Convoy ON 154

Convoy ON 154 (alternatively Convoy ON(S) 154 or Convoy ONS 154) was a North Atlantic convoy of the ON convoys which ran during the battle of the Atlantic in the Second World War. It was the 154th of the numbered series of merchant ship convoys Outbound from the British Isles to North America. It came under attack in December 1942 and lost 13 of its 50 freighters; one U-boat was sunk.

Background

As western Atlantic coastal convoys brought an end to the second happy time, Admiral Karl Dönitz, the '' Befehlshaber der U-Boote'' (BdU, commander in chief U-boats) shifted focus to the mid-Atlantic to avoid aircraft patrols. Although convoy routing was less predictable in mid-ocean, Dönitz anticipated that the increased numbers of U-boats being produced would be able to search for convoys. Only 20 per cent of the 180 trans-Atlantic convoys sailing from the end of July 1942 until the end of April 1943 lost ships to U-boat attack.

Bletchley Park

The British Government Code and Cypher School (GC&CS) based at Bletchley Park housed a small industry of code-breakers and traffic analysts. By June 1941, the German Enigma machine Home Waters (''Heimish'') settings used by surface ships and U-boats could quickly be read. On 1 February 1942, the Enigma machines used in U-boats in the Atlantic and Mediterranean were changed to a four-rotor Enigma (Shark to the British). By mid-1941, British Y-stations were able to receive and read W/T transmissions and give advance warning of ''Luftwaffe'' operations. In November 1942 the diversion of U-boats to North-West Africa against Operation Torch reduced losses on Atlantic convoys but world losses rose to the worst month of the war. Only two U-boat s were sunk in November. In mid-December did GC&CS begin to break the four-rotor enigma messages. Having broken one Shark cypher in mid-December, the delay in breaking them was serious and on 25 December, no settings had been found for the last six days. From 25 December to 1 January 1943 traffic was read quickly.

The German (, Observation Service) of the (MND, Naval Intelligence Service) had broken several Admiralty codes and cyphers by 1939, which were used to help ships elude British ships and provide opportunities for surprise attacks. From June to August 1940, six British submarines were sunk in the Skaggerak using information gleaned from British wireless signals. In 1941, read signals from the Commander-in-Chief, Western Approaches, informing convoys of areas patrolled by U-boats, enabling the submarines to move into "safe" zones. broke Combined Naval Cipher No. 3 in February 1942 and by March was reading up to 80 per cent of the traffic, which continued until 15 December 1942. By coincidence, the British lost access to the ''Shark'' cypher and had no information to send in Cypher No 3 which might compromise Ultra.

Prelude

The ships departed Liverpool on 18 December 1942 and comprised 50 merchant ships, in ballast or carrying trade goods. The convoy commodore was Vice Admiral (Retd.) Wion de Malpas Egerton in '' Empire Shackleton''. The convoy sailed in twelve columns of three or four ships each. The convoy formation was wide and long. Convoy ON 154 was a slow convoy, made up of ships that could manage at best. Slow convoys were particularly vulnerable, as their speed was matched by the submerged speed of the U-boats and was just half their surface speed, thus making it easier for a wolfpack to form around it. In the North Atlantic were the U-boat wolfpacks with 13 boats and with 11 boats, on patrol in the Mid-Atlantic gap, where Allied air cover was unable to reach. A third pack, acted as a reserve but attacked Convoy HX 219 instead.

The ocean escort for Convoy ON 154 was the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) Mid-Ocean Escort Force Group C-1, led by Lieutenant-Commander Guy Windeyer in the . The group comprised the s , , , , and . The Town-class destroyer had mechanical defects, did not sail and was not replaced with another destroyer. RCN ships generally suffered from overwork compared to their Royal Navy equivalents, and were more likely to be un-modernized. Convoy ON 154 included the convoy rescue ship ''Toward'', the oiler ''Scottish Heather'' and the French-crewed special service vessel . ''Fidelity'' was armed with four guns, four torpedo tubes and a defensive torpedo net. She carried the landing craft ''LCV-752'' and ''LCV-754'', two Kingfisher floatplanes and the Motor Torpedo Boat ''MTB 105''.

Action

26/27 December

The winter of 1942–1943 turned out to be the worst in the Atlantic for thirty years. In November, convoys were routed further south than usual, which took them away from the air cover from northern bases, when Allied Anti-submarine warfare (ASW) aircraft were not grounded by the weather. Convoy ON 154 was routed south towards the Azores to avoid the winter storms and remained distant from escort support groups for longer than usual. reported the convoy on 26 December. That night torpedoed the leading ships from two of the starboard columns. '' Empire Union'' was hit at 01:40, ''Melrose Abbey'' was hit ten minutes later. Both British freighters sank at about 02:30. ''Toward'' rescued 63 survivors from the first ship and 47 from the second. In a second attack, ''U-356'' torpedoed the Dutch freighter ''Soekaboemi'' at 04:10 and the British freighter ''King Edward'' at 04:15. ''King Edward'' sank within three minutes. ''U-356'' was detected by the escorts and was sunk with no survivors following depth charge attacks by ''St. Laurent'', ''Chilliwack'', ''Battleford'' and ''Napanee''. At dawn, ''Toward'' rescued 25 men from ''King Edward'' and assisted ''Napanee'', recovering all but one of ''Soekaboemi''s crew, the ship remaining afloat when abandoned at 07:30.

27/28 December

began stalking ''Scottish Heather'' as she refuelled some of the escorts astern of the convoy on the afternoon of 27 December. ''U-225'' was twice driven off by ''Chilliwack'' before hitting the oiler with a torpedo in a third approach at 20:40. The ship was temporarily abandoned but the second mate re-boarded her with ten men and sailed the ship out of the danger zone. At dawn he returned and pattern-searched for lifeboats. The oiler returned to England independently after recovering all of her crew.

28/29 December

began shadowing the convoy on the morning of 28 December and directed 18 U-boats to the convoy. ''Fidelity'' attempted to launch a Kingfisher but it capsized and sank at 19:15. While ''St. Laurent'' rescued the Kingfisher crew, a coordinated night attack began with U-boats entering the starboard side of the convoy at 19:58. torpedoed the Norwegian freighter ''Norse King'' at 20:00. ''U-225'' torpedoed the British freighters ''Melmore Head'' at 20:03 and ''Ville de Rouen'' at 20:05. ''U-260'' torpedoed the British freighter '' Empire Wagtail'' at 20:45. As ''Empire Wagtail'' disintegrated in an explosion that claimed all of her crew, ''Fidelity'' reported a main engine failure and ''Shediac'' was sent to assist her astern of the convoy.

U-boats then entered the port side of the convoy. torpedoed the British freighters ''Lynton Grange'' at 21:20, ''Zarian'' at 21:23, and ''Baron Cochrane'' at 21:24. ''U-662'' hit the damaged ''Ville de Rouen'' again at 22:10 and ''U-225'' torpedoed the convoy commodore's freighter '' Empire Shackleton'' at 22:15 and the Belgian freighter ''President Francoui'' at 22:30. Disabled ships were also being attacked astern of the convoy. ''Baron Cochrane'' was sunk at 21:50 by and sank ''Lynton Grange'' a few minutes later. The crews had abandoned both ships when they were hit earlier. ''U-123'' and sank ''Empire Shackleton'' at 22:55. ''U-591'' sank the abandoned ''Zarian'' just before midnight.

''Shediac'' was ordered to leave ''Fidelity'' astern and rejoin the convoy while searching for survivors. ''Shediac'' rescued 35 survivors from ''Melmore Head'' and 71 from ''Ville de Rouen'' between 03:10 and 03:30 and 24 from ''Empire Shackleton'' at 05:30. ''Shediac'' rejoined the convoy at 13:00 short of fuel and with inadequate provisions for the number of survivors aboard. Two lifeboats abandoned the damaged ''President Francoui'', but the remainder of the crew attempted to sail independently to the Azores. ''U-225'' torpedoed the ship again at 06:30 and it was sunk at 09:30 by . The damaged ''Norse King'' was similarly attempting to reach the Azores when she was sunk by ''U-435'' at 15:07. There were no survivors. The convoy escort was reinforced by the M-class destroyers and at 14:00 on 29 December after the arriving destroyers rescued 42 survivors from ''Baron Cochrane'' at 07:00, 52 survivors from ''Lynton Grange'' at 07:20 and 49 survivors from ''Zarian'' at 08:15.

HMS ''Fidelity'' 29/30 December

''Fidelity'' restarted main engines at 05:00 and declined the offer to dispatch a tug from Gibraltar. Speed was limited to two knots while streaming anti-torpedo nets when observed by ''Meteor'' and ''Milne'' at 05:30. found ''Fidelity'' while her main engines were again stopped for repairs between 10:15 and 11:00. ''U-615'' identified ''Fidelity'' as a Q-ship and shadowed her cautiously. A reconnaissance flight by ''Fidelity''s remaining Kingfisher observed two shadowing submarines and two of ''Empire Shackleton''s lifeboats. ''Fidelity'' launched ''LCV-752'' and ''LCV-754'' to retrieve the lifeboats. ''Fidelity'' recovered the Kingfisher and the two landing craft with ''Empire Shackleton''s survivors that afternoon and launched MTB-105 to conduct anti-submarine patrols through the night.

