Pramana

''Pramana'' (; IAST: Pramāṇa) literally means " proof" and "means of knowledge".pramANa
Sanskrit-English Dictionary, Koeln University, GermanyJames Lochtefeld, "Pramana" in The Illustrated Encyclopedia of Hinduism, Vol. 2: N-Z, Rosen Publishing. , pages 520-521 One of the core concepts in Indian epistemology, pramanas are one or more reliable and valid means by which human beings gain accurate, true knowledge. The focus of pramana is how correct knowledge can be acquired, how one knows, how one does not know, and to what extent knowledge pertinent about someone or something can be acquired.Karl Potter (2002), Presuppositions of India's Philosophies, Motilal Banarsidass, , pages 25-26DPS Bhawuk (2011), Spirituality and Indian Psychology (Editor: Anthony Marsella), Springer, , page 172

While the number of pramanas varies widely from system to system, many ancient and medieval Indian texts identify six pramanas as correct means of accurate knowledge and attaining to the truth. Three of these are almost universally accepted: perception ( ), inference (), and "word" ('' śabda''), meaning the testimony of past or present reliable experts. The other three pramanas are more contentious: comparison and analogy (); postulation or derivation from circumstances (); and non-perception, or proof from absence (). Gavin Flood, An Introduction to Hinduism, Cambridge University Press, , page 225 Each of these are further categorized in terms of conditionality, completeness, confidence, and possibility of error.

The various schools of Indian philosophies vary on how many of these six ''pramanas'' are epistemically reliable and valid means to knowledge. For example, the Carvaka school of the Śramaṇa tradition holds that only one (perception) is a reliable source of knowledge, Buddhism holds that two (perception, inference) are valid means, Jainism holds three (perception, inference and testimony) as valid,John A. Grimes, A Concise Dictionary of Indian Philosophy: Sanskrit Terms Defined in English, State University of New York Press, , page 238 and the Mimamsa and Advaita Vedanta schools of Hinduism hold that all six ''pramanas'' are useful and can be reliable means to knowledge.
*Eliott Deutsche (2000), in Philosophy of Religion : Indian Philosophy Vol 4 (Editor: Roy Perrett), Routledge, , pages 245-248;
*John A. Grimes, A Concise Dictionary of Indian Philosophy: Sanskrit Terms Defined in English, State University of New York Press, , page 238 The various schools of Indian philosophy have debated whether one of the six forms of ''pramana'' can be derived from another and the relative uniqueness of each. For example, Buddhism considers Buddha and other "valid persons", "valid scriptures" and "valid minds" as indisputable, but that such testimony is a form of perception and inference ''pramanas''.

Etymology

literally means "proof," based on the word ''pramā.'' The Sanskrit root (), is a preposition meaning "outward" or "forth", and () means "measurement." means "correct notion, true knowledge, basis, foundation, understand." being a nominalization of the word, means that which is a "means of acquiring or certain, correct, true knowledge".

forms one part of a trio of concepts, which describe the ancient Indian view on how knowledge is gained. The other two concepts are , (, the subject, the knower) and (, the object, the knowable). They each influence the knowledge, by their own characteristic and the process of knowing.

In Buddhist literature, is referred to as . is also related to the Indian concept of ''yukti'' () which means active application of epistemology or what one already knows, innovation, clever expedients or connections, methodological or reasoning trick, joining together, application of contrivance, means, method, novelty or device to more efficiently achieve a purpose.R Narasimha (2012), Asia, Europe, and the Emergence of Modern Science: Knowledge Crossing Boundaries, Palgrave Macmillan, , pages 95-97 ''yukti'' and are discussed together in some Indian texts, with ''yukti'' described as active process of gaining knowledge in contrast to passive process of gaining knowledge through observation/perception. The texts on ''pramana'', particularly by Samkhya, Yoga, Mimamsa and Advaita Vedanta schools of Hinduism, often include in their scope what might be termed "theories of errors"; that is, philosophies regarding the reason for human error, how one may know if one is wrong, and—if so—how one can discover whether one's epistemic method or conclusion was flawed, as well what one ought then do in order to correct it.

Hinduism

Six ''pramanas''

Hinduism identifies six ''pramanas'' as correct means of accurate knowledge and to truths: ''Pratyakṣa'' (evidence/perception), ''Anumāna'' (inference), ''Upamāna'' (comparison and analogy), ''Arthāpatti'' (postulation, derivation from circumstances), ''Anupalabdhi'' (non-perception, negative/cognitive proof) and ''Śabda'' (word, testimony of past or present reliable experts).

