David Malet Armstrong (8 July 1926 – 13 May 2014), often D. M. Armstrong, was an
Australian philosopher. He is well known for his work on
metaphysics
Metaphysics is the branch of philosophy that examines the basic structure of reality. It is traditionally seen as the study of mind-independent features of the world, but some theorists view it as an inquiry into the conceptual framework of ...
and the
philosophy of mind
Philosophy of mind is a branch of philosophy that deals with the nature of the mind and its relation to the Body (biology), body and the Reality, external world.
The mind–body problem is a paradigmatic issue in philosophy of mind, although a ...
, and for his defence of a
factualist ontology
Ontology is the philosophical study of existence, being. It is traditionally understood as the subdiscipline of metaphysics focused on the most general features of reality. As one of the most fundamental concepts, being encompasses all of realit ...
, a
functionalist theory of the
mind
The mind is that which thinks, feels, perceives, imagines, remembers, and wills. It covers the totality of mental phenomena, including both conscious processes, through which an individual is aware of external and internal circumstances ...
, an
externalist
Internalism and externalism are two opposite ways of integrating and explaining various subjects in several areas of philosophy. These include human motivation, knowledge, justification, meaning, and truth. The distinction arises in many areas of d ...
epistemology
Epistemology is the branch of philosophy that examines the nature, origin, and limits of knowledge. Also called "the theory of knowledge", it explores different types of knowledge, such as propositional knowledge about facts, practical knowle ...
, and a
necessitarian conception of the
laws of nature.
[
]
Keith Campbell said that Armstrong's contributions to metaphysics and epistemology "helped to shape philosophy's agenda and terms of debate", and that Armstrong's work "always concerned to elaborate and defend a philosophy which is ontically economical, synoptic, and compatibly continuous with established results in the natural sciences".
Life and career
After studying at the
University of Sydney
The University of Sydney (USYD) is a public university, public research university in Sydney, Australia. Founded in 1850, it is the oldest university in both Australia and Oceania. One of Australia's six sandstone universities, it was one of the ...
, Armstrong undertook a B.Phil. at the
University of Oxford
The University of Oxford is a collegiate university, collegiate research university in Oxford, England. There is evidence of teaching as early as 1096, making it the oldest university in the English-speaking world and the List of oldest un ...
and a Ph.D. at the
University of Melbourne
The University of Melbourne (colloquially known as Melbourne University) is a public university, public research university located in Melbourne, Australia. Founded in 1853, it is Australia's second oldest university and the oldest in the state ...
. He taught at
Birkbeck College
Birkbeck, University of London (formally Birkbeck College, University of London), is a public research university located in London, England, and a member institution of the University of London. Established in 1823 as the London Mechanics' ...
in 1954–55, then at the University of Melbourne from 1956 to 1963. In 1964, he became
Challis Professor
The Challis Professorship are professorships at the University of Sydney named in honour of John Henry Challis, an Anglo-Australian merchant, landowner and philanthropist, whose bequests to the University of Sydney allowed for their establishmen ...
of Philosophy at the University of Sydney, where he stayed until his retirement in 1991. During his career, he was a visiting lecturer at a number of institutions, including
Yale
Yale University is a private Ivy League research university in New Haven, Connecticut, United States. Founded in 1701, Yale is the third-oldest institution of higher education in the United States, and one of the nine colonial colleges ch ...
,
Stanford
Leland Stanford Junior University, commonly referred to as Stanford University, is a private research university in Stanford, California, United States. It was founded in 1885 by railroad magnate Leland Stanford (the eighth governor of and th ...
, the
University of Notre Dame
The University of Notre Dame du Lac (known simply as Notre Dame; ; ND) is a Private university, private Catholic research university in Notre Dame, Indiana, United States. Founded in 1842 by members of the Congregation of Holy Cross, a Cathol ...
, the
University of Texas at Austin
The University of Texas at Austin (UT Austin, UT, or Texas) is a public university, public research university in Austin, Texas, United States. Founded in 1883, it is the flagship institution of the University of Texas System. With 53,082 stud ...
and
Franklin and Marshall College
Franklin & Marshall College (F&M) is a private liberal arts college in Lancaster, Pennsylvania, United States. Founded in 1787 as Franklin College and later merged with Marshall College in 1853, it is one of the oldest colleges in the United St ...
.
