SMS Seydlitz was a 24,988 metric tons (24,593 long tons; 27,545 short
tons) battlecruiser of the Imperial German Navy, built in
Hamburg.[a][b] She was ordered in 1910 and commissioned in May 1913,
the fourth battlecruiser built for the High Seas Fleet. She was named
after Friedrich Wilhelm von Seydlitz, a Prussian general during the
reign of King
Frederick the Great
Frederick the Great and the Seven Years' War.
Seydlitz represented the culmination of the first generation of German
battlecruisers, which had started with the Von der Tann in 1906 and
continued with the pair of Moltke-class battlecruisers ordered in 1907
and 1908. Seydlitz featured several incremental improvements over the
preceding designs, including a redesigned propulsion system and an
improved armor layout. The ship was also significantly larger than her
predecessors—she was approximately 3,000 metric tons heavier
than the Moltke-class ships.
Seydlitz participated in many of the large fleet actions during the
First World War, including the battles of
Dogger Bank and Jutland in
the North Sea. The ship suffered severe damage during both
engagements; during the Battle of Dogger Bank, a 13.5 in
(34.3 cm) shell from the British battlecruiser Lion struck
Seydlitz's rearmost turret and nearly caused a magazine explosion that
could have destroyed the ship. At the
Battle of Jutland
Battle of Jutland she was hit 21
times by heavy caliber shells, one of which penetrated the working
chamber of the aft superfiring turret. Although the resulting fire
destroyed the turret, the safety measures imposed after the battle of
Dogger Bank prevented a catastrophe. The ship was also hit by a
torpedo during the battle, causing her to take in over
5,300 metric tons of water and her freeboard was reduced to
2.5 m. She had to be lightened significantly to permit her
crossing of the Jade Bar. The ship inflicted severe damage on her
British opponents as well; early in the battle, salvos from both
Seydlitz and Derfflinger destroyed the battlecruiser Queen Mary in
Seydlitz saw limited action in the Baltic Sea, when she provided
screening for the German flotilla that at Battle of the Gulf of Riga
attempted to clear the gulf in 1915. As with the rest of the German
battlecruisers that survived the war, the ship was interned in Scapa
Flow in 1918. The ship, along with the rest of the High Seas Fleet,
was scuttled in June 1919, to prevent her seizure by the British Royal
Navy. She was raised on 2 November 1928 and scrapped by 1930 in
2.1 General characteristics
3 Service history
3.1 World War I
3.1.1 Battle of Heligoland Bight
3.1.2 Bombardment of Yarmouth
3.1.3 Bombardment of Scarborough, Hartlepool, and Whitby
3.1.4 Battle of Dogger Bank
3.1.5 Battle of the Gulf of Riga
3.1.6 Bombardment of Yarmouth and Lowestoft
3.1.7 Battle of Jutland
3.1.8 Later operations
6 External links
Seydlitz in the floating dry dock at Kiel, before the war
Despite the success of the previous German battlecruisers
designs—those of Von der Tann and the Moltke class—there was still
significant debate as to how new ships of the type were to be
designed. In 1909, the
Reichsmarineamt (Navy Department) requested
Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz, the State Secretary for the navy, to
provide them with the improvements that would be necessary for the
next battlecruiser design. Tirpitz continued to push for the use of
battlecruisers solely as fleet scouts and to destroy enemy cruisers,
along the lines of the battlecruisers employed by the British Royal
Navy. The Kaiser, Wilhelm II, and the majority of the Navy Department
argued that due to Germany's numerical inferiority compared to the
Royal Navy, the ships would also have to fight in the line of battle.
This necessitated much heavier armor protection than that afforded to
the Royal Navy's battlecruiser designs. Ultimately, the Kaiser and the
Navy Department won the debate, and the battlecruiser for the
1909–1910 building year would continue in the pattern of the
previous Von der Tann and Moltke-class designs.
Financial constraints meant that there would have to be a trade-off
between speed, battle capabilities, and displacement. The initial
design specifications mandated that speed was to have been at least as
high as with the Moltke class, and that the ship was to have been
armed with either eight 305 mm (12.0 in) guns or ten
280 mm (11.0 in) guns. The design staff considered triple
turrets, but these were discarded when it was decided that the
standard 280 mm twin turret was sufficient.