In verse 1.2.1 of the Taittirīya Āraṇyaka (c. 9th–6th centuries BCE), "four means of attaining correct knowledge" are listed: ''smṛti'' ("scripture, tradition"), ''pratyakṣa'' ("perception"), ''aitihya'' ("expert testimony, historical tradition"), and ''anumāna'' ("inference").

In some texts such as by Vedvyasa, ten ''pramanas'' are discussed, Krtakoti discusses eight epistemically reliable means to correct knowledge. The most widely discussed ''pramanas'' are:

''Pratyakṣa''

''Pratyakṣa'' (प्रत्यक्ष) means perception. It is of two types in Hindu texts: external and internal. External perception is described as that arising from the interaction of five senses and worldly objects, while internal perception is described by this school as that of inner sense, the mind.MM Kamal (1998), The Epistemology of the Carvaka Philosophy, Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies, 46(2): 13-16 According to Matt Stefan, the distinction is between direct perception (''anubhava/anubhavaḥ'') and remembered perception (''smriti/smṛti'').

The ancient and medieval Indian texts identify four requirements for correct perception:Karl Potter (1977), Meaning and Truth, in Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies, Volume 2, Princeton University Press, Reprinted in 1995 by Motilal Banarsidass, , pages 160-168
# ''Indriyārthasannikarṣa/Indriyārthasannikarṣaḥ'' (direct experience by one's sensory organ(s) with the object, whatever is being studied);
# ''Avyapadeśya'' (non-verbal; correct perception is not through hearsay, according to ancient Indian scholars, where one's sensory organ relies on accepting or rejecting someone else's perception, i.e., no intermediate agency involved in sensory perception);
# ''Avyabhicāra'' (consistency; does not wander; correct perception does not change, nor is it the result of deception because one's sensory organ or means of observation is drifting, defective, suspect);
# ''Vyavasāyātmika'' (definite, lacks bias, and lacks inferential judgment and corresponding exertion to make such; correct perception excludes judgments of doubt, either because of one's failure to observe all the details, or because one is mixing inference with observation and observing what one wants to observe, or not observing what one does not want to observe).

Some ancient scholars proposed "unusual perception" as ''pramāṇa'' and called it internal perception, a proposal contested by other Indian scholars. The internal perception concepts included ''pratibhā'' (intuition), ''sāmānyalakṣaṇapratyakṣa'' (a form of induction from perceived specifics to a universal), and ''jñānalakṣaṇapratyakṣa'' (a form of perception of prior processes and previous states of a 'topic of study' by observing its current state). Further, some schools of Hinduism considered and refined rules of accepting uncertain knowledge from ''pratyakṣapranama'', so as to contrast ''nirṇaya'' (definite judgment, conclusion) from ''anadhyavasāya'' (indefinite judgment).

''Anumāna''

''Anumāna'' (अनुमान) means ‘inference’ in Sanskrit, though it often is used to mean ‘guess’ in modern Indian languages. In the context of classical philosophy, it is described as reaching a new conclusion and truth from one or more observations and previous truths by applying reason. Observing smoke and inferring fire is an example of ''Anumana''. In all except one Hindu philosophies, this is a valid and useful means to knowledge. The method of inference is explained by Indian texts as consisting of three parts: ''pratijna'' (hypothesis), ''hetu'' (a reason), and ''drshtanta'' (examples).James Lochtefeld, "Anumana" in The Illustrated Encyclopedia of Hinduism, Vol. 1: A-M, Rosen Publishing. , page 46-47 The hypothesis must further be broken down into two parts, state the ancient Indian scholars: ''sadhya'' (that idea which needs to proven or disproven) and ''paksha'' (the object on which the ''sadhya'' is predicated). The inference is conditionally true if ''sapaksha'' (positive examples as evidence) are present, and if ''vipaksha'' (negative examples as counter-evidence) are absent. For rigor, the Indian philosophies also state further epistemic steps. For example, they demand ''Vyapti''—the requirement that the ''hetu'' (reason) must necessarily and separately account for the inference in "all" cases, in both ''sapaksha'' and ''vipaksha''. A conditionally proven hypothesis is called a ''nigamana'' (conclusion).

