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Lindahl Tax
A Lindahl tax is a form of taxation conceived by Erik Lindahl in which individuals pay for Public good (economics), public goods according to their marginal benefits. In other words, they pay according to the amount of satisfaction or utility they derive from the consumption of an additional unit of the public good. Lindahl taxation is designed to maximize Economic efficiency, efficiency for each individual and provide the optimal level of a public good. Lindahl taxes can be seen as an individual's share of the collective Tax incidence, tax burden of an economy. The optimal level of a public good is that quantity at which the willingness to pay for one more unit of the good, taken in totality for all the individuals is equal to the marginal cost of supplying that good. Lindahl tax is the optimal quantity times the willingness to pay for one more unit of that good at this quantity.0 . Existence Duncan K. Foley, Foley proved that, If the utility functions have continuous derivati ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Taxation
A tax is a mandatory financial charge or levy imposed on an individual or legal person, legal entity by a governmental organization to support government spending and public expenditures collectively or to Pigouvian tax, regulate and reduce negative Externality, externalities. Tax compliance refers to policy actions and individual behavior aimed at ensuring that taxpayers are paying the right amount of tax at the right time and securing the correct tax allowances and tax relief. The first known taxation occurred in Ancient Egypt around 3000–2800 BC. Taxes consist of direct tax, direct or indirect taxes and may be paid in money or as labor equivalent. All countries have a tax system in place to pay for public, common societal, or agreed national needs and for the functions of government. Some countries levy a flat tax, flat percentage rate of taxation on personal annual income, but most progressive tax, scale taxes are progressive based on brackets of yearly income amounts. Most ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Ashish Goel
Ashish Goel is an American professor whose research focuses on the design, analysis and applications of algorithms. He is a professor of Management Science and Engineering (and by courtesy Computer Science) at Stanford University. Early life and early education Ashish Goel was born in Uttar Pradesh in India. He did his schooling at Uttar Pradesh including at St. Peter's, Agra. He was ranked first in IIT JEE 1990. He graduated with a B.Tech. in Computer Science from IIT Kanpur in 1994. He then went on to obtain a Ph.D. in Computer Science from Stanford University in 1999. Academic work Ashish Goel's research has spanned algorithmic problems in several areas of computer science and computational social science including computer networks, theoretical computer science, molecular self-assembly, algorithmic game theory, and computational social choice. Ashish Goel's early work resolved several open algorithmic problems in graph theory and computer networks including showing that ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Incentive Compatible
In game theory and economics, a mechanism is called incentive-compatible (IC) if every participant can achieve their own best outcome by reporting their true preferences. For example, there is incentive compatibility if high-risk clients are better off in identifying themselves as high-risk to insurance firms, who only sell discounted insurance to high-risk clients. Likewise, they would be worse off if they pretend to be low-risk. Low-risk clients who pretend to be high-risk would also be worse off. The concept is attributed to the Russian-born American economist Leonid Hurwicz. Typology There are several different degrees of incentive-compatibility: * The stronger degree is dominant-strategy incentive-compatibility (DSIC). This means that truth-telling is a weakly-dominant strategy, i.e. you fare best or at least not worse by being truthful, regardless of what the others do. In a DSIC mechanism, strategic considerations cannot help any agent achieve better outcomes than the tru ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Pareto-efficient
In welfare economics, a Pareto improvement formalizes the idea of an outcome being "better in every possible way". A change is called a Pareto improvement if it leaves at least one person in society better off without leaving anyone else worse off than they were before. A situation is called Pareto efficient or Pareto optimal if all possible Pareto improvements have already been made; in other words, there are no longer any ways left to make one person better off without making some other person worse-off. In social choice theory, the same concept is sometimes called the unanimity principle, which says that if ''everyone'' in a society ( non-strictly) prefers A to B, society as a whole also non-strictly prefers A to B. The Pareto front consists of all Pareto-efficient situations. In addition to the context of efficiency in ''allocation'', the concept of Pareto efficiency also arises in the context of ''efficiency in production'' vs. ''x-inefficiency'': a set of outputs of goo ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Quadratic Voting
Quadratic voting (QV) is a voting system that encourages voters to express their true relative intensity of preference (utility) between multiple options or elections. By doing so, quadratic voting seeks to mitigate tyranny of the majority—where minority preferences are by default repressed since under majority rule, majority cooperation is needed to make any change. Quadratic voting prevents this failure mode by allowing voters to vote multiple times on any one option at the cost of not being able to vote as much on other options. This enables minority issues to be addressed where the minority has a sufficiently strong preference relative to the majority (since motivated minorities can vote multiple times) while also disincentivizing extremism / putting all votes on one issue (since additional votes require more and more sacrifice of influence over other issues). Quadratic voting works by having voters allocate "credits" (usually distributed equally, although some proposals tal ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Concave Function
