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Reversal Symmetry
The reversal symmetry criterion is a voting system criterion which says that if every voter's opinions on each of the candidates is perfectly reversed (i.e. they rank candidates in order from worst to best), the outcome of the election should be reversed as well, i.e. the first- and last-place finishers should switch places. In other words, the results of the election should not depend arbitrarily on whether voters rank candidates from best to worst (and then select the best candidate), or whether we ask them to rank candidates from worst to best (and then select the least-bad candidate). Another, equivalent way to motivate the criterion is to say that a voting system should never elect the worst candidate, according to the method itself (as doing so suggests the method is, in some sense, self-contradictory). The worst candidate can be identified by reversing all ballots (to rank candidates from worst-to-best) and then running the algorithm to find a single worst candidate. Sit ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Voting System Criterion
This article discusses the methods and results of comparing different electoral systems. There are two broad methods to compare voting systems: # Metrics of voter satisfaction, either through simulation or survey. # Adherence to logical criteria. Evaluation by metrics Models of the electoral process Voting methods can be evaluated by measuring their accuracy under random simulated elections aiming to be faithful to the properties of elections in real life. The first such evaluation was conducted by Chamberlin and Cohen in 1978, who measured the frequency with which certain non-Condorcet systems elected Condorcet winners. Condorcet jury model The Marquis de Condorcet viewed elections as analogous to jury votes where each member expresses an independent judgement on the quality of candidates. Candidates differ in terms of their objective merit, but voters have imperfect information about the relative merits of the candidates. Such jury models are sometimes known as valence models. ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Instant-runoff Voting
Instant-runoff voting (IRV; ranked-choice voting (RCV), preferential voting, alternative vote) is a single-winner ranked voting election system where Sequential loser method, one or more eliminations are used to simulate Runoff (election), runoff elections. When no candidate has a majority of the votes in the first round of counting, each following round eliminates the candidate with the fewest First-preference votes, first-preferences (among the remaining candidates) and transfers their votes if possible. This continues until one candidate accumulates a majority of the votes still in play. Instant-runoff voting falls under the plurality-based voting-rule family, in that under certain conditions the candidate with the least votes is eliminated, making use of secondary rankings as contingency votes. Thus it is related to the Runoff election, two-round runoff system and the exhaustive ballot. IRV could also be seen as a single-winner equivalent of Single transferable vote, sin ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Minimax
Minimax (sometimes Minmax, MM or saddle point) is a decision rule used in artificial intelligence, decision theory, combinatorial game theory, statistics, and philosophy for ''minimizing'' the possible loss function, loss for a Worst-case scenario, worst case (''max''imum loss) scenario. When dealing with gains, it is referred to as "maximin" – to maximize the minimum gain. Originally formulated for several-player zero-sum game theory, covering both the cases where players take alternate moves and those where they make simultaneous moves, it has also been extended to more complex games and to general decision-making in the presence of uncertainty. Game theory In general games The maximin value is the highest value that the player can be sure to get without knowing the actions of the other players; equivalently, it is the lowest value the other players can force the player to receive when they know the player's action. Its formal definition is: :\underline = \max_ \min_ W ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Borda Count
The Borda method or order of merit is a positional voting rule that gives each candidate a number of points equal to the number of candidates ranked below them: the lowest-ranked candidate gets 0 points, the second-lowest gets 1 point, and so on. The candidate with the most points wins. The Borda count has been independently reinvented several times, with the first recorded proposal in 1435 being by Nicholas of Cusa (see History below), but is named after the 18th-century French mathematician and naval engineer Jean-Charles de Borda, who re-devised the system in 1770. The Borda count is well-known in social choice theory both for its pleasant theoretical properties and its ease of manipulation. In the absence of strategic voting and strategic nomination, the Borda count tends to elect broadly-acceptable options or candidates (rather than consistently following the preferences of a majority); when both voting and nomination patterns are completely random, the Borda count gener ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Kemeny–Young Method
