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Separating Equilibrium
In signaling games, a separating equilibrium is a type of perfect Bayesian equilibrium where agents with different characteristics choose different actions. See also *Signaling games *Pooling equilibrium *Cheap talk In game theory, cheap talk is communication between players that does not directly affect the payoffs of the game. Providing and receiving information is free. This is in contrast to signalling (economics), signalling, in which sending certain mess ... References Game theory equilibrium concepts {{gametheory-stub ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Signaling Games
In game theory, a signaling game is a type of a dynamic game, dynamic Bayesian game.Subsection 8.2.2 in Fudenberg Trole 1991, pp. 326–331 The essence of a signaling game is that one player takes action, the signal, to convey information to another player. Sending the signal is more costly if the information is false. A manufacturer, for example, might provide a warranty for its product to signal to consumers that it is unlikely to break down. A traditional example is a worker who acquires a college degree not because it increases their skill but because it conveys their ability to employers. A simple signaling game would have two players: the sender and the receiver. The sender has one of two types, which might be called "desirable" and "undesirable," with different payoff functions. The receiver knows the probability of each type but not which one this particular sender has. The receiver has just one possible type. The sender moves first, choosing an action called the "sign ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
In game theory, a Bayesian game is a strategic decision-making model which assumes players have incomplete information. Players may hold private information relevant to the game, meaning that the payoffs are not common knowledge. Bayesian games model the outcome of player interactions using aspects of Bayesian probability. They are notable because they allowed the specification of the solutions to games with incomplete information for the first time in game theory. Hungarian economist John C. Harsanyi introduced the concept of Bayesian games in three papers from 1967 and 1968: He was awarded the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences for these and other contributions to game theory in 1994. Roughly speaking, Harsanyi defined Bayesian games in the following way: players are assigned a set of characteristics by nature at the start of the game. By mapping probability distributions to these characteristics and by calculating the outcome of the game using Bayesian probability, the r ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Signaling Games
In game theory, a signaling game is a type of a dynamic game, dynamic Bayesian game.Subsection 8.2.2 in Fudenberg Trole 1991, pp. 326–331 The essence of a signaling game is that one player takes action, the signal, to convey information to another player. Sending the signal is more costly if the information is false. A manufacturer, for example, might provide a warranty for its product to signal to consumers that it is unlikely to break down. A traditional example is a worker who acquires a college degree not because it increases their skill but because it conveys their ability to employers. A simple signaling game would have two players: the sender and the receiver. The sender has one of two types, which might be called "desirable" and "undesirable," with different payoff functions. The receiver knows the probability of each type but not which one this particular sender has. The receiver has just one possible type. The sender moves first, choosing an action called the "sign ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Pooling Equilibrium
A pooling equilibrium in game theory is an equilibrium outcome of a signaling game. In a signaling game, players send actions called "signals" to other players. These signals are based on privately held information, which is not known to others in the game. These actions do reveal a player's "type" to other players, who then choose their strategies accordingly. In a pooling equilibrium, all types of a given sender send the same signal. Some senders represent their true type, while others correctly mimic the type of others, having no incentive to differentiate themselves. As a result, the receiver acts as if they have received no information, maximizing their utility according to their prior The term prior may refer to: * Prior (ecclesiastical), the head of a priory (monastery) * Prior convictions, the life history and previous convictions of a suspect or defendant in a criminal case * Prior probability, in Bayesian statistics * Prio ... beliefs. See also * Separating equ ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
