Olduvai Theory

The Olduvai Theory posits that industrial civilization, as it currently exists, will have a maximum duration of approximately one hundred years, beginning in 1930. According to this theory, from 2030 onward, humanity is expected to gradually regress to levels of civilization comparable to those experienced in the past, ultimately culminating in a hunting-based culture by around 3000 AD. This regression is likened to the conditions present three million years ago when the Oldowan industry developed, hence the name of the theory.Until a few decades ago, special importance was given to the role of hunting in the subsistence of the first humans, and a hypothesis was put forward in which hominids were unspecialized hunters who took their prey to a base camp where they shared food. Revision of these ideas has been severe, especially since the 1968 international colloquium, ''Man the Hunter''. Possibly Oldowan toolmakers were just foragers and scavengers. Richard C. Duncan, the theory's proponent, formulated it based on his expertise in energy sources and his interest in archaeology.

Originally proposed in 1989 under the name "pulse-transient theory",Duncan, R. C. (1989). ''Evolution, technology, and the natural environment: A unified theory of human history.'' Proceedings of the Annual Meeting, American Society of Engineering Educators: Science, Technology, & Society, 14B1-11 to 14B1-20. the concept was rebranded in 1996 to its current name, inspired by the renowned archaeological site of Olduvai Gorge, although the theory itself does not rely on data from that location. Since the initial publication, Duncan has released multiple versions of the theory, each with varying parameters and predictions, which has generated significant criticism and controversy.

In 2007, Duncan defined five postulates based on the observation of data:

# The world energy production per capita.
# Earth carrying capacity.
# The return to the use of coal as a primary source and the peak oil production.
# Migratory movements.
# The stages of energy utilization in the United States.

In 2009, he published an updated version that reiterated the postulate regarding world energy consumption per capita, expanding the comparison from solely the United States to include OECD countries, while placing less emphasis on the roles of emerging economies.

Scholars such as Pedro A. Prieto have used the Olduvai Theory and other models of catastrophic collapse to formulate various scenarios with differing timelines and societal outcomes. In contrast, figures like Richard Heinberg and Jared Diamond also acknowledge the possibility of social collapse but envision more optimistic scenarios wherein degrowth can occur alongside continued welfare.

Criticism of the Olduvai Theory has focused on its framing of migratory movements and the ideological stance of its publisher, Social Contract Press, known for advocating anti-immigration measures and population control. Various critiques challenge the theoretical foundations and assert that alternative perspectives, such as those of Cornucopians, proponents of resource-based economies, and environmentalist positions, do not support the claims made by the Olduvai Theory.

History

Richard C. Duncan is an author known for proposing the Olduvai theory in 1989, originally titled "The Pulse-Transient Theory of Industrial Civilization." This theory was later expanded in 1993 with the publication of the article "The Life-Expectancy of Industrial Civilization: The Decline to Global Equilibrium"

In June 1996, Duncan presented a paper titled "The Olduvai Theory: Falling Towards a Post-Industrial Stone Age Era", during which he adopted the term "Olduvai theory" to replace the earlier "pulse-transient theory". An updated version of his theory, titled "The Peak of World Oil Production and the Road to the Olduvai Gorge", was presented at the Geological Society of America's 2000 Symposium Summit on November 13, 2000.Duncan, Richard C. (2000). "''The Peak of World Oil Production and the Road to the Olduvai Gorge''" In 2005, Duncan further extended the data set of his theory to 2003 in the article "The Olduvai Theory: Energy, Population, and Industrial Civilization."

Description

The Olduvai theory is a model that primarily draws from the peak oil theory and the per capita energy yield of oil. It posits that, in light of anticipated resource depletion, the rates of energy consumption and global population growth cannot mirror those of the 20th century.

The theory is characterized by the concept of material quality of life (MQOL), which is defined by the ratio of energy production, use, and consumption (E) to the growth of the world population (P) (MQOL = E/P). From 1954 to 1979, this ratio grew annually by approximately 2.8%. However, from 1979 to 2000, it exhibited erratic growth at only 0.2% per year. Between 2000 and 2007, the rate experienced exponential growth, largely due to the rise of emerging economies.

In earlier works, Richard C. Duncan identified 1979 as the peak year for per capita energy consumption and, consequently, the peak of civilization. However, he has since revised this assessment, considering 2010 to be the likely peak year for per capita energy consumption due to the growth observed in emerging economies. Despite this adjustment, Duncan maintains that by 2030, per capita energy production will approximate levels seen in 1930, which he identifies as a potential endpoint for current civilization.

The theory argues that the first reliable signs of collapse are likely to consist of a series of widespread blackouts in the developed world. With the lack of electrical power and fossil fuels, there will be a transition from today's civilization to a situation close to that of the pre-industrial era. He goes on to argue that in events following that collapse the technological level is expected to eventually move from Dark Ages-like levels to those observed in the Stone Age within approximately three thousand years.

Duncan's formulation of the Olduvai theory is based on several key data points:

# Data on global energy production per capita.
# Population trends from 1850 to 2005.
# Estimates of Earth's carrying capacity in the absence of oil.
# Stages of energy utilization in the United States, which are expected to reflect global trends due to its dominant position.
# Estimation of the year 2007 as the time of the peak oil.
# Migratory movements or attractiveness principle.