In August 1909, the Reichstag stated that it would tolerate no
increases in cost over the Moltke-class battlecruisers, and so for a
time, the Navy Department considered shelving the new design and
instead to build a third Moltke-class ship. Admiral Tirpitz was able
to negotiate a discount on armor plate from both
Krupp and Dillingen;
Tirpitz also pressured the ship's builder, Blohm & Voss, for a
discount. These cost reductions freed up sufficient funds to make some
material improvements to the design. On 27 January 1910, the Kaiser
approved the design for the new ship, ordered under the provisional
name "Cruiser J".
Seydlitz, drawn in her 1916 configuration
Seydlitz was 200 meters (656 ft 2 in) long at the waterline,
and 200.6 m (658 ft 2 in) overall. The ship had a beam
of 28.5 m (93 ft 6 in), which was increased to
28.8 m (94 ft 6 in) with anti-torpedo nets equipped.
She had a draft of 9.29 m (30 ft 6 in) forward and
9.09 m (29 ft 10 in) aft. Seydlitz displaced 24,988
tonnes (24,593 long tons) as designed, and carrying a full load, the
ship displaced 28,550 tonnes (28,100 long tons). Seydlitz had a double
bottom for 76 percent of the length of the hull. The ship
carried a number of smaller boats, including one picket boat, three
barges, two launches, two yawls, and two dinghies. Seydlitz was
described as having been a good sea boat with gentle motion. The ship
lost up to 60 percent of her speed at a hard rudder, and would
heel over to 9 degrees. The ship had a standard complement of 43
officers and 1025 men, and when serving as the flagship of I Scouting
Group , she was manned by an additional 13 officers and 62 men.
Seydlitz's steam plant consisted of 27 Schulz-Thornycroft small-tube
boilers with 52 fire boxes—2 fire boxes per boiler—divided into
three engine rooms. These powered two sets of Parsons direct-drive
turbines. Each set consisted of a high-pressure outboard turbine which
exhausted into a low-pressure inboard turbine. Each turbine drove a
3-bladed screw that was 3.88 m (12.7 ft) in diameter.
Steering was controlled by tandem rudders. The engines were
designed to produce 62,138 shp (46,336 kW) and a top speed
of 26.5 knots (49.1 km/h; 30.5 mph). Using forced draft on
trials, the engines provided up to 88,510 shp (66,002 kW)
and a top speed of 28.1 knots (52.0 km/h; 32.3 mph). The
ship carried up to 3,600 tonnes (3,500 long tons) of coal. With full
fuel stores, Seydlitz could steam at a cruising speed of 14 knots
(26 km/h; 16 mph) for 4,200 nautical miles (7,800 km;
4,800 mi). Electrical power was provided by six turbo
generators that produced 1,800 kW at 220 V.
Seydlitz steaming into Scapa Flow
Seydlitz mounted a nearly identical main battery to that of the
preceding Moltke-class ships—ten 28 cm (11 in) SK L/50
guns[c] in five twin turrets. The guns were arranged similarly as
well, with one turret fore, two staggered wing turrets, and two
super-firing turrets aft. They were placed in newer Drh. L C/1910
mountings, which enabled depression of the guns down to
−8 degrees and elevation to 13.5 degrees—the same range
of motion of the earlier Drh. L C/1908 turrets. At 13.5 degrees,
the guns could be fired to 18,100 m (19,800 yd). In 1916, as
with Moltke, Seydlitz had her main turrets modified to allow for
elevation up to 16 degrees, for a maximum range of 19,100 m
(20,900 yd). The fore and aft guns were able to train
approximately 150 degrees in both directions from the centerline.
The two staggered wing turrets were able to train only 80 degrees
in both directions from the perpendicular. The main battery was
supplied with 87 armor-piercing rounds per gun, for a total of 870
shells. In addition to the 666 lb (302 kg) shell, each
gun chambered a 57 lb (26 kg) fore propellant charge in a
silk bag and a 174 lb (79 kg) main charge in a brass case.
The guns fired the shells at a muzzle velocity of 2,887 ft
(880 m) per second.
Seydlitz carried a similar secondary battery to the preceding
Moltke-class design. The ship mounted twelve 15 cm (5.9 in)
SK L/45 quick-firing guns in single casemates along the center of the
ship. These guns could hit targets out to a distance of 13,500 m
(14,800 yd), and after the 1916 refit, the range was extended to
16,800 m (18,400 yd). The 15 cm guns had a total of
1,920 shells, with 160 rounds for each gun. The ship was also armed
with twelve 8.8 cm (3.5 in) SK L/45 quick-firing guns, which
were mounted in casemates as well. Two of these guns were removed in
1916 and replaced with high-angle 8.8 cm Flak L/45 guns. As was
customary for all German capital ships of the time, Seydlitz was
equipped with four submerged torpedo tubes. The ship mounted one tube
in the bow, one in the stern, and two on the sides of the vessel. The
weapons were 50 cm (19.7 in) in diameter, and a total of 11
torpedoes were stored.
