Entity realism (also selective realism),
[ sometimes equated with ]referential realism A direct reference theory (also called referentialism or referential realism)Andrea Bianchi (2012) ''Two ways of being a (direct) referentialist'', in Joseph Almog, Paolo Leonardi, ''Having in Mind: The Philosophy of Keith Donnellan''p. 79/ref> is a ...
, is a philosophical position within the debate about scientific realism
Scientific realism is the view that the universe described by science is real regardless of how it may be interpreted.
Within philosophy of science, this view is often an answer to the question "how is the success of science to be explained?" T ...
. It is a variation of realism (independently proposed by Stanford School philosophers Nancy Cartwright and Ian Hacking in 1983) that restricts warranted belief to only certain entities.[Psillos, Stathis, ''Scientific Realism: How Science Tracks Truth'', Routledge, 1999, p. 247.]
Overview
Whereas traditional scientific realism argues that our best scientific theories are true, or approximately true, or closer to the truth than their predecessors, entity realism does not commit itself to judgments concerning the truth of scientific theories. Instead, entity realism claims that the theoretical entities
An entity is something that exists as itself, as a subject or as an object, actually or potentially, concretely or abstractly, physically or not. It need not be of material existence. In particular, abstractions and legal fictions are usually r ...
that feature in scientific theories
A theory is a rational type of abstract thinking about a phenomenon, or the results of such thinking. The process of contemplative and rational thinking is often associated with such processes as observational study or research. Theories may be ...
, e.g. 'electron
The electron (, or in nuclear reactions) is a subatomic particle with a negative one elementary electric charge. Electrons belong to the first generation of the lepton particle family,
and are generally thought to be elementary partic ...
s', should be regarded as real if and only if they refer to phenomena that can be routinely used to create effects in domains that can be investigated independently. 'Manipulative success' thus becomes the criterion by which to judge the reality of (typically unobservable) scientific entities. As Ian Hacking, the main proponent of this formulation of entity realism, puts it (referring to an experiment he observed in a Stanford laboratory, where electrons and positrons were sprayed, one after the other, onto a superconducting
Superconductivity is a set of physical properties observed in certain materials where electrical resistance vanishes and magnetic flux fields are expelled from the material. Any material exhibiting these properties is a superconductor. Unlike ...
metal sphere), "if you can spray them, then they are real."
Entity realism has been an influential position partly because it coincided with a general trend in philosophy of science, and science studies more generally, to downplay the role of theories and put more emphasis on experiment
An experiment is a procedure carried out to support or refute a hypothesis, or determine the efficacy or likelihood of something previously untried. Experiments provide insight into cause-and-effect by demonstrating what outcome occurs wh ...
ation and scientific practice. Thus, entity realism sometimes is also called instrumental realism or experimental realism.
Criticism
While many philosophers acknowledge the intuitive pull of entity realism, it has also been strongly criticised, both as being too restrictive (in that it ignores entities that are observable yet do not lend themselves to manipulation) and as being too permissive (to the extent that seemingly successful instances of manipulation may turn out to be spurious).
Stathis Psillos remarks that entity realism is indeed a realist position (since it defends the reality of unobservable entities), but it is a selective realist position, since "it restricts warranted belief to entities only, and suggests to fellow realists that they are wrong in claiming that the theoretical descriptions of these entities are approximately true."[ Psillos also remarks that to a certain extent "this scepticism about theories is motivated by none other than the argument from the ]pessimistic induction
In the philosophy of science, the pessimistic induction, also known as the pessimistic meta-induction, is an argument which seeks to rebut scientific realism, particularly the scientific realist's notion of epistemic optimism. The pessimistic meta- ...
".[
]
See also
* Semirealism
In moral philosophy, instrumental and intrinsic value are the distinction between what is a ''means to an end'' and what is as an ''end in itself''. Things are deemed to have instrumental value if they help one achieve a particular end; intrinsic ...
, a similarA Metaphysics for Scientific Realism: Knowing the Unobservable, reviewed by James Ladyman, University of Bristol
/ref> position
Notes
References
* Nancy Cartwright (1983). ''How the Laws of Physics Lie'', Clarendon Press.
* Ian Hacking (1983). ''Representing and Intervening, Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science'', Cambridge University Press.
*Hans Lenk (2003). ''Grasping Reality: An Interpretation-Realistic Epistemology'', World Scientific, ch. 8
pp. 132–49
{{Philosophy of science
Metaphysics of science
Metatheory of science
Philosophical realism