Majority Loser Criterion
The majority loser criterion is a criterion to evaluate single-winner voting systems. The criterion states that if a majority of voters give a candidate no support, i.e. do not list that candidate on their ballot, that candidate must lose (unless no candidate is accepted by a majority of voters). Either of the Condorcet loser criterion or the mutual majority criterion implies the majority loser criterion. However, the Condorcet criterion does not imply the majority loser criterion, since the minimax method satisfies the Condorcet but not the majority loser criterion. Also, the majority criterion is logically independent from the majority loser criterion, since the plurality rule satisfies the majority but not the majority loser criterion, and the anti-plurality rule satisfies the majority loser but not the majority criterion. There is no positional scoring rule which satisfies both the majority and the majority loser criterion, but several non-positional rules, including ma ... [...More Info...]       [...Related Items...]     OR:     [Wikipedia]   [Google]   [Baidu]   |
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Single-winner Voting System
A single-member district or constituency is an electoral district represented by a single officeholder. It contrasts with a multi-member district, which is represented by multiple officeholders. In some countries, such as Australia and India, members of the lower house of parliament are elected from single-member districts, while members of the upper house are elected from multi-member districts. In some other countries, such as Singapore, members of parliament can be elected from either single-member or multi-member districts. History in the United States The United States Constitution, ratified in 1789, states: "The House of Representatives shall be composed of Members chosen every second Year by the People of the several States...Representatives...shall be apportioned among the several States which may be included within this Union, according to their respective Numbers." In other words, the Constitution specifies that each state will be apportioned a number of representat ... [...More Info...]       [...Related Items...]     OR:     [Wikipedia]   [Google]   [Baidu]   |
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Truncation (voting)
Strategic or tactical voting is voting in consideration of possible ballots cast by other voters in order to maximize one's satisfaction with the election's results. Gibbard's theorem shows that no voting system has a single "always-best" strategy, i.e. one that always maximizes a voter's satisfaction with the result, regardless of other voters' ballots. This implies all voting systems can sometimes encourage voters to strategize. However, weaker guarantees can be shown under stronger conditions. Examples include one-dimensional preferences (where the median rule is strategyproof) and dichotomous preferences (where approval or score voting are strategyproof). With large electoral districts, party list methods tend to be difficult to manipulate in the absence of an electoral threshold. However, biased apportionment methods can create opportunities for strategic voting, as can small electoral districts (e.g. those used most often with the single transferable vote). Proportio ... [...More Info...]       [...Related Items...]     OR:     [Wikipedia]   [Google]   [Baidu]   |
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Condorcet Loser Criterion
In single-winner voting system theory, the Condorcet loser criterion (CLC) is a measure for differentiating voting systems. It implies the majority loser criterion but does not imply the Condorcet winner criterion. A voting system complying with the Condorcet loser criterion will never allow a ''Condorcet loser'' to win. A Condorcet loser is a candidate who can be defeated in a head-to-head competition against each other candidate.https://arxiv.org/pdf/1801.05911 "We say that an alternative is a Condorcet loser if it would be defeated by every other alternative in a kind of one-on-one contest that takes place in a sequential pairwise voting with a fixed agenda4.– Condorcet loser criterion (CLC), ..we say that a social choice procedure satisfies the Condorcet loser criterion (CLC) provided that a Condorcet loser is never among the social choices." (Not all elections will have a Condorcet loser since it is possible for three or more candidates to be mutually defeatable in di ... [...More Info...]       [...Related Items...]     OR:     [Wikipedia]   [Google]   [Baidu]   |
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Mutual Majority Criterion
The mutual majority criterion is a criterion for evaluating electoral systems. It is also known as the majority criterion for solid coalitions and the generalized majority criterion. This criterion requires that whenever a majority of voters prefer a group of candidates above all others, then the winner must be a candidate from that group. The mutual majority criterion may also be thought of as the single-winner case of Droop- Proportionality for Solid Coalitions. Formal definition Let L be a subset of candidates. A solid coalition in support of L is a group of voters who strictly prefer all members of L to all candidates outside of L. In other words, each member of the solid coalition ranks their least-favorite member of L higher than their favorite member outside L. Note that the members of the solid coalition may rank the members of L differently. The mutual majority criterion says that if there is a solid coalition of voters in support of L, and this solid coalition consist ... [...More Info...]       [...Related Items...]     OR:     [Wikipedia]   [Google]   [Baidu]   |
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Condorcet Criterion
A Condorcet winner (, ) is a candidate who would receive the support of more than half of the electorate in a one-on-one race against any one of their opponents. Voting systems where a majority winner will always win are said to satisfy the Condorcet winner criterion. The Condorcet winner criterion extends the principle of majority rule to elections with multiple candidates. Named after Nicolas de Condorcet, it is also called a majority winner, a majority-preferred candidate, a beats-all winner, or tournament winner (by analogy with round-robin tournaments). A Condorcet winner may not necessarily always exist in a given electorate: it is possible to have a rock, paper, scissors-style cycle, when multiple candidates defeat each other (Rock < Paper < Scissors < Rock). This is called , and is analogous to the counterintuitive [...More Info...]       [...Related Items...]     OR:     [Wikipedia]   [Google]   [Baidu]   |
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Minimax Condorcet
In voting systems, the Minimax Condorcet method is a single-winner ranked-choice voting method that always elects the majority (Condorcet) winner. Minimax compares all candidates against each other in a round-robin tournament, then ranks candidates by their worst election result (the result where they would receive the fewest votes). The candidate with the ''largest'' (maximum) number of votes in their ''worst'' (minimum) matchup is declared the winner. Description of the method The Minimax Condorcet method selects the candidate for whom the greatest pairwise score for another candidate against him or her is the least such score among all candidates. Football analogy Imagine politicians compete like football teams in a round-robin tournament, where every team plays against every other team once. In each matchup, a candidate's score is equal to the number of voters who support them over their opponent. Minimax finds each team's (or candidate's) worst game – the one wher ... [...More Info...]       [...Related Items...]     OR:     [Wikipedia]   [Google]   [Baidu]   |
