The consequence argument is an argument against

compatibilism Compatibilism is the belief that free will and determinism are mutually compatible and that it is possible to believe in both without being logically inconsistent. Compatibilists believe that freedom can be present or absent in situations for re ...

popularised by

Peter van Inwagen Peter van Inwagen (; born September 21, 1942) is an American analytic philosopher and the John Cardinal O'Hara Professor of Philosophy at the University of Notre Dame The University of Notre Dame du Lac, known simply as Notre Dame ( ) or N ...

. The argument claims that if agents have no control over the facts of the past then the agent has no control of the consequences of those facts. The

Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy The ''Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy'' (''SEP'') combines an online encyclopedia of philosophy with peer-reviewed publication of original papers in philosophy, freely accessible to Internet users. It is maintained by Stanford University. Eac ...

gives the following version of the argument, in the form of a

syllogism A syllogism ( grc-gre, συλλογισμός, ''syllogismos'', 'conclusion, inference') is a kind of logical argument that applies deductive reasoning to arrive at a conclusion based on two propositions that are asserted or assumed to be true. ...

#No one has power over the facts of the past and the laws of nature. #No one has power over the fact that the facts of the past and the laws of nature entail every fact of the future (i.e.,
determinism Determinism is a philosophical view, where all events are determined completely by previously existing causes. Deterministic theories throughout the history of philosophy have developed from diverse and sometimes overlapping motives and consi ...
is true) #Therefore, no one has power over the facts of the future.

Or in van Inwagan's own words, in ''An Essay on Free Will'':

If determinism is true, then our acts are the consequence of laws of nature and events in the remote past. But it's not up to us what went on before we were born, and neither is it up to us what the laws of nature are. Therefore, the consequences of these things (including our present acts) are not up to us (p. 56).

References

Free will Philosophical arguments Concepts in metaphysics {{metaphysics-stub