''Upamāna''

''Upamāna'' (उपमान) means comparison and analogy. Some Hindu schools consider it as a proper means of knowledge. ''Upamana'', states Lochtefeld, may be explained with the example of a traveller who has never visited lands or islands with endemic population of wildlife. He or she is told, by someone who has been there, that in those lands you see an animal that sort of looks like a cow, grazes like cow but is different from a cow in such and such way. Such use of analogy and comparison is, state the Indian epistemologists, a valid means of conditional knowledge, as it helps the traveller identify the new animal later.James Lochtefeld, "Upamana" in The Illustrated Encyclopedia of Hinduism, Vol. 2: N-Z, Rosen Publishing. , page 721 The subject of comparison is formally called ''upameyam'', the object of comparison is called ''upamanam'', while the attribute(s) are identified as ''samanya''.Monier Williams (1893), Indian Wisdom - Religious, Philosophical and Ethical Doctrines of the Hindus, Luzac & Co, London, pages 457-458 Thus, explains Monier Williams, if a boy says "her face is like the moon in charmingness", "her face" is ''upameyam'', the moon is ''upamanam'', and charmingness is ''samanya''. The 7th-century text Bhaṭṭikāvya in verses 10.28 through 10.63 discusses many types of comparisons and analogies, identifying when this epistemic method is more useful and reliable, and when it is not. In various ancient and medieval texts of Hinduism, 32 types of ''Upamāna'' and their value in epistemology are debated.

''Arthāpatti''

''Arthāpatti'' (अर्थापत्ति) means postulation, derivation from circumstances. In contemporary logic, this ''pramana'' is similar to circumstantial implication. As example, if a person left in a boat on river earlier, and the time is now past the expected time of arrival, then the circumstances support the truth postulate that the person has arrived. Many Indian scholars considered this ''pramana'' as invalid or at best weak, because the boat may have gotten delayed or diverted. However, in cases such as deriving the time of a future sunrise or sunset, this method was asserted by the proponents to be reliable. Another common example for ''arthapatti'' in ancient Hindu texts is, that if "Devadatta is fat" and "Devadatta does not eat in day", then the following must be true: "Devadatta eats in the night". This form of postulation and deriving from circumstances is, claim the Indian scholars, a means to discovery, proper insight and knowledge. The Hindu schools that accept this means of knowledge state that this method is a valid means to conditional knowledge and truths about a subject and object in original premises or different premises. The schools that do not accept this method, state that postulation, extrapolation and circumstantial implication is either derivable from other ''pramanas'' or flawed means to correct knowledge, instead one must rely on direct perception or proper inference.

''Anupalabdhi''

''Anupalabdhi'' (अनुपलब्धि) means non-perception, negative/cognitive proof. ''Anupalabdhi pramana'' suggests that knowing a negative, such as "there is no jug in this room" is a form of valid knowledge. If something can be observed or inferred or proven as non-existent or impossible, then one knows more than what one did without such means. In the two schools of Hinduism that consider ''Anupalabdhi'' as epistemically valuable, a valid conclusion is either ''sadrupa'' (positive) or ''asadrupa'' (negative) relation—both correct and valuable. Like other ''pramana'', Indian scholars refined ''Anupalabdi'' to four types: non-perception of the cause, non-perception of the effect, non-perception of object, and non-perception of contradiction. Only two schools of Hinduism accepted and developed the concept "non-perception" as a ''pramana''. The schools that endorsed ''Anupalabdi'' affirmed that it as valid and useful when the other five ''pramanas'' fail in one's pursuit of knowledge and truth.

''Abhava'' (अभाव) means non-existence. Some scholars consider ''Anupalabdi'' to be same as ''Abhava'', while others consider ''Anupalabdi'' and ''Abhava'' as different. ''Abhava-pramana'' has been discussed in ancient Hindu texts in the context of '' Padārtha'' (पदार्थ, referent of a term). A ''Padartha'' is defined as that which is simultaneously ''Astitva'' (existent), ''Jneyatva'' (knowable) and ''Abhidheyatva'' (nameable). Specific examples of ''padartha'', states Bartley, include ''dravya'' (substance), '' guna'' (quality), ''karma'' (activity/motion), ''samanya/jati'' (universal/class property), ''samavaya'' (inherence) and ''vishesha'' (individuality). ''Abhava'' is then explained as "referents of negative expression" in contrast to " referents of positive expression" in ''Padartha''. An absence, state the ancient scholars, is also "existent, knowable and nameable", giving the example of negative numbers, silence as a form of testimony, ''asatkaryavada'' theory of causation, and analysis of deficit as real and valuable. ''Abhava'' was further refined in four types, by the schools of Hinduism that accepted it as a useful method of epistemology: ''dhvamsa'' (termination of what existed), ''atyanta-abhava'' (impossibility, absolute non-existence, contradiction), ''anyonya-abhava'' (mutual negation, reciprocal absence) and ''pragavasa'' (prior, antecedent non-existence).

