Battle Of Calabria

The Battle of Calabria (9 July 1940) known to the Italian Navy as the Battle of Punta Stilo, was a naval battle during the Battle of the Mediterranean in the Second World War. Ships of the were opposed by vessels of the Mediterranean Fleet. The battle took place to the east of Punta Stilo, Calabria.

The battle was one of the few in the Mediterranean campaign involving large numbers of ships on both sides. The battle was indecisive and the ships returned to base; it was the first battleship engagement between the and the Mediterranean Fleet.

Background

When Italy entered the Second World War, its forces in Libya were ill-equipped for offensive operations, and the Italian fleet was forced to start large supply convoys in order to bring them up to fighting condition.

On 6 July a convoy of four merchant ships left Naples on their way to Benghazi, while attempting to fool the Allies into thinking they were making for Tripoli. That evening two torpedo boats from Catania and another freighter met them off Messina and the next day their escort force joined the convoy from Taranto after being informed that the Allies had recently left port in Alexandria. The transports carried 2,190 troops, 72 Fiat M11/39 tanks, 232 other vehicles, of supplies and of fuel. The convoy's escort, commanded by Admiral Inigo Campioni, consisted of three groups. The first, comprising four destroyers and six torpedo boats, sailed directly protecting the cargo ships. A second group sailed to the east consisting of six heavy cruisers and another four destroyers. Finally, the main battle group consisted of two battleships ( and ), eight light cruisers and another 16 destroyers. A substantial number of the Italian destroyers didn't take part in the battle due to mechanical problems and the need to refuel.

The British were involved in a similar convoy action. The fleet sailed from Alexandria bound towards Malta where the destroyers would deliver supplies and a limited number of specialist reinforcements. Two convoys were arranged to take off fleet stores and civilians from Malta to Alexandria. Two groups of merchantmen sailed, a fast convoy at and slow one at . Protecting them were three groups of ships: Force A, with five cruisers and a destroyer; Force B, with the battleship and five destroyers, and Force C, the main battle group, with the battleships and , the aircraft carrier and eleven destroyers. One of them, , had to return to Alexandria with a burst steam pipe on the early hours of 8 July. All were under the direction of Admiral Andrew Cunningham.

At 14:40 on 8 July two Italian Cant Z.506 seaplanes from Tobruk spotted the British fleet and shadowed it for nearly four hours. Campioni ordered his fleet to defend the convoy by turning eastward and preparing for action. Comando Supremo (Italian Supreme Command) was reluctant to risk its warships in a night action and they ordered the fleet to avoid contact.Greene & Massignani, p. 68 During the initial positioning the Italians suffered technical problems on three destroyers and two light cruisers, so these ships, with several additional destroyers, were detached to refuel in Sicily. To make up for the detachments another destroyer group was summoned from Taranto. At this point, the Italian fleet had 16 destroyers.Greene & Massignani, p. 70

From 10:00 to 18.40, 72 land-based bombers of the Italian (Royal Air Force) from the mainland attacked the British force. Unlike the dive-bombers favoured by the Germans, Italian bombers operated in formations at high altitudes during the early stages of the war, about . Scores of bombs were dropped by the Italians and achieved a hit on in two attacks. The captain, six officers and eleven ratings were killed, three officers and six ratings were wounded. The forward fire control and the steering equipment was destroyed, and for the rest of the battle, she would be commanded from the emergency station.

At 15:10 on 8 July, Cunningham's fleet steamed toward Taranto, to cut the Italians' return route. At dusk, Cunningham changed course from 310° to 260° and slowed the fleet speed. During the first hours of 9 July, they took a 305° course, to avoid the Italian air reconnaissance while keeping their fleet between the Italian squadron and the Gulf of Taranto. By 12:30, the Italian Supreme Command was unaware of the situation of the British fleet. Campioni told his fleet to scramble by 14:00 about south east of Cape Spartivento in search of the British. Campioni eventually received reports of the British position at 13:30, and six Ro.43 floatplanes launched shortly after by the Italian cruisers spotted the British warships 30 miles closer than supposed. By late evening of 8 July, the Italian convoy had arrived in Benghazi unscathed.

