Nuclear Weapons Sharing

Nuclear sharing is a concept in NATO and Russia's policies of nuclear deterrence, which allows member countries without nuclear weapons of their own to participate in the planning, training, and, in extremis, the use of nuclear weapons. In particular, it provides for involvement of the armed forces of those countries in the nuclear sharing arrangements for delivering nuclear weapons in the event of the authorization for their use by the head of state of the nuclear possessor country.

As part of nuclear sharing, the participating countries carry out consultations and make common decisions on nuclear weapons policy, training, and deployment, and maintain technical equipment (notably nuclear-capable airplanes) required for the delivery of nuclear weapons. Some of these states also allow the nuclear weapon state to store nuclear weapons on their territory. In case of war, the United States publicly stated (and the negotiating parties agreed) that the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) would no longer be controlling.

NATO

Of the three nuclear powers in NATO (France, the United Kingdom and the United States), only the United States is known to have provided weapons for nuclear sharing. However, the UK also deployed, stationed, or tested nuclear weapons on the territory of other states, and France tested nuclear weapons on the territory of Algeria, then a colony. The United States began moving weapons to Europe in 1954, first to the UK, and then to West Germany. The US negotiated agreements with the Allied countries where US nuclear weapons would be stored, including Section 144b of the Atomic Energy Act, and a national stockpile agreement. It also negotiated additional agreements with France, West Germany, Belgium, Netherlands, Canada, and the UK for the use of nuclear weapons stored and controlled by US forces in West Germany. These arrangements included delivery of short-range nuclear weapons - including landmines, rockets, and artillery, as well as nuclear armed depth charges and anti-aircraft missiles. The US also negotiated a separate agreement with Canada to provide nuclear-armed anti-air and anti-ship weapons to defend North America. The US deployed nuclear forces in Greenland (Danish territory) and Iceland - as well as extensively in the Pacific theater, but these were solely for delivery by US troops.

, Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Turkey have been hosting U.S. nuclear weapons as part of NATO's nuclear sharing policy. Canada hosted weapons under the control of the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), rather than NATO, until 1984, and Greece until 2001. The United Kingdom also received U.S. tactical nuclear weapons such as nuclear artillery and Lance missiles until 1992, even though the UK is a nuclear-weapon state in its own right; these were mainly deployed in Germany.

In peacetime, the nuclear weapons stored in non-nuclear countries are guarded by United States Air Force (USAF) personnel and previously, some nuclear artillery and missile systems were guarded by United States Army (USA) personnel; the Permissive Action Link codes required for arming them remain under American control. In case of war, the weapons are to be mounted on the participating countries' warplanes. The weapons are under custody and control of USAF Munitions Support Squadrons co-located on NATO main operating bases who work together with the host nation forces.

, 100 tactical B61 nuclear bombs are believed to be deployed in Europe under the nuclear sharing arrangement. The weapons are stored within a vault in hardened aircraft shelters, using the USAF WS3 Weapon Storage and Security System. The delivery warplanes used are General Dynamics F-16 Fighting Falcons (F-16s) and Panavia Tornados.

Historically, the shared nuclear weapon delivery systems were not restricted to bombs. Greece used Nike-Hercules Missiles as well as A-7 Corsair II attack aircraft. Canada had Bomarc nuclear-armed anti-aircraft missiles, Honest John surface-to-surface missiles and the AIR-2 Genie nuclear-armed air-to-air rocket, as well as tactical nuclear bombs for the CF-104 fighter. PGM-19 Jupiter medium-range ballistic missiles were shared with Italian air force units and Turkish units with U.S. dual key systems to enable the warheads. PGM-17 Thor intermediate-range ballistic missiles were forward deployed to the UK with RAF crews. An extended version of nuclear sharing, the NATO Multilateral Force was a plan to equip NATO surface ships of the member states with UGM-27 Polaris missiles, but the UK ended up purchasing the Polaris missiles and using its own warheads, and the plan to equip NATO surface ships was abandoned.
After the Soviet Union collapsed, the nuclear weapon types shared within NATO were reduced to tactical nuclear bombs deployed by Dual-Capable Aircraft (DCA). According to the press, Eastern European Member States of NATO have resisted the withdrawal of the shared nuclear bombs from Europe, fearing it would show a weakening of U.S. commitment to defend Europe against Russia.

