André Sordet

General Jean-François André Sordet (17 May 1852 – 28 July 1923) was a senior officer of the French Army. During the First World War his cavalry corps operated in close proximity to the British Expeditionary Force during the Battle of the Frontiers and during Great Retreat of August 1914.

Early career

Born on 17 May 1852 at Saint-Germain-du-Plain in the Saône-et-Loire department, the son of Claude Alfred Sordet and Marguerite Marie de la Blanche. Sordet was commissioned into the 57th Infantry Regiment as a second lieutenant in November 1870, during the Franco-Prussian War. In September 1871, he attended the École spéciale militaire de Saint-Cyr and specialised in the cavalry arm. By August 1903, Sordet had been promoted to '' General de brigade'' and was given command of the 5th Dragoon Brigade, followed by command of 5th Cavalry Division in September 1907, 4th Cavalry Division in April 1910 and X Army Corps in May 1912. He was appointed a Knight of the Legion of Honour in July 1893, an Officer in July 1904 and a Commander in December 1912.

Reconnaissance into Belgium

In 1914, Sordet commanded the I Cavalry Corps. General Joseph Joffre, the French Commander-in-Chief, believed that the main German thrust would be towards Verdun, but when Germany demanded passage of her troops through Belgium, he sent Sordet's corps into the Belgian Ardennes region to reconnoitre in force on 5 August.Krause 2014, pp. 11–12

The Germans attacked the outermost Liège forts on 5 August. Three cavalry divisions under Sordet were to enter south-eastern Belgium on 6 August to reconnoitre the area east of the Meuse (President Poincaré and War Minister Messimy had wanted to send five corps, but this suggestion did not meet with Joffre's approval). Between 5 and 8 August Sordet's corps searched the country east of the Meuse as far as Liège, covering in the last three days.Spears 1930, p. 102 They got within 9 miles of Liège, and also checked as far west as Charleroi, only to find no evidence yet of the Germans crossing the Meuse in order to march west through Belgium. Far from the opening weeks of war being marked by a "clash of cavalry" as predicted by prewar theorists, Sordet's three divisions failed to find any German troops until 8 August, when they encountered a security screen of German cavalry and machine-gun fire from Jägers around the northern group of armies near Liège and Namur and were unable to assess the size of the German force.Hastings 2013, pp. 164–5

The reconnaissance had been, in historian Ian Senior's view, too early as half a million German infantry were still backing up the roads from Germany. After an exhausting march in August heat with little water, Sordet's men were back roughly where they had started by 10 August. After a rest on 10 August Sordet's forces were in constant movement between 11 and 18 August. The Germans crossed the Meuse on 15 August, the first sign that they were coming further west than Joffre had anticipated. Sordet had been on the eastern side of the river. He made a brief attempt to attack the Germans from the south, but then crossed to the west bank at Givet and moved to a position northwest of Dinant.

Sordet's men often covered per day, and at one point in August the 9th Cuirassiers covered in 48 hours. Unlike British cavalry who were trained to conserve their horses' strength by leading them whenever possible, French cavalry remained in the saddle, causing saddle sores and the loss of many horses from exhaustion. Sordet's men had covered distances which, as Spears put it, "would have taxed even British cavalry", and yet he was under pressure to fulfil different roles. Sir John French wanted him to cover the assembly of the British Expeditionary Force (BEF), whereas Charles Lanrezac wanted him to gather tactical intelligence and was told by Joffre's deputy chief of staff Henri Berthelot on 17 August that this took priority.Spears 1930, pp. 101–2 By 17 August, Liège having fallen, Sordet was ordered north of the Sambre by Joffre in a condition described by historian Barbara W. Tuchman as "shoeless". He was ordered to move up to Namur and Louvain to make contact with the remnants of Belgian Army to attempt to dissuade them from falling back on Antwerp. Grand Quartier Général (GQG) staff were unfairly angered at Sordet's "dilatoriness", even though his horses were too tired to do more than walk. Lanrezac demanded to Joffre on morning of 18th that he have use of Sordet's corps.