[
]
In 1974, when the University of Sydney's Philosophy department split into two departments—the Department for General Philosophy and the Department for Traditional and Modern Philosophy—Armstrong joined the latter along with
David Stove and
Keith Campbell, while the former department pursued more radical politics and taught courses on
Marxism
Marxism is a political philosophy and method of socioeconomic analysis. It uses a dialectical and materialist interpretation of historical development, better known as historical materialism, to analyse class relations, social conflict, ...
and
feminism
Feminism is a range of socio-political movements and ideology, ideologies that aim to define and establish the political, economic, personal, and social gender equality, equality of the sexes. Feminism holds the position that modern soci ...
. The two departments were reunified in 2000.
Armstrong married Jennifer Mary de Bohun Clark in 1982 and had step children. He previously married Madeleine Annette Haydon in 1950.
[
] He also served in the
Royal Australian Navy
The Royal Australian Navy (RAN) is the navy, naval branch of the Australian Defence Force (ADF). The professional head of the RAN is Chief of Navy (Australia), Chief of Navy (CN) Vice admiral (Australia), Vice Admiral Mark Hammond (admiral), Ma ...
, in which his father had been a commodore.
[
]
In 1950, Armstrong formed an Anti-
Conscription
Conscription, also known as the draft in the United States and Israel, is the practice in which the compulsory enlistment in a national service, mainly a military service, is enforced by law. Conscription dates back to antiquity and it conti ...
Committee with David Stove and Eric Dowling (R. E. Dowling), all three former students of
John Anderson, the Australian philosopher, and all later to be academic philosophers, who then began to support conscription and also believed that anti-conscription opinions ought to be suppressed.
To mark the 50th anniversary in 2014 of Armstrong's appointment to the Challis Chair of Philosophy at Sydney University,
''Quadrant'' magazine published a tribute to him (originally written in 1991) by David Stove and an overview of Armstrong's work by
Andrew Irvine.
Philosophy
Armstrong's philosophy is broadly naturalistic. In ''Sketch for a Systematic Metaphysics'', Armstrong states that his philosophical system rests upon "the assumption that all that exists is the space time world, the physical world as we say". He justifies this by saying that the physical world "seems obviously to exist" while other things "seem much more hypothetical". From this fundamental assumption flows a rejection of
abstract objects
In philosophy and the arts, a fundamental distinction exists between abstract and concrete entities. While there is no universally accepted definition, common examples illustrate the difference: numbers, sets, and ideas are typically classified ...
including
Platonic forms
The Theory of Forms or Theory of Ideas, also known as Platonic idealism or Platonic realism, is a philosophical theory credited to the Classical Greek philosopher Plato.
A major concept in metaphysics, the theory suggests that the physical wo ...
.
Armstrong's development as a philosopher was influenced heavily by
John Anderson,
David Lewis, and
J. J. C. Smart
John Jamieson Carswell Smart (16 September 1920 – 6 October 2012) was a British-Australian philosopher who was appointed as an Emeritus Professor by the Australian National University. He worked in the fields of metaphysics, philosophy of sci ...
, as well as by
Ullin Place
Ullin Thomas Place (24 October 1924 – 2 January 2000), usually cited as U. T. Place, was a British philosopher and psychologist. Along with J. J. C. Smart, he developed the identity theory of mind. After several years at the University of Ad ...
,
Herbert Feigl
Herbert Feigl (; ; December 14, 1902 – June 1, 1988) was an Austrian- American philosopher and an early member of the Vienna Circle. He coined the term " nomological danglers".
Biography
The son of a trained weaver who became a textile designer ...
,
Gilbert Ryle
Gilbert Ryle (19 August 1900 – 6 October 1976) was a British philosopher, principally known for his critique of Cartesian dualism, for which he coined the phrase " ghost in the machine". Some of Ryle's ideas in philosophy of mind have been ca ...
and
G. E. Moore
George Edward Moore (4 November 1873 – 24 October 1958) was an English philosopher, who with Bertrand Russell, Ludwig Wittgenstein and earlier Gottlob Frege was among the initiators of analytic philosophy. He and Russell began de-emphasizing ...
. Armstrong collaborated with C. B. Martin on a collection of critical essays on
John Locke
John Locke (; 29 August 1632 (Old Style and New Style dates, O.S.) – 28 October 1704 (Old Style and New Style dates, O.S.)) was an English philosopher and physician, widely regarded as one of the most influential of the Enlightenment thi ...
and
George Berkeley
George Berkeley ( ; 12 March 168514 January 1753), known as Bishop Berkeley (Bishop of Cloyne of the Anglican Church of Ireland), was an Anglo-Irish philosopher, writer, and clergyman who is regarded as the founder of "immaterialism", a philos ...
