Battle off Samar

The Battle off Samar was the centermost action of the Battle of Leyte Gulf, one of the largest naval battles in history, which took place in the Philippine Sea off Samar Island, in the Philippines on October 25, 1944. It was the only major action in the larger battle in which the Americans were largely unprepared. After the previous day's fighting, the Imperial Japanese Navy's First Mobile Striking Force, under the command of Takeo Kurita, had suffered significant damage and appeared to be retreating westward. However, by the next morning, the Japanese force had turned around and resumed its advance toward Leyte Gulf. With Admiral William Halsey Jr. lured into taking his powerful Third Fleet north after a decoy fleet and the Seventh Fleet engaged to the south, the recently landed 130,000 men of the Sixth Army were left vulnerable to Japanese attack on Leyte.

Kurita, aboard the , took his large force of battleships, cruisers and destroyers from the San Bernardino Strait and headed south toward Leyte, where they encountered Task Unit 77.4.3 ("Taffy 3"), the northernmost of the three escort carrier groups under Rear Admiral Clifton Sprague that comprised the only American forces remaining in the area. Composed of only six small escort carriers, three destroyers, and four destroyer escorts, Taffy 3 was intended to provide shore support and anti-submarine patrols, and did not have guns capable of penetrating the Japanese armor. The Japanese opened fire shortly after dawn, targeting Taffy 3's escort carriers, which Kurita mistook for the main carriers of the Third Fleet. The escort carriers fled for the cover of rain squalls and launched their aircraft in defense, while the three destroyers and destroyer escort , led by , launched a torpedo attack that sank one ship and sent the Japanese strike force into disarray.

Japanese aircraft from the base at Luzon launched ''kamikaze'' attacks on the retreating American task force, sinking one escort carrier and damaging three others. With Taffy 2's aircraft joining the battle, the increasing severity of the air attack further convinced Kurita that he was engaging the Third Fleet's surface carriers. Satisfied with sinking what he believed were multiple carriers and worried the bulk of the Third Fleet was approaching, Kurita withdrew his fleet north, having failed to carry out his orders to attack the landing forces at Leyte Gulf.

Taffy 3 sustained heavy losses in the action, losing two escort carriers, two destroyers, a destroyer escort and numerous aircraft. Over 1,000 Americans died, comparable to the combined losses of American men and ships at the Coral Sea and Midway. Three Japanese cruisers were sunk by air attack, and three others were damaged. The Japanese had over 2,700 casualties. Taffy 3 was awarded the Presidential Unit Citation and Captain Ernest E. Evans of the sunk ''Johnston'' was posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor. Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz wrote afterwards that the success of Taffy 3 was "nothing short of special dispensation from the Lord Almighty." The Battle off Samar has been cited by historians as one of the greatest last stands in naval history.

Background

The overall Japanese strategy at Leyte Gulf—a plan known as Shō-Go 1—called for Vice Admiral Jisaburō Ozawa's Northern Force to lure the American Third Fleet away from the Allied landings on Leyte, using an apparently vulnerable force of Japanese carriers as bait. The landing forces, stripped of air cover by the Third Fleet, would then be attacked from the west and south by Vice Admiral Takeo Kurita's Center Force, and Vice Admiral Shoji Nishimura's Southern Force. Kurita's Center Force consisted of five battleships, including and , the largest battleships afloat, escorted by cruisers and destroyers. Nishimura's flotilla included two battleships and would be followed by Vice Admiral Kiyohide Shima's cruisers and destroyers.

On the night of October 23, the American submarines and detected Center Force entering the Palawan Passage along the northwest coast of Palawan Island. After alerting Halsey, the submarines torpedoed and sank two cruisers, while crippling a third and forcing it to withdraw. One of the cruisers lost was Admiral Kurita's flagship, but he was rescued and transferred his flag to ''Yamato''.

Subsequently, the carriers of the Third Fleet launched a series of air strikes against Kurita's forces in the Sibuyan Sea, damaging several vessels and sinking ''Musashi'', initially forcing Kurita to retreat. At the same time, the Third Fleet light carrier was sunk by a Japanese bomb, with secondary explosions causing damage to a cruiser assisting alongside.

In the Battle of Surigao Strait, Nishimura's ships entered a deadly trap. Outmatched by the U.S. Seventh Fleet Support Force, they were devastated, running a gauntlet of torpedoes from 39 PT boats and 22 destroyers before coming under accurate radar-directed gunfire from six battleships (five of them survivors of the Pearl Harbor attack) and seven cruisers. As Shima's force encountered what was left of Nishimura's ships, he decided to retreat, stating "If we continued dashing further north, it was quite clear that we should only fall into a ready trap."

At the Battle of the Sibuyan Sea, Halsey's Third Fleet savaged the Center Force, which had been detected on its way to landing forces from the north. Center Force lacked any air cover to defend against the 259 sorties from the five fleet carriers ''Intrepid'', ''Essex'', ''Lexington'', ''Enterprise'', and ''Franklin'', and light carrier ''Cabot'', the combination of which sank the massive battleship ''Musashi'' (sister to ''Yamato'') with 17 bombs and 19 torpedoes.

Halsey's Third Fleet, having spotted Japanese carriers, engaged them in the Battle off Cape Engaño. Although ordered to destroy enemy forces threatening the Philippine invasion area, Halsey was also ordered by Nimitz to destroy a major portion of the Japanese fleet if the opportunity arose.

Forces

The Japanese Center Force now consisted of the battleships ''Yamato'', , , and ; heavy cruisers , , , , , ; light cruisers , and ; and 11 destroyers; ''Yahagi'' led , , , and ; while ''Noshiro'' led , , , , , and . operated independently, but was overloaded with survivors and did not see action. The battleships carried a minimum of guns, firing shells over a range of more than . The heavy cruisers carried batteries plus torpedo tubes, and were capable of . The Japanese destroyers outnumbered Sprague's eleven to three.

Rear Admiral Clifton Sprague's Task Unit 77.4.3 ("Taffy 3") consisted of , , , , and . Screening for Taffy 3 were the destroyers , and , and destroyer escorts , , , and . These six escort carriers carried about 165 aircraft, equivalent to two fleet carriers. Each carrier had a squadron composed of twelve to fourteen FM-2 Wildcat fighters and an equivalent number of Grumman TBF Avenger torpedo bombers. Yet, the carriers had a top speed of only 18 knots, far less than the Japanese cruisers and destroyers capable of 30 knots. In addition, none of his ships had a gun larger than , firing shells, but unable to penetrate the Japanese cruiser or battleship armor, and had a limited range of .

Battle

Kurita's force passed through San Bernardino Strait at 03:00 on October 25, 1944 and steamed southwards along the coast of Samar, hoping that Halsey had taken the bait and moved most of his fleet away as he had in fact done. Kurita had been advised that Nishimura's Southern Force had been destroyed at Surigao Strait and would not be joining his force at Leyte Gulf. However, Kurita did not receive the transmission from the Northern Force that they had successfully lured away Halsey's Third Fleet of battleships and fleet carriers. Through most of the battle, Kurita would be haunted by doubts about Halsey's actual location. The wind was from the North-Northeast and visibility was approximately with a low overcast and occasional heavy rain squalls which the U.S. forces would exploit for concealment in the battle to come.

Taffy 3 comes under attack

Steaming about east of Samar before dawn on October 25, ''St. Lo'' launched a four-plane antisubmarine patrol while the remaining carriers of Taffy 3 prepared for the day's air strikes against the landing beaches. At 06:37, Ensign William C. Brooks, flying a Grumman TBF Avenger from ''St. Lo'', sighted a number of ships expected to be from Halsey's Third Fleet, but they appeared to be Japanese. When he was notified, Admiral Sprague was incredulous, and he demanded positive identification. Flying in for an even closer look, Brooks reported, "I can see pagoda masts. I see the biggest meatball flag on the biggest battleship I ever saw!" ''Yamato'' alone displaced as much as all units of Taffy 3 combined. Brooks had spotted the largest of the three attacking Japanese forces, consisting of four battleships, six heavy cruisers, two light cruisers, and eleven destroyers.

They were approaching from the west-northwest only away, and they were already well within gun and visual range of the closest task group, Taffy 3. Armed only with depth charges in case of an encounter with enemy submarines, the aviators nevertheless carried out the first attack of the battle, dropping several depth charges which just bounced off the bow of a cruiser.

The lookouts of Taffy 3 spotted the anti-aircraft fire to the north. The Japanese came upon Taffy 3 at 06:45, achieving complete tactical surprise. At about the same time, others in Taffy 3 had picked up targets from surface radar and Japanese radio traffic. At about 07:00, ''Yamato'' opened fire at a range of . Lacking the Americans' gunnery radars and Ford Mark I Fire Control Computer, which provided co-ordinated automatic firing solutions as long as the gun director was pointed at the target, Japanese fire control relied on a mechanical calculator for ballistics and another for own and target course and speed, fed by optical rangefinders. Color-coded dye loads were used in the battleships' armor-piercing shells so that the spotters of each ship could identify its own fall of shot, a common practice for the capital ships of many navies. The Americans, unfamiliar with battleship combat, were soon astonished by the spectacle of colorful geysers as the first volleys of shellfire found their range. ''Nagato'' used a brilliant pink; ''Haruna'' used a greenish-yellow variously described as green or yellow by the Americans; and ''Kongō'' used a blood-red dye which could appear red, purple, or even blue in some circumstances. ''Yamato'' used no dye loads, so her shell splashes appeared white.

Not finding the silhouettes of the tiny escort carriers in his identification manuals, Kurita mistook them for large fleet carriers and assumed that he had a task group of the Third Fleet under his guns. His first priority was to eliminate the carrier threat, ordering a "General Attack": rather than a carefully orchestrated effort, each division in his task force was to attack separately. The Japanese had just changed to a circular anti-aircraft formation, and the order caused some confusion, allowing Sprague to lead the Japanese into a stern chase, which restricted the Japanese to using only their forward guns, and restricted their anti-aircraft gunnery. Sprague's ships would not lose as much of their firepower in a stern chase, as their stern chase weapons were more numerous than their forward guns, and his carriers would still be able to operate aircraft.

The Run to the East (06:45 to 07:15)

At 06:50 Admiral Sprague ordered a formation course change to 090, directed his carriers to turn to launch their aircraft and then withdraw towards a squall to the east, hoping that bad visibility would reduce the accuracy of Japanese gunfire. He ordered his escorts to the rear of the formation to generate smoke to mask the retreating carriers and ordered the carriers to take evasive action, "chasing salvos" to throw off their enemy's aim, and then launched all available FM-2 Wildcat fighter planes and TBM Avenger torpedo bombers with whatever armament they were already loaded with. Some had rockets, machine guns, depth charges, or nothing at all. Very few carried anti-ship bombs or aerial torpedoes which would have enabled aircraft to sink heavy armored warships. The Wildcats were deemed a better fit on such small aircraft carriers instead of the faster and heavier Grumman F6F Hellcats that were flown from the larger U.S. Navy carriers. Their pilots were ordered "to attack the Japanese task force and proceed to Tacloban airstrip, Leyte, to rearm and refuel". Many of the planes continued to make "dry runs" after expending their ammunition and ordnance to distract the enemy. At about 07:20 the formation entered the squall, and the Japanese fire slackened markedly as they did not have gunnery radar that could penetrate the rain and smoke.

Kurita meanwhile was already experiencing the consequences of ordering a General Attack, as his Fifth Cruiser and Tenth Destroyer Divisions cut across the course of the Third Battleship Division in their haste to close with the American carriers, forcing the battleship ''Kongō'' to turn north out of formation; ''Kongō'' acted independently for the remainder of the battle. Concerned that his destroyers would burn too much fuel in a stern chase of what he presumed were fast carriers while obstructing his battleships' line of fire, Kurita ordered his destroyers to the rear of his formation at 07:10, a decision which had immediate consequences, as the Tenth Destroyer Squadron was forced to turn away just as they were gaining on the right flank of the American formation. For the Second Destroyer Squadron, the consequences were more significant if less immediate: ordered to fall in behind Third Battleship Division, ''Yahagi'' and her accompanying destroyers steamed north from their position on the south side of Kurita's formation seeking division flagship ''Kongō'', leaving no Japanese units in position to intercept the American carriers when they turned back south at 07:30. Despite his General Attack order, Kurita continued to dictate fleet course changes throughout the battle.

In the meantime, ''Yamato'' fired the first shots of the battle as her forward six 18.1-inch (46 cm) guns opened fire at the escort carrier ''White Plains'' at 35,000 yards. the first salvo contained four type 3 anti aircraft shells, and the rest were all armor piercing rounds. On the third salvo, one of these shells landed mere feet underneath ''White Plain''s keel, disabling a boiler and electrical power. However, damaging control brought these back online after 3 minutes. This did not change that ''Yamato''s shell damaged ''White Plain''s hull beyond repair, demoting her to an aircraft ferry in local waters after the battle. ''Yamato'' with four more salvos straddled the escort carrier ''Kitkun Bay'' multiple times, while ''Nagato'' straddled the escort carrier ''Saint Lo'' several times at 35,000 yards. However, the extreme range made gunfire mostly ineffective, prompting the battleships to cease firing.

Three destroyers and four smaller destroyer escorts had been tasked to protect the escort carriers from aircraft and submarines. The three s—affectionately nicknamed "tin cans" because they lacked armor—were fast enough to keep up with a fast carrier task force. Each had five single-mounted guns and several light antiaircraft guns, none of which were effective against armored warships. Only their ten Mark-15 torpedoes—housed in two swiveling five-tube launchers amidships—posed a serious threat to battleships and cruisers.

An advantage the American destroyers had was the radar-controlled Mark 37 Gun Fire Control System, which provided coordinated automatic firing of their guns as long as the gun director was pointing at the target. A dual-purpose system, the Mark 37's gunfire radar and antiaircraft capabilities allowed the destroyers' guns to remain on target despite poor visibility and their own radical evasive maneuvering. The Japanese reliance on optical range finders aided by color-coded dye loads in each shell and mechanical calculators made it difficult for them to identify their targets through the rain and smoke and limited their ability to maneuver while firing. The different colored splashes the Japanese shells made as they hit the water by the American ships after a near miss prompted one ''White Plains'' sailor to quip "They're shooting at us in Technicolor!"

The four s were smaller and slower because they had been designed to protect slow freighter convoys against submarines. They were armed with two guns without automatic fire control, and three torpedoes, although their crews rarely trained for torpedo attacks. Since the torpedoes had a range of only about , they were best used at night: during daylight, an attack on heavy warships would have to pass through a gauntlet of shellfire that could reach out to . In this battle they would be launched against a fleet led by the largest battleship in history, although it was the ships' ability to generate dense, heavy smoke from their funnels and chemical smoke generators which would most influence the course of the battle.

After laying down smoke to hide the carriers from Japanese gunners, they were soon making desperate torpedo runs, using their smoke for concealment. The ship profiles and aggressiveness caused the Japanese to think the destroyers were cruisers, and the destroyer escorts were full-sized destroyers. Their lack of armor allowed armor-piercing rounds to pass right through without exploding, until the Japanese gunners switched to high-explosive (HE) shells, which caused much more damage. Their speed and agility enabled some ships to dodge shellfire completely before launching torpedoes. Effective damage control and redundancy in propulsion and power systems kept them running and fighting even after they had absorbed dozens of hits before they sank, although the decks would be littered with the dead and the seriously wounded. Destroyers from Taffy 2 to the south also found themselves under shellfire, but as they were spotted by , which had signaled for their assistance, they were ordered back to protect their own carriers.

Johnston's torpedo charge and subsequent attacks

At 07:00, Commander Ernest E. Evans of the destroyer , responded to incoming shell fire bracketing carriers of the group he was escorting by laying down a protective smokescreen and zigzagging. At about 07:10, Gunnery Officer Robert Hagen began firing at the closest attackers, then away, and registered several hits on the leading heavy cruisers. The Japanese targeted ''Johnston'' and soon shell splashes were bracketing the destroyer. In response and without consulting with his commanders, Evans ordered ''Johnston'' to "flank speed, full left rudder"; ''Johnston'', still making smoke and zigzagging, accelerated at maximum speed towards the Japanese.

As Johnston continued to charge on, multiple Japanese ships located an American "cruiser" charging the formation, and switched fire from the escort carriers to this much closer target. ''Nagato and Haruna'' both unleashed their main guns on ''Johnston'', while ''Yamato'' fired 19 6.1-inch (155 mm) shells from her secondary battery; not a single shell made its mark, although ''Johnston'' was straddled a number in times. At 07:15, Hagen concentrated fire on the leading heavy cruiser squadron's flagship, the ''Kumano''. ''Kumano'' and her sistership ''Suzuya'' noticed an American destroyer closing the range and prepared to fire their own guns. At a distance of 18,000 yards, ''Johnston, Kumano'', and ''Suzuya'' all commenced opening fire on each other, and ''Johnston'' was straddled multiple times but not directly hit once. In turn, ''Kumano'' took the brunt of ''Johnston''s fire as multiple 5-inch (127 mm) shell hits set fire to her superstructure. Some reported 45 shell hits out of 200 fired allegedly hit their target as ''Johnston'' had closed to around 10,300 yards at 07:15, swerved to broadside, and dumped all ten of her torpedoes into the water. at 07:27, ''Kumano'' noticed three of ''Johnston''s torpedoes swimming her way at 27 knots and attempted to turn to avoid, but it was too late. One mark 15 torpedo smashed into the cruiser and blew off her entire bow. Her speed was reduced to 12 knots in reverse as ''Suzuya'' stopped to remove Captain Teraoka from the crippled ''Kumano''. However, as this was being done a flight of aircraft from ''Gambier Bay'' attacked the stationary cruiser and scored a bomb near miss which bent one of her port propellers, cutting ''Suzuya''s speed to 22 knots and taking her out of the majority of the battle. After knocking two cruisers out of the fight, ''Johnston'' retreated as Japanese fire increased in intensity, yet not a single shell hit the victorious destroyer. ''Kumano'' was never repaired from the damage inflicted by ''Johnston'', only fitted with a false bow and limited to 15 knots for the rest of her career, and finished off by mixed submarine and air attacks over the next month.

At 07:16, Sprague ordered Commander William Dow Thomas aboard ''Hoel'', in charge of the small destroyer screen, to attack. ''Hoel'' began a long sprint to get into firing position for their torpedoes. At 07:20, ''Hoel'' located ''Kongō'' at 14,000 yards and sped to engage the battleship; this was a perfect opportunity as ''Kongō'' was blinded by rain squalls and was completely unaware of ''Hoel''s presence. However, the same could not be said for the heavy cruiser ''Haguro'', which noticed an enemy "cruiser" at 10,300 at 07:26 and opened fire. ''Haguro''s first salvo scored a pair of 8-inch (203 mm) shell hits to Hoel's bridge and rangefinder, destroying her mark 37 director, FD radar, PPI scope, machine gun control, and all voice radio communications. ''Hoel'' commenced firing on ''Kongō'' as ''Haguro''s second salvo handed an 8-inch (203 mm) hit to her forward fire room two feet above the waterline, then her third salvo landed three additional 8-inch (203 mm) shells hit started a powder fire in her turret 3 magazines, punctured and flooded her port engine and after generator, dropping her speed to 17 knots. In response, ''Hoel'' unloaded five torpedoes at the still blinded ''Kongō'', right with three more 8-inch (203 mm) shells destroyer her turrets 4 and 5 and aft AA mounts. ''Haguro''s final salvo landed a 5-inch (127 mm) shell which holed the destroyer below the waterline before she ceased fire and wrote off the enemy "cruiser" as sunk. For all this effort, ''Kongō'' noticed a spread of torpedoes some distance ahead of her and continued in a straight line.Contrary to Morrison's claim, ''Kongō'' was not forced to evade the torpedoes and continued in a straight line. ''Kongō'' was also not responsible for the initial crippling damage to ''Hoel'', given the Japanese ship couldn't even see the American destroyer at 9,000 yards. The claims of a 14-inch (356 mm) shell hitting ''Hoel''s bridge is based on nothing

Mere minutes later, ''Johnston''s luck began to run out as ''Yamato'' had been tracking the enemy "cruiser" which had torpedoed ''Kumano''. Permission to fire the main battery was granted as the nine 18.1-inch (46 cm) guns tracked the enemy and opened fire. Three first salvo 18.1-inch (46 cm) shells hit ''Johnston'' aft below the waterline, cutting her speed to 17 knots and destroying her 5-inch (127 mm) turrets 3, 4, and 5. Immediately afterwards, three first salvo 6.1-inch (155 mm) shells from ''Yamato''s secondary battery tore into the destroyer, one hitting aft and destroying an AA director, while two hit the torpedo director and bridge, causing numerous casualties and severing the fingers of Commander Evans's left hand. The ship was mangled badly, with dead and dying sailors strewn across her bloody decks. Hagen and others repeated the myth that these were 14-inch (356 mm) shells from ''Kongō'' at 14,250 yards, who was still in a rain squall and couldn't even see ''Hoel'' at 9,000 yards. ''Noshiro'' and her destroyers recorded ''Yamato'' sinking an enemy ship. The rough estimation of the fall of the shell hits was 21,000 yards and 18 degrees; Yamato was at 20,300 yards at 17.5 degrees. However, ''Johnston'' was crippled but not sunk as she hid behind a rain squall and conducted damaged control for 10 minutes as ''Yamato'' fired AP shells from her main guns that over-penetrated ''Johnston'' without exploding. Already depleted before the battle, her remaining store of oil did not fuel a catastrophic explosion.

Japanese advancement on the escort carriers

With the attempts by ''Johnston'' and ''Hoel'' to halt the Japanese dealt with for the time being, the fleet continued to close the range on the American escort carriers. Much of the gunfire for the next 20 minutes were focus on the destroyer escorts, ''John C. Butler'' and ''Raymond'' coming under heavy fire but not receiving a hit. ''Raymond'' and ''Dennis'' fired their torpedoes without obtaining a hit. However, solid hits were scored by 08:50 as ''Haruna'' fired on an enemy "destroyer" at 17,000 yards and claimed a hit after two salvos were fired before rain squalls blinded her. The range and bearing match the escort carrier ''Kalinin Bay'', which is hit by a 14-inch (356 mm) shell. Meanwhile, the Japanese heavy cruisers began to close the range, with ''Chikuma'' leading ''Tone'', ''Haguro'', and ''Chōkai''. ''Haguro'' fired on the escort carrier ''Fanshaw Bay'' at 17,200 yards and landed a pair of 8-inch (203 mm) hits to her forward flight deck, before briefly firing on ''Heermann''. Just after 08:00, ''Haguro'' switched fire to the ''Kalinin Bay'' and in running gunnery duel in which ''Tone'' joined in, ''Kalinin Bay'' was hit by three 8-inch (203 mm) - two hitting the stern and one hitting the bow - while ''Haguro'' in turn took two hits from ''Kalinin Bay''s lone 5-inch (127 mm) gun that damaged her radio transmitter and communication cables. However, critical damage came at 07:25 when ''Fanshaw Bay'' aircraft took vengeance on her opponent and gouged ''Haguro'' with a pair of 100 pound bombs which exploded inside her turret 2 magazines, starting a powder fire which forced the cruiser to conduct damage control.

Simultaneously, destroyer ''Heermann'' and destroyer escort ''Samuel B. Roberts'' had finished screening the escort carriers and rushed into action at 08:45. ''Samuel B. Roberts'' still carried torpedo tubes (which were removed on many destroyer escorts), and Lieutenant Commander Robert W. Copeland decided to make use of them. ''Samuel B. Roberts'' was basically a mini destroyer, equipped with two 5-inch (127 mm) guns and a triple torpedo tube mount, and only designed for 26 knots, intended for light escorting duties and anti-submarine warfare. However, by raising pressure to 660 pounds per square inch (4,600 kPa) and diverting all available steam to the ship's turbines, ''Samuel B. Roberts'' obtained 28.7 knots. At the same time, the still wounded ''Hoel'' had five more torpedoes on deck and limped to expend the rest. At 07:50, ''Hoel'' spotted what she claimed was a cruiser column, but was actually the Japanese battleships and closed to engage. ''Yamato'' and ''Nagato'' located ''Hoel'' and took her under fire; ''Nagato'' with all her guns at 9,400 yards and ''Yamato'' with her secondary battery at 6,300 yards. One of ''Nagato''s 16.1-inch (41 cm) shells hit below her bridge alongside a flurry of 5.5-inch (14 cm) and 6.1-inch (155 mm) secondary shell hits destroying her forward engine room and generator, shredding her superstructure, and causing a 10 degree list to port. However, this did not stop ''Hoel'' from dumping the rest of her torpedoes at her opponent's position. ''Yamato'' and ''Nagato'' turned away to avoid the attack, and though no torpedo hits were scored, the Japanese battleships' evasive maneuvers forced them out of the action for 20 minutes and took Kurita out of command on the Japanese side.

''Heermann'' endured a similar counter when at 07:50 she correctly identified the heavy cruiser column, and took the leading ''Chikuma'' under fire. After an exchange of gunnery which landed no hits on either side, ''Heermann'' fired seven of her ten torpedoes at ''Chikuma'', which again landed no hits. At the same time, the crippled but still bloodthirsty ''Johnston'' rejoined the action and joined ''Heermann'' in an exchange of fire with an enemy "cruiser" at 08:00. Japanese records show ''Haruna'' opened fire on an enemy "cruiser" at that exact same time matching the destroyer's range and bearing, and was in all likelihood ''Johnston''s and ''Heermann''s opponent. ''Heermann'' and ''Johnston'' almost collided, but turned away around 200 yards from each other. Finally, ''Samuel B. Roberts'' enacted a gunnery duel with the ''Chōkai,'' and scored multiple 5-inch (127 mm) shell hits. The extent and of damage is unknown since no ''Chōkai'' sailors survived to account the hits. In turn, ''Samuel B. Roberts'' took a pair of 8-inch (203 mm) shells hits which temporarily jammed her torpedo mount and aft turret. However, they were quickly brought back into service and all three torpedoes were fired at her opponent. A torpedo hit was claimed and the crew believed they had blown off ''Chōkai''s stern, but Japanese reports fail to support this.

Taffy 3's losses

After this point, three Japanese battleships returned to the scene. ''Yamato'' and ''Nagato'' were recovering from ''Hoel''s torpedo spread and had Taffy 3 in their crosshairs, while ''Kongō'' had finally left the rain squall and chased the far off action, and the presence of the Japanese flagship took effect as the nearest escort carrier, the ''Gambier Bay'', was targeted by a first salvo from ''Haruna'' and ''Yamato'' and hit by battleship caliber shell that passed through the very aft end of the flight deck. However, at 08:17 the first definitive 18.1-inch (46 cm) shell sliced through ''Gambier Bay''s forward hangar bay, before at 08:20, another 18.1-inch (46 cm) shell hit ''Gambier Bay'' below the waterline and sliced through her aft engine room, causing major flooding and immediately cutting her speed to 10 knots. ''Yamato'' followed up with another pair of 18.1-inch (46 cm) hits at 08:23, one hitting below the waterline and causing more major flooding destroying her machine shop and some freshwater tanks and the other slicing through her bow.