Duncan articulates five primary postulates within the Olduvai theory:

# The exponential growth of world energy production ended in 1970.
# The intervals of growth, stagnation, and final decline of energy production per capita in the United States anticipate the intervals of energy production per capita in the rest of the world. In such intervals, there is a shift from oil to coal as the primary energy source.
# The decline of industrial civilization is projected to begin around 2008-2012.
# Partial and total blackouts are considered reliable indicators of the terminal decline of industrial civilization.
# Global population is expected to decrease in tandem with the decline in per capita energy production.

Bases for the formulation of the theory

Carrying capacity limit and demographic explosion

The sustainable capacity of the Earth without oil, according to some estimates, is between 500 and 2,000 million people. This figure has been surpassed significantly, attributed to an economic structure reliant on inexpensive oil. It is posited that the Earth's homeostatic balance is around 2 billion people. As oil resources diminish, it is suggested that over 4 billion people may be unable to sustain themselves, potentially leading to a high mortality rate.

Historically, prior to 1800, the global population doubled approximately every 500 to 1,000 years, with the world population nearing 1 billion by that time. The onset of the Industrial Revolution and colonial expansion led to a shift in demographic growth rates, particularly in the Western world, where the population began to double in just over 100 years. By 1900, the global population reached approximately 1.55 billion. The Second Industrial Revolution further accelerated population growth, with the global population doubling in less than 100 years. During the peak of oil extraction and the advent of the digital revolution, the global population grew from 2.4 billion in 1950 to about 6.07 billion by 2000, reflecting a doubling time of roughly 50 years.

The theory posits that the Earth's capacity for sustaining human population has been exceeded since around 1925, predicting that the rate of population growth is unsustainable. It suggests an apocalyptic scenario in which global population growth would slow in 2012 due to an economic downturn, peaking in 2015 at approximately 6.9 billion people. Following this peak, the theory anticipates that births and deaths would equalize around 2017, resulting in a 1:1 ratio, after which deaths would surpass births (>1:1), leading to a significant decline in population. Projections indicate that the global population could decrease to about 6.8 billion by the end of 2020, 6.5 billion by 2025, 5.26 billion by 2027, and approximately 4.6 billion by 2030. Ultimately, it is suggested that the population may stabilize between 200 million and 500 million by 2050-2100.

Duncan's forecasts are compared with those of Dennis Meadows in his book ''The Limits to Growth'' (1972). While Duncan predicts a peak population of 6.9 billion in 2015, Meadows anticipates a peak of approximately 7.47 billion in 2027. Duncan also estimates a decline to 2 billion by 2050, in contrast to Meadows’ projection of 6.45 billion for the same year.

Alternative estimates aligned with Olduvai's theory suggest that the population may peak between 2025 and 2030, reaching between 7.1 billion and 8 billion before declining symmetrically, resembling a Gaussian bell curve.

Scholars such as Paul Chefurka emphasize that the Earth's carrying capacity will be influenced by various factors, including ecological damage incurred during industrialization, the development of alternative technologies or substitutes for oil, and the preservation of knowledge and traditional lifestyles that could enable sustainable living for the remaining population.

Principle of attractiveness

This theoretical framework, informed by Jay Forrester's work on the dynamics of complex social systems, suggests that per capita natural resource availability and material standards of living are fundamentally linked to the per capita energy yield of oil. The framework posits that the attractiveness of a country to immigrants is largely determined by the disparity in material standards of living between nations. For example, in 2005, the material standard of living in the United States was approximately 57.7 barrels of oil equivalent (BOE) per capita, compared to 9.8 BOE per capita for the rest of the world, resulting in a consumption gap of 47.9 BOE per capita.The energy contained in a barrel of oil is equivalent to 1.46 x 10⁶ Kcal or equivalent to one year of energy consumption of a forestry worker in the tropics (4,000 Kcal/day according to Apud and collaborators, 1999). However, for Matthew Savinar one barrel of oil is equivalent to 25,000 man-hours and for Roscoe Bartlett 12 workers working for a year. This significant difference in lifestyle and consumption patterns is seen as a driving factor for immigration.

According to this theory, new immigrants tend to adopt the consumerist lifestyle of their host country, which can lead to increased resource demand and strain on the system. Duncan argues that as immigration increases, the disparities in material living standards between the host country and the global average will diminish through an equalizing process, potentially leading the host country to approach the world’s material standard of living.

This proposition has faced criticism in various regions. Critics contend that while Duncan implies a need for stricter immigration policies, he does not adequately address the role of consumerist lifestyles in wealthier nations as a primary factor contributing to resource depletion.
File:Energy per capita.png, alt=, Per capita energy consumption expressed in kilograms of oil equivalent (kgoe) per person in 2001 by country. In black the countries for which no data were collected, in light colors the countries with the lowest consumption, in bold colors the countries with the highest consumption; those tending to red are those that have shown an increase in consumption and those tending to green are those that have shown a decrease in consumption.
File:Net Migration Rate.svg, alt=, World migration in 2016, in blue the attractive countries, in orange the countries from which there is migration to the attractive countries. In green color the countries that showed negligible migration movements, and in gray the countries for which no data were collected.

