UN Security Council Veto Power

The United Nations Security Council veto power is the power of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) to veto any "substantive" resolution. They also happen to be the nuclear-weapon states (NWS) under the terms of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. However, a permanent member's abstention or absence does not prevent a draft resolution from being adopted. This veto power does not apply to "procedural" votes, as determined by the permanent members themselves. A permanent member can also block the selection of a Secretary-General, although a formal veto is unnecessary since the vote is taken behind closed doors.

The veto power is controversial. Supporters regard it as a promoter of international stability, a check against military interventions, and a critical safeguard against United States domination. Critics say that the veto is the most undemocratic element of the UN, as well as the main cause of inaction on war crimes and crimes against humanity, as it effectively prevents UN action against the permanent members and their allies.

UN Charter

The veto power originates in Article 27 of the United Nations Charter, which states:

# Each member of the Security Council shall have a vote.
# Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members.
# Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members including the concurring votes of the permanent members; provided that, in decisions under Chapter VI, and under paragraph 3 of Article 52, a party to a dispute shall abstain from voting.

Chapter VI and Article 52 only involve Security Council recommendations, and not binding resolutions (which are under Chapter VII), thus ensuring that the permanent members have veto power over all UN sanctions and all UN peacekeeping operations.

A negative vote from any of the permanent members will block the adoption of a draft resolution. However, a permanent member that abstains or is absent from the vote will not block a resolution from being passed.

Although the "power of veto" is not mentioned by name in the UN Charter, Article 27 requires concurring votes from the permanent members. For this reason, the "power of veto" is also referred to as the principle of "great power unanimity" and the veto itself is sometimes referred to as the "great power veto".

Origins

The idea of a veto over the actions of international organisations was not new in 1945. In the League of Nations, every member of the League Council had a veto on any non-procedural issue. At the foundation of the League, there were 4 permanent and 4 non-permanent members. The League Council had expanded by 1936 to have 4 permanent and 11 non-permanent members, which meant that there were 15 countries with veto power. The existence of such a large number of vetoes made it very difficult for the League to agree on many issues.

The veto was the result of extensive discussion during the negotiations for the formation of the United Nations at Dumbarton Oaks (August–October 1944) and Yalta (February 1945). The veto provision became known as the Yalta formula. The evidence is that the United States, Soviet Union, United Kingdom, and China all favored the principle of unanimity, not only out of desire for the major powers to act together, but also to protect their own sovereign rights and national interests. Harry S. Truman, who became President of the United States in April 1945, wrote: "All our experts, civil and military, favored it, and without such a veto no arrangement would have passed the Senate."

As the precise limits of the veto power were seen as ambiguous, the voting formula subcommittee presented a formal questionnaire to the sponsoring members (US, UK, USSR, and China) containing 22 questions on how they interpreted the veto power. They responded with a 10-point statement (''Statement by the Delegations of the Four Sponsoring Governments on Voting Procedure in the Security Council''), also called the San Francisco Declaration, which France later joined as well. The statement says that a veto cannot be used to stop the Council from considering a topic at all, but interpreted its applicability broadly, including that the veto power could be exercised in the question of whether an issue is procedural or non-procedural. This has been called a ''double veto'' as it involves initiating a vote on whether an issue is procedural, using a veto to force it to be termed non-procedural, and then using a second veto on the issue itself. As the other countries disagreed with this interpretation, it was not adopted into the Charter, and it is unclear whether the San Francisco Declaration is formally binding. The permissibility of a double veto has never been resolved, but the permanent members later reached an informal agreement to avoid using it, and it has not been used since 1959.

A central goal of the United Nations at its founding was to make sure the five Great Powers would continue working with the UN, in order to avoid the lack of universality that had diminished the political strength of the League of Nations. At San Francisco, the Big Five made it clear that there would be no United Nations if they were not given the veto. Francis O. Wilcox, an adviser to the US delegation, described the dramatic negotiations: "At San Francisco, the issue was made crystal clear by the leaders of the Big Five: it was either the Charter with the veto or no Charter at all. Senator Connally rom the US delegationdramatically tore up a copy of the Charter during one of his speeches and reminded the small states that they would be guilty of that same if they opposed the unanimity principle. 'You may, if you wish,' he said, 'go home from this Conference and say that you have defeated the veto. But what will be your answer when you are asked: "Where is the Charter"?

Bypassing the veto

The veto only applies to votes that come before the United Nations Security Council, so the United Nations General Assembly is unaffected.

From Article 27(3), both elected and permanent members must abstain from certain votes about issues where they are among the interested parties. The specific language was a compromise between the idea that one should not be able to pass judgement on their own actions, and the principle that the Security Council should not act against its permanent members. However, there are no clear guidelines about how to establish when the requirements are met, and its application has been inconsistent.

In 1950, the General Assembly adopted the "Uniting for Peace" resolution, which was backed by the United States as a safeguard against potential vetoes by the USSR. It has been argued that with the adoption of this resolution, and given the interpretations of the Assembly's powers that became customary international law as a result, that the Security Council "power of veto" problem could be surmounted.