Egyptian Forces

The Egyptian Armed Forces () are the military forces of the Arab Republic of Egypt. The Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces directs (a) Egyptian Army forces, (b) the Egyptian Navy, (c) Egyptian Air Force and (d) Egyptian Air Defense Forces. The Chief of Staff directly supervises army field forces (armies and districts), without any separate Egyptian Army headquarters.

Since the 1952 Egyptian revolution that overthrew the monarchy, Egypt’s military has dominated Egypt’s politics and economy. Senior members of the military can convene the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, such as during the course of the 2011 Egyptian revolution, when President Mubarak resigned and transferred power to this body on February 11, 2011.

The Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces directs all branches, forces, armies, regions, bodies, agencies and departments of the Armed Forces. The Commander-in-Chief simultaneously holds the position of Minister of Defence. Since July 2024, General Abdel Mageed Saqr has been Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces; Minister of Defense; and Military Production. The only person above him in the leadership ladder is the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, who is the President of the Republic, and this position is currently held by Abdel Fattah el-Sisi. The Chief of Staff is Lieutenant General Ahmed Fathy Khalifa (since July 2024). The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces consists of 23 members, headed by the Commander-in-Chief and Minister of Defense, and represented by the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, with membership of: Commanders of the main branches of air, navy, and air defense, commanders of the border guard forces, commanders of the armies (Second and Third), and commanders of the military regions ( Central, Northern, Western and Southern) and the heads of the Operations, Armament, Logistics and Supply, Engineering, Training, Financial Affairs, Military Justice, Management and Administration, the directors of the Officers Affairs and Military Intelligence departments, the Assistant Minister of Defense for Constitutional and Legal Affairs, and the Secretary of the Council is the Secretary-General of the Ministry of Defense.

The armament of the Egyptian armed forces varies between eastern and western sources through weapons deliveries by several countries, led by the United States, Russia, France, China, Italy, Ukraine and Britain. Much of the equipment is manufactured locally at Egyptian factories. The Egyptian armed forces celebrate their anniversary on October 6 each year to commemorate the Crossing of the Suez during the October War of 1973.

The modern Egyptian armed forces have been involved in numerous military crises and wars since independence, including the 1948 Arab–Israeli War, Egyptian Revolution of 1952, Suez Crisis, North Yemen Civil War, Six-Day War, Nigerian Civil War, War of Attrition, Yom Kippur War, Egyptian bread riots, 1986 Egyptian conscripts riot, Egyptian-Libyan War, Gulf War, War on Terror, Egyptian Crisis, Second Libyan Civil War, War on ISIL and the Sinai insurgency.

History

Nineteenth century

The modern Egyptian military was established by Muhammad Ali during his consolidation of power in Egypt, which significantly reduced Ottoman influence and contributed to Egypt becoming an autonomous vassal of the Ottoman Empire and effectively a de facto independent state.

In the early 19th century, Muhammad Ali of Egypt undertook comprehensive military reforms aimed at establishing a centralized, European-style army capable of securing his territorial ambitions and consolidating his authority over Egypt and beyond. Though his initial campaigns, such as those in Arabia and Greece, were formally conducted on behalf of the Ottoman Empire, Muhammad Ali progressively distanced himself from the Sublime Porte and expanded Egypt’s military power through independent campaigns.

Central to his military project was the reorganization of the Egyptian army along modern lines. Recruits were placed under strict discipline and surveillance within newly constructed barracks, subject to multiple daily roll calls and corporal punishment, including the use of the bastinado and whipping. Military regulations and codes of conduct were developed to ensure obedience and uniform discipline, while new administrative practices introduced standardized record-keeping, personal identification numbers for soldiers, and hierarchical unit structures. These measures facilitated internal control, particularly in deterring desertion during forced marches or redeployment.

Initially, Muhammad Ali relied on Bedouin groups to monitor troops at training camps, but tensions soon arose, prompting a shift toward a system of internment and self-contained oversight within military facilities. His reforms extended to logistical administration, including the centralization of salaries, distinctions between officers and enlisted men, and the formalization of career military service.

These internal reforms laid the foundation for a series of expansionist campaigns. In 1811, Muhammad Ali launched a campaign into the Arabian Peninsula to suppress the First Saudi State, recapturing the Hejaz region and eventually defeating the House of Saud after a prolonged campaign led by his sons, Tusun Pasha and Ibrahim Pasha. This was followed by the Turco-Egyptian conquest of Sudan (1820–1824), in which Egyptian forces subdued fragmented tribal entities, establishing Egyptian authority in the region and creating a new source of conscripts and slaves for the Egyptian army, including the formation of the ''Gihadiya'' foot regiments.

