The Dolev–Yao model,
named after its authors
Danny Dolev
Daniel (Danny) Dolev is an Israeli computer scientist known for his research in cryptography and distributed computing. He holds the Berthold Badler Chair in Computer Science at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and is a member of the scientific c ...
and
Andrew Yao, is a
formal model used to prove properties of interactive cryptographic protocols.
[
]
The network
The network is represented by a set of abstract machines that can exchange messages.
These messages consist of formal terms. These terms reveal some of the internal structure of the messages, but some parts will hopefully remain opaque to the adversary.
The adversary
The adversary in this model can overhear, intercept, and synthesize any message and is only limited by the constraints of the cryptographic methods used. In other words: "the attacker carries the message."
This
omnipotence has been very difficult to model, and many threat models simplify it, as has been done for the attacker in
ubiquitous computing.
The algebraic model
Cryptographic primitive
Cryptographic primitives are well-established, low-level cryptographic algorithms that are frequently used to build cryptographic protocols for computer security systems. These routines include, but are not limited to, one-way hash functions and ...
s are modeled by abstract operators. For example, asymmetric encryption for a user
is represented by the encryption function
and the decryption function
. Their main properties are that their composition is the
identity function (
) and that an encrypted message
reveals nothing about
. Unlike in the real world, the adversary can neither manipulate the encryption's bit representation nor guess the key. The attacker may, however, re-use any messages that have been sent and therefore become known. The attacker can encrypt or decrypt these with any keys he knows, to forge subsequent messages.
A protocol is modeled as a set of sequential runs, alternating between queries (sending a message over the network) and responses (obtaining a message from the network).
Remark
The symbolic nature of the Dolev–Yao model makes it more manageable than computational models and accessible to
algebraic methods but potentially less realistic. However, both kinds of models for cryptographic protocols have been related.
Also, symbolic models are very well suited to show that a protocol is ''broken'', rather than secure, under the given assumptions about the attackers capabilities.
See also
*
Security
Security is protection from, or resilience against, potential harm (or other unwanted coercive change) caused by others, by restraining the freedom of others to act. Beneficiaries (technically referents) of security may be of persons and social ...
*
Cryptographic protocol
References
{{DEFAULTSORT:Dolev-Yao model
Computer security