As was standard for German warships of the period, Seydlitz used Krupp
cemented and nickel steel for her armor plating. The ship had an
armored belt that was 300 mm (12 in) thick at its strongest
area in the citadel, and tapered down to 100 mm (3.9 in) in
the bow and stern. The main belt was reinforced by a torpedo bulkhead
that was 50 mm (2.0 in) thick. The forward conning tower had
350 mm (14 in) of armor on the sides, and a 200 mm
(7.9 in) thick roof. The turrets were protected by 250 mm
(9.8 in) on the sides and armor ranging in thickness from
70–100 mm (2.8–3.9 in) on the turret roofs. The
casemates had lighter armor protection, with 150 mm (5.9 in)
on the sides and 35 mm (1.4 in) roofs. The deck armor ranged
in thickness, depending on the area being protected. In the more vital
areas, the deck armor was 80 mm (3.1 in) thick, while less
important areas of the ship were covered by only 30 mm
(1.2 in). A 50 mm (2.0 in) belt of sloping armor was
placed under the main deck armor. The turret barbettes were protected
by plating 230 mm (9.1 in) thick. The portions of the
barbettes that were behind the main belt were thinner to save weight,
which was a practice employed on most German and British ships of the
Seydlitz moored in harbor, c. 1914–1916
Seydlitz was launched on 30 March 1912, and was christened by General
der Kavallerie Karl Wilhelm Heinrich von Kleist. On 22 May 1913 the
ship was commissioned into the German fleet, manned by the crew of the
old armored cruiser Yorck, which had been recently transferred to the
reserve fleet. After trials, Seydlitz joined the rest of the High
Seas Fleet for maneuvers off Helgoland.
Konteradmiral (Rear Admiral)
Franz von Hipper, the commander of the I Scouting Group, raised his
flag in the ship on 23 June 1914. The ship served as Hipper's flagship
until 26 October 1917.
World War I
Battle of Heligoland Bight
Main article: Battle of Heligoland (1914)
Shortly after the outbreak of World War I, a brief engagement between
German light cruisers and a raiding force of British cruisers and
battlecruisers took place on 28 August 1914. During the morning,
British cruisers from the
Harwich Force attacked the German destroyers
patrolling the Heligoland Bight. Six German light cruisers—Cöln,
Strassburg, Stettin, Frauenlob, Stralsund, and Ariadne—responded to
the attack and inflicted serious damage to the British raiders. The
arrival at approximately 13:37 of the British 1st Battlecruiser
Squadron, under the command of Vice Admiral David Beatty, quickly put
the German ships at a disadvantage.
Along with the rest of the
I Scouting Group
I Scouting Group battlecruisers, Seydlitz
was stationed in the
Wilhelmshaven Roads on the morning of the battle.
By 08:50, Hipper had requested permission from Admiral Friedrich von
Ingenohl, the commander in chief of the High Seas Fleet, to send his
ships to relieve the beleaguered German cruisers. The
battlecruisers Von der Tann and Moltke were ready to sail by 12:10,
but the low tide prevented the ships from being able to pass over the
sand bar at the mouth of the
Jade Estuary safely. At 14:10, Moltke and
Von der Tann were able to cross the Jade bar; Hipper ordered the
German light cruisers to fall back to his ships, while Hipper himself
was about an hour behind in Seydlitz. At 14:25, the remaining light
cruisers—Strassburg, Stettin, Frauenlob, Stralsund, and
Ariadne—rendezvoused with the battlecruisers. Seydlitz arrived
on the scene by 15:10, while Ariadne succumbed to battle damage and
sank. Hipper ventured forth cautiously to search for the two missing
light cruisers, Mainz and Cöln, which had already sunk. By 16:00, the
German flotilla turned around to return to the Jade Estuary, arriving
at approximately 20:23.
Bombardment of Yarmouth
Main article: Raid on Yarmouth
On 2 November 1914, Seydlitz, followed by Moltke, Von der Tann, and
the armored cruiser Blücher, along with four light cruisers, left the
Jade Estuary and steamed towards the English coast. The flotilla
Great Yarmouth at daybreak the following morning and
bombarded the port, while the light cruiser Stralsund laid a
minefield. The British submarine D5 responded to the bombardment, but
struck one of the mines laid by Stralsund and sank. Shortly
thereafter, Hipper ordered his ships to turn back to German waters.