Battle

Cruiser engagement

At noon on 9 July the two fleets were apart. Vice Admiral Cunningham could not close the distance to engage with the further back formation of ''Malaya'' and the significantly slower ''Royal Sovereign'' ( vs ) and took ''Warspite'' in on its own. Meanwhile, at 13:15, ''Eagle'' launched several unsuccessful sorties by Fairey Swordfish against the Italian heavy cruisers, which they mistook for battleships. At 13:10, the Italian Supreme Command had instructed Campioni to engage one of the two enemy forces facing him, but in fact they had planned to keep the action close to Italy and were deliberately moving north in order to draw the Allies closer to their airbases. By 14:00, however, Cunningham's plans to cut off the Italian fleet from Taranto had succeeded.Greene & Massignani, p. 72

The Allied cruiser group was spread out in front of ''Warspite'' and at 15:15 they caught sight of the Italian main battle force and the two groups opened fire at . Italian rangefinding was better than the Allied, and within three minutes they had found the distance even though they were firing at extreme range. Although the Allies' rangefinding was not as good and they had trouble with their rounds falling short, the Allied gunlaying was better and they were able to place their rounds in much tighter groups. Generally the gunnery of the two forces was fairly well matched. After only a few minutes the range was down to and the Allied guns became useful. However, by 15:22, the Italian fire came dangerously close to the Allied cruisers and Vice Admiral John Tovey decided to disengage. At this point splinters from a shell fired by the cruiser hit , damaging her catapult and the reconnaissance aircraft beyond repair. The cruisers continued to open the range and by 15:30 fire ceased.

Battleship engagement

One group of Italian light cruisers, mistaken for the heavy cruisers of the , was on the Allied side of the battle line and was soon within range of the charging ''Warspite''. Once again the Allied rounds fell short, and neither of her targets, and , received any damage in the initial salvos. However, by this time ''Warspite'' was also out of position, and she circled in place in order to allow ''Malaya'' to catch up. Meanwhile, ''Royal Sovereign'' was still well to the rear.

The Italian commander decided to take on ''Warspite'', and started moving his two battleships into position. At 15:52 ''Giulio Cesare'' opened fire at a range of . ''Conte di Cavour'' held her fire, as Italian doctrine was for battleships to fight one-on-one. It had been discovered during the Battle of Jutland that more than one ship firing at a single target made it very difficult for the rangefinding parties to tell which rounds were fired by their ship. ''Conte di Cavour'' had been assigned to ''Malaya'' and ''Royal Sovereign'', which did not enter the engagement.

''Warspite'', not aware of the Italian firing patterns, split her guns between the two ships. During the exchange one of ''Giulio Cesare''s rounds fell long and caused splinter damage to ''Warspite''s escorting destroyers and , which had formed up on the far side of the action. At 15:54 ''Malaya'' started firing, well out of range, hoping to cause some confusion on the Italian ships. Meanwhile, the Italian heavy cruisers came into action and started firing on ''Warspite'' at 15:55 but had to break off as the Allied cruisers returned.

At 15:59 two shells from ''Giulio Cesare'' fell very close to ''Warspite''. Almost immediately after, one of ''Warspite''s rounds hit the rear deck of ''Giulio Cesare'', exploding in the funnel, and setting off the stored ammunition for one of her anti-aircraft guns. Two seamen were killed and several wounded. The fumes from the burning ammunition were sucked down into the engine room, which had to evacuate and shut down half of the boilers. ''Giulio Cesare''s speed quickly fell off to 18 knots and ''Conte di Cavour'' took over. ''Giulio Cesare'' and ''Warspite'' were well over apart at the time of the hit, which was one of the longest-range naval artillery hits in history.

It would appear that ''Warspite'' was in an excellent position to deal some serious blows to the slowing ''Giulio Cesare'', but she once again executed another tight turn to allow ''Malaya'' to catch up. With her guns suddenly silenced during the turn, rangefinders on ''Malaya'' discovered what the Italians had been intending to avoid, that her rounds were falling short of ''Giulio Cesare'' and they had been watching ''Warspite''s rounds, not their own.

