JNIM

Jama'at Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin (, JNIM; , GSIM; ) is a Salafi Jihadist organisation in the Maghreb and West Africa formed by the merger of Ansar Dine, al-Mourabitoun and the Saharan branch of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (a militant wing of Al-Qaeda). Its leaders swore allegiance to Ayman al-Zawahiri.

In the early 2020s, JNIM was reported to be the fastest-growing terrorist organization in the world. As of 2025, it is considered the most heavily armed militant group in the Sahel and one of the most powerful globally. The group operates a decentralized proto-state model in areas under its control, enforcing a strict interpretation of Islamic law and collecting taxes. Its influence is presently expanding southward into coastal West African countries, including Benin and Togo.

History

''Jama'a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin'' (JNIM) was formed as a coalition of Salafi-jihadist groups operating in West Africa that were supportive of Al-Qaeda. The groups that made up the merger were Ansar Dine, al-Mourabitoun, and the Saharan branch of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. The umbrella group came under the leadership of Iyad ag Ghali and Amadou Koufa, both of whom had held prominent roles in the Mali War that began in 2012, during which Islamist and separatist factions seized large parts of the country’s north. Ghali is from the Tuareg ethnic group, while Koufa belongs to the Fulani.

On 2 March 2017, JNIM announced its formation in a video declaring it's Bay'ah (pledge of allegiance) to al-Qaeda's top leader Ayman al-Zawahiri, AQIM leader Abdelmalek Droukdel, and Taliban leader Hibatullah Akhundzada. They also praised prominent slain al-Qaeda leaders such as Osama bin Laden and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. On 16 March, the AQIM leadership released an audio message approving the merger. On 19 March, Al-Qaeda issued a statement approving the new group and accepting their bay'ah.Two leaders sanctioned by the US Treasury's office were named as Ali Maychou and Bah Ag Moussa. Moussa was a former Malian army colonel who led an operation in March 2019 against the Malian Armed Forces base in Dioura that killed at least 21 Malian soldiers. Maychou was a native of Morocco who had claimed responsibility for a JNIM attack on a military camp that housed Malian troops in Gao, killing dozens. The Treasury office said Maychou held an operational role in JNIM's activities, while Moussa acted on behalf of JNIM's leader Iyad Ag Ghaly. In 2021, two additional leaders were designated as Specially Designated Global Terrorists: Sidan Ag Hitta and Salem ould Breihmatt.

The French government declared that 50 jihadists linked to the al-Qaeda group were killed in central Mali during an operation launched by the French anti-jihadist Barkhane force on 30 October 2020. The French force also confiscated arms and material and captured four of the jihadists live, as per French Defense Minister Florence Parly. The French authorities also confirmed the death of a key JNIM leader Bah ag Moussa with four of his group. He was in charge of terrorist operations and training new extremist recruits. France has deployed more than 5,000 troops in the Sahel region to combat insurgents.

On 29 March 2021, a force of about 100 members raided a camp of UN Peacekeepers in Northern Mali, approximately from the Algerian border. Four of the Chadian Peacekeepers were killed in the assault, and 34 wounded. Initial reports suggested that approximately 20 of the jihadists had been killed, a number that was later revised to 40, including Abdallaye Ag Albaka. Ag Albaka was described as "a right-hand man to Iyad Ag Ghaly", and unofficially as the Number 3 man in the organization.

Activity

From 2017 to 2023, JNIM was responsible for more than half of violent events across the Sahel region, notably due to increased capabilities in using roadside bombs, mortars, landmines and rockets. It had its most violent interactions with Burkina Faso's military (1,762 times) and the Malian army (945 times). It also targets volunteer fighting groups as well as communities it considers sympathetic to the state.

On 26 April 2021, David Beriáin, Roberto Fraile and Rory Young were killed following an ambush by the JNIM on their convoy in eastern Burkina Faso, near the Benin border.

On 5 September 2023, at least 50 Burkina Faso soldiers were killed in clashes in Yatenga Province.

On 7 September 2023, at least 154 civilians and fifteen Malian soldiers were killed when JNIM militants simultaneously attacked a Malian military camp at Bamba and the civilian boat ''Tombouctou'' on the Niger River near the village of Banikane, Gourma-Rharous.

On 26 November 2023, JNIM militants launched a major assault on the city of Djibo in Burkina Faso, resulting in at least 40 civilian deaths. The siege of Djibo began in February 2022.

Islamic State in the Greater Sahara serves as an opponent to JNIM and while it does not have the same strength and capabilities of JNIM, it is similar to JNIM and the strategy it uses. Ghaly has stated that JNIM's strategy is to expand its presence across West Africa and train militants to fight against the group's enemies while appeasing local communities by giving them material resources and signing local agreements. JNIM regularly attacks French, multinational, and local security forces in West Africa, as well as local and foreign civilians in the region.

In June 2024, JNIM fighters claimed to have killed more than 100 soldiers at an army base in the northern region of Mansila near Niger. Security analysts said it was one of the deadliest attacks on government forces ever in the region. JNIM also claimed to have captured seven soldiers and seized weapons and ammunition.

