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Nakamura Number
In cooperative game theory and social choice theory, the Nakamura number measures the degree of rationality of preference aggregation rules (collective decision rules), such as voting rules. It is an indicator of the extent to which an aggregation rule can yield well-defined choices. *If the number of alternatives (candidates; options) to choose from is less than this number, then the rule in question will identify "best" alternatives without any problem. In contrast, *if the number of alternatives is greater than or equal to this number, the rule will fail to identify "best" alternatives for some pattern of voting (i.e., for some profile (tuple) of individual preferences), because a voting paradox will arise (a ''cycle'' generated such as alternative a socially preferred to alternative b, b to c, and c to a). The larger the Nakamura number a rule has, the greater the number of alternatives the rule can rationally deal with. For example, since (except in the case of four individuals ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Cooperative Game Theory
In game theory, a cooperative game (or coalitional game) is a game with competition between groups of players ("coalitions") due to the possibility of external enforcement of cooperative behavior (e.g. through contract law). Those are opposed to non-cooperative games in which there is either no possibility to forge alliances or all agreements need to be self-enforcing (e.g. through credible threats). Cooperative games are often analysed through the framework of cooperative game theory, which focuses on predicting which coalitions will form, the joint actions that groups take and the resulting collective payoffs. It is opposed to the traditional non-cooperative game theory which focuses on predicting individual players' actions and payoffs and analyzing Nash equilibria. Cooperative game theory provides a high-level approach as it only describes the structure, strategies and payoffs of coalitions, whereas non-cooperative game theory also looks at how bargaining procedures wil ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Behavioral Economics
Behavioral economics studies the effects of psychological, cognitive, emotional, cultural and social factors on the decisions of individuals or institutions, such as how those decisions vary from those implied by classical economic theory. Behavioral economics is primarily concerned with the bounds of rationality of economic agents. Behavioral models typically integrate insights from psychology, neuroscience and microeconomic theory. The study of behavioral economics includes how market decisions are made and the mechanisms that drive public opinion. The concepts used in behavioral economics today can be traced back to 18th-century economists, such as Adam Smith, who deliberated how the economic behavior of individuals could be influenced by their desires. The status of behavioral economics as a subfield of economics is a fairly recent development; the breakthroughs that laid the foundation for it were published through the last three decades of the 20th century. Beh ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Voting Theory
Social choice theory or social choice is a theoretical framework for analysis of combining individual opinions, preferences, interests, or welfares to reach a ''collective decision'' or ''social welfare'' in some sense.Amartya Sen (2008). "Social Choice,". ''The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics'', 2nd EditionAbstract & TOC./ref> Whereas choice theory is concerned with individuals making choices based on their preferences, social choice theory is concerned with how to translate the preferences of individuals into the preferences of a group. A non-theoretical example of a collective decision is enacting a law or set of laws under a constitution. Another example is voting, where individual preferences over candidates are collected to elect a person that best represents the group's preferences. Social choice blends elements of welfare economics and public choice theory. It is methodologically individualistic, in that it aggregates preferences and behaviors of individual membe ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Voting Paradox
The Condorcet paradox (also known as the voting paradox or the paradox of voting) in social choice theory is a situation noted by the Marquis de Condorcet in the late 18th century, in which collective preferences can be cyclic, even if the preferences of individual voters are not cyclic. This is paradoxical, because it means that majority wishes can be in conflict with each other: Suppose majorities prefer, for example, candidate A over B, B over C, and yet C over A. When this occurs, it is because the conflicting majorities are each made up of different groups of individuals. Thus an expectation that transitivity on the part of all individuals' preferences should result in transitivity of societal preferences is an example of a fallacy of composition. The paradox was independently discovered by Lewis Carroll and Edward J. Nanson, but its significance was not recognized until popularized by Duncan Black in the 1940s. Example Suppose we have three candidates, A, B, and C, and t ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
May's Theorem
In social choice theory, May's theorem states that simple majority voting is the only anonymous, neutral, and positively responsive social choice function between two alternatives. Further, this procedure is resolute when there are an odd number of voters and ties (indecision) are not allowed. Kenneth May first published this theorem in 1952. Various modifications have been suggested by others since the original publication. Mark Fey extended the proof to an infinite number of voters. Robert Goodin and Christian List showed that, among methods of aggregating first-preference votes over multiple alternatives, plurality rule uniquely satisfies May's conditions; under approval balloting, a similar statement can be made about approval voting. Arrow's theorem in particular does not apply to the case of two candidates, so this possibility result can be seen as a mirror analogue of that theorem. (Note that anonymity is a stronger form of non-dictatorship.) Another way of explaining ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Gibbard–Satterthwaite Theorem