At 16:01 the Italian destroyers generated smoke and the battleships got under cover. There is some debate about this point today, the Allied position being that the battleships were leaving battle, the Italian that they were attempting to make a torpedo attack with their destroyers from within the smoke.

Final actions

At 15:58 re-opened fire on her counterpart in the Allied line, , and soon two groups of Italian cruisers (, and , closely followed by and ) entered combat range with the main Allied cruiser battle group. Firing continued as both groups attempted to form up and at 16:07 ''Bolzano'' was hit three times by 6-inch shells from HMS ''Neptune'', temporarily locking her rudder and causing two fatalities in the torpedo room. A near miss on the destroyer caused minor damage.

Meanwhile, mechanics on ''Giulio Cesare'' were able to repair two of the four damaged boilers, allowing the battleship to reach . Admiral Campioni, considering the possibility of his remaining battleship, ''Conte di Cavour'', having to face three enemy battleships and an aircraft carrier, decided to withdraw the battleships towards Messina. ''Giulio Cesare'' was out of action for 30 days.

Over the next hour both fleets attempted to make long-range torpedo runs with their destroyer groups, without success. At 16:40, the Italian air force made an attack with 126 aircraft, reporting damage on ''Eagle'', ''Warspite'' and ''Malaya''; because of some misunderstanding, 50 of the Italian aircraft also attacked the Italian ships, without damage. The battle ended at 16:50 with both sides withdrawing.

One final victim was the destroyer , sent to Augusta in Sicily, which was hit by a torpedo launched from a Swordfish at 09:40 the next day and sank in shallow water. She was refloated and returned to service in December 1941.)

Aftermath

After the battle both fleets turned for home. This allowed the Italians to claim a victory of sorts, as their cargo ships were already past the action by this time and sailed safely for Libya. Meanwhile, the Allied ships also reached Alexandria along with their escort. Although the battle was indecisive, Allied sources claimed that the Royal Navy asserted an important "moral ascendancy" over their Italian counterpart.

Other sources instead dispute those claims, pointing out that, in the immediate aftermath of the battle, the moods of the two commanders were quite different. Campioni wrote that, even having been able to employ only two old refurbished battleships, the battle gave to every man in the fleet, from the senior officers to the seamen, the impression of being able to cope with the British Fleet on equal terms. Cunningham, conversely, was dismayed by the performance of his two older units, whose lack of speed permitted the Italians to dictate the course of the action, and whose guns were out-ranged not only by those of the two Italian battleships, but by those of the heavy cruisers as well. Cunningham dismissed the ''Royal Sovereign'' as a "constant source of anxiety", and asked the Admiralty for two or three more s, possibly equipped with radar, a new carrier with an armoured deck, the heavy cruisers and , and enough smaller ships to cover the major units.

One question is why the Italians did not send their two operational battleships of at Taranto, both almost ready for action and only a few hours from the scene. Both capital ships were still undergoing trials, and had suffered an electrical mishap on one of her main turrets. ''Littorio'' and would have tipped the balance of fire well onto the Italian side.

Even without these ships the fleets were fairly even. Despite Italian superiority in aircraft, due to the nearby land-based aircraft of the , the attacks proved ineffective, achieving little apart from the damage to ''Gloucester.'' Despite this, the air arm's battle reports were inflated to the point of claiming damage to half of the Allied fleet.

Overall, Allied gunnery proved superior, while the Italian salvos were too widely dispersed due to technical reasons that were not to be overcome until the end of the conflict.Greene & Massignani, p. 79

Order of battle

(F) denotes flagship, (FD) division flagship, (FS) squadron flagship

Allies

Force A – Commanded by Vice Admiral John Tovey

''7th Cruiser Squadron''
* 5 light cruisers: (FS), (''damaged''), , (''damaged''), and

Force B – Commanded by Vice Admiral Andrew Cunningham who was the Commander in Chief Mediterranean Fleet;
* 1 battleship: (F)
* 6 destroyers: , , , (''damaged''), (''damaged''),

Force C – Commanded by Vice-Admiral Sir Henry Pridham-Wippell.

