a more deadly form of the fungus. The same year, workers at the Norfolk Supply Center in Norfolk, Virginia, were unknowingly exposed to ''Aspergillus fumigatus'' spores. Another case of human research was the biodefense medical research program, Operation Whitecoat. This decade-long experiment on volunteer Seventh Day Adventist servicemen exposed them to tularaemia via aerosols. They were then treated with antibiotics. The goal of the experiment, unknown to the volunteers, was to standardize tularaemia bomb-fill for attacks on civilian populations.

In the 1960s, the U.S. changed its main approach from biological agents aimed to kill to those that would incapacitate. In 1964, research programs studied Enterotoxin type B, which can cause food poisoning. New research initiatives also included prophylaxis, the preventive treatment of diseases. Pathogens studied included the biological agents causing a myriad of diseases such as anthrax, glanders, brucellosis, melioidosis, Venezuelan equine encephalitis, Q fever, coccidioidomycosis, and other plant and animal pathogens.

The Vietnam War brought public awareness to the U.S. biological weapons program. The use of chemicals, riot-control agents, and herbicides like Agent Orange drew international criticism, and negatively affected the U.S. public opinion on the development of biological weapons. Highly controversial human research programs and open air experiments were discovered. Jeanne Guillemin, wife of biologist Matthew Meselson, summarized the controversy:Dr. Robert A. Wampler
"THE NIXON ADMINISTRATION'S DECISION TO END U.S. BIOLOGICAL WARFARE PROGRAMS"
''National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 58'', 2001

The Nixon administration felt an urgent need to respond to the growing negative perception of biological weapons. The realization that biological weapons may become the poor man's atom bomb also contributed to the end of the U.S. biological weapons program. Subsequently, President Nixon announced that the U.S. was unilaterally renouncing its biological warfare program, ultimately signing the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention in 1972.André Richardt, Marc-Michael Blum
Decontamination of Warfare Agents: Enzymatic Methods for the Removal of B/C Weapons
', Wiley-VCH, 2008, pp. 5–6,

End of the program (1969–1973)

President Richard M. Nixon issued his "Statement on Chemical and Biological Defense Policies and Programs" on November 25, 1969 in a speech from Fort Detrick. The statement officially ended all U.S. offensive biological weapons programs. Nixon noted that biological weapons were unreliableGraham, Thomas. ''Disarmament Sketches: Three Decades of Arms Control and International Law'',
Google Books
, University of Washington Press, 2002, pp. 21–30, (). and stated:Miller, pp. 61–64.

The United States shall renounce the use of lethal biological agents and weapons, and all other methods of biological warfare. The United States will confine its biological research to defensive measures such as immunization and safety measures.

In his speech Nixon called his move "unprecedented"; and it was in fact the first review of the U.S. biological warfare program since 1954. Guillemin, Jeanne. ''Biological Weapons'', pp. 122–27. Despite the lack of review, the biological warfare program had increased in cost and size since 1961. From the onset of the U.S. biological weapons program in 1943 through the end of World War II the United States spent $400 million on biological weapons, mostly on research and development.Guillemin, ''Biological Weapons'', pp. 71–73. The budget for fiscal year 1966 was $38 million.Smart, Jeffery K.
Medical Aspects of Chemical and Biological Warfare
': Chapter 19 - The U.S. Biological Warfare and Biological Defense Programs,
PDF
p. 430 . 6 in PDF, ''Borden Institute'', Textbooks of Military Medicine, PDF via Air University. Retrieved September 2, 2010. When Nixon ended the program the budget was $300 million annually. Cirincione, Joseph, et al. ''Deadly Arsenals'', p. 212. Nixon's statement confined all biological weapons research to defensive-only and ordered the destruction of the existing U.S. biological arsenal.Mauroni, Albert J. ''America's Struggle with Chemical-Biological Weapons'',
Google Books
, Greenwood Publishing Group, 2000, pp. 49–60, ().

U.S. biological weapons stocks were destroyed over the next few years. A $12 million disposal plan was undertaken at Pine Bluff Arsenal,Mangold, Tom. ''Plague Wars: The Terrifying Reality of Biological Warfare'',
Google Books
, Macmillan, 1999, pp. 54–57, (). where all U.S. anti-personnel biological agents were stored. That plan was completed in May 1972 and included decontamination of facilities at Pine Bluff. Other agents, including anti-crop agents such as wheat stem rust, were stored at Beale Air Force Base and Rocky Mountain Arsenal. These anti-crop agents, along with agents at Fort Detrick used for research purposes were destroyed in March 1973.