.
Armstrong's philosophy, while systematic, does not spend any time on social or ethical matters, and also does not attempt to build a
philosophy of language
Philosophy of language refers to the philosophical study of the nature of language. It investigates the relationship between language, language users, and the world. Investigations may include inquiry into the nature of Meaning (philosophy), me ...
. He once described his slogan as 'Put semantics last'
and, in ''Universals & Scientific Realism'', he rebuts an argument in favour of Plato's theory of forms that rely on semantics by describing "a long but, I think, on the whole discreditable tradition which tries to settle ontological questions on the basis of semantic considerations".
Metaphysics
Universals
In metaphysics, Armstrong defends the view that universals exist (although Platonic uninstantiated universals do not exist). Those universals match up with the fundamental particles that science tells us about.
[
] Armstrong describes his philosophy as a form of
scientific realism
Scientific realism is the philosophical view that the universe described by science (including both observable and unobservable aspects) exists independently of our perceptions, and that verified scientific theories are at least approximately true ...
.
Armstrong's universals are "sparse": not every predicate will have an accompanying property, but only those which are deemed basic by scientific investigation. The ultimate ontology of universals would only be realised with the completion of physical science.
Mass
Mass is an Intrinsic and extrinsic properties, intrinsic property of a physical body, body. It was traditionally believed to be related to the physical quantity, quantity of matter in a body, until the discovery of the atom and particle physi ...
would thus be a universal (subject to mass not being discarded by future physicists). Armstrong realises that we will need to refer to and use properties that are not considered universals in his sparse ontology—for instance, being able to refer to something ''being a game'' (to use the example from
Wittgenstein's ''
Philosophical Investigations
''Philosophical Investigations'' () is a work by the philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein, published posthumously in 1953.
''Philosophical Investigations'' is divided into two parts, consisting of what Wittgenstein calls, in the preface, ''Bemer ...
''). Armstrong then suggests that a
supervenience
In philosophy, supervenience refers to a relation between sets of properties or sets of facts. X is said to ''supervene'' on Y if and only if some difference in Y is necessary for any difference in X to be possible.
Examples of supervenience, i ...
relation exists between these second order properties and the ontologically authentic universals given to us by physics.
Armstrong's theory of universals treats relations as having no particular ontological difficulty, they can be treated in the same way non-relational properties are. How Armstrong's theory of universals deals with relations with varying adicities has been raised as an issue by Fraser MacBride. MacBride argues that there can be relations where the number of terms in the relation varies across instances. Armstrong's response is to affirm a theory he describes as the Principle of Instantial Invariance, wherein the adicity of properties are essential and invariant. According to Armstrong, complex relations which seem to challenge the principle are not ontologically real but are second-order properties that can be reduced to more basic properties that subscribe to the Principle of Instantial Invariance.
Armstrong rejects
nominalist
In metaphysics, nominalism is the view that universals and abstract objects do not actually exist other than being merely names or labels. There are two main versions of nominalism. One denies the existence of universals—that which can be inst ...
accounts of properties that attempt to align properties simply with classes. Coextension is a problem they face: if properties are simply classes, in a world where all blue things are also wet, and all wet things are also blue, class nominalists are unable to draw a distinction between the property of being blue and being wet. He provides an analogy to the argument in ''
Euthyphro
''Euthyphro'' (; ), is a philosophical work by Plato written in the form of a Socratic dialogue set during the weeks before the trial of Socrates in 399 BC. In the dialogue, Socrates and Euthyphro attempt to establish a definition of '' piet ...
'': to say that electrons are electrons because they are part of the class of electrons puts the cart before the horse. They are part of the class of electrons ''because'' they ''are'' electrons.
In Armstrong's view, nominalisms can also be criticised for producing a blob theory of reality. Objects have structure: they have parts, those parts are made of molecules, which are in turn made up of atoms standing in relation to one another, which are in turn made up of subatomic particles and so on. Blobbiness also threatens Platonic universals: a particular instantiating a universal in a world of Platonic universals becomes a matter of the blob-particular having a relation to a universal ''elsewhere'' (in the Platonic heaven, say), rather than having an internal relation in the way that a chemical element does to a constituent atom.