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Majority Favorite Criterion
The majority criterion is a voting system criterion applicable to voting rules over ordinal preferences required that if only one candidate is ranked first by over 50% of voters, that candidate must win. Some methods that comply with this criterion include any Condorcet method, instant-runoff voting, Bucklin voting, plurality voting, and approval voting. The mutual majority criterion is a generalized form of the criterion meant to account for when the majority prefers multiple candidates above all others; voting methods which pass majority but fail mutual majority can encourage all but one of the majority's preferred candidates to drop out in order to ensure one of the majority-preferred candidates wins, creating a spoiler effect. Difference from the Condorcet criterion By the majority criterion, a candidate ''C'' should win if a majority of voters answers affirmatively to the question "Do you (strictly) prefer ''C'' to every other candidate?" The Condorcet criterion gives a ... [...More Info...]       [...Related Items...]     OR:     [Wikipedia]   [Google]   [Baidu]   |
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Plurality Voting
Plurality voting refers to electoral systems in which the candidates in an electoral district who poll more than any other (that is, receive a plurality) are elected. Under single-winner plurality voting, and in systems based on single-member districts, plurality voting is called single member istrictplurality (SMP), which is widely known as " first-past-the-post". In SMP/FPTP the leading candidate, whether or not they have a majority of votes, is elected. There are several versions of plurality voting for multi-member district. The system that elects multiple winners at once with the plurality rule and where each voter casts as many X votes as the number of seats in a multi-seat district is referred to as plurality block voting. A semi-proportional system that elects multiple winners elected at once with the plurality rule and where each voter casts more than one vote but fewer than the number of seats to fill in a multi-seat district is known as limited voting. A semi-prop ... [...More Info...]       [...Related Items...]     OR:     [Wikipedia]   [Google]   [Baidu]   |
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Anti-plurality Voting
Anti-plurality voting describes an electoral system in which each voter votes ''against'' a single candidate, and the candidate with the fewest votes against wins. Anti-plurality voting is an example of a positional voting method. Example In this electoral system, each voter marks a vote against his or her fourth preference. In this case, it would be a tie between Nashville and Chattanooga, both receiving zero votes. If the tie is to be resolved with anti-plurality voting as well, Nashville would win, as it has less second-to-last place votes (32%) than Chattanooga (42%). Ties could also be resolved through a second subsequent runoff election. Characteristics As can be seen from the example, in the absence of tactical voting, this system tends to favor middle-of-the-road candidates. However, it is very sensitive to tactical voting, as any candidate perceived beforehand as a potential winner will attract more countervotes from partisans of their opponents. This creates the ... [...More Info...]       [...Related Items...]     OR:     [Wikipedia]   [Google]   [Baidu]   |
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Positional Voting
Positional voting is a ranked voting electoral system in which the options or candidates receive points based on their rank position on each ballot and the one with the most points overall wins. The lower-ranked preference in any adjacent pair is generally of less value than the higher-ranked one. Although it may sometimes be weighted the same, it is never worth more. A valid progression of points or weightings may be chosen at will (Voting at the Eurovision Song Contest, Eurovision Song Contest) or it may form a mathematical sequence such as an arithmetic progression (Borda count), a geometric one (Positional notation, positional number system) or a harmonic one (Borda count#Dowdall system (Nauru), Nauru/Dowdall method). The set of weightings employed in an election heavily influences the rank ordering of the candidates. The steeper the initial decline in preference values with descending rank, the more polarised and less consensual the positional voting system becomes. Position ... [...More Info...]       [...Related Items...]     OR:     [Wikipedia]   [Google]   [Baidu]   |
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Condorcet Method
A Condorcet method (; ) is an election method that elects the candidate who wins a majority of the vote in every head-to-head election against each of the other candidates, whenever there is such a candidate. A candidate with this property, the ''pairwise champion'' or ''beats-all winner'', is formally called the ''Condorcet winner'' or ''Pairwise Majority Rule Winner'' (PMRW). The head-to-head elections need not be done separately; a voter's choice within any given pair can be determined from the ranking. Some elections may not yield a Condorcet winner because voter preferences may be cyclic—that is, it is possible that every candidate has an opponent that defeats them in a two-candidate contest. The possibility of such cyclic preferences is known as the Condorcet paradox. However, a smallest group of candidates that beat all candidates not in the group, known as the Smith set, always exists. The Smith set is guaranteed to have the Condorcet winner in it should one exist. ... [...More Info...]       [...Related Items...]     OR:     [Wikipedia]   [Google]   [Baidu]   |
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Incomplete Ballot
Strategic or tactical voting is voting in consideration of possible ballots cast by other voters in order to maximize one's satisfaction with the election's results. Gibbard's theorem shows that no voting system has a single "always-best" strategy, i.e. one that always maximizes a voter's satisfaction with the result, regardless of other voters' ballots. This implies all voting systems can sometimes encourage voters to strategize. However, weaker guarantees can be shown under stronger conditions. Examples include one-dimensional preferences (where the median rule is strategyproof) and dichotomous preferences (where approval or score voting are strategyproof). With large electoral districts, party list methods tend to be difficult to manipulate in the absence of an electoral threshold. However, biased apportionment methods can create opportunities for strategic voting, as can small electoral districts (e.g. those used most often with the single transferable vote). Proportion ... [...More Info...]       [...Related Items...]     OR:     [Wikipedia]   [Google]   [Baidu]   |