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Philosophical Logic
Understood in a narrow sense, philosophical logic is the area of logic that studies the application of logical methods to philosophical problems, often in the form of extended logical systems like modal logic. Some theorists conceive philosophical logic in a wider sense as the study of the scope and nature of logic in general. In this sense, philosophical logic can be seen as identical to the philosophy of logic, which includes additional topics like how to define logic or a discussion of the fundamental concepts of logic. The current article treats philosophical logic in the narrow sense, in which it forms one field of inquiry within the philosophy of logic. An important issue for philosophical logic is the question of how to classify the great variety of non-classical logical systems, many of which are of rather recent origin. One form of classification often found in the literature is to distinguish between extended logics and deviant logics. Logic itself can be defined as t ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Logic
Logic is the study of correct reasoning. It includes both formal and informal logic. Formal logic is the study of deductively valid inferences or logical truths. It examines how conclusions follow from premises based on the structure of arguments alone, independent of their topic and content. Informal logic is associated with informal fallacies, critical thinking, and argumentation theory. Informal logic examines arguments expressed in natural language whereas formal logic uses formal language. When used as a countable noun, the term "a logic" refers to a specific logical formal system that articulates a proof system. Logic plays a central role in many fields, such as philosophy, mathematics, computer science, and linguistics. Logic studies arguments, which consist of a set of premises that leads to a conclusion. An example is the argument from the premises "it's Sunday" and "if it's Sunday then I don't have to work" leading to the conclusion "I don't have to wor ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Permission (philosophy)
Permission, in philosophy, is the attribute of a person whose performance of a specific action, otherwise ethically wrong or dubious, would thereby involve no ethical fault. The term "permission" is more commonly used to refer to consent. Consent is the legal embodiment of the concept, in which approval is given to another party. Permissions depend on norms or institutions. Many permissions and obligation An obligation is a course of action which someone is required to take, be it a legal obligation or a moral obligation. Obligations are constraints; they limit freedom. People who are under obligations may choose to freely act under obligations. ...s are complementary to each other, and deontic logic is a tool sometimes used in reasoning about such relationships. Further reading * Alexy, Robert, ''Theorie der Grundrechte'', Suhrkamp, Frankfurt a. M.: 1985. Translation: ''A theory of constitutional rights'', Oxford University Press, Oxford: 2002. * Raz, Joseph, ''Practical ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Relevance Logic
Relevance logic, also called relevant logic, is a kind of non-classical logic requiring the antecedent and consequent of implications to be relevantly related. They may be viewed as a family of substructural or modal logics. It is generally, but not universally, called ''relevant logic'' by British and, especially, Australian logicians, and ''relevance logic'' by American logicians. Relevance logic aims to capture aspects of implication that are ignored by the " material implication" operator in classical truth-functional logic, namely the notion of relevance between antecedent and conditional of a true implication. This idea is not new: C. I. Lewis was led to invent modal logic, and specifically strict implication, on the grounds that classical logic grants paradoxes of material implication such as the principle that a falsehood implies any proposition. Hence "if I'm a donkey, then two and two is four" is true when translated as a material implication, yet it seems int ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Principle Of Explosion
In classical logic, intuitionistic logic, and similar logical systems, the principle of explosion is the law according to which any statement can be proven from a contradiction. That is, from a contradiction, any proposition (including its negation) can be inferred; this is known as deductive explosion. The proof of this principle was first given by 12th-century French philosopher William of Soissons. Due to the principle of explosion, the existence of a contradiction ( inconsistency) in a formal axiomatic system is disastrous; since any statement can be proven, it trivializes the concepts of truth and falsity. Around the turn of the 20th century, the discovery of contradictions such as Russell's paradox at the foundations of mathematics thus threatened the entire structure of mathematics. Mathematicians such as Gottlob Frege, Ernst Zermelo, Abraham Fraenkel, and Thoralf Skolem put much effort into revising set theory to eliminate these contradictions, resulting in the mo ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Paraconsistent Logic
Paraconsistent logic is a type of non-classical logic that allows for the coexistence of contradictory statements without leading to a logical explosion where anything can be proven true. Specifically, paraconsistent logic is the subfield of logic that is concerned with studying and developing "inconsistency-tolerant" systems of logic, purposefully excluding the principle of explosion. Inconsistency-tolerant logics have been discussed since at least 1910 (and arguably much earlier, for example in the writings of Aristotle); however, the term ''paraconsistent'' ("beside the consistent") was first coined in 1976, by the Peruvian philosopher Francisco Miró Quesada Cantuarias. The study of paraconsistent logic has been dubbed paraconsistency, which encompasses the school of dialetheism. Definition In classical logic (as well as intuitionistic logic and most other logics), contradictions entail everything. This feature, known as the principle of explosion or ''ex contradiction ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Many-valued Logic