Armstrong further rejects nominalisms that deny that properties and relations exist in reality because he suggests that these sorts of nominalisms, specifically referring to what he calls class nominalism, and resemblance nominalism, postulate primitives of either class membership or resemblance.
This primitive results in a vicious regress for both kinds of nominalisms, Armstrong suggests, thus motivating his states-of-affairs based system that unites properties by postulating a primitive tie of instantiation based on a fact-ontology, called states of affairs.
In terms of the origin of Armstrong's view of universals, Armstrong says his view of universals is "relatively unexplored territory" but points to
Hilary Putnam
Hilary Whitehall Putnam (; July 31, 1926 – March 13, 2016) was an American philosopher, mathematician, computer scientist, and figure in analytic philosophy in the second half of the 20th century. He contributed to the studies of philosophy of ...
's 1970 paper 'On Properties' as a possible forerunner. He also says that "Plato in his later works, Aristotle and the Scholastic Realists were ahead of contemporary philosophy in this matter, although handicapped by the relative backwardness of the science and the scientific methodology of their day".
States of affairs
Central to Armstrong's philosophy is the idea of
states of affairs
In philosophy, a state of affairs (), also known as a situation, is a way the actual world must be in order to make some given ''proposition'' about the actual world true; in other words, a state of affairs is a ''truth-maker'', whereas a proposit ...
("facts" in Russell's terminology): in ''Sketch for a Systematic Metaphysics'', Armstrong claims that states of affairs are "''the'' fundamental structures in reality". A state of affairs roughly put is an instantiation of a particular and a universal: a state of affairs might be that a particular atom exists, instantiating a universal (say, that it is of a particular element, if chemical elements are ultimately accepted as part of Armstrong's universals). The particulars in Armstrong's ontology must have at least one universal—just as he rejects uninstantiated universals, he also rejects "unpropertied particulars".
Armstrong argues that states of affairs are distinct things in ontology because they are more than the sum of their parts. If some particular ''a'' has a non-symmetric relation ''R'' to another particular ''b'', then ''R (a, b)'' differs from ''R (b, a)''. It may be the case that ''R (a, b)'' obtains in the world but ''R (b, a)'' does not. Without states of affairs instantiating the particulars and universals (including relations), we cannot account for the truth of the one case and the falsity of the other.
Laws of nature
Armstrong's theory of universals gives him the basis for an understanding of laws of nature as being relations between universals, a non-
Humean account of laws of nature proposed independently by Armstrong,
Michael Tooley, and
Fred Dretske
Frederick Irwin "Fred" Dretske (; December 9, 1932 – July 24, 2013) was an American philosopher noted for his contributions to epistemology and the philosophy of mind.
Life and career
Born to Frederick and Hattie Dretske, Dretske first planned ...
. This account posits that the relations between universals are truthmakers for the statements about physical laws, and it is realist as it accepts that laws of nature are a feature of the world rather than just a way we talk about the world. Armstrong identifies the laws as holding between universals rather than particulars as an account of laws involving just particulars rather than universals would not adequately explain how laws of nature operate in the case of
counterfactuals
Counterfactual conditionals (also ''contrafactual'', ''subjunctive'' or ''X-marked'') are conditional sentences which discuss what would have been true under different circumstances, e.g. "If Peter believed in ghosts, he would be afraid to be he ...
.
To illustrate the theory,
Stephen Mumford gives the example of ''all ravens are black''. Under the theory of Armstrong, Tooley and Dretske, there is a relation of necessity between the universals ravenhood and blackness, rather than there being a relationship with every single raven. This allows the explanation of laws of nature that have not been instantiated. Mumford cites the frequently-used example of the
moa bird: "It is supposed that every bird of this now-extinct species died at a young age, though not because of anything in its genetic makeup. Rather, it died mainly because of some virus that just happened to sweep through the population. One bird could have escaped the virus only to be eaten by a predator on the day before its fiftieth birthday." Under the theory of Armstrong, Tooley and Dretske, such a coincidence would not be a law of nature.
Dispositions
Armstrong rejects
dispositionalism, the idea that dispositional properties (or powers as they are sometimes referred to) are ontologically significant and have an important role in explaining
laws of nature. Armstrong believes that the challenge that dispositionalism presents for his account of laws of nature is not in the case of ''manifested'' dispositions (say, a glass dropping on the ground and breaking) but ''unmanifested'' dispositions (the fact that counter factually if one were to drop the glass on the ground, it ''would'' break). Armstrong simply states that the disposition is simply in the nature of the instantiated properties of the thing which is supposed to have the disposition.