At around the same time, ''Samuel B. Roberts'' closed to point blank range and took ''Chikuma'' under fire. ''Chikuma'' turned to engage, but could score no hits as ''Samuel B. Roberts'' was now so close that ''Chikuma''s 8-inch (203 mm) guns could not be pressed down low enough for an accurate shot. ''Heermann'' also took ''Chikuma'' under fire, and 5-inch (127 mm) shell hits began to pile up on the leading Japanese heavy cruiser while the Americans took little damage in turn.

At 08:20, ''Kongō'' briefly shot at ''Johnston'', and in turn had forty 5-inch (127 mm) shells launched back at her. At 08:23, ''Kongō'' fired on ''Gambier Bay'' and claimed gunnery hits. ''Kongō'' probably witnessed the hits scored by ''Yamato'', which matched the range, bearing, and firing angle of said hits. At 08:30, ''Kalinin Bay''s break ended as the light cruiser ''Yahagi'', leading the destroyers ''Yukikaze'', ''Isokaze'', ''Urakaze'' and ''Nowaki'', fired a spread of 24 torpedoes at 15,000 yards, some of which came dangerously close to hitting the carrier until fighters destroyed them with strafing runs. However, things went from bad to worse as ''Tone'' and ''Haguro'' had recommenced firing on ''Kalinin Bay,'' and to great effect. Most of next eleven 8-inch (203 mm) shell hits were scored after 08:40 when ''Tone'' and ''Haguro'' had closed to 10,100 yards. Many hits passed through the flight deck and hanger bay, starting a large fire, while near misses flooded seawater into the ship. Most dangerously, an 8-inch (203 mm) shell holed ''Kalinin Bay'' below the waterline, passed through the ship, and detonated after coming out the other side and hitting the water, effectively acting as a near miss. This shell disabled the ship's fuel lines, shredded her forward bulkhead, and put the ship in serious danger. ''White Plains'' and ''Kitkun Bay'' meanwhile came under fire from ''Chōkai'', which straddled both carriers multiple times.

The plight of ''Gambier Bay'' had only continued during this period. ''Yamato''s gunfire set a massive fire inside the hanger bay and caused more flooding. Going off of older sources, ''Gambier Bay''s sinking is often credited to Japanese heavy cruisers, particularly ''Chikuma''. The story goes that ''Chikuma'' recognized ''Gambier Bay'' as an escort carrier, and the cruisers switched to high explosive 8-inch (203 mm) rounds and closed to point blank range, sinking ''Gambier Bay'' between 08:10 to 09:11. However, ''Chikuma'' was engaged in a gunnery duel with ''Heermann'' and ''Samuel B. Roberts'' by the time ''Gambier Bay'' took her first hit, and never fired on the escort carriers again. As for the other cruisers, ''Tone'' and ''Haguro'' focused their fire on the escort carriers ''Kalinin Bay''; ''Chōkai'' probably engaged ''White Plains'' and ''Kitkun Bay''. The surviving records from the Japanese cruisers also never correctly identified their targets, reporting either "''Ranger''-class aircraft carriers" or "''Independence''-class light carriers", and all damage inflicted to the other escort carriers were by armor piercing 8-inch (203 mm) shells. Most of this came from earlier accounts of the battle off Samar being based on U.S. accounts without taking Japanese records into perspective. Regardless, at 08:43 ''Gambier Bay'' took a shell hit which destroyed her forward engine room, leaving her dead in the water. The abandon ship order was issued as ''Gambier Bay'' began to sink, prompting ''Yamato'' to cease fire and for the light cruiser ''Noshiro'' to close the range and fire on a disabled and listing "''Independence''-class light carrier". The sinking ''Gambier Bay'' received multiple high explosive shell hits at this time period which killed evacuating crew members. ''Gambier Bay'' capsized at 09:07 and fully sank at 09:11 with the loss of 147 sailors.

''Hoel'' was searching for targets as to draw fire from the escort carriers when ''Yamato'' and ''Nagato'' noticed an enemy "cruiser" and opened fire at 9,000 yards, ''Nagato'' with all her guns and ''Yamato'' with her secondary battery only, her main guns still being focused on ''Gambier Bay''. ''Hoel'' responded with her forward guns, hitting the light cruiser ''Noshiro'' with a 5-inch (127 mm) shell which killed 1 sailor and wounded 3 others, but a mix of 5.5-inch, 6.1-inch, and 16.1-inch gunfire got the better of her as a hit destroyed her last boiler. Dead in the water, ''Hoel'' quickly accumulated hits from ''Yamato''s shells, and was set ablaze as her forward magazines ignited and practically every function on the ship became disabled. After sustaining over 40 shell hits, at 08:40 ''Hoel'' listed at 20 degrees as the crew attempted to abandon ship. The destroyer inspected the sinking destroyer escort, and although her crew wished to machine-gun the survivors as revenge for U.S. pilots strafing Japanese survivors in the water, Captain Maeda forbade such an attack. Still, ''Isokaze'' sailed off without rescuing the survivors as ''Hoel'' finally rolled over and sank at 08:55 with the loss of 253 sailors.

Things were going more successfully for ''Samuel B. Roberts'' and ''Heermann'' who through all of this continued to blast ''Chikuma''. ''Samuel B. Roberts'' ran out of high explosive 5-inch (127 mm) shells and switched to armor piercing rounds, then to training rounds, and finally to star shells. The star shells in particular engulfed ''Chikuma''s deck in flames as together ''Heermann'' and ''Samuel B. Roberts'' hit ''Chikuma'' with some 200 5-inch (127 mm) shells. ''Chikuma''s turret 3 was destroyed, and her bridge, superstructure, and deck were all set ablaze as Anerican aircraft took her under fire as well. However, ''Heermann'' took the brunt of the Japanese fire and took multiple 8-inch (203 mm) shell hits from ''Chikuma'' and ''Tone'' which destroyed her bridge, forward turrets, and steering room while two 14-inch (356 mm) near misses from ''Kongō'' exploded below her keel and flooded her bow so badly her anchors were dragging in the water. ''Heermann'' retreated to lay a smokescreen across the rear formation.

Almost entirely out of ammunition, ''Samuel B. Roberts'' attempted to withdraw to the escort carriers, only for the ''Kongō'' to track an American destroyer and open fire. With three salvos, two of her 6-inch (152 mm) secondary shells hit the destroyer escort, one passing through the aft superstructure, and the other hitting below the waterline and knocking out her forward boilers, cutting her speed to 17 knots. ''Kongō'' then fired a single main battery salvo, scoring three or four 14-inch (356 mm) shell hits which caused the destroyer to lose all power and stop dead in the water. The abandon ship order was issued as ''Samuel B. Roberts'' sank by the stern over 40 minutes with the loss of 90 men.