Muhammad Ali also participated in the suppression of the Greek War of Independence on behalf of the Ottomans, deploying a large expeditionary force under Ibrahim Pasha. Despite early advances, the Egyptian navy was decisively defeated at the Battle of Navarino (1827) by a coalition of European powers, costing Egypt its fleet and forcing withdrawal.

From 1831 to 1840, Muhammad Ali engaged in two major wars against the Ottoman Empire, seeking to annex Syria and eventually challenge Ottoman sovereignty. His forces captured much of the Levant and advanced into Anatolia, winning major victories such as the Battle of Konya (1832) and Battle of Nezib (1839). However, sustained pressure from the European powers led to diplomatic intervention and the signing of the Convention of London (1840). Under its terms, Muhammad Ali was forced to relinquish control of most of his conquests in exchange for recognition of hereditary rule over Egypt and Sudan, thus laying the groundwork for Egypt's de facto autonomy within the Ottoman Empire.

Under Muhammad Ali’s successors, the military remained central to the state but faced constraints. During the reign of Abbas I and Sa'id Pasha, modernization slowed, although limited reforms were introduced, including early railway construction and the beginning of land and labor reforms.

The most ambitious military and infrastructural expansions occurred under Ismail Pasha, who restructured the military academies, supported public works, and briefly pursued naval modernization, ordering ironclads and expanding the military's logistical capabilities. Egypt’s military also played a role in territorial expansion, particularly in Sudan and Darfur. However, this coincided with fiscal mismanagement and rising foreign debt, leading to increasing European oversight, culminating in the sale of Egyptian shares in the Suez Canal Company to Britain in 1879.

Dissatisfaction with foreign influence, combined with longstanding grievances among Egyptian officers, culminated in the Urabi Revolt (1881–1882), led by Ahmed ‘Urabi. Originally sparked by resentment against favoritism toward officers of Turkish origin, the movement evolved into a broader nationalist uprising. Despite initial military resistance, Urabi’s forces were ultimately defeated by the British Army at the Battle of Tel-el-Kebir, leading to the de facto British occupation of Egypt. Though nominally autonomous, Egypt effectively became a British protectorate until the unilateral declaration of independence in 1922.

Twentieth century

By 1914, the Egyptian military functioned largely as a native home-defence and colonial garrison force. It was organized and equipped under British supervision and staffed primarily with British officers. Its structure included infantry battalions, mounted infantry, camel corps units, support services, and irregular militia components.

The 1922 declaration of Egyptian independence formally ended the British protectorate but still left Egypt’s sovereignty constrained, particularly in military affairs. Britain retained control over Egypt’s defense, foreign relations, and Sudan, effectively limiting Egypt’s autonomy and perpetuating British military presence and influence. Although the declaration ended the legal fiction of Ottoman rule and met some nationalist demands, it failed to satisfy broader aspirations for full sovereignty. The resulting frustrations over continued British dominance, especially regarding the military, fueled further nationalist opposition and anti-British sentiment.

The Egyptian Air Force was initially established in 1930 as the Egyptian Army Air Force and formally inaugurated in 1932. In 1937, it was separated from army command and reorganized as an independent service under the name Royal Egyptian Air Force, becoming the third branch of the Egyptian military after the army and navy.

During World War I, Egypt’s strategic importance increased significantly due to the threat posed by Ottoman incursions across the Sinai. Although such offensives were ultimately repulsed, Egyptian forces remained focused primarily on internal security and regional garrison duties, especially in Sudan. By 1917, approximately 15,000 Egyptian volunteers were serving in the regular military, while over 98,000 Egyptians served in logistical capacities through the Egyptian Labour Corps and Egyptian Camel Transport Corps.

In the interwar period, although military service was technically compulsory, the armed forces remained limited in size and scope. By 1939, the total strength was modest, and British oversight remained extensive. Under the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936, Britain retained the right to station troops in Egypt for the protection of the Suez Canal and continued to exert influence over training and operations.

At the onset of the World War II, Egypt's military capacity remained limited. Following the Italian invasion of western Egypt in 1940, Egypt broke relations with the Axis powers and increasingly aligned itself with British military operations. While Egypt's forces were not the primary combatants, they contributed to British-led operations, including in the Western Desert campaign. Axis forces under General Erwin Rommel made temporary advances into Egyptian territory before being repelled at the Second Battle of El Alamein.

