Background
A general understanding of Somalia's geography, demography and culture is important in this analysis. Somalia sits on the Horn of Africa at the Entrance of the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea. Djibouti to the North, Ethiopia to the West and Kenya to the South provides its borders of approximately 8.5 million people, more than 98 percent are Somali giving it unusual ethnic homogeneity. More than 45 percent of the population are under 15 years of age. About 70 percent of Somali's are nomads who travel with their livestock, herds through Somalia, Kenya and Ethiopia. A lack of definite borders contributes to the unresolved land disputes between Somalia and its neighbors. Following the eruption and escalation of the civil war in Somalia in 1991, the UN and the Organization of African Unity (OAU) intervened, citing the war and starvation. Of the Somali population of 10 million people, over half were in severe danger of starvation and malnutrition-related disease, mostly in the drought-stricken rural areas. Another 1.5 million were judged at moderate risk of malnutrition. Three hundred thousand people died outright in the early months of 1992 and another 3 million fled the country as refugees. The UN was engaged in Somalia from early in 1991 when the civil strife began. UN personnel were withdrawn on several occasions during sporadic flare-ups of violence. A series of Security Council resolutions (733, 746) and diplomatic visits eventually helped impose a ceasefire between the two key factions, signed at the end of March 1992. These efforts were aided by other international bodies, such as the Organisation for African Unity, the League of Arab States and the Organisation of the Islamic Conference.Creation
Ineffectiveness
Despite the UN's efforts, all over Somalia the ceasefire was ignored, fighting continued, and continued to increase, putting the relief operations at great risk. The main parties to the ceasefire, General Mohamed Farrah Aidid and "President" Ali Mahdi Muhammad, once again showing the difficult and troubled relations between the warlords, proved to be difficult negotiating partners and continually frustrated attempts to move the peacekeepers and supplies. In August 1992 the Security Council endorsed the sending of another 3,000 troops to the region to protect relief efforts. However, most of these troops were never sent. Over the final quarter of 1992, the situation in Somalia continued to get worse. Factions in Somalia were splintering into smaller factions and splintering again. Agreements for food distribution with one party were worthless when the stores had to be shipped through the territory of another. Some elements were actively opposing the UNOSOM intervention. Troops were shot at, aid ships attacked and prevented from docking, cargo aircraft were fired upon and aid agencies, public and private, were subject to threats, robbery and extortion. Meanwhile, hundreds, if not thousands of poverty stricken refugees were starving to death every day. By November 1992, General Mohamed Farrah Aidid had grown confident enough to formally defy the Security Council and demand the withdrawal of peace keepers, as well as declaring hostile intent against any further UN deployments.Transition to UNITAF and UNOSOM II
In November 1992, the United States of America offered to establish a multinational force under its own leadership to secure the humanitarian operation. This offer was accepted by the Security Council, and what became known as the Unified Task Force ( UNITAF) was authorized to utilize "all necessary means" to ensure the protection of the relief efforts. Accordingly, the Security Council suspended any further significant strengthening of UNOSOM as UN affairs in Somalia were subsumed by UNITAF (also known to Americans as Operation Restore Hope). With only a handful of the 3,000 plus troops envisaged for UNOSOM ever put in place, the Security Council left it to “the discretion of the Secretary General” as to what should be done with the abortive mission. UNITAF was composed of forces from 24 different countries, with the vast bulk contributed by the United States. UNITAF soon secured the relief operations which were being coordinated and carried out by UNOSOM, which was also attempting to negotiate a political end to the conflict. Indeed, although UNOSOM had been replaced by UNITAF, it was technically still in operation and would remain ready to resume its function when UNITAF had met its goals of creating a secure environment for humanitarian relief. The Secretary-General convened a meeting in early 1993 in which 14 important Somalia political and rebel factions agreed to hand over all of their weapons to UNITAF and UNOSOM, and over $130 million was pledged by donors at an aid conference that year to assist in reconstruction. However, Somalia continued the stumble, and in March the UN decided to transform the UNITAF mission into what came to be known as UNOSOM II. The mandate of UNOSOM II stipulated that the operation was to secure continued relief efforts and, more significantly, to restore peace and rebuild the Somali state and economy.Statistics
In the few months of its operation, 54 military observers and 893 military personnel served with UNOSOM I, supported by international civilian and local staff. The mission suffered six fatalities. Contributing nations were:See also
* Operation Provide Relief * Operation United Shield * UNITAF * UNOSOM IIReferences
Further reading
*Allard, Colonel Kenneth, ''Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned'', National Defense University Press (1995).External links