''Johnston'' stood her ground against ''Noshiro'', attempting to cover the sinking ''Gambier Bay'', when Commander Evans noticed something grand. ''Johnston'' crew watched what appeared to be seven enemy destroyers - with a " Terutsuki class" destroyer taking the lead - closing on the escort carriers. This was actually the light cruiser ''Yahagi'' leading the destroyers ''Yukikaze'', ''Isokaze'', ''Urakaze'' and ''Nowaki'' preparing another torpedo attack on Taffy 3. Outnumbered, outgunned, and still badly wounded by ''Yamato''s gunfire, ''Johnston'' limped towards the five enemy ships and attempted to cross their T, only for ''Yahagi'' and her destroyers to turn broadside and bring all their guns to bear. Regardless, ''Johnston'' opened fire and claimed to hit ''Yahagi'' twelve times; a single 5-inch (127 mm) shell did hit ''Yahagi'' and exploded inside her port side officer's stateroom. ''Yahagi'' in turn opened fire, scoring at least one critical 6-inch (152 mm) shell hit which sliced through ''Johnston''s turret 2, killing everyone inside and leaving ''Johnston'' with just a single functional gun. Aircraft warded off ''Yahagi'', but salvation did not come as ''Yukikaze, Isokaze, Urakaze,'' and ''Nowaki'' smothered ''Johnston'' in 5-inch (127 mm) gunfire. Shell hits destroyed her last 5-inch (127 mm) gun as well as her remaining boilers and engine; punctured in her bridge, radio room, and superstructure; blew off her forward funnel; damaged her forward torpedo mount; and started a large fire next to her bridge which forced her command staff to evacuate to the stern. The ''Suzuya'' had also finally returned to the battle at this point and fired four salvos at ''Johnston'', scoring at least two hits. At 09:45, the abandon ship order was issued as the crew began to evacuate. ''Yukikaze'' inspected ''Johnston'' and pumped one last salvo into the destroyer to make sure she sank, then came alongside the sinking destroyer, not for an attack, but to salute the crew for their bravery. Crew members lined up on ''Yukikaze''s deck as commander Terauchi Masamichi was seen saluting the ship by Robert Billie and others. ''Yukikaze''s sailors noticed commander Evans on a lifeboat saluting back with tears in his eyes. ''Johnston'' fully capsized and sank just after 10:00 with 186 lives lost. Commander Ernest E. Evans was not among the eventually rescued survivors.

Japanese losses

By 08:55, ''Tone'' and ''Haguro'' took aim upon ''Fanshaw Bay''; ''Tone'' scored one 8-inch (203 mm) hit while ''Haguro'' landed three. Two shells hit the forward part of the flight deck and cut through electrical wires, starting a series of fires in the hanger bay, while the other two holed ''Fanshaw Bay''s bow above the waterline. At 09:00, ''Haguro'' fired on ''Dennis'' at 14,500 yards and hit the destroyer escort with four 8-inch (203 mm) shells, two hit the aft superstructure, one hit the bow below the waterline, and a final shell sliced through and destroyed her forward 5-inch (127 mm) gun turret. However, this was juxtaposed by the plight of two Japanese heavy cruisers. ''White Plains'' meanwhile had engaged in a gunnery duel with ''Chōkai'', and seemed to hit her opponent with at least six 5-inch (127 mm) shells. Before this continued, a flight of dive bombers from ''Kitkun Bay'' attacked ''Chōkai,'' whom failed to maneuver, and dropped a 500 pound high explosive bomb down ''Chokai''s main funnel, detonating her engine and boilers and leaving the cruiser dead in the water with immense flooding. ''Chōkai'' radioed to ''Yamato'' she was disabled, and it was decided she could not be saved in the moment. removed ''Chōkai''s crew before scuttling her with torpedo hits. During this event, ''Fujinami'' also discovered drifting sailors of the sunken ''Gambier Bay'', and allegedly saluted the crew.

''Chikuma'' had finished losing a gunfight to ''Heermann'' and ''Samuel B. Roberts'' when perhaps due to a mix of that fact and being the lead Japanese cruiser it became the main focus of American torpedo bombers. Four TBM Avenger torpedo-bombers attacked ''Chikuma'', and Richard Deitchman, flying from , succeeded in hitting the cruiser's stern port quarter with a Mark 13 torpedo that severed the stern and disabled its port screw and rudder. ''Chikuma'''s speed dropped to 18 knots (33 km/h), then to 9 knots (17 km/h), but more seriously, she became unsteerable. At 11:05, ''Chikuma'' was attacked by five TBMs from ''Kitkun Bay'' and hit portside amidships by two torpedoes and its engine rooms flooded. At 14:00, three TBMs from a composite squadron of ships from and led by Lt. Joseph Cady dropped more torpedoes which hit ''Chikuma'' portside. Cady was later awarded the Navy Cross for his action. ''Chikuma'' began to sink as the destroyer ''Nowaki'' came to assist the sinking heavy cruiser, removed her crew, and left the cruiser to slip beneath the waves.

Kurita withdraws

Although Kurita's battleships had not been seriously damaged, the air and destroyer attacks had broken up his formations, and he had lost tactical control. His flagship ''Yamato'' had been forced to turn north in order to avoid torpedoes, causing him to lose contact with much of his task force. The determined, concentrated sea and air attack from Taffy 3 had already sunk or crippled the heavy cruisers ''Chōkai'', ''Kumano'', and ''Chikuma'', which seemed to confirm to the Japanese that they were engaging major fleet units rather than escort carriers and destroyers. Kurita was at first not aware that Halsey had already taken the bait and that his battleships and carriers were far out of range. The ferocity of the renewed air attacks further contributed to his confusion and reinforced his suspicion that Halsey's aircraft carriers were nearby. Signals from Ozawa eventually convinced Kurita that he was not currently engaged with the entirety of Third Fleet, and that the remaining elements of Halsey's forces might close in and destroy him if he lingered too long in the area.

Finally, Kurita received word that the Southern Force that he was to meet had been destroyed the previous night. Calculating that the fight was not worth further losses and believing he had already sunk or damaged several American carriers, Kurita broke off the engagement at 09:20 with the order: "all ships, my course north, speed 20." He set a course for Leyte Gulf but became distracted by reports of another American carrier group to the north. Preferring to expend his ships against capital ships, rather than transports, he turned north after the non-existent enemy fleet and ultimately withdrew back through the San Bernardino Strait. ''Heermann'' was turning in circles evading Japanese gunfire, when suddenly, it stopped, leaving ''Heermann'' as the only American destroyer to survive the battle.

As he retreated north and then west through the San Bernardino Strait, the smaller and heavily damaged American force continued to press the battle. While watching the Japanese retreat, Admiral Sprague heard a nearby sailor exclaim, "Damn it, boys, they're getting away!". Another yelled "Just wait a little longer, boys, we're suckering them into 40-mm range". Their wishes were not wasted as at 10:50, the damaged ''Suzuya'' was waddling at 20 knots when a flight of ''Kitkun Bay'' aircraft attacked the heavy cruiser and scored multiple straddles and near misses, which detonated her starboard torpedoes and shredded the cruiser, blasting off her aft 5-inch (127 mm) secondary guns, destroying the starboard engines and boilers, and engulfing the ship in flames which, when they reached the remaining torpedoes and 5-inch (127 mm) ammunition, caused further destruction. The abandon ship order was issued as the destroyer ''Okinami'' evacuated the sinking ''Suzuya'' and rescued 620 men; 247 ''Suzuya'' sailors perished.