Italy

In Italy, B61 bombs are stored at the Ghedi Air Base and at the Aviano Air Base. According to the former Italian President Francesco Cossiga, Italy's role in a planned retaliation consisted in striking with those nuclear weapons Czechoslovakia and Hungary had the Warsaw Pact waged nuclear war against NATO. He acknowledged the presence of U.S. nuclear weapons in Italy, and speculated about the possible presence of British and French nuclear weapons.

Germany

The only German nuclear base is located in Büchel Air Base, near the border with Luxembourg. The base has 11 Protective Aircraft Shelters (PAS) equipped with WS3 Vaults for storage of nuclear weapons, each with a maximum capacity of 44 B61 nuclear bombs. There are 20 B61 bombs stored on the base for delivery by German PA-200 Tornado IDS bombers of the JaBoG 33 squadron. The Tornado IDS aircraft were due to be retired by the end of 2024; while 2010 and 2018 assessments questioned what nuclear sharing role, if any, Germany would then retain, in 2020 Germany announced that it would buy 30 Boeing F/A-18E/F Super Hornets to replace the Tornado in its nuclear-capable role. The Super Hornet was not yet certified for the B61 bomb, but Dan Gillian, head of Boeing's Super Hornet program, had previously stated his optimism about achieving this certification in a timely manner. In 2022, against the backdrop of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the Super Hornet order was cancelled and Germany instead chose to order 35 Lockheed Martin F-35 jets for nuclear sharing use.

Netherlands

On 10 June 2013, former Dutch prime minister Ruud Lubbers confirmed the existence of 22 shared nuclear bombs at Volkel Air Base. This was inadvertently confirmed again in June 2019 when a public draft report to the NATO Parliamentary Assembly was discovered to reference the existence of US nuclear weapons at Volkel, as well as locations in Belgium, Italy, Germany, and Turkey. A new version of the report was released on 11 July 2019 without reference to the locations of the weapons.

Turkey

In 2017 due to an increasingly unstable relationship between the United States and Turkey it was suggested that the United States consider removing 50 tactical nuclear weapons stored under American control at the Incirlik Air Base in Turkey. The presence of US nuclear weapons in Turkey gained increased public attention in October 2019 with the deterioration of relations between the two nations after the Turkish military incursion into Syria.

Polish aspirations

In 2022, after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, reports appeared about the possible inclusion of Poland in the nuclear sharing policy, with president Andrzej Duda calling the country's lack of nuclear weapons a "problem" and saying that it was in talks with the United States about the possibility of nuclear sharing. In June 2023, then-prime minister Mateusz Morawiecki declared Poland's interest in hosting nuclear weapons under the policy, citing the reported deployment of Russian nuclear weapons to its Kaliningrad region and Belarus, while National Security Bureau head Jacek Siewiera said the country was interested in certifying its upcoming F-35A fleet as being capable of delivering B61 bombs. In April 2024, president Duda said that Poland was "ready" to host nuclear weapons and had been discussing the matter with the United States government for "some time". The current Polish prime minister, Donald Tusk, said that he wanted to speak with Duda to understand the intention behind the statement and that he wanted Poland to "be safe and well-armed, but ewould also like any initiatives to be very well prepared by the people responsible for them and for all olesto be convinced that this is what heywant." In May 2024, foreign minister Radosław Sikorski accused president Duda of failing to consult with him on this and other major foreign policy announcements and said that he had "asked the president privately and publicly not to discuss such delicate and secret matters in public, because it idnot help Poland"; he also said that the previous Polish government had been told that the idea of Poland being involved with nuclear sharing was "not on the table". After the announcement in March 2025 that France was considering the extension of its nuclear deterrence to other European countries (see next section), Duda welcomed this development while simultaneously renewing his call for American weapons to be based in Poland.