''Śabda''

''Śabda'' (शब्द) means relying on word, testimony of past or present reliable experts, specifically the '' shruti'', Vedas. Hiriyanna explains ''Sabda-pramana'' as a concept which means reliable expert testimony. The schools of Hinduism which consider it epistemically valid suggest that a human being needs to know numerous facts, and with the limited time and energy available, he can learn only a fraction of those facts and truths directly.M. Hiriyanna (2000), The Essentials of Indian Philosophy, Motilal Banarsidass, , page 43 He must rely on others, his parent, family, friends, teachers, ancestors and kindred members of society to rapidly acquire and share knowledge and thereby enrich each other's lives. This means of gaining proper knowledge is either spoken or written, but through ''Sabda'' (words). The reliability of the source is important, and legitimate knowledge can only come from the ''Sabda'' of reliable sources. The disagreement between the schools of Hinduism has been on how to establish reliability. Some schools, such as Carvaka, state that this is never possible, and therefore ''Sabda'' is not a proper pramana. Other schools debate means to establish reliability.

Acceptance per school

Different schools of Hindu philosophy accept one or more of these ''pramanas'' as valid epistemology.

Carvaka school

Carvaka school accepted only one valid source of knowledge—perception. It held all remaining methods as outright invalid or prone to error and therefore invalid.

Vaisheshika school

Epistemologically, the Vaiśeṣika school considered the following as the only proper means of knowledge:

#Perception (''Pratyakṣa'')
#Inference (''Anumāna'')

Sankhya, Yoga, Vishishtadvaita Vedanta, and Dvaita Vedanta schools

According to the Sankhya, Yoga, and two sub-schools of Vedanta, the proper means of knowledge must rely on these three pramanas:Pramana
at Hindupedia, the Hindu Encyclopedia

#Pratyakṣa — perception
#Anumāna — inference
# Śabda — testimony/word of reliable experts

These are enumerated in sutra I.7 of the Yoga Sutras. The mode of Pramana itself in sutra I.6 is distinguished among 5 classes of vritti/mental modification, the others including indiscrimination, verbal delusion, sleep, and memory.

Nyaya school

''Nyaya'' literally means the science and study of ''pramanas''.

The Nyāya school accepts four means of obtaining knowledge (''pramāṇa''), viz., Perception, Inference, Comparison and Word.

#Perception, called ''Pratyakṣa'', occupies the foremost position in the Nyaya epistemology. Perception is defined by sense-object contact and is unerring. Perception can be of two types—ordinary or extraordinary. Ordinary (''Laukika'' or ''Sādhārana'') perception is of six types, viz., visual-by eyes, olfactory-by nose, auditory-by ears, tactile-by skin, gustatory-by tongue and mental-by mind. Extraordinary (''Alaukika'' or ''Asādhārana'') perception is of three types, viz., ''Sāmānyalakṣana'' (perceiving generality from a particular object), ''Jñānalakṣana'' (when one sense organ can also perceive qualities not attributable to it, as when seeing a chilli, one knows that it would be bitter or hot), and ''Yogaja'' (when certain human beings, from the power of ''Yoga'', can perceive past, present and future and have supernatural abilities, either complete or some). Also, there are two modes or steps in perception, viz., '' Nirvikalpa'', when one just perceives an object without being able to know its features, and '' Savikalpa'', when one is able to clearly know an object. All laukika and alaukika pratyakshas are savikalpa. There is yet another stage called ''Pratyabhijñā'', when one is able to re-recognise something on the basis of memory.
#Inference, called ''Anumāna'', is one of the most important contributions of Nyaya. It can be of two types – inference for oneself (''Svārthānumāna'', where one does not need any formal procedure, and at the most the last three of their five steps), and inference for others (''Parāthānumāna'', which requires a systematic methodology of five steps). Inference can also be classified into three types: ''Pūrvavat'' (inferring an unperceived effect from a perceived cause), ''Śeṣavat'' (inferring an unperceived cause from a perceived effect) and ''Sāmānyatodṛṣṭa'' (when inference is not based on causation but on uniformity of co-existence). A detailed analysis of error is also given, explaining when anumāna could be false.
#Comparison, called ''Upamāna''. It is produced by the knowledge of resemblance or similarity, given some pre-description of the new object beforehand.
#Word, or ''Śabda'' are also accepted as a ''pramāṇa''. It can be of two types, ''Vaidika'' ( Vedic), which are the words of the four sacred Vedas, or can be more broadly interpreted as knowledge from sources acknowledged as authoritative, and ''Laukika'', or words and writings of trustworthy human beings.