Seventh Fleet's calls for help

Shortly after 08:00, desperate messages calling for assistance began to come in from Seventh Fleet. One from Vice Admiral Thomas C. Kinkaid, sent in plain language, read, "My situation is critical. Fast battleships and support by airstrikes may be able to keep enemy from destroying CVEs and entering Leyte".

At 08:22, Kinkaid radioed, "Fast Battleships are Urgently Needed Immediately at Leyte Gulf".

At 09:05, Kinkaid radioed, "Need Fast Battleships and Air Support".

At 09:07, Kinkaid broadcast what his mismatched fleet was up against: "4 Battleships, 8 Cruisers Attack Our Escort Carriers".

away at Pearl Harbor, Admiral Chester W. Nimitz had monitored the desperate calls from Taffy 3, and sent Halsey a terse message: "Where is TF 34?". To complicate decryption, communications officers were to add a nonsense phrase at both ends of a message, in this case, prefixed with "Turkey trots to water" and suffixed with "The world wonders." The receiving radioman repeated the "where is" section of this message and his staff failed to remove the trailing phrase "the world wonders." A simple query by a distant supervisor had, through the random actions of three sailors, become a stinging rebuke.

Halsey was infuriated since he did not recognize the final phrase as padding, possibly chosen for the 90th anniversary of the Charge of the Light Brigade. He threw his hat to the deck and began to curse.

Halsey sent Task Group 38.1 (TG 38.1), commanded by Vice Admiral John S. McCain, to assist. Halsey recalled that he did not receive the vital message from Kinkaid until around 10:00 and later claimed that he had known that Kinkaid was in trouble but had not dreamed of the seriousness of the crisis. McCain, by contrast, had monitored Sprague's messages and turned TG 38.1 to aid Sprague even before Halsey's orders arrived (after prodding from Nimitz), putting Halsey's defense in question.

At 10:05, Kinkaid asked, "Who is guarding the San Bernardino Strait?"

McCain raced toward the battle and briefly turned into the wind to recover returning planes. At 10:30, a force of Helldivers, Avengers, and Hellcats was launched from , , and at the extreme range of . Although the attack did little damage, it strengthened Kurita's decision to retire.

At 11:15, more than two hours after the first distress messages had been received by his flagship, Halsey ordered TF 34 to turn around and head south to pursue Kurita, but the Japanese forces had already escaped.

Just hours after his perceived chastisement by Nimitz, Halsey's forces destroyed all four enemy aircraft carriers he had pursued. However, despite the complete absence of Third Fleet against the main Japanese force, the desperate efforts of Taffy 3 and assisting task forces had driven back the Japanese. A relieved Halsey sent the following message to Nimitz, Kinkaid and General Douglas MacArthur at 12:26: "It can be announced with assurance that the Japanese Navy has been beaten, routed and broken by the Third and Seventh Fleets."

Survivors' ordeal

Partly as a result of disastrous communication errors within Seventh Fleet and a reluctance to expose search ships to submarine attack, a very large number of survivors from Taffy 3, including those from ''Gambier Bay'', ''Hoel'', ''Johnston'', and ''Samuel B. Roberts'', were not rescued until October 27, after two days adrift. A plane had spotted the survivors, but the location radioed back was incorrect. By then, many had died as a result of exposure, thirst and shark attacks. Finally, when a Landing Craft Infantry of Task Group 78.12 arrived, its captain used what is almost a standard method of distinguishing friend from foe, asking a topical question about a national sport, as one survivor, Jack Yusen, relates:

We saw this ship come up, it was circling around us, and a guy was standing up on the bridge with a megaphone. And he called out 'Who are you? Who are you?' and we all yelled out 'Samuel B. Roberts!' He's still circling, so now we're cursing at him. He came back and yelled 'Who won the World Series?' and we all yelled 'St. Louis Cardinals!' And then we could hear the engines stop, and cargo nets were thrown over the side. That's how we were rescued.

Aftermath

The Japanese had succeeded in luring Halsey's Third Fleet away from its role of covering the invasion fleet, but the remaining light forces proved to be a very considerable obstacle. The force that Halsey had unwittingly left behind carried about 450 aircraft, comparable to the forces of five fleet carriers, although of less powerful types, and not armed for attacks on armored ships. The ships themselves, although slow and almost unarmed, in the confusion of battle and aided by weather and smokescreens, mostly survived. Their aircraft, although not appropriately armed, sank and damaged several ships, and did much to confuse and harass Center Force.

The breakdown in Japanese communications left Kurita unaware of the opportunity that Ozawa's decoy plan had offered him. Kurita's mishandling of his forces during the surface engagement further compounded his losses. Despite Halsey's failure to protect the northern flank of the Seventh Fleet, Taffy 3 and assisting aircraft turned back the most powerful surface fleet Japan had sent to sea since the Battle of Midway. Domination of the skies, prudent and timely maneuvers by the U.S. ships, tactical errors by the Japanese admiral, and superior American radar technology, gunnery and seamanship all contributed to this outcome.

In addition, accurate anti-aircraft fire and air cover over U.S. ships shot down several ''kamikaze''s, while Center Force, lacking air cover, was vulnerable to air attack and was forced to constantly conduct evasive maneuvers while under air attack. Lastly, the attacking Japanese force initially used armor-piercing shells which were largely ineffective against unarmored ships as they passed right through without exploding; such munitions can be ineffective against thinly-armored naval targets such as destroyers or destroyer escorts.

Kurita and his officers knew they could not conduct a high-speed chase after the small force without a fleet oiler, and it contradicted with the original plan orders, which prioritized the landing forces over anything else. Kurita then received a cryptic message ordering him north, and in a unanimous decision with his officers ordered his force northward toward Ozawa's force, where he thought a surface battle between the Northern Force and an American fleet was about to take place.

Clifton Sprague's task unit lost two escort carriers: ''Gambier Bay'', to surface attack, and ''St. Lo'', to ''kamikaze'' attack. Of the seven screening ships, fewer than half, two destroyers (''Hoel'' and ''Johnston'') and a destroyer escort (''Samuel B. Roberts''), were lost, as were several aircraft. The other four U.S. destroyers and escorts were damaged. Although it was such a small task unit, over 1,500 Americans died, comparable to the losses suffered at the Allied defeat of the Battle of Savo Island off Guadalcanal, when four cruisers were sunk. It was also comparable to the combined losses of the 543 men and 3 ships at the Battle of the Coral Sea, and 307 men and 2 ships at the Battle of Midway.

However, a few small and replicable American warships could not compare to the three heavy cruisers lost, ''Chōkai'', ''Chikuma'', and ''Suzuya''. The heavy cruiser ''Kumano'' was also damaged beyond reppair by gunfire and torpedoes from ''Johnston'', enabling her to be finished off by mixed submarine and air attacks over the next month. Nearly 3,000 Japanese sailors lost their lives. Of the six U.S. ships, totaling , lost during Leyte Gulf operations, five were from Taffy 3. The Japanese lost 26 ships, totaling , in Leyte Gulf combat.