In mathematics, a concave function is one for which the function value at any convex combination of elements in the domain is greater than or equal to that convex combination of those domain elements. Equivalently, a concave function is any function for which the hypograph is convex. The class of concave functions is in a sense the opposite of the class of convex functions. A concave function is also synonymously called concave downwards, concave down, convex upwards, convex cap, or upper convex. Definition A real-valued function f on an interval (or, more generally, a convex set in vector space) is said to be ''concave'' if, for any x and y in the interval and for any \alpha \in ,1/math>, :f((1-\alpha )x+\alpha y)\geq (1-\alpha ) f(x)+\alpha f(y) A function is called ''strictly concave'' if :f((1-\alpha )x+\alpha y) > (1-\alpha ) f(x)+\alpha f(y) for any \alpha \in (0,1) and x \neq y. For a function f: \mathbb \to \mathbb, this second definition merely states that for ev ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Homogeneous Function
In mathematics, a homogeneous function is a function of several variables such that the following holds: If each of the function's arguments is multiplied by the same scalar (mathematics), scalar, then the function's value is multiplied by some power of this scalar; the power is called the degree of homogeneity, or simply the ''degree''. That is, if is an integer, a function of variables is homogeneous of degree if :f(sx_1,\ldots, sx_n)=s^k f(x_1,\ldots, x_n) for every x_1, \ldots, x_n, and s\ne 0. This is also referred to a ''th-degree'' or ''th-order'' homogeneous function. For example, a homogeneous polynomial of degree defines a homogeneous function of degree . The above definition extends to functions whose domain of a function, domain and codomain are vector spaces over a Field (mathematics), field : a function f : V \to W between two -vector spaces is ''homogeneous'' of degree k if for all nonzero s \in F and v \in V. This definition is often further generalized to f ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Convex Programming
Convex optimization is a subfield of mathematical optimization that studies the problem of minimizing convex functions over convex sets (or, equivalently, maximizing concave functions over convex sets). Many classes of convex optimization problems admit polynomial-time algorithms, whereas mathematical optimization is in general NP-hard. Definition Abstract form A convex optimization problem is defined by two ingredients: * The ''objective function'', which is a real-valued convex function of ''n'' variables, f :\mathcal D \subseteq \mathbb^n \to \mathbb; * The ''feasible set'', which is a convex subset C\subseteq \mathbb^n. The goal of the problem is to find some \mathbf \in C attaining :\inf \. In general, there are three options regarding the existence of a solution: * If such a point ''x''* exists, it is referred to as an ''optimal point'' or ''solution''; the set of all optimal points is called the ''optimal set''; and the problem is called ''solvable''. * If f is unbo ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Free-rider Problem
In economics, the free-rider problem is a type of market failure that occurs when those who benefit from resources, public goods and common pool resources do not pay for them or under-pay. Free riders may overuse common pool resources by not paying for them, neither directly through fees or tolls, nor indirectly through taxes. Consequently, the common pool resource may be under-produced, overused, or degraded. Additionally, despite evidence that people tend to be cooperative by nature (a prosocial behaviour), the presence of free-riders has been shown to cause cooperation to deteriorate, perpetuating the free-rider problem. In social science, the free-rider problem is the question of how to limit free riding and its negative effects in these situations, such as the free-rider problem of when property rights are not clearly defined and imposed. The free-rider problem is common with public goods which are non-excludable and non-rivalrous. The non-excludability and non-rivalr ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Strategyproofness
In mechanism design, a strategyproof (SP) mechanism is a game form in which each player has a weakly- dominant strategy, so that no player can gain by "spying" over the other players to know what they are going to play. When the players have private information (e.g. their type or their value to some item), and the strategy space of each player consists of the possible information values (e.g. possible types or values), a truthful mechanism is a game in which revealing the true information is a weakly-dominant strategy for each player. An SP mechanism is also called dominant-strategy-incentive-compatible (DSIC), to distinguish it from other kinds of incentive compatibility. A SP mechanism is immune to manipulations by individual players (but not by coalitions). In contrast, in a group strategyproof mechanism, no group of people can collude to misreport their preferences in a way that makes every member better off. In a strong group strategyproof mechanism, no group of people can c ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Core (game Theory)
In cooperative game theory, the core is the set of feasible allocations or imputations where no coalition of agents can benefit by breaking away from the grand coalition. An allocation is said to be in the ''core'' of a game if there is no coalition that can improve upon it. The core is then the set of all feasible allocations. Origin The idea of the core already appeared in the writings of , at the time referred to as the ''contract curve''. Even though von Neumann and Morgenstern considered it an interesting concept, they only worked with zero-sum games where the core is always empty. The modern definition of the core is due to Gillies. Definition Consider a transferable utility cooperative game (N,v) where N denotes the set of players and v is the characteristic function. An imputation x\in\mathbb^N is ''dominated'' by another imputation y if there exists a coalition C, such that each player in C weakly-prefers y (x_i\leq y_i for all i\in C) and there exists i\in ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