Truth and truthmakers
Regarding truth, Armstrong holds to what he describes as a "maximalist version" of
truthmaker theory
Truthmaker theory is "the branch of metaphysics that explores the relationships between what is true and what exists". The basic intuition behind truthmaker theory is that truth depends on being. For example, a perceptual experience of a green tre ...
: he believes that every truth has a truthmaker, although there doesn't necessarily exist a one-to-one mapping between truth and truthmaker. The possibility of one to many relations between truths and truthmakers is a feature that Armstrong believes allows truthmaker theory to answer some of the criticisms levelled at older correspondence theories of truth (of which he believes truthmaker theory to be an improved version). Negative truths have truthmakers in Armstrong's account: he gives the example of a wall that is painted green. The wall being painted green is a truth for the proposition that it is ''not'' painted white ''and'' the proposition that it is ''not'' painted red and so on.
The difficulty in providing an adequate account of truthmakers for events in the past is one reason Armstrong gives for rejecting
presentism—the view that only the present exists (another reason being the incompatibility of such a view with
special relativity
In physics, the special theory of relativity, or special relativity for short, is a scientific theory of the relationship between Spacetime, space and time. In Albert Einstein's 1905 paper, Annus Mirabilis papers#Special relativity,
"On the Ele ...
). Presentists, Armstrong argues, must either deny that truthmakers are needed for statements about the past, or account for them "by postulating rather strange truthmakers".
Mind
Armstrong holds to a physicalist, functionalist theory of the mind. He initially was attracted to
Gilbert Ryle
Gilbert Ryle (19 August 1900 – 6 October 1976) was a British philosopher, principally known for his critique of Cartesian dualism, for which he coined the phrase " ghost in the machine". Some of Ryle's ideas in philosophy of mind have been ca ...
's ''
The Concept of Mind'' and the rejection of Cartesian dualism. Armstrong did not accept behaviourism and instead defended a theory he referred to as the "central-state theory" which identifies mental states with the state of the central nervous system. In ''A Materialist Theory of the Mind'', he accepted that mental states such as consciousness exist, but stated that they can be explained as physical phenomena. Armstrong attributes his adoption of the central-state theory to the work of
J. J. C. Smart
John Jamieson Carswell Smart (16 September 1920 – 6 October 2012) was a British-Australian philosopher who was appointed as an Emeritus Professor by the Australian National University. He worked in the fields of metaphysics, philosophy of sci ...
—specifically the paper 'Sensations and Brain Processes'—and traces the lineage from there to
Ullin Place
Ullin Thomas Place (24 October 1924 – 2 January 2000), usually cited as U. T. Place, was a British philosopher and psychologist. Along with J. J. C. Smart, he developed the identity theory of mind. After several years at the University of Ad ...
's 1956 paper 'Is Consciousness a Brain Process?'
Stephen Mumford said that Armstrong's ''A Materialist Theory of the Mind'' "represents an authoritative statement of Australian materialism and was, and still is, a seminal piece of philosophy".
Epistemology
Armstrong's view of knowledge is that the conditions of knowledge are satisfied when you have a
justified true belief that you arrived at through a reliable process: that is, the belief was caused by some factor in the external world (hence the label of externalism). Armstrong uses the analogy of a
thermometer
A thermometer is a device that measures temperature (the hotness or coldness of an object) or temperature gradient (the rates of change of temperature in space). A thermometer has two important elements: (1) a temperature sensor (e.g. the bulb ...
: as a thermometer changes to reflect the temperature of the environment it is in, so must one's beliefs if they are reliably formed. The connection between knowledge and the external world, for Armstrong, is a
nomological
In philosophy, nomology refers to a "science of laws" based on the theory that it is possible to elaborate descriptions dedicated not to particular aspects of reality but inspired by a scientific vision of universal validity expressed by scientific ...
relationship (that is, a law of nature relationship). Here, Armstrong's view is broadly similar to that of
Alvin Goldman
Alvin Ira Goldman (October 1, 1938 – August 4, 2024) was an American philosopher who was emeritus Board of Governors Professor of Philosophy and Cognitive Science at Rutgers University in New Jersey and a leading figure in epistemology.