In social choice theory, the Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem is a result published independently by philosopher Allan Gibbard in 1973 and economist Mark Satterthwaite in 1975. It deals with deterministic ordinal electoral systems that choose a single winner. It states that for every voting rule, one of the following three things must hold: # The rule is dictatorial, i.e. there exists a distinguished voter who can choose the winner; or # The rule limits the possible outcomes to two alternatives only; or # The rule is susceptible to tactical voting: in certain conditions, a voter's sincere ballot may not best defend their opinion. While the scope of this theorem is limited to ordinal voting, Gibbard's theorem is more general, in that it deals with processes of collective decision that may not be ordinal: for example, voting systems where voters assign grades to candidates. Gibbard's 1978 theorem and Hylland's theorem are even more general and extend these results to non-determi ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Recursively Enumerable Set
In computability theory, a set ''S'' of natural numbers is called computably enumerable (c.e.), recursively enumerable (r.e.), semidecidable, partially decidable, listable, provable or Turing-recognizable if: *There is an algorithm such that the set of input numbers for which the algorithm halts is exactly ''S''. Or, equivalently, *There is an algorithm that enumerates the members of ''S''. That means that its output is simply a list of all the members of ''S'': ''s''1, ''s''2, ''s''3, ... . If ''S'' is infinite, this algorithm will run forever. The first condition suggests why the term ''semidecidable'' is sometimes used. More precisely, if a number is in the set, one can ''decide'' this by running the algorithm, but if the number is not in the set, the algorithm runs forever, and no information is returned. A set that is "completely decidable" is a computable set. The second condition suggests why ''computably enumerable'' is used. The abbreviations c.e. and r.e. are oft ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Lattice (order)
A lattice is an abstract structure studied in the mathematical subdisciplines of order theory and abstract algebra. It consists of a partially ordered set in which every pair of elements has a unique supremum (also called a least upper bound or join (mathematics), join) and a unique infimum (also called a greatest lower bound or meet (mathematics), meet). An example is given by the power set of a set, partially ordered by Subset, inclusion, for which the supremum is the Union (set theory), union and the infimum is the Intersection (set theory), intersection. Another example is given by the natural numbers, partially ordered by divisibility, for which the supremum is the least common multiple and the infimum is the greatest common divisor. Lattices can also be characterized as algebraic structures satisfying certain axiomatic Identity (mathematics), identities. Since the two definitions are equivalent, lattice theory draws on both order theory and universal algebra. Semilatti ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Recursive Sets
In computability theory, a set of natural numbers is called computable, recursive, or decidable if there is an algorithm which takes a number as input, terminates after a finite amount of time (possibly depending on the given number) and correctly decides whether the number belongs to the set or not. A set which is not computable is called noncomputable or undecidable. A more general class of sets than the computable ones consists of the computably enumerable (c.e.) sets, also called semidecidable sets. For these sets, it is only required that there is an algorithm that correctly decides when a number ''is'' in the set; the algorithm may give no answer (but not the wrong answer) for numbers not in the set. Formal definition A subset S of the natural numbers is called computable if there exists a total computable function f such that f(x)=1 if x\in S and f(x)=0 if x\notin S. In other words, the set S is computable if and only if the indicator function \mathbb_ is computable. ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Lebesgue Measure
In measure theory, a branch of mathematics, the Lebesgue measure, named after French mathematician Henri Lebesgue, is the standard way of assigning a measure to subsets of ''n''-dimensional Euclidean space. For ''n'' = 1, 2, or 3, it coincides with the standard measure of length, area, or volume. In general, it is also called ''n''-dimensional volume, ''n''-volume, or simply volume. It is used throughout real analysis, in particular to define Lebesgue integration. Sets that can be assigned a Lebesgue measure are called Lebesgue-measurable; the measure of the Lebesgue-measurable set ''A'' is here denoted by ''λ''(''A''). Henri Lebesgue described this measure in the year 1901, followed the next year by his description of the Lebesgue integral. Both were published as part of his dissertation in 1902. Definition For any interval I = ,b/math>, or I = (a, b), in the set \mathbb of real numbers, let \ell(I)= b - a denote its length. For any subset E\subseteq\mathbb, the Lebesg ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Social Choice Theory
Social choice theory or social choice is a theoretical framework for analysis of combining individual opinions, preferences, interests, or welfares to reach a ''collective decision'' or ''social welfare'' in some sense. Amartya Sen (2008). "Social Choice,". ''The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics'', 2nd EditionAbstract & TOC./ref> Whereas choice theory is concerned with individuals making choices based on their preferences, social choice theory is concerned with how to translate the preferences of individuals into the preferences of a group. A non-theoretical example of a collective decision is enacting a law or set of laws under a constitution. Another example is voting, where individual preferences over candidates are collected to elect a person that best represents the group's preferences. Social choice blends elements of welfare economics and public choice theory. It is methodologically individualistic, in that it aggregates preferences and behaviors of individual mem ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
