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Supervenience
In philosophy, supervenience refers to a relation between sets of properties or sets of facts. X is said to supervene on Y if and only if some difference in Y is necessary for any difference in X to be possible. Some examples include: * Whether there is a table in the living room supervenes on the positions of molecules in the living room. * The truth value of (A) supervenes on the truth value of (¬A). For the same reason, the truth value of (¬A) supervenes on that of (A). * Properties of individual molecules supervene on the properties of individual atoms. * One's moral character supervenes on one's action(s). These are examples of supervenience because in each case the truth values of some propositions cannot vary unless the truth values of some other propositions vary. Supervenience is of interest to philosophers because it differs from other nearby relations, for example entailment. Some philosophers believe it possible for some A to supervene on some B without being enta ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Physicalism
In philosophy, physicalism is the metaphysical thesis that "everything is physical", that there is "nothing over and above" the physical, or that everything supervenes on the physical. Physicalism is a form of ontological monism—a "one substance" view of the nature of reality as opposed to a "two-substance" (dualism) or "many-substance" (pluralism) view. Both the definition of "physical" and the meaning of physicalism have been debated. Physicalism is closely related to materialism. Physicalism grew out of materialism with advancements of the physical sciences in explaining observed phenomena. The terms are often used interchangeably, although they are sometimes distinguished, for example on the basis of physics describing more than just matter (including energy and physical law). According to a 2009 survey, physicalism is the majority view among philosophers, but there remains significant opposition to physicalism. Neuroplasticity has been used as an argument in support of ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Jaegwon Kim
Jaegwon Kim (September 12, 1934 – November 27, 2019) was a Korean-American philosopher. At the time of his death, Kim was an emeritus professor of philosophy at Brown University. He also taught at several other leading American universities during his lifetime, including the University of Michigan, Cornell University, the University of Notre Dame, Johns Hopkins University, and Swarthmore College. He is best known for his work on mental causation, the mind-body problem and the metaphysics of supervenience and events. Key themes in his work include: a rejection of Cartesian metaphysics, the limitations of strict psychophysical identity, supervenience, and the individuation of events. Kim's work on these and other contemporary metaphysical and epistemological issues is well represented by the papers collected in ''Supervenience and Mind: Selected Philosophical Essays'' (1993). Biography Kim took two years of college in Seoul, South Korea as a French literature major, bef ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Emergentism
In philosophy, emergentism is the belief in emergence, particularly as it involves consciousness and the philosophy of mind. A property of a system is said to be emergent if it is a new outcome of some other properties of the system and their interaction, while it is itself different from them.O'Connor, Timothy and Wong, Hong Yu, "Emergent Properties", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2015 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = . Within the philosophy of science, emergentism is analyzed both as it contrasts with and parallels reductionism. Emergent properties, laws and principles, appear when a system is studied at a higher level of organization (holistic instead of atomic level). They often show a high level of complexity, despite the fundamental principles that regulate the components of the system being simple. For example, in emergentism, the laws of chemistry are believed to emerge only from a few fundamental laws of physics (some still not discovered), bio ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Meta-ethics
In metaphilosophy and ethics, meta-ethics is the study of the nature, scope, and meaning of moral judgment. It is one of the three branches of ethics generally studied by philosophers, the others being normative ethics (questions of how one ought to be and act) and applied ethics (practical questions of right behavior in given, usually contentious, situations). While normative ethics addresses such questions as "What should I do?", evaluating specific practices and principles of action, meta-ethics addresses questions such as "What ''is'' goodness?" and "How can we tell what is good from what is bad?", seeking to understand the assumptions underlying normative theories. Another distinction often made is that normative ethics involves first-order or substantive questions; meta-ethics involves second-order or formal questions. Some theorists argue that a metaphysical account of morality is necessary for the proper evaluation of actual moral theories and for making practical mor ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Anomalous Monism
Anomalous monism is a philosophical thesis about the mind–body relationship. It was first proposed by Donald Davidson in his 1970 paper "Mental Events". The theory is twofold and states that mental events are identical with physical events, and that the mental is anomalous, i.e. under their mental descriptions, relationships between these mental events are not describable by strict physical laws. Hence, Davidson proposes an identity theory of mind without the reductive bridge laws associated with the type-identity theory. Since the publication of his paper, Davidson has refined his thesis and both critics and supporters of anomalous monism have come up with their own characterizations of the thesis, many of which appear to differ from Davidson's. Overview Considering views about the relation between the mental and the physical as distinguished first by whether or not mental entities are identical with physical entities, and second by whether or not there are strict psychophysic ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Predicate (logic) In logic, a predicate is a symbol which represents a property or a relation. For instance, in the first order formula P(a), the symbol P is a predicate which applies to the individual constant a. Similarly, in the formula R(a,b), R is a predicate which applies to the individual constants a and b. In the semantics of logic, predicates are interpreted as relations. For instance, in a standard semantics for first-order logic, the formula R(a,b) would be true on an interpretation if the entities denoted by a and b stand in the relation denoted by R. Since predicates are non-logical symbols, they can denote different relations depending on the interpretation used to interpret them. While first-order logic only includes predicates which apply to individual constants, other logics may allow predicates which apply to other predicates. Predicates in different systems * In propositional logic, atomic formulas are sometimes regarded as zero-place predicates In a sense, these are nul ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |