McMahon Line

The McMahon Line is the boundary between Tibet and British India as agreed in the maps and notes exchanged by the respective plenipotentiaries on 24–25 March 1914 at Delhi, as part of the 1914 Simla Convention.
The line delimited the respective spheres of influence of the two countries in the eastern Himalayan region along northeast India and northern Burma (Myanmar), which were earlier undefined.
The Republic of China was not a party to the McMahon Line agreement,
but the line was part of the overall boundary of Tibet defined in the Simla Convention, initialled by all three parties and later repudiated by the government of China.
The Indian part of the Line currently serves as the ''de facto'' boundary between China and India, although its legal status is disputed by the People's Republic of China. The Burmese part of the Line was renegotiated by the People's Republic of China and Myanmar.

The line is named after Henry McMahon, foreign secretary of British India and the chief British negotiator of the conference at Simla. The bilateral agreement between Tibet and Britain was signed by McMahon on behalf of the British government and Lonchen Shatra on behalf of the Tibetan government.
It spans from the corner of Bhutan to the Isu Razi Pass on the Burma border, largely along the crest of the Himalayas.

The outcomes of the Simla Conference remained ambiguous for several decades because China did not sign the overall Convention but the British were hopeful of persuading the Chinese. The Convention and the McMahon's agreement were omitted in the 1928 edition of Aitchison's ''Treaties''. It was revived in 1935 by Olaf Caroe, then deputy foreign secretary of British India, who obtained London's permission to implement it as well as to publish a revised version of the 1928 Aitchison's ''Treaties''.

India regards its interpretation of the McMahon Line as the legal national border, but China rejects the Simla Accord and the McMahon Line, contending that Tibet was not a sovereign state and therefore did not have the power to conclude treaties. Chinese maps show some of the territory south of the line as part of the Tibet Autonomous Region, known as South Tibet in China. Chinese forces briefly occupied this area during the Sino-Indian War of 1962 and later withdrew. China does recognise a Line of Actual Control which closely approximates the McMahon Line in this part of its border with India, according to a 1959 diplomatic note by Prime Minister Zhou Enlai.

The 14th Dalai Lama did not originally recognise India's sovereignty over Arunachal Pradesh. As late as 2003, he said that "Arunachal Pradesh was actually part of Tibet". In January 2007, however, he said that both the Tibetan government and Britain recognized the McMahon Line in 1914. In June 2008, he explicitly recognized for the first time that "Arunachal Pradesh was a part of India under the agreement signed by Tibetan and British representatives".

Background

British India expanded east of Bhutan in the early 19th century with the First Anglo-Burmese War. At the end of the war the Brahmaputra valley of Assam came under its control and over the next few decades British India extended its direct administration over the region in stages. The thickly forested hill tracts surrounding the valley were inhabited by tribal people, who were not easily amenable to British administrative control. The British were content to leave them alone. In 1873, the British drew an "Inner Line" as an administrative line to inhibit their subjects from encroaching into the tribal territory within its control. The British boundary, also called the "Outer Line", was defined to mark the limits of British jurisdiction. But it was not significantly different from the Inner Line in this region.

The British aimed to have peaceful neighbourly relations with the Himalayan tribes who lived beyond the Outer Line.
: Quoting Lord Curzon, the Viceroy of India, from 1905: "We do not want Mr (J C) White or anybody else to present us with a North-east frontier problem or policy. There being no problem beyond that of remaining on peaceful and friendly terms with our neighbours and quietly developing our relations ... there is no occasion for a policy."
However, British influence was nevertheless extended to many regions, through treaties, trade relations, and occasional punitive expeditions in response to "outrages" committed against British civilians.
: "While the tribal hills were not inside the limits of British territory, yet it was felt that they fell within the sphere of British influence, and that the Indian Government was fully entitled to take what action it saw fit there to protect its interests. There seemed no need, however, before 1910 to have this situation confirmed by any international agreement."

There is evidence of the British regarding the Assam Himalayan region as geographical part of India irrespective of political jurisdiction. Scholar Guyot-Réchard sees them as having extended "external sovereignty" over the Assam Himalayan tribes.

