Global incidence and ramifications for sovereign debt and fertility rates
Most Western countries have abolished mandatory fictional income splitting, while in several countries fictional income splitting is optional (if the couple chooses it). A 2009 study of 26 European countries found that: "In France, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg and Portugal, couples are jointly assessed. Ireland and Germany operate joint taxation, respectively, with an option for individual taxation and the right to be individually taxed when this is more advantageous; conversely individual taxation is the default option in Spain and Poland, but the option of joint assessment is offered. Elements of jointness remain in some income tax codes for which the individual is the unit of taxation – the Belgian, Estonian, Greek, Icelandic and Norwegian codes – some of which are minor while others matter. The remaining countries enforce individual income taxation without exceptions". In 2015, Portugal abolished the mandatory joint taxation of a family, establishing separate taxation for married (or '' de facto'' unions) taxpayers as the norm, with an option being available for joint taxation. The International Monetary Fund has called for the countries to abandon the practice of taxing family income instead of individual income, along with other tax practices, such as the method of assessing payroll tax in the United States, which assesses extra taxes, higher tax rates, and reduced benefits to families that have two earners, and provides funded and unfunded subsidies to patriarchal families, which are related to sovereign debt problems in these countries. In the United States, the spouse to whom the income is fictionally attributed does not pay payroll tax on that "split" earned income, while the benefit of that spouse's lower rate does accrue to the greater earner. The "split" is thus ignored in that context while it is applied in the income tax context. Even though the fictionally earning spouse does not pay payroll tax, the couple draws two sets of Social Security and Medicare benefits. Declining fertility rates in countries that subsidize patriarchal/maternalist marriage and rebounding fertility rates in countries that shift their policies to recognizing equal parental responsibility are also a factor in many countries abandoning fictional income splitting for tax measurement. In part because of these concerns, as well as child welfare policies that advocate recognizing both parents having personal responsibility for children in order to support their development without distortion, fictional income splitting is becoming rare globally, and, since 1970, it has been abolished in many countries. Some countries require joint returns but measure the tax on income individually, while others use only individual returns. Tax laws in these countries generally have regulations preventing the direct transfer of earned income from one spouse to another to reduce taxes. There are often still methods of using income splitting to reduce taxes in these jurisdictions. For those who own their own company, hiring family members will often reduce the overall tax burden by shifting income to lower-income family members.United States
In the United States, tax benefits or "marriage bonuses" to married couples with only one breadwinner (or with a breadwinner earning the bulk of the couple's income) have been cited by the Tax Policy Center as one of the debt-ballooning policies of the Bush tax cuts. The Tax Policy Center asserts that these "marriage bonuses" (received by the greater or sole earner in the marriage) and "marriage penalties" (paid by the lesser or non-earner in the marriage) are often subsidized by single people and two-earner marriages or are unfunded and thus contribute to government borrowing. While its effects on the national debt have increased substantially in recent years, income splitting became required for married persons filing jointly in the United States in 1948. After two successive vetoes by President Harry S. Truman, a GOP-led effort in Congress obtained enough votes to institute the splitting of marital income. Until then, only single filing was permitted. However, couples in community property states such as California had access to ''de facto'' fictional income splitting, since one-half of the income of one spouse could be fictionally attributed to the other spouse. This led to issues of patriarchal taxpayers in community property states paying lower tax rates than patriarchal taxpayers in common law states and hastened the passage of ''de jure'' income splitting. While other solutions to this distortion in community property states were available, political activism to establish a male entitlement (or first right) to paid work, and to push women back into unpaid or lower paid work after their substantial economic contributions during World War II, led to the override of Truman's double veto. Fictional income splitting is strongly opposed by people in two-earner marriages, and especially by those in Shared Earning/Shared Parenting Marriages. U.S. economists Betsey Stevenson and Justin Wolfers are among those who oppose it. The opposition also comes from those who see this type of taxation contributing to problems ofGermany
In Germany, income splitting involves two aspects. First, if married couples file jointly, their total tax liability is determined by twice the tax liability of applying half the total taxable income. Let and denote each spouse's taxable income. Defining the tax schedule, the tax due for couples is computed by . The splitting advantage increases if both partners have unequal incomes. Another consequence is a high marginal tax rate for the secondary earner, as the secondary earner indirectly pays the marginal tax rate of the higher-earning spouse. The second aspect involves the Withholding tax (''Lohnsteuer'') which is paid on employment income. Family taxation implies that married couples may split the total basic exemption (''Grundfreibetrag''). This is done via choosing the appropriate tax bracket (''Steuerklasse''). The higher-earning spouse predominantly opts for ''Steuerklasse III'' to claim both exemptions, while the lower-earning spouse will be taxed without exemption (''Steuerklasse V''). Both arrangements are widely considered to create an incentive for unequal employment within married couples in Germany, providing one cause for low labor force participation among married women.Canada
Income splitting was not a part ofSee also
* Bachelor tax * Marriage penalty * Shared earning/shared parenting marriageReferences
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