''1st Battle Squadron''
* 2 battleships: , and (FS)
* 1 aircraft carrier:
* 10 destroyers: , , , , , , , , and

(Three battleships, one aircraft carrier, five light cruisers and 16 destroyers took part in the battle.)

Regia Marina

Italian force commanded by Admiral Inigo Campioni.
''Pola'' (F)

Convoy Close Escort

''2nd Light Cruiser Division''
Vice-Admiral Ferdinando Casardi – Division Commander
* 2 light cruisers: ''Giovanni delle Bande Nere'', ''Bartolomeo Colleoni''

''10th Destroyer Squadron''
Captain Franco Garofalo – Squadron Commander
* 4 destroyers: ''Maestrale'', ''Libeccio'', ''Grecale'', ''Scirocco''

6 Torpedo Boats: , , ''Pegaso'', ''Procione'', ''Orsa'', ''Orione''

1st Fleet

Admiral Inigo Campioni – Commander

5th Battleship Division
Vice Admiral Bruto Brivonesi – Division Commander
* 2 battleships: (F), ''(damaged)''

4th (Light) Cruiser Division
Vice-Admiral Alberto Marenco di Moriondo – Division Commander
* 4 light cruisers: (F), , ,

8th (Light) Cruiser Division
Vice-Admiral Antonio Legnani – Division Commander
* 2 light cruisers: (FD),

7th Destroyer Squadron
Commander Amleto Baldo – Squadron Commander
* 4 destroyers: (FS), , ,

8th Destroyer Squadron
Commander Luigi Liannazza – Squadron Commander
* 4 destroyers: (FS), , ,

15th Destroyer Squadron
Captain Paolo Melodia – Squadron Commander
* 2 destroyers: (FS),

16th Destroyer Squadron
Captain Ugo Salvadori – Squadron Commander
* 3 destroyers: (FS), ,

14th Destroyer Squadron
Captain Giovanni Galati – Squadron Commander
* 3 destroyers: (FS), ,

2nd Fleet

Admiral Riccardo Paladini – Commander

1st (Heavy) Cruiser Division
Vice-Admiral Pellegrino Matteucci – Division Commander
* 3 heavy cruisers: (FD), ,

3rd (Heavy) Cruiser Division
Vice-Admiral Carlo Cattaneo – Division Commander
* 3 heavy cruisers: ''Pola'' (F), , ''(damaged)''

7th (Light) Cruiser Division
Vice-Admiral Luigi Sansonetti – Division Commander
* 4 light cruisers: (FD), , ,

9th Destroyer Squadron
Captain Lorenzo Daretti – Squadron Commander
* 4 destroyers: (FS) ''(damaged)'', , ,

11th Destroyer Squadron
Captain Carlo Margottini – Squadron Commander
* 4 destroyers: (FS), , ,

12th Destroyer Squadron
Captain Carmine D'Arienzo – Squadron Commander
* 4 destroyers: (FS), , ,

(Two battleships, six heavy cruisers, eight light cruisers, 23 destroyers took part in the battle.)

Notes

References

Sources

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* Green, Jack & Massignani, Alessandro (1998). ''The Naval War in the Mediterranean, 1940–1943'', Chatham Publishing, London.
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* Miller, Nathan: ''War at Sea: A Naval History of World War II'', Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1995. (Pbk.).
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Further reading

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External links

Naval-History.Net


– Plancia di Commando

Despatch by Admiral Sir Andrew B. Cunningham

OOB WWII Punto-Stilo/Calabria

{{DEFAULTSORT:Calabria, Battle Of
Conflicts in 1940
1940 in Italy
Calabria
Malta Convoys
Battle of the Mediterranean
Naval battles of World War II involving Australia
Naval battles of World War II involving Italy
Calabria
Mediterranean convoys of World War II
July 1940 in Europe
Stilo