Sharing of non-US weapons

In March 2025, amid European concerns over whether the United States could continue to be relied on as an ally, the French president Emmanuel Macron said that his country would consider the possibility of extending the protection offered by its nuclear arsenal to other European states. Both Macron and defence minister Sébastien Lecornu stressed that ultimate control over the weapons would be retained by France, and claims that the potential decision amounted to a plan for nuclear sharing were explicitly denied. Friedrich Merz said that discussions on nuclear sharing should be held with France and Britain (which also has nuclear weapons) but warned that European weapons could only ever be a supplement to the existing American arrangement.

List of Weapons Shared by the US with Allies from 1954-present

*Current:
**B61 nuclear bomb (Belgium, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, and Turkey)
*Former:
**AIR-2 Genie (Canada)
**B57 nuclear bomb (Canada, United Kingdom, and West Germany)
**B28 nuclear bomb (Canada, and the United Kingdom)
**B43 nuclear bomb (Canada, United Kingdom)
**B61 nuclear bomb (Greece)
** BGM-109G Ground Launched Cruise Missile (Belgium, Italy, Netherlands, United Kingdom, and West Germany)
**CIM-10 Bomarc (Canada)
**Mark 7 nuclear bomb (United Kingdom)
** Mk 101 Lulu (Netherlands and the United Kingdom)
**MGR-1 Honest John (Belgium, Canada, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Turkey, United Kingdom, and West Germany)
**MGM-1 Matador (West Germany)
**MGM-5 Corporal (United Kingdom)
**MGM-29 Sergeant (West Germany)
**MGM-52 Lance (Belgium, Italy, Netherlands, United Kingdom, and West Germany)
** MIM-14 Nike Hercules (Belgium, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Turkey, and West Germany)
**Pershing 1 (West Germany)
**Pershing 1a (West Germany)
**PGM-17 Thor (United Kingdom)
**PGM-19 Jupiter (Italy and Turkey)
**UGM-27 Polaris (Italy)
** W33 and W48 Artillery Shells (Canada, Belgium, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Turkey, United Kingdom, and West Germany)

Non-NATO

USSR

The Soviet Union practiced nuclear sharing with East Germany, as early as 1959, and nuclear sharing arrangements similar to the NATO arrangements were also made with Hungary, and Poland. It is possible that similar arrangements were made with Bulgaria, but no sources have been found to date.

Russia–Belarus nuclear weapons sharing

On 27 February 2022, shortly after the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, Belarusians voted in a referendum to repeal the post-Soviet Constitutional prohibition on basing of nuclear weapons in Belarus. At a meeting on 25 June 2022, Russian President Putin and President of Belarus Lukashenko agreed the deployment of Russian short-range nuclear-capable missiles.

Russia supplied Belarus with nuclear-capable Iskander-M missile systems in 2023, with President Putin announcing the first delivery of warheads occurring as of 16 June 2023 in a speech at the St. Petersburg International Forum. Additionally, Russia has completed modifications necessary for Belarusian Su-25 bombers to carry nuclear air-dropped bombs and the pilots have received training. Belarus has reported full operation of the nuclear-capable Iskanders and Su-25s, and exercised their use with training nuclear warheads in May 2024.

Potential nuclear sharing between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia

It is common belief among foreign officials that Saudi Arabia and Pakistan have an understanding in which Pakistan would supply Saudi Arabia with warheads if security in the Persian Gulf was threatened. A Western official told ''The Times'' that Saudi Arabia could have the nuclear warheads in a matter of days of approaching Pakistan. Pakistan's ambassador to Saudi Arabia, Muhammed Naeem Khan, was quoted as saying, "Pakistan considers the security of Saudi Arabia not just as a diplomatic or an internal matter but as a personal matter." Naeem also said that the Saudi leadership considered Pakistan and Saudi Arabia to be one country and that any threat to Saudi Arabia is also a threat to Pakistan. Other vendors were also likely to enter into a bidding war if Riyadh indicated that it was seeking nuclear warheads. Both Saudi Arabia and Pakistan have denied the existence of any such agreement. Western intelligence sources have told ''The Guardian'' that "the Saudi monarchy paid for up to 60% of the Pakistani nuclear programme, and in return has the option to buy a small nuclear arsenal ('five to six warheads') off the shelf". Saudi Arabia has potential dual-purpose delivery infrastructure, including Tornado IDS and F-15S fighter bombers and improved Chinese CSS-2 intermediate range ballistic missiles with accuracy sufficient for nuclear warheads but delivered with high explosive warheads.