''U-615'' launched four torpedoes at ''Fidelity'' at about 20:00 but the anti-torpedo net protected the ship from damage. ''MTB-105'' had engine trouble and lost contact with ''Fidelity'' at about 23:00. ''MTB-105'' heard radio calls from ''Fidelity'' shortly after dawn but had inadequate battery power to respond. ''U-435'' torpedoed ''Fidelity'' at 16:30 and was surprised by the size of the resulting explosion and by the large number of men subsequently seen floating in the water where the ship had sunk. ''MTB-105'' rigged a makeshift sail to try and reach land. ''Fidelity'' had on board 369 people (274 crew, 51 Marines and 44 survivors from ''Empire Shackleton''), all were lost at sea, including Egerton, the convoy commodore.

30 December

On 30 December British destroyer arrived, Commander Ralph Heathcote, the commander of B-6 Escort Group taking over,

''Battleford'', ''Shediac'', ''Milne'' and ''Meteor'' were released on 30 December to refuel in the Azores, leaving only four escorts remaining and as many as twelve U-boats in contact with the convoy. Following the loss of the convoy commodore, the two fast ships with large passenger complements (''Calgary'' and ''Advastun''), were invited to escape if they found an opportunity. and the V-class destroyer reinforced the convoy escort before nightfall on 30 December. warned BdU of the reinforcement of the convoy escorts and the U-boats were ordered to disengage, many to rendezvous with to the west of the Azores.

''Shediac'' and ''Meteor'' ran out of fuel before reaching the Azores. ''Battleford'' towed ''Shediac'' the last and ''Meteor'' was towed the last . Once refuelled, the four ships joined the search for survivors from ''Fidelity''. On 1 January, ''Woodstock'' found and rescued the eight men aboard ''MTB-105'', which included the two aircrew from the Kingfisher but aside from the two-man Kingfisher crew rescued earlier by ''St. Laurent'', there were no other survivors from ''Fidelity''s crew of 325 and the men rescued from ''Empire Shackleton''. ''Prescott'' also saved 26 men from ''President Francoui'' whose Chief Officer, Lagay, reported that the conduct of some of the survivors had been less than admirable, malingering, insubordination and violence being reported. ''Scottish Heather'' reached the Clyde on 2 January and the remainder of the convoy reached New York City on 12 January 1943.

Analysis

Convoy ON 154 lost 14 ships of 69,378 GRT and 486 men killed. It ranked as one of the worst North Atlantic convoy disasters of the war. The Admiralty was critical of the Canadians, comparing the convoy unfavourably with the transit of Convoy ON 155 escorted by B-6 escort group without loss. Blair (2000) and Milner (2018) point out that the Admiralty also bore responsibility for routing the convoy so far south, through the widest part of the Air Gap, that took five days to cross. Escort Group C-1 was also expected to operate with a destroyer short, inadequate provision for re-fueling and with without modern equipment, against a pack that outnumbered it by four to one. Milner wrote that Escort Group B-6 had been given a more northerly course and a faster convoy and that the Canadian groups had generally been assigned to the more vulnerable slow convoys of the SC and ON(S) series, while the British groups had the faster HX and ON convoys.

Analysis of the convoy's losses also shows that of the fourteen ships sunk, nine were lost outside the convoy, having been damaged or disabled in a previous attack and straggled. After the first attack by ''U-356'' only ''U-225'', ''U-406'', ''U-591'', ''U-260'' and ''U-123'' had penetrated the escort screen, while the rest of the pack had picked off the stragglers. Blair also points out that the German success against Convoy ON 154 was an exception; in December the Allies ran 16 trans-Atlantic convoys, containing some 650 ships; only three of them were attacked and only twenty ships had been sunk (i.e. apart from the fourteen in Convoy ON 154, only two from Convoy HX 217 and four from Convoy ON 153), plus seven other ships sailing independently.

Aftermath

Analysis

The attack on Convoy ON 154 was undoubtedly a success for the Germans, but the safe arrival of over two-thirds of the convoy's ships and the destruction of one of the attackers, whilst being outnumbered by nearly four to one, was not a complete failure by the escort forces. The Admiralty took the drastic decision to withdraw the Canadian escort groups from the Atlantic, for intensive training at the Royal Navy facilities at Liverpool and Tobermory; refitting the Canadian escort ships with modern equipment, a tacit acceptance of the complaints of the Canadian Navy. The burden of escorting slow convoys on the Atlantic route fell to the British, leading to experiences not dissimilar to those suffered by the Canadians.

Orders of battle

Convoy ON 154

Mid-ocean escort force

Escort reinforcements

U-boats

See also

* Convoy Battles of World War II

Notes

Footnotes

Bibliography

*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*

Further reading

*
*
*
*
*
*
*

{{World War II
ON154
Naval battles of World War II involving Canada
C