Follow up attacks

Furthermore, the attacks chasing Kurita's fleet after the battle were quite effective. ''Yamato'', ''Nagato'', and ''Kongō'' were all damaged by bomb hits and near misses, while the light cruiser ''Noshiro'' and the destroyer ''Hayashimo'' were sunk by air attacks. Meanwhile, the destroyer ''Nowaki'' was traversing the San Bernadino straight still carrying the ''Chikuma'' survivors when she ran into the American fleet, and was subsequently crippled by gunfire from the light cruisers , , and , then finished off by torpedoes from the destroyer . ''Nowaki'' sank with all hands lost, including the ''Chikuma'' survivors (a single ''Chikuma'' sailor whom was not rescued by ''Nowaki'' drifted ashore and was captured by the U.S. Navy). Meanwhile, the destroyers ''Fujinami'' and were detached to assist the grounded ''Hayashimo'' when U.S. carrier aircraft sank both vessels with all hands lost; ''Fujinami'' sinking with all the ''Chōkai'' survivors.

The battle took place in the very deep water above the Philippine Trench, with most sinkings in waters over deep. Wreckages that have been found include IJN ''Chōkai'' at nearly ,, USS ''Johnston'' at , and , the deepest wreck ever surveyed at a depth of , the USS ''Samuel B. Roberts''.

Criticism of Halsey

Halsey was criticized for his decision to take TF 34 north in pursuit of Ozawa and for failing to detach it when Kinkaid first appealed for help. A piece of U.S. Navy slang for Halsey's actions is "Bull's Run", a phrase combining Halsey's newspaper nickname "Bull" (in the U.S. Navy, the nickname "Bull" was used primarily by enlisted men, and Halsey's friends and fellow officers called him "Bill") with an allusion to the Battle of Bull Run in the American Civil War.

In his dispatch after the battle, Halsey gave reasons for his decision as follows:Halsey also said that he had feared that leaving TF 34 to defend the strait without carrier support would have left it vulnerable to attack from land-based aircraft and leaving one of the fast carrier groups behind to cover the battleships would have significantly reduced the concentration of air power going north to strike Ozawa.

Morison writes in a footnote, "Admiral Lee, however, said after the battle that he would have been only too glad to have been ordered to cover San Bernardino Strait without air cover." If Halsey had been in proper communication with Seventh Fleet, the escort carriers of TF 77 could have provided adequate air cover for TF 34, a much easier matter than it would be for those escort carriers to defend themselves against the onslaught of Kurita's heavy ships.

It may be argued that the fact that Halsey was aboard one of the battleships and "would have had to remain behind" with TF 34 while the bulk of his fleet charged northwards to attack the Japanese carriers may have contributed to that decision. However, it would have been perfectly feasible and logical to have taken one or both of Third Fleet's two fastest battleships, ''Iowa'' and ''New Jersey'', with the carriers in the pursuit of Ozawa, while leaving the rest of the Battle Line off San Bernardino Strait. (Indeed, Halsey's original plan for the composition of TF 34 was that it would contain only four, not all six, of the Third Fleet's battleships.) Therefore, to guard San Bernardino Strait with a powerful battleship force would have been compatible with Halsey's personally going north aboard the ''New Jersey''.

It seems likely that Halsey was strongly influenced by his chief of staff, Rear Admiral Robert "Mick" Carney, who was also wholeheartedly in favor of taking all Third Fleet's available forces northwards to attack the Japanese carrier force.

Clifton Sprague, the commander of Task Unit 77.4.3 in the battle off Samar, was later bitterly critical of Halsey's decision and of his failure to inform Kinkaid and the Seventh Fleet clearly that their northern flank was no longer protected:Regarding Halsey's failure to turn TF 34 southwards when Seventh Fleet's first calls for assistance off Samar were received, Morison writes:Morison also observes, "The mighty gunfire of the Third Fleet's Battle Line, greater than that of the whole Japanese Navy, was never brought into action except to finish off one or two crippled light ships." Perhaps the most telling comment was made laconically by Vice Admiral Willis Augustus Lee in his action report as the Commander of TF 34: "No battle damage was incurred, nor inflicted on the enemy by vessels while operating as Task Force Thirty-Four."

In his master's thesis submitted at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Lieutenant Commander Kent Coleman argues that the division of command hierarchies of the Third Fleet, under Halsey reporting to Admiral Nimitz, and Seventh Fleet, under Vice Admiral Kinkaid reporting to General MacArthur, was the primary contributor to the near-success of Kurita's attack. Coleman concludes that "the divided U.S. naval chain of command amplified problems in communication and coordination between Halsey and Kinkaid. This divided command was more important in determining the course of the battle than the tactical decision made by Halsey and led to an American disunity of effort that nearly allowed Kurita's mission to succeed."

Presidential Unit Citation

Taffy 3 was awarded a Presidential Unit Citation:

For extraordinary heroism in action against powerful units of the Japanese Fleet during the Battle off Samar, Philippines, October 25, 1944. ... the gallant ships of the Task Unit waged battle fiercely against the superior speed and fire power of the advancing enemy, ... two of the Unit's valiant destroyers and one destroyer escort charged the battleships point-blank and, expending their last torpedoes in desperate defense of the entire group, went down under the enemy's heavy shells as a climax to two and one half hours of sustained and furious combat. The courageous determination and the superb teamwork of the officers and men who fought the embarked planes and who manned the ships of Task Unit 77.4.3 were instrumental in effecting the retirement of a hostile force threatening our Leyte invasion operations and were in keeping with the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service.

Legacy

A number of ships were named after participants and ships from that battle, including , , , and , and . When struck a mine in 1988, her crew touched a plaque commemorating the original crew as they struggled to save the ship.

While the battle is frequently included in historical accounts of the Battle of Leyte Gulf, the duels between the destroyer and destroyer escorts and ''Yamato'' and the Japanese force were the subject of a '' Dogfights'' television episode, "Death of the Japanese Navy". That episode, as well as a History Channel documentary, was based on '' The Last Stand of the Tin Can Sailors'', written by James D. Hornfischer. The battle is also the subject of an episode of ''Ultimate Warfare'' on American Heroes Channel, "Courage at Sea".

Notes

References

Works cited

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Further reading

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Reports

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Audio/visual media

* ''Lost Evidence of the Pacific: The Battle of Leyte Gulf''. History Channel. TV. Based on book by Hornfischer, James D. (2004). ''The Last Stand of the Tin Can Sailors''.
* ''Dogfights: Death of the Japanese Navy''. History Channel. TV. Based on book, and with interview by Hornfischer, James D. (2004). ''The Last Stand of the Tin Can Sailors''.

External links

Return to the Philippines
public domain documents from HyperWar Foundation


ominch Secret Information Bulletin No. 22
Task Force 77 Action Report: Battle of Leyte Gulf


at NavWeaps.com

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