While Hipper's ships were returning to German waters, a heavy fog
covered the Heligoland Bight, so the ships were ordered to halt until
visibility improved so they could safely navigate the defensive
minefields. The armored cruiser Yorck made a navigational error that
led the ship into one of the German minefields. Yorck struck two mines
and quickly sank; the coastal defense ship Hagen was able to save 127
men of the crew.
Bombardment of Scarborough, Hartlepool, and Whitby
Main article: Raid on Scarborough, Hartlepool and Whitby
Ingenohl decided that another raid on the English coast should to be
carried out in the hopes of luring a portion of the
Grand Fleet into
combat where it could be destroyed. At 03:20 on 15 December,
Seydlitz, Moltke, Von der Tann, the new battlecruiser Derfflinger, and
Blücher, along with the light cruisers Kolberg, Strassburg,
Stralsund, and Graudenz, and two squadrons of torpedo boats left the
Jade. The ships sailed north past the island of Heligoland, until
they reached the Horns Reef lighthouse, at which point the ships
turned west towards Scarborough. Twelve hours after Hipper left the
Jade, the High Seas Fleet, consisting of 14 dreadnoughts and 8
pre-dreadnoughts and a screening force of 2 armored cruisers, 7 light
cruisers, and 54 torpedo boats, departed to provide distant cover.
Seydlitz with a zeppelin overhead
On 26 August 1914, the German light cruiser Magdeburg had run aground
in the Gulf of Finland; the wreck was captured by the Russian navy,
which found code books used by the German navy, along with
navigational charts for the North Sea. These documents were then
passed on to the Royal Navy.
Room 40 began decrypting German signals,
and on 14 December, intercepted messages relating to the plan to
bombard Scarborough. The exact details of the plan were unknown,
and it was assumed that the
High Seas Fleet
High Seas Fleet would remain safely in
port, as in the previous bombardment. Beatty's four battlecruisers,
supported by the 3rd Cruiser Squadron and the 1st Light Cruiser
Squadron, along with the 2nd Battle Squadron's six dreadnoughts, were
to ambush Hipper's battlecruisers.
During the night of 15 December, the main body of the High Seas Fleet
encountered British destroyers. Fearing the prospect of a nighttime
torpedo attack, Ingenohl ordered the ships to retreat. Hipper was
unaware of Ingenohl's reversal, and so he continued with the
bombardment. Upon reaching the British coast, Hipper's battlecruisers
split into two groups. Seydlitz, Moltke, and Blücher went north to
shell Hartlepool, while Von der Tann and Derfflinger went south to
shell Scarborough and Whitby. During the bombardment of
Hartlepool, Seydlitz was hit three times and Blücher was hit six
times by the coastal battery. Seydlitz suffered only minimal damage,
and no casualties. By 09:45 on the 16th, the two groups had
reassembled, and they began to retreat eastward.
The High Seas Fleet's disposition on the morning of 16 December
By this time, Beatty's battlecruisers were in position to block
Hipper's chosen egress route, while other forces were en route to
complete the encirclement. At 12:25, the light cruisers of the
II Scouting Group began to pass through the British forces
searching for Hipper. One of the cruisers in the 2nd Light Cruiser
Squadron spotted Stralsund and signaled a report to Beatty. At 12:30,
Beatty turned his battlecruisers towards the German ships. Beatty
presumed that the German cruisers were the advance screen for Hipper's
ships, but the battlecruisers were some 50 km (27 nmi)
ahead. The 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron, which had been screening
for Beatty's ships, detached to pursue the German cruisers, but a
misinterpreted signal from the British battlecruisers sent them back
to their screening positions.[d] This confusion allowed the German
light cruisers to escape and alerted Hipper to the location of the
British battlecruisers. The German battlecruisers wheeled to the
northeast of the British forces and made good their escape.
Both the British and the Germans were disappointed that they failed to
effectively engage their opponents. Ingenohl's reputation suffered
greatly as a result of his timidity. The captain of the Moltke was
furious; he stated that Ingenohl had turned back "because he was
afraid of eleven British destroyers which could have been eliminated
... under the present leadership we will accomplish nothing." The
official German history criticized Ingenohl for failing to use his
light forces to determine the size of the British fleet, stating: "He
decided on a measure which not only seriously jeopardized his advance
forces off the English coast but also deprived the German Fleet of a
signal and certain victory."