Many-valued logic (also multi- or multiple-valued logic) is a propositional calculus in which there are more than two truth values. Traditionally, in Aristotle's Term logic, logical calculus, there were only two possible values (i.e., "true" and "false") for any proposition. Classical two-valued logic may be extended to ''n''-valued logic for ''n'' greater than 2. Those most popular in the literature are Three-valued logic, three-valued (e.g., Jan Łukasiewicz, Łukasiewicz's and Stephen Cole Kleene, Kleene's, which accept the values "true", "false", and "unknown"), four-valued logic, four-valued, nine-valued logic, nine-valued, the finite-valued logic, finite-valued (finitely-many valued) with more than three values, and the infinite-valued logic, infinite-valued (infinitely-many-valued), such as fuzzy logic and probabilistic logic, probability logic. History It is ''wrong'' that the first known classical logician who did not fully accept the law of excluded middle was Aristotle ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Free Logic
A free logic is a logic with fewer existential presuppositions than classical logic. Free logics may allow for terms that do not denote any object. Free logics may also allow models that have an empty domain. A free logic with the latter property is an inclusive logic. Explanation In classical logic there are theorems that clearly presuppose that there is something in the domain of discourse. Consider the following classically valid theorems. :1. \forall xA \Rightarrow \exists xA :2. \forall x \forall rA(x) \Rightarrow \forall rA(r) :3. \forall rA(r) \Rightarrow \exists xA(x) A valid scheme in the theory of equality which exhibits the same feature is :4. \forall x(Fx \rightarrow Gx) \land \exists xFx \rightarrow \exists x(Fx \land Gx) Informally, if F is '=y', G is 'is Pegasus', and we substitute 'Pegasus' for y, then (4) appears to allow us to infer from 'everything identical with Pegasus is Pegasus' that something is identical with Pegasus. The problem comes from s ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Intuitionistic Logic
Intuitionistic logic, sometimes more generally called constructive logic, refers to systems of symbolic logic that differ from the systems used for classical logic by more closely mirroring the notion of constructive proof. In particular, systems of intuitionistic logic do not assume the law of excluded middle and double negation elimination, which are fundamental inference rules in classical logic. Formalized intuitionistic logic was originally developed by Arend Heyting to provide a formal basis for L. E. J. Brouwer's programme of intuitionism. From a proof-theoretic perspective, Heyting’s calculus is a restriction of classical logic in which the law of excluded middle and double negation elimination have been removed. Excluded middle and double negation elimination can still be proved for some propositions on a case by case basis, however, but do not hold universally as they do with classical logic. The standard explanation of intuitionistic logic is the BHK interpre ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Deviant Logic
Deviant logic is a type of logic incompatible with classical logic. Philosopher Susan Haack uses the term ''deviant logic'' to describe certain non-classical systems of logic. In these logics: * the set of well-formed formulas generated equals the set of well-formed formulas generated by classical logic. * the set of theorems generated is different from the set of theorems generated by classical logic. The set of theorems of a deviant logic can differ in any possible way from classical logic's set of theorems: as a proper subset, superset, or fully exclusive set. A notable example of this is the trivalent logic developed by Polish logician and mathematician Jan Łukasiewicz. Under this system, any theorem necessarily dependent on classical logic's principle of bivalence would fail to be valid. The term ''deviant logic'' first appears in Chapter 6 of Willard Van Orman Quine's ''Philosophy of Logic'', New Jersey: Prentice Hall (1970), which is cited by Haack on p. 15 of ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Quantifier (logic)
In logic, a quantifier is an operator that specifies how many individuals in the domain of discourse satisfy an open formula. For instance, the universal quantifier \forall in the first-order formula \forall x P(x) expresses that everything in the domain satisfies the property denoted by P. On the other hand, the existential quantifier \exists in the formula \exists x P(x) expresses that there exists something in the domain which satisfies that property. A formula where a quantifier takes widest scope is called a quantified formula. A quantified formula must contain a bound variable and a subformula specifying a property of the referent of that variable. The most commonly used quantifiers are \forall and \exists. These quantifiers are standardly defined as duals; in classical logic: each can be defined in terms of the other using negation. They can also be used to define more complex quantifiers, as in the formula \neg \exists x P(x) which expresses that nothing has ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Higher-order Logic
In mathematics and logic, a higher-order logic (abbreviated HOL) is a form of logic that is distinguished from first-order logic by additional quantifiers and, sometimes, stronger semantics. Higher-order logics with their standard semantics are more expressive, but their model-theoretic properties are less well-behaved than those of first-order logic. The term "higher-order logic" is commonly used to mean higher-order simple predicate logic. Here "simple" indicates that the underlying type theory is the ''theory of simple types'', also called the ''simple theory of types''. Leon Chwistek and Frank P. Ramsey proposed this as a simplification of ''ramified theory of types'' specified in the '' Principia Mathematica'' by Alfred North Whitehead and Bertrand Russell. ''Simple types'' is sometimes also meant to exclude polymorphic and dependent types. Quantification scope First-order logic quantifies only variables that range over individuals; '' second-order logic'', also qua ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Mental State
A mental state, or a mental property, is a state of mind of a person. Mental states comprise a diverse class, including perception, pain/pleasure experience, belief, desire, intention, emotion, and memory. There is controversy concerning the exact definition of the term. According to ''Epistemology, epistemic approaches'', the essential mark of mental states is that their subject has privileged epistemic access while others can only infer their existence from outward signs. ''Consciousness, Consciousness-based approaches'' hold that all mental states are either conscious themselves or stand in the right relation to conscious states. ''Intentionality, Intentionality-based approaches'', on the other hand, see the power of minds to refer to objects and represent the World#Philosophy of mind, world as the mark of the mental. According to ''Functionalism (philosophy of mind), functionalist approaches'', mental states are defined in terms of their role in the causal network independent of ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