Forward policies of early 1900s

By 1900, the Chinese influence over Tibet had significantly weakened and the British became apprehensive that Tibet was about to fall into a Russian orbit. In an effort to preclude Russian influence over Tibet as well as to enforce their treaty rights, the British launched an expedition to Tibet in 1904, which resulted in a Convention of Lhasa signed between Tibet and Britain.

Qing China became apprehensive about British inroads into Tibet and responded with its own forward policy. This involved taking complete control over the southeastern Kham region of Tibet (also referred to as the "March Country"), through which passed the Chinese communications to Tibet. An assistant amban (imperial resident) was appointed for Chamdo in western Kham, who was to implement the new strategy. Over a period of three years, 1908–1911, the amban Zhao Erfeng, implemented brutal policies of subjugation and sinification in the Kham region, for which he earned the nickname of "Zhao the butcher".

Zhao Erfeng's campaigns entered the Tibetan districts adjoining the Assam Himalayan region such as Zayul, Pomed (Bome County) and Pemako (Medog County). They also encroached into parts of the adjoining the tribal territory. This alarmed the British officials in the region, who advocated the extension of British jurisdiction into the tribal territory.
The higher administration of British India was initially reluctant to concede these demands, but, by 1912, the Army General Staff had proposed drawing a boundary along the crest of Himalayas.
The British appear to have been clear that they were only extending the political administration of their rule but not the geographical extent of India, which was taken to include the Assam Himalayan region.
: Quoting the Secretary of State for India in 1913, "It should be observed that Tibet is nowhere coterminous with the settled districts of British India, but with a belt of country which, though ''geographically part of India'', politically is partly a no-man's land inhabited by aboriginal savages, partly the territories of states epal, Bhutan and Sikkim...." (emphasis added)

Tawang tract

Drawing the Line

In 1913, British officials met at Simla, India to discuss Tibet's status.Maxwell, Neville
''India's China War''
, New York, Pantheon, 1970. The conference was attended by representatives of Britain, China, and Tibet. "Outer Tibet," covering approximately the same area as the modern "Tibet Autonomous Region," would be under the administration of the Dalai Lama's government, under the "suzerainty" of China. Suzerainty is an Asian political concept indicating limited authority over a dependent state. The final 3 July 1914 accord lacked any textual boundary delimitations or descriptions. Prescott, J. R. V., ''Map of Mainland Asia by Treaty'', Melbourne, Melbourne University Press, 1975, , pages 276–7 It made reference to a small scale map with very little detail, one that primarily showed lines separating China from "Inner Tibet" and "Inner Tibet" from "Outer Tibet." This map lacked any initials or signatures from the Chinese plenipotentiary Ivan Chen.

Both drafts of this small scale map extend the identical red line symbol between "Inner Tibet" and China further to the southwest, approximating the entire route of the McMahon Line, and thus dead ending near Tawang at the Bhutan tripoint. However, neither draft labels "British India" or anything similar in the area that now constitutes Arunachal Pradesh.

The far more detailed eight miles to the inch McMahon Line map of 24–25 March 1914 is signed only by the Tibetan and British representatives. This map and McMahon Line negotiations were both done without Chinese participation.Maxwell, Neville, ''India's China War'' New Delhi, Natraj Publishers, pages 48–9. After Beijing repudiated Simla, the British and Tibetan delegates attached a note denying China any privileges under the agreement and signed it as a bilateral accord.Goldstein 1989, pp. 48–75 British records show that the condition for the Tibetan government to accept the new border was that China must accept the Simla Convention. As Britain was not able to get an acceptance from China, Tibetans considered the McMahon line invalid.

British ambiguity (1915–1947)

Simla was initially rejected by the Government of India as incompatible with the 1907 Anglo-Russian Convention. C.U. Aitchison's ''A Collection of Treaties'', was published with a note stating that no binding agreement had been reached at Simla. The Anglo-Russian Convention was renounced by Russia and Britain jointly in 1921,UK relations with Tibet
but the McMahon Line was forgotten until 1935, when interest was revived by civil service officer Olaf Caroe. The Survey of India published a map showing the McMahon Line as the official boundary in 1937. In 1938, the British published the Simla Accord in Aitchison's ''Treaties''. A volume published earlier was recalled from libraries and replaced with a volume that includes the Simla Accord together with an editor's note stating that Tibet and Britain, but not China, accepted the agreement as binding. The replacement volume has a false 1929 publication date.