Geneva Protocol and BWC

The 1925 Geneva Protocol, ratified by most major powers in the 1920s and 30s, had still not been ratified by the United States at the dawn of World War II. Among the Protocol's provisions was a ban on bacteriological warfare.O'Brien, Neil. ''An American Editor in Early Revolutionary China: John William Powell and the China Weekly/monthly Review'',
Google Books
, Routledge, 2003, pp. 217–19, (). The Geneva Protocol had encountered opposition in the U.S. Senate, in part due to strong lobbying against it by the Chemical Warfare Service, and it was never brought to the floor for a vote when originally introduced. Regardless, on June 8, 1943 President Roosevelt affirmed a no-first-use policy for the United States concerning biological weapons. Even with Roosevelt's declaration opposition to the Protocol remained strong; in 1949 the Protocol was among several old treaties returned to President Harry S. Truman unratified.

When Nixon ended the U.S. bio-weapons program in 1969 he also announced that he would resubmit the Geneva Protocol to the U.S. Senate. This was a move Nixon was considering as early as July 1969. The announcement included language that indicated the Nixon administration was moving toward an international agreement on an outright ban on bio-weapons. Thus, the Nixon administration became the world's leading anti-biological weapons voice calling for an international treaty. The Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee was discussing a British draft of a biological weapons treaty which the United Nations General Assembly approved in 1968 and that NATO supported. These arms control talks would eventually lead to the Biological Weapons Convention, the international treaty outlawing biological warfare.Carter, April, (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute). ''Success and Failure in Arms Control Negotiations'',
Google Books
, Oxford University Press, 1989, p. 298, (). Prior to the Nixon announcement only Canada supported the British draft. Beginning in 1972, the Soviet Union, United States and more than 100 other countries signed the BWC. The United States ratified the Geneva Protocol in 1975.
, via ''Federation of American Scientists'', April 29, 1975. Retrieved January 5, 2009.

Agents studied and weaponized

When the U.S. biological warfare program ended in 1969 it had developed six mass-produced, battle-ready biological weapons in the form of agents that cause anthrax, tularemia, brucellosis, Q-fever, Venezuelan equine encephalitis virus, and botulism. In addition staphylococcal enterotoxin B was produced as an incapacitating agent.Croddy, Eric C. and Hart, C. Perez-Armendariz J., ''Chemical and Biological Warfare'',
Google Books
, Springer, 2002, pp. 30–31, (). In addition to the agents that were ready to be used, the U.S. program conducted research into the weaponization of more than 20 other agents. They included: smallpox, EEE and WEE, AHF, Hantavirus, BHF, Lassa fever, Coronavirus,The United States is known to have researched both ''B. mallei'' (the causal agent of glanders) and ''B. pseudomallei'' (the causal agent of melioidosis) from 1943–1944. Neither bacteria was weaponized. See Khardori, ''Bioterrorism Preparedness'', p. 16. melioidosis, plague, yellow fever, psittacosis, typhus, dengue fever, Rift Valley fever (RVF), CHIKV, late blight of potato, rinderpest, Newcastle disease, bird flu, and the toxin ricin.Chemical and Biological Weapons: Possession and Programs Past and Present
, ''James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies'', Middlebury College, April 9, 2002. Retrieved January 3, 2009.

Besides the numerous pathogens that afflict human beings, the U.S. had developed an arsenal of anti-agriculture biological agents. These included rye stem rust spores (stored at Edgewood Arsenal, 1951–1957), wheat stem rust spores (stored at the same facility 1962–1969), and the causative agent of rice blast (stored at Fort Detrick 1965–1966).

A U.S. facility at Fort Terry focused primarily on anti-animal biological agents. The first agent that was a candidate for development was foot and mouth disease (FMD). Besides FMD, five other top-secret biological weapons projects were commissioned on Plum Island.Carroll, Michael C. ''Lab 257: The Disturbing Story of the Government's Secret Plum Island Germ Laboratory'',
Google Books
, HarperCollins, 2004, pp. 45–48, (). The other four programs researched included RVF, rinderpest, African swine fever, plus eleven miscellaneous exotic animal diseases. The eleven miscellaneous pathogens were: Blue tongue virus, bovine influenza, bovine virus diarrhea (BVD), fowl plague

HOME


Content is Copyleft
Website design, code, and AI is Copyrighted (c) 2014-2017 by Stephen Payne


Consider donating to Wikimedia



As an Amazon Associate I earn from qualifying purchases