In November 2013, a variety of sources told BBC Newsnight that Saudi Arabia was able to obtain nuclear weapons from Pakistan at will. The new-report further stated, according to western experts, it was alleged that Pakistan's defense sector, including its missile and defense labs, had received plentiful financial assistance from Saudi Arabia. Gary Samore, an adviser to Barack Obama, said, "I do think that the Saudis believe that they have some understanding with Pakistan that, in extremis, they would have claim to acquire nuclear weapons from Pakistan." Amos Yadlin, formerly head of Israeli military intelligence, said "They already paid for the bomb, they will go to Pakistan and bring what they need to bring."

According to the US-based Center for Strategic and International Studies think-thank, the BBC's report on possible Pakistani-Saudi nuclear sharing was partially incorrect. There was no indication of the validity or credibility of the BBC's sources, and the article failed to expand on what was essentially an unverified lead. Furthermore, if Pakistan were to transfer nuclear warheads onto Saudi soil, it was highly unlikely that either nation would face any international repercussions if NATO-esque guidelines were followed. A research paper produced by the British House of Commons Defence Select Committee states that as long as current NATO nuclear sharing arrangements remain in place, the NATO states would have few valid grounds for complaint if such a transfer were to occur.

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty considerations

Some members of the Non-Aligned Movement have raised concerns about NATO's nuclear sharing arrangements and their compatability with the NPT, going so far as to accuse NATO allies of violating Article I of the NPT Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). In 2015, Russia accused the US of violating the NPT, but since Russia resumed its own nuclear sharing arrangements, now with Belarus, it no longer makes this assertion. However, China accused the US of violating the NPT at a side event to the NPT review process in Geneva in July 2024.

At the time the NPT was being negotiated, the NATO nuclear sharing agreements were well known and discussed publicly in the United Nations at the NPT negotiations in Geneva, national parliaments, NATO and government press releases, and in the news media. The US and USSR discussed the wording of Articles I and II at length bilaterally and negotiated the wording to ensure that they were compatible with the NPT during an especially intense negotiation from 22-30 October 1966 on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly in New York. While some have erroneously claimed that such arrangements were secret or unknown, and that some signatories not have known about these agreements and interpretations at that time, these claims have been thoroughly debunked.

See also

*1958 US–UK Mutual Defence Agreement
*United States military deployments around the world
*U.S. nuclear weapons in Japan
* Taiwan and weapons of mass destruction

References

External links

Negotiations of Articles I and II the NPT Vol. 1 (1961-1966)
NATO Archives, Brussels
Negotiations of Articles I and II the NPT Vol. 2 (1966-1969)
NATO Archives, Brussels
* Mohamed Shaker
The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, Origin and Implementation 1959-1979, Volumes I-III
, Oceana Publications, London 1980
NATO Nuclear Sharing
Tim Street, Oxford Research Group, ORG Explains No. 5, June 2018
U.S. Nuclear Weapons in Europe
Hans M. Kristensen, Natural Resources Defense Council, February 2005
NATO and Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament
NATO, July 2024
North Atlantic Council Statement on the 50th Anniversary of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
NATO Headquarters, 5 March 2020
United States Air Forces in Europe – Munitions Support Squadron
GlobalSecurity.org
A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945–1963
(Chapter 5: Eisenhower and Nuclear Sharing), Marc Trachtenberg, 1999, Princeton University Press,
Commitment to purpose : how alliance partnership won the cold war
Richard L. Kugler, RAND, MC-190-RC/FF, 1993,
The Woodrow Wilson Center's Nuclear Proliferation International History Project
or NPIHP is a global network of individuals and institutions engaged in the study of international nuclear history through archival documents, oral history interviews and other empirical sources.
Soviet Nuclear Weapons in Hungary 1961–1991

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