JNIM claimed in July 2024 a "complex ambush" had wiped out a convoy during the Battle of Tinzaouaten, killing 50 Russians and a number of Malian soldiers, and published videos showing several vehicles ablaze as well as dozens of bodies in the area. A Tuareg militant group spokesman said some Malian troops and Russian fighters had also been captured during the battle. According to some unofficial Russian Telegram channels, as many as 80 Russians were killed. That would make it by far the worst loss for Russian paramilitaries in several years of operating in Africa, as the Kremlin has sought to use proxy forces to challenge Western influence across the Sahel and central Africa and prop up unstable regimes.

On 25 August 2024, JNIM launched a major attack on people given the responsibility of digging trenches for the protection of security outposts in the region of Barsalogho, Burkina Faso, killing at least 600 soldiers and civilians.

JNIM attacked a military training camp near the airport in Mali's capital in September 2024 as explosions were heard in the area. Within hours, the government announced it was temporarily closing the airport in Bamako. The whole attack lasted for 9 hours and 100+ were killed and wounded. At least 15 people were arrested in connection with the attack. JNIM took responsibility through their media.

On 18 April 2025, Jama'at Nasr al-Islam wal-Muslimin claimed responsibility for coordinated attacks on two military posts in northeastern Benin, resulting in the deaths of 70 soldiers, according to the SITE Intelligence Group. The assaults occurred in Kandi province, Alibori department, approximately 500 kilometers from the capital, Cotonou. This marks the deadliest attack attributed to jihadist groups in Benin since the expansion of Sahel-based insurgencies into coastal West African states. The conflict, which began in Mali in 2012 and spread to Burkina Faso and Niger, has increasingly destabilized regions further south, including Benin and Togo. The broader insurgency has caused widespread displacement and contributed to political instability in the region, including several military coups between 2020 and 2023.

Aims and support

The Center for Strategic and International Studies describes JNIM as "an al Qaeda-affiliated Salafi-jihadist insurgent organization that seeks to replace established state authority with a conservative interpretation of Islamic law." A June 2025 report by ''Africa Confidential'' observed that JNIM appears to be publicly distancing itself from al-Qaeda, in an effort to mirror the successful strategy of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham in Syria. This shift is reportedly intended to facilitate tactical alliances with insurgent groups such as the Azawad Liberation Front (FLA), which, although secular, shares JNIM’s opposition to the Malian government and has demanded JNIM severe ties with al-Qaeda. In this context, JNIM communiqués have increasingly omitted references to al-Qaeda, and in a 2025 interview with ''France24'', the group’s ideological leader, Amadou Koufa, declined to comment on JNIM ties to the organization. Some analysts interpret these moves as part of a broader effort to rebrand JNIM as a domestically focused insurgency rather than a transnational jihadist organization.

In 2025, observers and refugees reported that JNIM’s recruitment was bolstered by the war crimes carried out by state-backed militias, particularly their targeting of Fulani communities—a predominantly Muslim, semi-nomadic ethnic group spread across West Africa. Although initially rejected by many locals, JNIM gained support in areas where pro-government forces carried out widespread civilian killings. These attacks drove many disillusioned Fulani, including entire families, to join the group. One Burkinabe refugee recounted how his daughters and their husbands aligned with JNIM after militias killed dozens of fellow Fulani, stating: “They were afraid, and they ran to them.”

JNIM has formed alliances with local communities and the Tuareg or other ethnic factions. In January 2023, some clans in northern Mali were reported to have pledged allegiance to the group. Despite these developments, the Africa Center for Strategic Studies reported in 2022 that JNIM did not enjoy broad popular support. The Economist Intelligence Unit observed that JNIM was generally more accepted by local populations than Islamic State-affiliated groups. It noted that JNIM had integrated into local rebel networks with deep community ties, while IS-linked factions were often viewed as foreign to the region.

The rivalry between the JNIM and IS has caused the region to become the global epicenter of terrorism, now accounting for over half of all terrorism-related deaths, according to the Global Terrorism Index (GTI). In 2023, the region recorded 3,885 fatalities out of 7,555 worldwide, a nearly tenfold increase since 2019. The rise in extremist violence is driven by the expansion of groups like ISIS-Sahel and Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimeen (JNIM), which compete for land and impose strict Sharia governance. Political instability, weak governance, and military coups in Mali, Burkina Faso, Guinea, and Niger have further fueled the insurgency. These groups finance operations through ransom kidnappings, illicit gold mining, and drug trafficking, with the Sahel now a major route for cocaine smuggling from South America to Europe. Meanwhile, regional governments have shifted from Western alliances to Russia and China, relying on paramilitary groups like the Africa Corps (formerly Wagner) for security assistance, though with little success. The violence is now spreading to neighboring countries like Togo and Benin, raising concerns about further regional destabilization.

See also

*Islamist insurgency in the Sahel
*Jihadist insurgency in Burkina Faso
*List of Islamist terrorist attacks

References

{{Al-Qaeda

Anti-Israeli sentiment in Africa
Organizations designated as terrorist by Iraq
Organisations designated as terrorist by the United Kingdom
Organizations designated as terrorist by the United States
Organizations designated as terrorist by China
Organizations designated as terrorist by Russia
Organizations based in Africa designated as terrorist
Jihadist groups in Algeria
Rebel groups in Burkina Faso
Rebel groups in Mali
Rebel groups in Niger
Salafi Jihadist groups
2017 establishments in Africa
Organizations established in 2017
Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
Military units and factions of the Mali War