By the late 1940s, internal dissatisfaction with military leadership was growing. Many younger officers, particularly those educated in Britain, became disillusioned with the entrenched senior command, which was perceived as corrupt and incompetent, accusations heightened by Egypt's poor performance in the 1948 Arab–Israeli War. Although a partial purge of the senior officer corps was carried out in 1950, many of the dismissed officers were later reinstated by royal decree, further fueling discontent within the ranks.

In an effort to assert greater independence and reduce British influence, King Farouk dismissed the British Military Mission in 1950 and invited former German Wehrmacht officers, including Generals Wilhelm Fahrmbacher and Oskar Munzel, to serve as advisors to the Egyptian military establishment. These advisors remained in the country until 1958.

The Egyptian military’s failure in the 1948 Arab–Israeli War was a catalyst for the formation of the Free Officers led by Muhammad Naguib and Gamal Abdel Nasser. In the Egyptian coup d'état of 1952, they overthrew King Farouk and initiated sweeping reforms within the military and state.

One of the early achievements of the new regime was the signing of the Anglo–Egyptian Agreement of 1954, which mandated the phased withdrawal of British forces from the Suez Canal zone. The agreement allowed for continued British access to the base under specific circumstances and stipulated complete withdrawal by June 1956.

In 1956, the Egyptian Armed Forces were thrust into a major international conflict during the Suez Crisis, also known as the Tripartite Aggression. The crisis erupted after President Gamal Abdel Nasser revoked the concession of the Anglo-French owned Suez Canal Company and transferred canal operation to the state-owned Suez Canal Authority, prompting a coordinated military response from Israel, the United Kingdom, and France. On 29 October, Israeli forces invaded the Sinai Peninsula, followed days later by Anglo-French landings in the Canal Zone. The stated aim was to separate the combatants and secure freedom of navigation through the canal, but the operation was widely perceived as a ploy to topple Nasser and restore Western control over the vital waterway.

In the early 1950s, particularly after the revolution of 1952, politics rather than military competence was the main criterion for promotion. Field Marshal Abdel Hakim Amer in particular was a purely political appointment, whose approach would lead to large-scale problems during the Suez War. Promotions were often based on loyalty rather than merit, and a rigid divide between officers and enlisted men contributed to widespread dysfunction. Although some Egyptian defensive positions, such as at Abu Agelia and Mitla Pass, were organized and offered resistance, the Israeli forces quickly seized the initiative and routed Egyptian positions across the Sinai. Nasser ordered a general withdrawal from the peninsula, which allowed Israeli troops to advance rapidly toward the Suez Canal.

The invasion was soon halted under intense international pressure. The United States, Soviet Union, and United Nations condemned the attack, forcing a ceasefire by 7 November. Although Egypt suffered tactical defeats, the crisis ultimately elevated Nasser’s stature in the Arab world and signaled the decline of British and French influence in the Middle East. The Egyptian Armed Forces emerged from the conflict with considerable reputational damage, having revealed deep structural weaknesses, but the political outcome was widely seen as a strategic victory for Egypt.

During the North Yemen Civil War that began in 1962, the Egyptian Armed Forces undertook one of their most extensive foreign deployments, dispatching tens of thousands of troops in support of republican forces against the royalists backed by Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Israel.Sandler, Stanley. ''Ground Warfare: The International Encyclopedia''. Vol. 1 (2002): p. 977. "Egypt immediately began sending military supplies and troops to assist the Republicans... On the royalist side Jordan and Saudi Arabia were furnishing military aid, and Britain lent diplomatic support. In addition to Egyptian aid, the Soviet Union supplied 24 MiG-19s to the republicans." Authorized by President Gamal Abdel Nasser, the campaign involved sustained aerial and ground operations with Soviet support. Within months of the initial deployment in 1962, Nasser recognized that the campaign would demand far more than anticipated and sought a face-saving exit strategy, but the scope of engagement continued to escalate.

Fewer than 5,000 troops were initially deployed in October 1962, rising to 15,000 by December, 36,000 by late 1963, and 50,000 by late 1964. The peak came in late 1965, with approximately 55,000 personnel divided across 13 infantry regiments, an artillery division, a tank division from the Egyptian Armoured Corps, and multiple Special Forces and airborne regiments. Egyptian field commanders reported logistical constraints, notably the absence of reliable topographical maps during the early phase of operations. The prolonged and resource-intensive conflict strained Egypt’s military capabilities and readiness, contributing to its strategic vulnerability ahead of Israel's invasion in 1967 .

