''Evolution and the Theory of Games'' is a book by the British

evolutionary biologist Evolutionary biology is the subfield of biology that studies the evolutionary processes such as natural selection, common descent, and speciation that produced the diversity of life on Earth. In the 1930s, the discipline of evolutionary biol ...

John Maynard Smith John Maynard Smith (6 January 1920 – 19 April 2004) was a British mathematical and theoretical biology, theoretical and mathematical evolutionary biologist and geneticist. Originally an aeronautical engineer during the Second World War, he ...

evolutionary game theory Evolutionary game theory (EGT) is the application of game theory to evolving populations in biology. It defines a framework of contests, strategies, and analytics into which Darwinism, Darwinian competition can be modelled. It originated in 1973 wi ...

. The book was initially published in December 1982 by

Cambridge University Press Cambridge University Press was the university press of the University of Cambridge. Granted a letters patent by King Henry VIII in 1534, it was the oldest university press in the world. Cambridge University Press merged with Cambridge Assessme ...

Overview

In the book,

summarises work on

that had developed in the 1970s, to which he made several important contributions. The main contribution of the book is in introducing the concept of

Evolutionarily Stable Strategy An evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) is a strategy (or set of strategies) that is ''impermeable'' when adopted by a population in adaptation to a specific environment, that is to say it cannot be displaced by an alternative strategy (or set of ...

(ESS). ESS states that for a set of behaviours to be conserved over evolutionary time, they must be the most beneficial avenue of action when common, so that no alternative behaviour can invade. Supposing, for instance, that in a population of frogs, males fight to the death over breeding ponds. This would be an ESS if any one cowardly frog that does not fight to the death always fares worse (in terms of evolutionary survival fitness). A more likely scenario is one in which fighting to the death is not an ESS because a frog might arise that will stop fighting if it realises that it is going to lose. This frog would thus reap the benefits of fighting, but not the ultimate cost. Hence, fighting to the death would easily be invaded by a mutation that causes this "informed fighting." Much complexity can develop from this.

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External links

Cambridge University Press
1982 non-fiction books Books about evolution Books about game theory Evolutionary game theory Mathematics books

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