Prabhakara Mimamsa school

In Mimamsa school of Hinduism linked to Prabhakara considered the following pramanas as proper:
# ''Pratyakṣa'' (perception)
# ''Anumāṇa'' (inference)
# ''Śabda'' (word, testimony)
# ''Upamāṇa'' (comparison, analogy)
# ''Arthapatti'' (postulation, presumption)

Advaita Vedanta and Bhatta Mimamsa schools

In Advaita Vedānta, and Mimamsa school linked to Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, the following pramanas are accepted:
# Śabda (word, testimony)
# Pratyakṣa (perception)
# Anumāṇa (inference)
# Upamāṇa (comparison, analogy)
# Arthāpatti (postulation, presumption)
# Anupalabdhi, Abhava (non-perception, cognitive proof using non-existence)
Nearly all Vedantins, except Neo-Vedantins for example, accept ''śabda'' ''pramāṇa'' as a more important ''pramāṇa'' than ''anumāna''.

Buddhism

According to the ''Padmākara Translation Group'', in a 2005 translation of Śāntarakṣita's ''The Adornment of the Middle Way'':

Strictly speaking, pramana (''tshad ma'') means "valid cognition." In uddhistpractice, it refers to the tradition, principally associated with Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, of logic (''rtags rigs'') and epistemology (''blo rigs'').

Buddhism accepts only two ''pramana'' (''tshad ma'') as valid means to knowledge: Pratyaksha (''mngon sum tshad ma'', perception) and Anumāṇa (''rjes dpag tshad ma'', inference). Rinbochay adds that Buddhism also considers scriptures as third valid ''pramana'', such as from Buddha and other "valid minds" and "valid persons". This third source of valid knowledge is a form of perception and inference in Buddhist thought. Valid scriptures, valid minds and valid persons are considered in Buddhism as ''Avisamvadin'' (''mi slu ba'', incontrovertible, indisputable).Daniel Perdue, Debate in Tibetan Buddhism, , pages 19-20 Means of cognition and knowledge, other than perception and inference, are considered invalid in Buddhism.

In Buddhism, the two most important scholars of pramāṇa are Dignāga and Dharmakīrti.

Sautrantrika

Dignāga and Dharmakīrti are usually categorized as expounding the view of the Sautrāntika tenets, though one can make a distinction between the "Sautrāntikas Following Scripture" () and the "Sautrāntikas Following Reason" () and both these masters are described as establishing the latter.Śāntarakṣita & Ju Mipham (2005) pp. 32–39 Dignāga's main text on this topic is the '' Pramāṇa-samuccaya''. Dignāga's ''Pramāṇa-samuccaya'' played a crucial role in shaping the discipline of epistemology (''pramāṇaśāstra''), blending it with logical discourse. Dharmakīrti, influenced by Dignāga, further developed these ideas in his Pramanavarttika.

These two rejected the complex Abhidharma-based description of how in the Vaibhāṣika school and the Sautrāntika Following Scripture approach connected an external world with mental objects, and instead posited that the mental domain never connects directly with the external world but instead only perceives an aspect based upon the sense organs and the sense consciousnesses. Further, the sense consciousnesses assume the form of the aspect (Sanskrit: Sākāravāda) of the external object and what is perceived is actually the sense consciousness which has taken on the form of the external object. By starting with aspects, a logical argument about the external world as discussed by the Hindu schools was possible. Otherwise their views would be so different as to be impossible to begin a debate. Then a logical discussion could follow.

This approach attempts to solve how the material world connects with the mental world, but not completely explaining it. When pushed on this point, Dharmakīrti then drops a presupposition of the Sautrāntrika position and shifts to a kind of Yogācāra position that extramental objects never really occur but arise from the habitual tendencies of mind. So he begins a debate with Hindu schools positing external objects then later to migrate the discussion to how that is logically untenable.

