Definist Fallacy

	Definist Fallacy Definist fallacy may refer to: * Persuasive definition A persuasive definition is a form of stipulative definition which purports to describe the true or commonly accepted meaning of a term, while in reality stipulating an uncommon or altered use, usually to support an argument for some view, or to cr ..., misrepresenting an idiosyncratic definition as a term's common meaning * A purported fallacy involving the definition of one property in terms of another, described by William Frankena as part of a 1939 critique of G.E. Moore's writing about the naturalistic fallacy See also * Fallacies of definition {{Disambiguation ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu]
	Persuasive Definition A persuasive definition is a form of stipulative definition which purports to describe the true or commonly accepted meaning of a term, while in reality stipulating an uncommon or altered use, usually to support an argument for some view, or to create or alter rights, duties or crimes. The terms thus defined will often involve emotionally charged but imprecise notions, such as "freedom", "terrorism", "antisemitism, "democracy", etc. In argumentation the use of a persuasive definition is sometimes called definist fallacy. (The latter sometimes more broadly refers to a fallacy of a definition based on improper identification of two distinct properties.) Examples of persuasive definitions (definist fallacies) include: * Democrat – "a leftist who desires to overtax the corporations and abolish freedom in the economic sphere". * Atheist – "someone who doesn't yet realize that God exists." Persuasive definitions commonly appear in controversial topics such as polit ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu]
	Naturalistic Fallacy In metaethics, the naturalistic fallacy is the claim that it is possible to define good in terms of merely described entities, properties, or processes such as ''pleasant'', ''desirable'', or '' fitness''. The term was introduced by British philosopher G. E. Moore in his 1903 book ''Principia Ethica''. Moore's naturalistic fallacy is closely related to the is–ought problem, which comes from David Hume's '' Treatise of Human Nature'' (1738–40); however, unlike Hume's view of the is–ought problem, Moore (and other proponents of ethical non-naturalism) did not consider the naturalistic fallacy to be at odds with moral realism. Common uses The is–ought problem The term ''naturalistic fallacy'' is sometimes used to label the problematic inference of an ''ought'' from an ''is'' (the is–ought problem). Michael Ridge relevantly elaborates that " e intuitive idea is that evaluative conclusions require at least one evaluative premise—purely factual premises about the na ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu]