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Participation Constraint
In game theory, and particularly mechanism design, participation constraints or individual rationality constraints are said to be satisfied if a mechanism leaves all participants at least as well-off as they would have been if they hadn't participated. Unfortunately, it can frequently be shown that participation constraints are incompatible with other desirable properties of mechanisms for many purposes. One kind of participation constraint is the participation criterion for voting systems. It requires that by voting, a voter should not decrease the odds of their preferred candidates winning. See also * Individual rationality * Compensating variation In economics, compensating variation (CV) is a measure of utility change introduced by John Hicks (1939). 'Compensating variation' refers to the amount of additional money an agent would need to reach their initial utility after a change in prices, ... Mechanism design Electoral system criteria {{gametheory-stub ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Game Theory
Game theory is the study of mathematical models of strategic interactions among rational agents. Myerson, Roger B. (1991). ''Game Theory: Analysis of Conflict,'' Harvard University Press, p.&nbs1 Chapter-preview links, ppvii–xi It has applications in all fields of social science, as well as in logic, systems science and computer science. Originally, it addressed two-person zero-sum games, in which each participant's gains or losses are exactly balanced by those of other participants. In the 21st century, game theory applies to a wide range of behavioral relations; it is now an umbrella term for the science of logical decision making in humans, animals, as well as computers. Modern game theory began with the idea of mixed-strategy equilibria in two-person zero-sum game and its proof by John von Neumann. Von Neumann's original proof used the Brouwer fixed-point theorem on continuous mappings into compact convex sets, which became a standard method in game theory and m ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Mechanism Design
Mechanism design is a field in economics and game theory that takes an objectives-first approach to designing economic mechanisms or incentives, toward desired objectives, in strategic settings, where players act rationally. Because it starts at the end of the game, then goes backwards, it is also called reverse game theory. It has broad applications, from economics and politics in such fields as market design, auction theory and social choice theory to networked-systems (internet interdomain routing, sponsored search auctions). Mechanism design studies solution concepts for a class of private-information games. Leonid Hurwicz explains that 'in a design problem, the goal function is the main "given", while the mechanism is the unknown. Therefore, the design problem is the "inverse" of traditional economic theory, which is typically devoted to the analysis of the performance of a given mechanism.' So, two distinguishing features of these games are: * that a game "designer" ch ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Participation Criterion
The participation criterion is a voting system criterion. Voting systems that fail the participation criterion are said to exhibit the no show paradox and allow a particularly unusual strategy of tactical voting: abstaining from an election can help a voter's preferred choice win. The criterion has been defined as follows: * In a deterministic framework, the participation criterion says that the addition of a ballot, where candidate A is strictly preferred to candidate B, to an existing tally of votes should not change the winner from candidate A to candidate B. * In a probabilistic framework, the participation criterion says that the addition of a ballot, where each candidate of the set X is strictly preferred to each other candidate, to an existing tally of votes should not reduce the probability that the winner is chosen from the set X. Plurality voting, approval voting, range voting, and the Borda count all satisfy the participation criterion. All Condorcet methods, Bucklin v ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Voting Systems
An electoral system or voting system is a set of rules that determine how elections and referendums are conducted and how their results are determined. Electoral systems are used in politics to elect governments, while non-political elections may take place in business, non-profit organisations and informal organisations. These rules govern all aspects of the voting process: when elections occur, who is allowed to vote, who can stand as a candidate, how ballots are marked and cast, how the ballots are counted, how votes translate into the election outcome, limits on campaign spending, and other factors that can affect the result. Political electoral systems are defined by constitutions and electoral laws, are typically conducted by election commissions, and can use multiple types of elections for different offices. Some electoral systems elect a single winner to a unique position, such as prime minister, president or governor, while others elect multiple winners, such as me ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Individual Rationality
Rational choice theory refers to a set of guidelines that help understand economic and social behaviour. The theory originated in the eighteenth century and can be traced back to political economist and philosopher, Adam Smith. The theory postulates that an individual will perform a cost-benefit analysis to determine whether an option is right for them.Gary Browning, Abigail Halcli, Frank Webster (2000). ''Understanding Contemporary Society: Theories of the Present'', London: SAGE Publications. It also suggests that an individual's self-driven rational actions will help better the overall economy. Rational choice theory looks at three concepts: rational actors, self interest and the invisible hand. Rationality can be used as an assumption for the behaviour of individuals in a wide range of contexts outside of economics. It is also used in political science, sociology, and philosophy. Overview The basic premise of rational choice theory is that the decisions made by individual ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Compensating Variation
In economics, compensating variation (CV) is a measure of utility change introduced by John Hicks (1939). 'Compensating variation' refers to the amount of additional money an agent would need to reach their initial utility after a change in prices, a change in product quality, or the introduction of new products. Compensating variation can be used to find the effect of a price change on an agent's net welfare. CV reflects new prices and the old utility level. It is often written using an expenditure function, e(p,u): :CV = e(p_1, u_1) - e(p_1, u_0) : = w - e(p_1, u_0) : = e(p_0, u_0) - e(p_1, u_0) where w is the wealth level, p_0 and p_1 are the old and new prices respectively, and u_0 and u_1 are the old and new utility levels respectively. The first equation can be interpreted as saying that, under the new price regime, the consumer would accept ''CV'' in exchange for allowing the change to occur. More intuitively, the equation can be written using the value function, v( ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Mechanism Design
Mechanism design is a field in economics and game theory that takes an objectives-first approach to designing economic mechanisms or incentives, toward desired objectives, in strategic settings, where players act rationally. Because it starts at the end of the game, then goes backwards, it is also called reverse game theory. It has broad applications, from economics and politics in such fields as market design, auction theory and social choice theory to networked-systems (internet interdomain routing, sponsored search auctions). Mechanism design studies solution concepts for a class of private-information games. Leonid Hurwicz explains that 'in a design problem, the goal function is the main "given", while the mechanism is the unknown. Therefore, the design problem is the "inverse" of traditional economic theory, which is typically devoted to the analysis of the performance of a given mechanism.' So, two distinguishing features of these games are: * that a game "designer" ch ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