Sordet's forces had now had a chance to recover their strength and he reported that he would be ready to move again on 22 August. He asked permission to operate north of the Sambre against the Germans who were reported to be marching west against the British. Lanrezac lent the 11th Infantry Brigade (part of III Corps), but on 21 August Sordet's men were pushed out of Luttre and Pont-à-Celles, crossings on the Charleroi Canal north of the Sambre.

Order of battle of Sordet's Cavalry Corps

Charleroi and Mons

On retiring, the corps was attached to the French Fifth Army during the Battle of Charleroi (21-3 August) and the Battle of Mons (23 August). By the end of 22 August, Lanrezac, commander of the Fifth Army, reported that Sordet's corps was "greatly exhausted" and that it had had to pull back, helping to open a gap of – enough for an enemy corps – between Fifth Army's left and the right of the BEF. Together with the news which reached him at noon next day that Belgian 4th Division were evacuating Namur, this helped decide Lanrezac to pull back from his position at Charleroi.

Sordet telegraphed to Lanrezac at 8 pm on the 23rd that Sir John French, commander-in-chief of the BEF, was pulling back to the Bavai-Maubeuge line (in fact this was a slight misunderstanding, as he was just making inquiries about the possibility of doing so), and asked if he should "keep to ismission on its left". Edward Spears argued that this may have been the source for the "legend" that Lanrezac pulled back because the BEF was doing so. He wrote that in fact Lanrezac pulled back before receiving the message and answering it at 11.30pm. Barbara Tuchman disagreed, citing Lanrezac's later claim that he had "received confirmation" of Sordet's message. She also scoffed at Spears' claim that "no evidence" had been found to link Lanrezac's retreat to concern about the British retreat, observing that Messimy testified at the postwar Briey hearings that there were 25 to 30 million relevant documents for the period in the archives.

Le Cateau

Sir John French, worried at being cut off from the English Channel, visited Sordet at Avesnes on 24 August, and was informed that the Allied west flank was being defended by Territorial Army forces (reservists aged between 35 and 48) under Albert d'Amade at Arras and by the Lille garrison. Sir John asked Sordet to cover the British left, but Sordet initially asked to consult his own chain of command first. Sordet told Sir John that his horses were too tired to move, but he actually moved a long distance afterwards, a fact which Major-General Snow, commander of British 4th Division, later cited as evidence that Sordet is unlikely to have done much during the Battle of Le Cateau.Snow & Pottle 2011, pp. 29–32 At 10am on 24 August Lanrezac, concerned that Sir John French might be falling back on his lines of communication and away from the French forces, ordered Sordet to fall back on Landrecies on the next day, between the BEF and the Fifth Army. Lanrezac changed his mind an hour or so later and ordered Sordet to fall back to the BEF left as previously ordered.

Later that day Lanrezac was informed that Joffre had taken direct command of Sordet with effect from 25 August, although GQG were not clear where he was. He brought his exhausted horses round the back of British Army and, in Spears' description, "that splendid little soldier never got rattled in the welter of contradictory orders he received", appearing on the British left on the evening of the 24th. Joffre wanted Sordet to reinforce d'Amade's three Territorial Divisions and the Lille garrison, which was now free to deploy after Lille had been declared an open city.

On Tuesday 25 August the Cavalry Corps marched westward behind the BEF retreat, to the south of Esnes where British 12th Brigade was. That day War Minister Messimy complained to Joffre that German cavalry were running amok in Belgium and that "Sordet, who has had very little fighting, is asleep. This is inadmissible." This was unfair criticism from a man who was soon to be forced to resign. That night Sordet's forces passed behind the British forces and caused a delay of an hour until 1am in the pullback of British II Corps. Sordet's corps was bivouacked between Walincourt and Esnes on the night of 25/6 "wet through and the horses dead beat".

At the Battle of Le Cateau (26 August) Sordet's men were deployed on the British left. Sordet moved off south very early on 26 August. 1st Cavalry Division moved to Villers-Guilain, 14 miles south of Cambrai and the same distance from 4 Division's left; it later moved forward to Cambrai. Sordet only moved up after receiving a message from Joffre timed 1pm ordering him not just to cover the British left flank but "to intervene in the battle with all the forces at isdisposal".Snow & Pottle 2011, p. 60 Spears wrote that after a march of 30 miles the previous day Sordet's artillery and cyclists attacked the flank of German forces attacking 4th Division, using their 75mm guns.Hastings 2013, p. 236 Sordet's artillery fought from Séranvillers and Florenville south of Cambrai.Spears 1930, p. 529 Smith-Dorrien heard Sordet's guns around 4.30pm.

