|
Vivid Designator
In modal logic and the philosophy of language, a vivid designator is a term which is ''believed'' to designate the same thing in all possible worldsQuine, W.V.O., ''Quintessence: Intensions Revisited'', 2004, pp. 356–357 and nothing else where such an object does not exist in a possible world. It is the analogue, in the sense of believing, of a rigid designator, which ''is'' ( refers to) the same in all possible worlds, rather than is just ''believed'' to be so. Willard Van Orman Quine Willard Van Orman Quine credits David Kaplan (who in turn credits Montgomery Furth) for the term "vivid designator" in his 1977 paper "Intensions Revisited". He examines the separation between ''de re'' and ''de dicto'' and does away with ''de re'' statements, because ''de re'' statements can only work for names that are used referentially. In fact, both rigid designators and vivid designators are similarly dependent on context and empty otherwise. The same is true of the whole quantified ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Modal Logic
Modal logic is a collection of formal systems developed to represent statements about necessity and possibility. It plays a major role in philosophy of language, epistemology, metaphysics, and natural language semantics. Modal logics extend other systems by adding unary operators \Diamond and \Box, representing possibility and necessity respectively. For instance the modal formula \Diamond P can be read as "possibly P" while \Box P can be read as "necessarily P". Modal logics can be used to represent different phenomena depending on what kind of necessity and possibility is under consideration. When \Box is used to represent epistemic necessity, \Box P states that P is epistemically necessary, or in other words that it is known. When \Box is used to represent deontic necessity, \Box P states that P is a moral or legal obligation. In the standard relational semantics for modal logic, formulas are assigned truth values relative to a '' possible world''. A formula's truth value ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Quantification (logic)
In logic, a quantifier is an operator that specifies how many individuals in the domain of discourse satisfy an open formula. For instance, the universal quantifier \forall in the first order formula \forall x P(x) expresses that everything in the domain satisfies the property denoted by P. On the other hand, the existential quantifier \exists in the formula \exists x P(x) expresses that there exists something in the domain which satisfies that property. A formula where a quantifier takes widest scope is called a quantified formula. A quantified formula must contain a bound variable and a subformula specifying a property of the referent of that variable. The mostly commonly used quantifiers are \forall and \exists. These quantifiers are standardly defined as duals; in classical logic, they are interdefinable using negation. They can also be used to define more complex quantifiers, as in the formula \neg \exists x P(x) which expresses that nothing has the property P. Other ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Philosophy Of Language
In analytic philosophy, philosophy of language investigates the nature of language and the relations between language, language users, and the world. Investigations may include inquiry into the nature of meaning, intentionality, reference, the constitution of sentences, concepts, learning, and thought. Gottlob Frege and Bertrand Russell were pivotal figures in analytic philosophy's " linguistic turn". These writers were followed by Ludwig Wittgenstein ('' Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus''), the Vienna Circle, logical positivists, and Willard Van Orman Quine. In continental philosophy, language is not studied as a separate discipline. Rather, it is an inextricable part of many other areas of thought, such as phenomenology, structural semiotics, language of mathematics, hermeneutics, existentialism, deconstruction and critical theory. History Ancient philosophy In the West, inquiry into language stretches back to the 5th century BC with Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, an ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Possible World
A possible world is a complete and consistent way the world is or could have been. Possible worlds are widely used as a formal device in logic, philosophy, and linguistics in order to provide a semantics for intensional and modal logic. Their metaphysical status has been a subject of controversy in philosophy, with modal realists such as David Lewis arguing that they are literally existing alternate realities, and others such as Robert Stalnaker arguing that they are not. Logic Possible worlds are one of the foundational concepts in modal and intensional logics. Formulas in these logics are used to represent statements about what ''might'' be true, what ''should'' be true, what one ''believes'' to be true and so forth. To give these statements a formal interpretation, logicians use structures containing possible worlds. For instance, in the relational semantics for classical propositional modal logic, the formula \Diamond P (read as "possibly P") is actually true if ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Scientific Essentialism
Scientific essentialism, a view espoused by Saul Kripke and Hilary Putnam, maintains that there exist essential properties that objects possess (or instantiate) necessarily. In other words, having such and such essential properties is a necessary condition for membership in a given natural kind. For example, tigers are tigers in virtue of possessing a particular set of genetic properties, but identifying (or appearance-based) properties are nonessential properties. If a tiger lost a leg, or didn't possess stripes, we would still call it a tiger. They are not necessary for being a member of the class of tigers. It is important, however, that the set of essential properties of an object not be used to identify or be identified with that object because they are not ''necessary and sufficient'', but only necessary. Having such and such a genetic code does not suffice for being a tiger. We wouldn't call a piece of tiger tail a tiger, even though a piece of tiger tail contains the genet ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Non-rigid Designator
In the philosophy of language and modal logic, a term is said to be a non-rigid designator (or flaccid designator) or connotative term if it does not extensionally designate (denote, refer to) the same object in all possible worlds. This is in contrast to a rigid designator, which does designate the same object in all possible worlds in which that object exists, and does not designate anything else in those worlds in which that object does ''not'' exist. The term was coined by Saul Kripke in his 1970 lecture series at Princeton University, later published as the book ''Naming and Necessity''. Examples As an example, consider the phrase "The 43rd President of the United States of America": while the 43rd President of the United States is ''actually'' George W. Bush, things might have been different. Bush might have lost the election, meaning that the 43rd President might have been Al Gore or Ralph Nader instead. (''How remote'' these possible worlds are from the actual world is a di ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Rigid Designator
In modal logic and the philosophy of language, a term is said to be a rigid designator or absolute substantial term when it designates (picks out, denotes, refers to) the same thing in ''all possible worlds'' in which that thing exists. A designator is ''persistently rigid'' if it also designates nothing in all other possible worlds. A designator is ''obstinately rigid'' if it designates the same thing in every possible world, period, whether or not that thing exists in that world. Rigid designators are contrasted with ''connotative terms'', ''non-rigid'' or ''flaccid designators'', which may designate different things in different possible worlds. History The Scholastic philosophers in the Middle Ages developed a theory of properties of terms in which different classifications of concepts feature prominently. Concepts, and the terms that signify them, can be divided into absolute or connotative, according to the mode in which they signify. If they signify something absolutely, ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Naming And Necessity
''Naming and Necessity'' is a 1980 book with the transcript of three lectures, given by the philosopher Saul Kripke, at Princeton University in 1970, in which he dealt with the debates of proper names in the philosophy of language. The transcript was brought out originally in 1972 in ''Semantics of Natural Language'', edited by Donald Davidson and Gilbert Harman. Among analytic philosophers, ''Naming and Necessity'' is widely considered one of the most important philosophical works of the twentieth century. Overview Language is a primary concern of analytic philosophers, particularly the use of language to express concepts and to refer to individuals. In ''Naming and Necessity'', Kripke considers several questions that are important within analytic philosophy: *How do names refer to things in the world? (the problem of intensionality) *Are all statements that can be known ''a priori'' necessarily true, and are all statements that are known ''a posteriori'' contingently true? ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Essence
Essence ( la, essentia) is a polysemic term, used in philosophy and theology as a designation for the property or set of properties that make an entity or substance what it fundamentally is, and which it has by necessity, and without which it loses its identity. Essence is contrasted with accident: a property that the entity or substance has contingently, without which the substance can still retain its identity. The concept originates rigorously with Aristotle (although it can also be found in Plato), who used the Greek expression ''to ti ên einai'' (τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι, literally meaning "the what it was to be" and corresponding to the scholastic term quiddity) or sometimes the shorter phrase ''to ti esti'' (τὸ τί ἐστι, literally meaning "the what it is" and corresponding to the scholastic term haecceity) for the same idea. This phrase presented such difficulties for its Latin translators that they coined the word ''essentia'' (English "essence") to ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Rigid Designators
In modal logic and the philosophy of language, a term is said to be a rigid designator or absolute substantial term when it designates (picks out, denotes, refers to) the same thing in ''all possible worlds'' in which that thing exists. A designator is ''persistently rigid'' if it also designates nothing in all other possible worlds. A designator is ''obstinately rigid'' if it designates the same thing in every possible world, period, whether or not that thing exists in that world. Rigid designators are contrasted with ''connotative terms'', ''non-rigid'' or ''flaccid designators'', which may designate different things in different possible worlds. History The Scholastic philosophers in the Middle Ages developed a theory of properties of terms in which different classifications of concepts feature prominently. Concepts, and the terms that signify them, can be divided into absolute or connotative, according to the mode in which they signify. If they signify something absolutely, ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Philosophy Of Language
In analytic philosophy, philosophy of language investigates the nature of language and the relations between language, language users, and the world. Investigations may include inquiry into the nature of meaning, intentionality, reference, the constitution of sentences, concepts, learning, and thought. Gottlob Frege and Bertrand Russell were pivotal figures in analytic philosophy's " linguistic turn". These writers were followed by Ludwig Wittgenstein ('' Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus''), the Vienna Circle, logical positivists, and Willard Van Orman Quine. In continental philosophy, language is not studied as a separate discipline. Rather, it is an inextricable part of many other areas of thought, such as phenomenology, structural semiotics, language of mathematics, hermeneutics, existentialism, deconstruction and critical theory. History Ancient philosophy In the West, inquiry into language stretches back to the 5th century BC with Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, an ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
De Dicto And De Re
''De dicto'' and ''de re'' are two phrases used to mark a distinction in intensional statements, associated with the intensional operators in many such statements. The distinction is used regularly in metaphysics and in philosophy of language. The literal translation of the phrase "''de dicto''" is "about what is said", whereas ''de re'' translates as "about the thing". The original meaning of the Latin locutions may help to elucidate the living meaning of the phrases, in the distinctions they mark. The distinction can be understood by examples of intensional contexts of which three are considered here: a context of thought, a context of desire, and a context of modal logic, modality. Context of thought There are two possible interpretations of the sentence "Peter believes someone is out to get him". On one interpretation, 'someone' is unspecific and Peter suffers a general paranoia; he believes that it is true that a person is out to get him, but does not necessarily have any b ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
