use–mention distinction

In analytic philosophy, a fundamental distinction is made between the use of a term and the mere mention of it.Devitt and Sterelny (1999) pp. 40–1. W. V. O. Quine (1940) p. 24. Many philosophical works have been "vitiated by a failure to distinguish use and mention." The distinction can sometimes be pedantic, especially in simple cases where it is obvious.

The distinction between use and mention can be illustrated with the word "cheese":
# Use: Cheese is derived from milk.
# Mention: "Cheese" is derived from the Old English word .

The first sentence is a statement about the substance called "cheese": it the word "cheese" to refer to that substance. The second is a statement about the word "cheese" as a signifier: it the word without using it to refer to anything other than itself.

Overview

In written language, words or phrases often appear between single or double quotation marks or in italics. In philosophy, single quotation marks are typically used, while in other fields (such as linguistics) italics are more common. Some style authorities, such as Strunk and White, emphasize that mentioned words or phrases should be visually distinct. On the other hand, words or phrases do not carry typographic markings.

The phenomenon of a term having different references in various contexts was referred to as '' suppositio'' (substitution) by medieval logicians. A substitution describes how a term is substituted in a sentence based on its referent. For nouns, a term can be used in different ways:
* With a : "That is my ''pig''." (personal supposition)
* With a : "Santa Claus's ''pig'' is very big." (personal supposition)
* With a : "Any ''pig'' breathes air." (simple supposition)
* Metaphorically: "Your grandfather is a ''pig''." (improper supposition)
* As a : "''Pig'' has only three letters." (material supposition)

The use–mention distinction is particularly significant in analytic philosophy. Confusing use with mention can lead to misleading or incorrect statements, such as category errors.

Self-referential statements also engage the use–mention distinction and are often central to logical paradoxes, such as Quine's paradox. In mathematics, this concept appears in Gödel's incompleteness theorem, where the diagonal lemma plays a crucial role.

Commentary

Stanisław Leśniewski extensively employed this distinction, noting the fallacies that can result from confusing it in Russell and Whitehead's ''Principia Mathematica''.

Donald Davidson argued that quotation cannot always be treated as mere mention, giving examples where quotations carry both use and mention functions.

Douglas Hofstadter explains the distinction between use and mention as follows:

Issues arise when a mention itself is mentioned. Notating this with italics or repeated quotation marks can lead to ambiguity.

Some analytic philosophers have said the distinction "may seem rather pedantic".

In a 1977 response to analytic philosopher John Searle, Jacques Derrida mentioned the distinction as "rather laborious and problematical".

See also

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Notes

References

Sources

* Derrida, Jacques (1977) ''Limited Inc abc ...'' in '' Limited Inc''
* Michael Devitt, Kim Sterelny (1999
''Language and reality: an introduction to the philosophy of language''
* W. V. O. Quine (1940
''Mathematical Logic''
§4 ''Use versus mention'', pp. 23–5
* Wheeler, Samuel (2005) ''Davidson as Derridean: Analytic Philosophy as Deconstruction'' in ''Cardozo Law Review'' Vol. 27–2 November 200
''Symposium: Derrida/America, The Present State of America's Europe''

Further reading

* A. W. Moore (1986
''How Significant Is the Use/Mention Distinction?''
in ''Analysis'' Vol. 46, No. 4 (Oct. 1986), pp. 173–179

External links

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, by William A. Wisdom, c. 2002
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, by Ralph E. Kenyon Jr. PhD, 29 December 1992, Revised 21 October 1993, Published in ''ETC: A Review of General Semantics'', Vol. 51 No 1, Spring 1994. (accessed: 26 August 2006).
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The evolution of Confusion
, talk by Daniel Dennett AAI 2009, 4 October 2009

{{DEFAULTSORT:Use-mention distinction
Analytic philosophy
Concepts in the philosophy of language
Metalogic
Conceptual distinctions