Sordet's action helped the British 4th Division to pull away that night. The liaison officer Victor Huguet gave Sordet even greater praise on 28 August, claiming that he had helped the entire British II Corps withdraw.

British Generals' views of Sordet at Le Cateau

Snow was highly critical of Sordet's conduct at Le Cateau, believing that he never intended to do more than demonstrate, but that the French Territorials and artillery on the left had helped protect the British flank. Snow wrote that there were not enough Germans to attempt to turn the British left flank until 3pm when 4th Division was already beginning to withdraw. Snow thought the guns which were heard that afternoon were more likely to belong to the Cambrai garrison. Snow also wrote that Sordet's guns opened fire at 6.30pm. Snow was wrong about this; in fact this was the time when Sordet ''broke off'' against German IV Reserve Corps, and his forces undoubtedly helped 4th Division to withdraw.Snow & Pottle 2011, p. 61

Smith-Dorrien, the commander of British II Corps, thanked Sordet in his Order of the Day (29 August). In that document he wrote of the French on his left, especially the Territorials who had been engaging German troops further west, that "otherwise it is almost certain we should have had another corps against us on the 26th". However, Smith-Dorrien called the relevant chapter in his memoirs "Sordet's Tardy Help".

In his original despatch (7 September) Sir John French wrote that Sordet gave no help and, according to General Snow, censured him. This was an exaggeration by Snow: in fact Sir John wrote that he sent Sordet an urgent message to support the retirement of the British left flank, but that Sordet was unable to intervene owing to the fatigue of his horses. But in his unreliable memoirs ''1914'' Sir John gave credit to Sordet, claiming that he had been ignorant of the assistance rendered by Sordet and d'Amade, and implying that Smith-Dorrien had misled him. By then Sir John was keen to praise everybody ''but'' Smith-Dorrien, against whom he bore a grudge.

Retreat and dismissal

On 27 August, GQG, which had again briefly lost contact with Sordet, ordered him to cover British left until the BEF had crossed the Somme, then remain around Saint-Quentin until given further orders. Snow later wrote that the only time he ever saw "the great Sordet and his cavalry" during the retreat was on 27 August, when he saw several squadrons to the British left. The forces exchanged stirring messages via Colonel Edmonds, only for the French cavalry to withdraw immediately under shrapnel fire.

Sordet, whose corps was by now incapable of fighting as a whole, formed a Provisional Cavalry Division under General Cornulier-Luciniere from the regiments which were still mobile, and placed it for two days at the disposal of Michel-Joseph Maunoury, commander of the Sixth Army. Maunoury was able to fall back behind the River Avre (29 August) because of the Battle of Guise.

Sordet was under Maunoury's Sixth Army from 30 August to 1 September.Spears 1930, p. 373 Captain Lepic of Sordet's corps, reconnoitring northwest of Compiègne on 31 August, saw nine German cavalry squadrons (Uhlans, some of whom had discarded their helmets, were wearing cloth caps and were pretending to be ''"Englisch"'') followed by an infantry column 15 minutes later. They were not making south for Paris but rather south-east for Compiègne, the beginning of von Kluck's great turning movement east of Paris.

Sordet was then under the direct command of Joseph Gallieni, Military governor of Paris, from 1 September to 4 September. He crossed the Seine between Mantes and Melun on 3 September. He was then again placed under the command of Sixth Army from 5 September, and was ordered to collect his troops together by 7 September in the region of Longjumeau-Brunoy, whilst the Provisional Cavalry Division moved east of Paris. In the space of a month, the corps had covered close to .Briastre 2013, pp. 35–36

On 8 September, during the Battle of the Ourcq (part of the First Battle of the Marne), Sordet tried to envelop the northern flank of von Kluck's German First Army via the Bargny Plateau. His three divisions left their bivouacs around Nanteuil-le-Haudouin around dawn, approaching Lévignen

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