In the period leading up to the Six-Day War in 1967, the Egyptian Armed Forces were organized into four regional military commands, Suez, Sinai, the Nile Delta, and the Nile Valley up to the border with Sudan, while the remaining 75 percent of Egypt’s territory fell under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Frontier Corps. Tensions escalated in May 1967 when President Gamal Abdel Nasser announced the closure of the Straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping, an action Israel interpreted as a casus belli and responded to by mobilizing its forces.

In response, Egypt deployed three battalions of commandos to Amman in coordination with Jordan on 3 June. According to historian Trevor N. Dupuy, drawing on the memoirs of King Hussein of Jordan, Nasser’s intent was not to initiate a war but to achieve political and rhetorical leverage. Nevertheless, Israel proceeded with military action on 5 June.

At the time, the Egyptian Army had seven divisions positioned in the Sinai, two armored and five infantry, under the newly established Sinai Front Command, led by General Abdel Mohsin Murtagi, who had recently returned from Yemen. In the weeks before the outbreak of hostilities, Field Marshal Abdel Hakim Amer implemented wide-ranging changes to the command structure, replacing both the commanders and chiefs of staff in six of the seven divisions. Scholars such as Kenneth Pollack argue that these changes aimed to enhance operational effectiveness by placing veterans of the Yemeni conflict in key leadership roles.

On the morning of 5 June, Israel launched a coordinated military offensive, targeting Egyptian airbases and achieving a substantial degradation of Egypt’s air power early in the conflict. Ground forces soon advanced into the Sinai Peninsula, where Egyptian units faced mounting pressure across several fronts. Amid the deteriorating situation, Field Marshal Amer issued an order for a general withdrawal to the Suez Canal. The execution of this withdrawal, conducted under fire and without coherent coordination, contributed to considerable disruption among Egyptian forces, who sustained further losses during the retreat.

In July 1972, President Anwar Sadat expelled Soviet Armed Forces advisors from Egypt. On 6 October 1973, during the Yom Kippur holiday, which coincided with the 10th day of Ramadan, Egypt and Syria launched a surprise offensive to recover occupied territory, initiating the October War. In the Sinai, Egyptian forces crossed the Suez Canal as part of Operation Badr and established positions on the eastern bank, which it held throughout the conflict. On 14 October, Egyptian forces advanced deeper into the peninsula to relieve pressure on the Syrian front; however, the Israelis halted this offensive after three days. Seizing the initiative, Israeli forces crossed the canal through a single crossing point at Deversoir, cleared during the Battle of the Chinese Farm, and proceeded to advance north toward Ismailia and Port Said to isolate the Egyptian Second Army, south toward Suez to isolate the Third Army, and westward towards Cairo but were held at Nefalia. They encountered fierce resistance on all fronts and Israel suffered a major setback northwards at the Battle of Ismailia. A UN-brokered ceasefire took effect on 22 October, only to collapse soon after amid mutual accusations of violations. When hostilities resumed, Israel managed to achieve a breakthrough southward, effectively threatening the Third Army’s supply lines, but was ultimately unable to capture Suez despite multiple attempts. A second ceasefire on 25 October ended the fighting.

When Sadat and the Israelis concluded the Camp David Accords in September 1978, part of the ''quid pro quo'' for Egypt’s acceptance of peace was the provision of substantial U.S. military assistance. Today, the U.S. provides an annual assistance package often quoted at a nominal $1.3 billion to the Egyptian Armed Forces. This level is second only to that provided to Israel.

Scholars such as Kenneth Pollack, DeAtkine, and Robert Springborg have proposed multiple explanations for the challenges that Arab (and Egyptian) armies encountered in conflicts with Israel from 1948 through the 1970s and beyond. In particular, they suggest that from 1948 onward, junior officers often exhibited limited willingness to manoeuvre, innovate, or act independently. Ground forces units reportedly struggled with manipulation of information and insufficient attention to intelligence gathering and unbiased analysis. Observers note that elements from two Egyptian divisions sent to Saudi Arabia in 1990–91, accompanied by U.S. personnel during the 1991 Gulf War, frequently reported intense combat despite facing minimal or no resistance, whether or not U.S. military personnel or journalists were present. Later studies, such as those by Springborg, indicate that these patterns continued within the Egyptian Armed Forces into the twenty-first century.

Twenty-first century

During the 2011 Egyptian revolution, the Egyptian Army was deployed to restore order in major cities. On 31 January 2011, Israeli media reported that the 9th, 2nd, and 7th Divisions were ordered into Cairo. Subsequently, on 3 July 2013, the Armed Forces removed President Mohamed Morsi

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