Return to the use of coal as a primary source

The theory proposes that due to the predominance of one nation the rest of the world will follow the same sequence in the implementation of a resource as a primary source. It thus comparatively analyzes a chronology of resource utilization as a primary source between United States and the rest of the world:

Utilization of

biomass as a primary source.

* In the United States until 1886.
* In the rest of the world until 1900.

Use of

coal as a primary source.

* In the United States from 1886 to 1951.
* In the rest of the world from 1900 to 1963.

Use of

oil as a primary source.

* In the United States from 1951 to 1986.
* In the rest of the world from 1963 to 2005.

Return to the use of

coal as a primary source.

* In the United States since 1986.
* In the rest of the world from 2005.

According to Duncan, from 2000 to 2005 while world coal production increased by 4.8% per year, oil increased by just 1.6%.

The return to coal as a primary source, another taboo fact due to its high level of pollution, has been muted in the media as has the carrying capacity of the Earth for obvious political reasons, Duncan says.

Energy consumption of the population

The transition from oil to coal as a primary energy source in the United States is seen as indicative of broader global changes in energy consumption and production. Duncan identifies three stages in U.S. energy consumption that reflect trends in global consumption:

Growth

* 1945-1970: During this period, the U.S. experienced an average growth of 1.4% per capita energy production per year.
* 1954-1979: A parallel world growth stage emerged, with an average growth of 2.8% per capita energy production annually.

Stagnation

* 1970-1998: The U.S. entered a stagnation phase characterized by an average decline of 0.6% per year in per capita energy production.
* 1979-2008: This global stagnation period saw only a modest average growth of 0.2% per capita energy production per year, with a slight uptick after 2000, primarily driven by the growth of emerging economies.

Final decline or decay

* 1998 onwards: The U.S. faced a final decline phase, with an average decline of 1.8% per year in per capita energy production from 1998 to 2005.
* 2008-2012 onwards: A potential stage of final global decline is anticipated, although the rapid development of emerging economies and extensive coal utilization in China may temporarily mitigate this decline until around 2012.

Theory updates

2009 update

Following criticism regarding discrepancies in per capita energy consumption trends, Duncan published an updated analysis in 2009. This work compared the energy consumption curves of OECD member countries (30 nations) with those of non-OECD countries (165 nations), which include Brazil, India, and China.

In this updated paper, Duncan identified several key points regarding per capita energy consumption:
* 1973: Peak per capita energy in the United States.
* 2005: OECD countries reached a peak per capita energy consumption of approximately 4.75 tonnes of oil equivalent (toe).
* 2008: After having increased from 2000 to 2007 the per capita consumption of non-OECD countries by 28%, the composite leading indicator of China, India, and Brazil declined sharply in 2008, leading him to conclude that the average standard of living in non-OECD countries has already begun to fall. However, a report from the OECD in February 2010 appeared to contradict this assertion.
* 2010: Most likely date of peak energy per capita globally.

Duncan's forecast projected significant declines in average per capita energy consumption by 2030: a 90% decrease for the United States, an 86% decrease for OECD countries, and a 60% decrease for non-OECD countries. He anticipated that by 2030, the average standard of living in OECD countries would converge with that of the non-OECD world, reaching an estimated 3.53 barrels of oil equivalent per capita.
File:Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.svg, alt=, The thirty OECD countries in 2009, were considered as the club of rich countries plus Turkey and Mexico. According to Duncan, the peak per capita energy consumption of these countries occurred in 2005.
File:Newly Industrialized Country.png, alt=, Map with the newly industrialized or emerging economy countries. According to Duncan, the composite leading indicators of China, India, and Brazil fell sharply in 2008.

File:Olduvai per capita-en.png, alt=, Update 2000. Forecast of per capita energy consumption. In blue is the growth stage, in green and yellow is the stagnation stage, and in red is the final decline stage.

File:Olduvai per capita (2007)-en.png, alt=, Update 2007. Forecast of per capita energy consumption. In blue is the growth stage, in green and yellow is the stagnation stage, and in red is the terminal decline stage.

File:Olduvai per capita (2009)-en.png, alt=, Update 2009. Forecast of per capita energy consumption. In blue is the growth stage, in green and yellow is the stagnation stage, and in red is the final decline stage.

Societal scenarios according to the theory

Pedro A. Prieto, a notable Spanish-language expert on the subject, has proposed a scenario of potential societal collapse based on various aspects of energy consumption theory.

Crisis of the Nation-State

Prieto suggests that wealthy nations may experience heightened insecurity, leading to a transformation of democratic societies into totalitarian and ultraconservative regimes, driven by public demands for external resources and increased security. He posits the possibility of conflict over scarce resources escalating into a global conflict, likened to a potential World War III. without ruling out scenarios similar to the final solution or nuclear war. This scenario might involve three major blocks of civilizations: Western, Orthodox and Sinic