The Kemeny–Young method is an electoral system that uses ranked ballots and pairwise comparison counts to identify the most popular choices in an election. It is a Condorcet method because if there is a Condorcet winner, it will always be ranked as the most popular choice. This method assigns a score for each possible sequence, where each sequence considers which choice might be most popular, which choice might be second-most popular, which choice might be third-most popular, and so on down to which choice might be least-popular. The sequence that has the highest score is the winning sequence, and the first choice in the winning sequence is the most popular choice. (As explained below, ties can occur at any ranking level.) The Kemeny–Young method is also known as the Kemeny rule, VoteFair popularity ranking, the maximum likelihood method, and the median relation. Description The Kemeny–Young method uses preferential ballots on which voters rank choices according to th ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Schulze Method
Articles with example pseudocode Debian Electoral systems Monotonic Condorcet methods Single-winner electoral systems The Schulze method (), also known as the beatpath method, is a single winner ranked-choice voting rule developed by Markus Schulze. The Schulze method is a Condorcet completion method, which means it will elect a majority-preferred candidate if one exists. In other words, if most people rank ''A'' above ''B'', ''A'' will defeat ''B'' (whenever this is possible). Schulze's method breaks cyclic ties by using indirect victories. The idea is that if Alice beats Bob, and Bob beats Charlie, then Alice (indirectly) beats Charlie; this kind of indirect win is called a "beatpath". For proportional representation, a single transferable vote (STV) variant known as Schulze STV also exists. The Schulze method is used by several organizations including Debian, Ubuntu, Gentoo, Pirate Party political parties and many others. It was also used by Wikimedia prior to th ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Rated Voting
Rated, evaluative, graded, or cardinal voting rules are a class of voting methods that allow voters to state how strongly they support a candidate, by giving each one a grade on a separate scale. The distribution of ratings for each candidate—i.e. the percentage of voters who assign them a particular score—is called their merit profile. For example, if candidates are graded on a 4-point scale, one candidate's merit profile may be 25% on every possible rating (1, 2, 3, and 4), while a perfect candidate would have a merit profile where 100% of voters assign them a score of 4. Since rated methods allow the voters to express how strongly they support a candidate, these methods are not covered by Arrow's impossibility theorem, and their resistance to the spoiler effect becomes a more complex matter. Some rated methods are immune to the spoiler effect when every voter rates the candidates on an absolute scale, but they are not when the voters' rating scales change based on the ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Approval Voting
Approval voting is a single-winner rated voting system where voters can approve of all the candidates as they like instead of Plurality voting, choosing one. The method is designed to eliminate vote-splitting while keeping election administration simple and Summability criterion, easy-to-count (requiring only a single score for each candidate). Approval voting has been used in both organizational and political elections to improve representativeness and voter satisfaction. Critics of approval voting have argued the simple ballot format is a disadvantage, as it forces a Dichotomous preferences, binary choice for each candidate (instead of the expressive grades of other rated voting rules). Effect on elections Research by Social choice theory, social choice theorists Steven Brams and Dudley R. Herschbach found that approval voting would increase voter participation, prevent minor-party candidates from being spoiler effect, spoilers, and reduce negative campaigning. Brams' researc ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Score Voting
Score voting, sometimes called range voting, is an electoral system for single-seat elections. Voters give each candidate a numerical score, and the candidate with the highest average score is elected. Score voting includes the well-known approval voting (used to calculate approval ratings), but also lets voters give partial (in-between) approval ratings to candidates. Usage Political use Historical A crude form of score voting was used in some elections in ancient Sparta, by measuring how loudly the crowd shouted for different candidates. This has a modern-day analog of using clapometers in some television shows and the judging processes of some athletic competitions. Beginning in the 13th century, the Republic of Venice elected the Doge of Venice using a multi-stage process with multiple rounds of score voting. This may have contributed to the Republic's longevity, being partly responsible for its status as the longest-lived democracy in world history. Score voting w ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