In April 1938, a small British force led by Captain G. S. Lightfoot arrived in Tawang and informed the monastery the district was now Indian territory. The Tibetan government protested and its authority was restored after Lightfoot's brief stay. The district remained in Tibetan hands until 1951. However, Lhasa raised no objection to British activity in other sectors of the McMahon Line. In 1944, NEFT established direct administrative control for the entire area it was assigned, although Tibet soon regained authority in Tawang.

India–China boundary dispute

When India and Pakistan became independent in 1947 through Partition of India, all the territories that had been part of British India had been transferred to the two new countries, causing the prevailing boundaries of British India to be inherited. The maps of the period showed the McMahon Line as the boundary of India in the northeast.

In October 1947, the Tibetan government wrote a note to the Government of India asking for a "return" of the territories that the British had allegedly occupied from Tibet. Among these were listed "Sayul ayuland Walong and in direction of Pemakoe, Lonag, Lopa, Mon, Bhutan, Sikkim, Darjeeling and others on this side of river Ganges". Similar claims were apparently made against China as well. The Indian government did not take the claims seriously and asked instead to be treated on par with the former British Indian government. After a few months, the Tibetans agreed to the proposal.

In Beijing, the Communist Party came to power in 1949 and declared its intention to "liberate" Tibet. India objected at first, but eventually acquiesced to Chinese claims over Tibet and recognised China as the suzerain power.

In the 1950s, when India-China relations were cordial and the boundary dispute quiet, the Indian government under Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru promoted the slogan ''Hindi-Chini bhai-bhai.'' (Indians and Chinese are brothers). Nehru maintained his 1950 statement that he would not accept negotiations if China brought the boundary dispute up, hoping that "China would accept the '' fait accompli''. In 1954, India renamed the disputed area the North East Frontier Agency.

India acknowledged that Tibet was a part of China and gave up its extraterritorial rights in Tibet inherited from the British in a treaty concluded in April 1954. Nehru later claimed that because China did not bring up the border issue at the 1954 conference, the issue was settled. But the only border India had delineated before the conference was the McMahon Line. Several months after the conference, Nehru ordered maps of India published that showed expansive Indian territorial claims as definite boundaries, notably in Aksai Chin. In the NEFA sector, the new maps gave the hill crest as the boundary, although in some places this line is slightly north of the McMahon Line.

The failure of the 1959 Tibetan uprising and the 14th Dalai Lama's arrival in India in March led Indian parliamentarians to censure Nehru for not securing a commitment from China to respect the McMahon Line. Additionally, the Indian press started openly advocating Tibetan independence, with anti-Chinese sentiment steadily rising throughout Indian society due to rising sympathy for the Tibetans. For example, in 1959, Jayaprakash Narayan, one of India's foremost Gandhians, stated that, "Tibet may be a theocratic state rather than a secular state and backward economically and socially, but no nation has the right to impose progress, whatever that may mean, upon another nation."* Nehru, seeking to quickly assert sovereignty in response, established "as many military posts along the frontier as possible", unannounced and against the advice of his staff. On discovering the posts, and already suspicious from the ruminations of the Indian press, Chinese leaders began to suspect that Nehru had designs on the region. In August 1959, Chinese troops captured a new Indian military outpost at Longju on the Tsari Chu (the main tributary, from the north, of the Subansiri River in Arunachal Pradesh.) Longju was and is just north of the McMahon Line according to the inside back cover map in Maxwell and according to notable Indian mountaineer Harish Kapadia who explored the area in 2005. His published map and text locate Longju a kilometre or two on the China side of the McMahon Line "near the Chinese garrison town of Migyitun" (which is now quite sizeable, at 28-39-40 north latitude, over four kilometres north of the line.) (The rarely reliable coordinates in the Geonames database (National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency) incorrectly place "Longju" in snow and ice 10 kilometres away from the river at over 12,000 feet in elevation.) In a letter to Nehru dated 24 October 1959, Zhou Enlai proposed that India and China each withdraw their forces 20 kilometres from the line of actual control.(LAC) Shortly afterwards, Zhou defined this line as "the so-called McMahon Line in the east and the line up to which each side exercises actual control in the west".