Note there are two differing interpretations of Dharmakīrti's approach later in Tibet, due to differing translations and interpretations. One is held by the Gelug school leaning to a moderate realism with some accommodation of universals and the other held by the other schools who held that Dharmakīrti was distinctly antirealist.Śāntarakṣita & Ju Mipham (2005) p.37

Apoha

A key feature of Dignāga's logic is in how he treats generalities versus specific objects of knowledge. The Nyāya Hindu school made assertions about the existence of general principles, and in refutation Dignāga asserted that generalities were mere mental features and not truly existent. To do this he introduced the idea of ''Apoha'', that the way the mind recognizes is by comparing and negating known objects from the perception. In that way, the general idea or categories of objects has to do with differences from known objects, not from identification with universal truths. So one knows that a perceived chariot is a chariot not because it is in accord with a universal form of a chariot, but because it is perceived as different from things that are not chariots. This approach became an essential feature of Buddhist epistemology.

Madhyamaka

The contemporary of Dignāga but before Dharmakīrti, Bhāvaviveka, incorporated a logical approach when commenting upon Nāgārjuna. He also started with a Sautrāntika approach when discussing the way appearances appear, to debate with realists, but then took a Middle Way view of the ultimate nature of phenomenon. But he used logical assertions and arguments about the nature of that ultimate nature.

His incorporation of logic into the Middle Way system was later critiqued by Candrakīrti, who felt that the establishment of the ultimate way of abiding since it was beyond thought and concept was not the domain of logic. He used simple logical consequence arguments to refute the views of other tenet systems, but generally he thought a more developed use of logic and epistemology in describing the Middle Way was problematic. Bhāvaviveka's use of autonomous logical arguments was later described as the Svātantrika approach.

In Tibet

Modern Buddhist schools employ the 'three spheres' (Sanskrit: trimaṇḍala; Tibetan: 'khor gsum):
#subject
#object,
#action.Thub-bstan-chos-kyi-grags-pa, Chokyi Dragpa, Heidi I. Koppl, Chokyi Nyima Rinpoche (2004). ''Uniting Wisdom and Compassion: Illuminating the thirty-seven practices of a bodhisattva''. Wisdom Publications. . Source

(accessed: February 4, 2009) p.202

When Madhyamaka first migrated to Tibet, Śāntarakṣita established a view of Madhyamaka more consistent with Bhāvaviveka while further evolving logical assertions as a way of contemplating and developing one's viewpoint of the ultimate truth.

In the 14th century Je Tsongkhapa presented a new commentary and approach to Madhyamaka, which became the normative form in Tibet. In this variant, the Madhyamaka approach of Candrakīrti was elevated instead of Bhāvaviveka's yet Tsongkhapa rejected Candrakirti's disdain of logic and instead incorporated logic further.

The exact role of logic in Tibetan Buddhist practice and study may still be a topic of debate, but it is definitely established in the tradition. Ju Mipham remarked in his 19th-century commentary on Śāntarakṣita's ''Madhyamakālaṅkāra'':

See also

* Buddhist logic
*Epistemology
*Hindu philosophy
*Metaphysics
*Nyaya
*Philosophy of Perception
* Śāstra pramāṇam in Hinduism

Notes

References

Sources

*

Bibliography

* Śāntarakṣita (author); Mipham (commentator); Padmākara Translation Group (translators)(2005). ''The Adornment of the Middle Way: Shantarakshita's Madhyamakalankara with commentary by Jamgön Mipham.'' Boston, Massachusetts, US: Shambhala Publications, Inc. (alk. paper)

External links

Pramāṇamīmāṃsā: Devanagari
A SARIT Initiative, German Research Foundation
Pramāṇavārttika Pariśiṣṭa 1: Devanagari
A SARIT Initiative, German Research Foundation
Pramāṇavārttika: Devanagari
A SARIT Initiative, German Research Foundation
Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛttiṭīkā: Devanagari
A SARIT Initiative, German Research Foundation
Pramāṇavārttikālaṅkāra: Devanagari
A SARIT Initiative, German Research Foundation
Pramāṇāntarbhāva: Devanagari
A SARIT Initiative, German Research Foundation
Vidhabhusana, Satis Chandra (1907). History of the Mediaeval School of Indian Logic. Calcutta University.

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Concepts in epistemology
Hindu philosophical concepts
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