Educat ...
and
Robert Nozick
Robert Nozick (; November 16, 1938 – January 23, 2002) was an American philosopher. He held the Joseph Pellegrino Harvard University Professor, University Professorship at Harvard University,[Alvin Plantinga
Alvin Carl Plantinga (born November 15, 1932) is an American analytic philosophy, analytic philosopher who works primarily in the fields of philosophy of religion, epistemology (particularly on issues involving theory of justification, epistemic ...]
towards an account of knowledge that added the requirement for 'properly-functioning' cognitive systems operating according to a design plan.
Belief
On the question of the relationship between
belief
A belief is a subjective Attitude (psychology), attitude that something is truth, true or a State of affairs (philosophy), state of affairs is the case. A subjective attitude is a mental state of having some Life stance, stance, take, or opinion ...
s and
knowledge
Knowledge is an Declarative knowledge, awareness of facts, a Knowledge by acquaintance, familiarity with individuals and situations, or a Procedural knowledge, practical skill. Knowledge of facts, also called propositional knowledge, is oft ...
, Armstrong defends a "weak acceptance" of the belief condition, namely that if a person can be said to know some thing ''p'', he or she believes ''p''. In a paper for the
Aristotelian Society
The Aristotelian Society for the Systematic Study of Philosophy, more generally known as the Aristotelian Society, is a philosophical society in London.
History
Aristotelian Society was founded at a meeting on 19 April 1880, at 17 Bloomsbury Squar ...
, Armstrong rejects a series of linguistic arguments for a rejection of the belief condition which argue that one can have knowledge without having belief because a common usage of the word 'belief' is to imply lack of knowledge—Armstrong gives the example of if you asked a man on a railway station whether the train has just left and he said "I believe it has", you would take from this that he does not ''know'' that it has.
[
]
Armstrong also argues that contradictory beliefs show that there ''is'' a connection between beliefs and knowledge. He gives the example of a woman who has learned her husband is dead but cannot bring herself to ''believe'' her husband is dead. She both believes and disbelieves her husband is dead: it just happens that one of her two beliefs is justified, true and satisfies some knowledge conditions.
Armstrong presents a response to
Colin Radford's modified version of the "unconfident examinee" example. A student is asked when Queen Elizabeth I died, and he hesitatingly answers "1603" and exhibits no confidence in his answer. He has forgotten that at some point previously, he studied English history. Radford presents this as an example of knowledge without belief. But Armstrong differs on this: the unconfident examinee has a belief that Queen Elizabeth I died in 1603, he knows that she died in 1603, but he does not ''know that he knows''. Armstrong rejects the
KK Principle—that to know some thing ''p'', one must know that one knows ''p''.
Armstrong's rejection of the KK Principle is consistent with his wider externalist project.
Bibliography
Books
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Selected articles
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Miscellaneous
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Honours and recognition
Armstrong was a Foundation Fellow of the Australian Academy of the Humanities in 1969. He was appointed an
Officer of the Order of Australia
The Order of Australia is an Australian honours and awards system, Australian honour that recognises Australian citizens and other persons for outstanding achievement and service. It was established on 14 February 1975 by Elizabeth II, Monarch ...
in the
1993 Australia Day Honours.
He was elected a Foreign Honorary Member of the
American Academy of Arts and Sciences
The American Academy of Arts and Sciences (The Academy) is one of the oldest learned societies in the United States. It was founded in 1780 during the American Revolution by John Adams, John Hancock, James Bowdoin, Andrew Oliver, and other ...
in 2008.
[
]
See also
*
Moderate realism
Moderate realism (also called immanent realism) is a position in the debate on the metaphysics of universals which holds that there is no realm in which universals exist (in opposition to Platonic realism, which asserts the existence of abstrac ...
* "
The Nature of Mind"
References
Further reading
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External links
Guide to the Papers of David Armstrong*
P. Forrest'Armstrong, D.M.' in ''A Companion to Philosophy in Australia and New Zealand''(archived)
David Armstrong (1926-2014), Sydney philosopher(video)
Armstrong speaks about his teacher John Anderson
{{DEFAULTSORT:Armstrong, David Malet
1926 births
2014 deaths
20th-century Australian philosophers
21st-century Australian philosophers
Analytic philosophers
People from Melbourne
Australian epistemologists
Fellows of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences
Australian metaphysicians
Australian philosophers of mind
University of Sydney alumni
Academic staff of the University of Sydney
Challis professor
Fellows of the Australian Academy of the Humanities
Officers of the Order of Australia