In November 1961, Nehru formally adopted the "Forward Policy" of setting up military outposts in disputed areas, including 43 outposts north of Zhou's LAC. On 8 September 1962, a Chinese unit attacked an Indian post at Dhola in the Namka Chu valley immediately south of the Thag La Ridge, seven kilometres north of the McMahon Line according to the map on page 360 of Maxwell. On 20 October China launched a major attack across the McMahon Line as well as another attack further north. The Sino-Indian War which followed was a national humiliation for India, with China quickly advancing from the McMahon Line to Rupa and then Chaku (65 km southeast of Tawang) in NEFA's extreme western portion, and in the NEFA's extreme eastern tip advancing to Walong.Maxwell, Neville
''India's China War''
, pp. 408–9, New York, Pantheon, 1970. The Soviet Union, United States, and Great Britain pledged military aid to India. China then withdrew to the McMahon Line and repatriated the Indian prisoners of war (1963). The legacy of the border remains significant especially in India where the government sought to explain its defeat by blaming it on being caught by surprise.

NEFA was renamed Arunachal Pradesh in 1972—Chinese maps refer to the area as South Tibet. In 1981, Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping offered India a "package settlement" of the border issue. Eight rounds of talks followed, but there was no agreement.

In 1984, India Intelligence Bureau personnel in the Tawang region set up an observation post in the Sumdorong Chu Valley just south of the highest hill crest, but three kilometres north of the McMahon Line (the straight line portion extending east from Bhutan for 30 miles). The IB left the area before winter. In 1986, China deployed troops in the valley before an Indian team arrived.Sultan Shahin
Vajpayee claps with one hand on border dispute
Asia Times Online, 1 August 2003 This information created a national uproar when it was revealed to the Indian public. In October 1986, Deng threatened to "teach India a lesson". The Indian Army airlifted a task force to the valley. The confrontation was defused in May 1987 though, as clearly visible on Google Earth, both armies have remained and recent construction of roads and facilities are visible.Natarajan, V.
"The Sumdorong Chu Incident"
, ''Bharat Rakshak Monitor'', Nov.-Dec. 2000, 3 (3)

The Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi visited China in 1988 and agreed to a joint working group on boundary issues which has made little apparent positive progress. A 1993 Sino-Indian agreement set up a group to define the LAC; this group has likewise made no progress. A 1996 Sino-Indian agreement set up "confidence-building measures" to avoid border clashes. Although there have been frequent incidents where one state has charged the other with incursions, causing tense encounters along the McMahon Line following India's nuclear test in 1998 and continuing to the present, both sides generally attribute these to disagreements of less than a kilometre as to the exact location of the LAC.

Border crossings

Maps

File:McMahon Line Simla Accord Treaty 1914 Map1.jpg, McMahon Line 1914, Map 1
File:McMahon Line Simla Accord Treaty 1914 Map2.jpg, McMahon Line 1914, Map 2
File:Simla Accord Treaty 1914 Map2.jpg, Simla Convention map signed in 1914 (facsimile)
File:Simla Convention map by Hugh Richardson.jpg, Simla Convention map reproduced by Hugh Richardson

See also

* Origins of the Sino-Indian War
* Borders of India
* Durand Line
* Curzon Line
* Radcliffe Line

Notes

References

Citations

Sources

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Further reading

Why China is playing hardball in Arunachal
by Venkatesan Vembu, Daily News & Analysis, 13 May 2007

China, India, and the fruits of Nehru's folly
by Venkatesan Vembu, Daily News & Analysis, 6 June 2007

The British forgery at the heart of India and China’s Tibetan border dispute
by Peter Lee


by Peter Lee

{{DEFAULTSORT:McMahon Line
Foreign relations of India
Foreign relations of the United Kingdom
Neighbourhoods in Shimla
China–India border
Geography of Tibet
British Empire
History of Tibet
Tibet
1914 in international relations
Eponymous border lines
International borders
Borders of Arunachal Pradesh