Battle of Dogger Bank
Main article: Battle of
Dogger Bank (1915)
In early January 1915, it became known that British ships were
conducting reconnaissance in the
Dogger Bank area. Ingenohl was
initially reluctant to attempt to destroy these forces, because the I
Scouting Group was temporarily weakened while Von der Tann was in
drydock for periodic maintenance.
Konteradmiral Richard Eckermann, the
Chief of Staff of the High Seas Fleet, insisted on the operation, and
so Ingenohl relented and ordered Hipper to take his battlecruisers to
the Dogger Bank. On 23 January, Hipper sortied, with Seydlitz in
the lead, followed by Moltke, Derfflinger, and Blücher, along with
the light cruisers Graudenz, Rostock, Stralsund, and Kolberg and 19
torpedo boats from V Flotilla and II and XVIII Half-Flotillas.
Graudenz and Stralsund were assigned to the forward screen, while
Kolberg and Rostock were assigned to the starboard and port,
respectively. Each light cruiser had a half-flotilla of torpedo boats
Again, interception and decryption of German wireless signals played
an important role. Although they were unaware of the exact plans, the
Room 40 were able to deduce that Hipper would be
conducting an operation in the
Dogger Bank area. To counter it,
Battlecruiser Squadron, Rear Admiral Archibald Moore's
Battlecruiser Squadron and Commodore William Goodenough's 2nd
Light Cruiser Squadron were to rendezvous with Commodore Reginald
Harwich Force at 8:00 on 24 January, approximately
30 nmi (56 km) north of the Dogger Bank. At 08:14,
Kolberg spotted the light cruiser Aurora and several destroyers from
the Harwich Force. Aurora challenged Kolberg with a search light,
at which point Kolberg attacked Aurora and scored two hits. Aurora
returned fire and scored two hits on Kolberg in retaliation. Hipper
immediately turned his battlecruisers towards the gunfire, when,
almost simultaneously, Stralsund spotted a large amount of smoke to
the northwest of her position. This was identified as a number of
large British warships steaming towards Hipper's ships.
Hipper turned south to flee, but was limited to 23 knots
(43 km/h), which was the maximum speed of the older armored
cruiser Blücher. The pursuing British battlecruisers were steaming at
27 knots (50 km/h), and quickly caught up to the German ships. At
09:52, Lion opened fire on Blücher from a range of approximately
20,000 yards (18,000 m); shortly thereafter, Queen Mary and Tiger
began firing as well. At 10:09, the British guns made their first
hit on Blücher. Two minutes later, the German ships began returning
fire, primarily concentrating on Lion, from a range of 18,000 yards
(16,000 m). At 10:28, Lion was struck on the waterline, which
tore a hole in the side of the ship and flooded a coal bunker. At
10:30, New Zealand, the fourth ship in Beatty's line, came within
range of Blücher and opened fire. By 10:35, the range had closed to
17,500 yards (16,000 m), at which point the entire German line
was within the effective range of the British ships. Beatty ordered
his battlecruisers to engage their German counterparts.[e] Confusion
aboard Tiger led the captain to believe he was to fire on Seydlitz,
which left Moltke able to fire without distraction.
Seydlitz was struck in her forecastle at 10:25, by a 13.5 in
(343 mm) shell from Lion, but this hit did minor damage. At
10:40, Lion hit Seydlitz with another 13.5 in shell, which holed
the deck and penetrated the rear barbette. The shell itself failed to
enter the barbette, but the explosion flashed into the working chamber
and detonated the propellant charges inside.
In the reloading chamber, where the shell penetrated, part of the
charge in readiness for loading was set on fire. The flames rose high
up into the turret and down into the ammunition chamber, and thence
through a connecting door, usually kept shut, through which men from
the ammunition chamber tried to escape into the fore turret. The
flames thus made their way through to the other ammunition chamber and
thence up to the second turret, and from this cause the entire guns'
crews of both turrets perished very quickly. The flames rose above the
turrets as high as a house.
The explosion killed 159 men, and destroyed both of the rear turrets.
The fire was prevented from spreading to the shell magazines, which
could have destroyed the ship, by the quick action of the executive
officer, who ordered both magazines be flooded.[f] The Pumpenmeister
Wilhelm Heidkamp was severely injured when he turned the red-hot
valves to flood the magazines. At 11:01, Seydlitz struck back at
Lion, and with a single 28 cm shell, knocked out two of Lion's
engines. Shortly thereafter, a pair of 30.5 cm shells fired by
Derfflinger struck Lion, one at the waterline. The penetration allowed
water to enter the port feed tank—this hit eventually crippled Lion,
the sea water contamination forced the ship's crew to shut down the
port engine. At 11:25, Seydlitz was struck on her armored belt
amidships by a third and final shell, which did little damage.
By this time, Blücher was severely damaged after having been pounded
by heavy shells. The chase ended when there were several reports of
U-boats ahead of the British ships; Beatty quickly ordered evasive
maneuvers, which allowed the German ships to increase the distance to
their pursuers. At this time, Lion's last operational dynamo
failed, which dropped her speed to 15 knots (28 km/h). Beatty, in
the stricken Lion, ordered the remaining battlecruisers to "Engage the
enemy's rear," but signal confusion caused the ships to solely target
Blücher, allowing Moltke, Seydlitz, and Derfflinger to escape. By
the time Beatty regained control over his ships, after having boarded
Princess Royal, the German ships had too far a lead for the British to
catch them; at 13:50, he broke off the chase.
Seydlitz was repaired at the Kaiserliche Werft (Imperial Dockyard) in
Wilhelmshaven from 25 January to 31 March 1915, after which she
rejoined the fleet.
Battle of the Gulf of Riga
Main article: Battle of the Gulf of Riga
On 3 August 1915, Seydlitz, Moltke, and Von der Tann were transferred
to the Baltic with I Reconnaissance Group (AG) to participate in a
planned foray into the Riga Gulf. The intention was to destroy the
Russian naval forces in the area, including the pre-dreadnought Slava,
and to use the minelayer Deutschland to block the entrance to Moon
Sound with naval mines. The German forces, under the command of
Hipper, included the four Nassau and four Helgoland-class battleships,
the battlecruisers Seydlitz, Moltke, and Von der Tann, and a number of
smaller craft. Throughout the operation, Seydlitz and the other
two battlecruisers remained in the Baltic and provided cover for the
assault into the Gulf of Riga.
Following the operation, Seydlitz and the other heavy units of the
High Seas Fleet
High Seas Fleet returned to the North Sea. On 11–12 September,
Seydlitz and the rest of the
I Scouting Group
I Scouting Group covered a minefield
laying operation off Terschelling. On 24 November, the ship ran
aground in the Kaiser Wilhelm Canal, but was quickly refloated. On 4
December, while exiting the Kaiser Wilhelm Canal, Seydlitz became
entangled in one of the net barriers. Divers had to remove the tangled
nets from the starboard screws.
Bombardment of Yarmouth and Lowestoft
Main article: Bombardment of Yarmouth and Lowestoft
On 24–25 April 1916, the
I Scouting Group
I Scouting Group undertook another
operation to bombard the English coast, this time, the towns of
Yarmouth and Lowestoft. Hipper was on sick leave, so the German ships
were under the command of
Konteradmiral Friedrich Boedicker, who flew
his flag in Seydlitz. The German battlecruisers Derfflinger, Lützow,
Moltke, Seydlitz and Von der Tann left the
Jade Estuary at 10:55 on 24
April, and were supported by a screening force of 6 light cruisers and
two torpedo boat flotillas. The heavy units of the High Seas Fleet
sailed at 13:40, with the objective to provide distant support for
Boedicker's ships. The British Admiralty was made aware of the German
sortie through the interception of German wireless signals, and
Grand Fleet at 15:50.
By 14:00, Boedicker's ships had reached a position off Norderney, at
which point he turned his ships northward to avoid the Dutch observers
on the island of Terschelling. At 15:38, Seydlitz struck a mine, which
tore a 15 m (50-foot) hole in her hull, just abaft of the
starboard broadside torpedo tube. 11 men were killed and 1,400 short
tons (1,200 long tons) of water entered the ship. The ship's draft
increased 1.4 metres (4.6 ft) at the bow of the ship.
Seydlitz turned back with the screen of light cruisers at a speed of
15 knots (28 km/h). The four remaining battlecruisers turned
south immediately in the direction of
Norderney to avoid further mine
damage. By 16:00, Seydlitz was clear of imminent danger, so the ship
stopped to allow Boedicker to disembark. The torpedo boat V28 brought
Boedicker to Lützow, and the operation continued as planned. After
Boedicker departed the ship, Seydlitz, escorted by a pair of torpedo
boats, withdrew southward to the Jade. She was out of service for
over a month for repair work due to the mine damage.
Battle of Jutland
Maps showing the maneuvers of the British (blue) and German (red)
fleets on 31 May – 1 June 1916
Main article: Battle of Jutland
Almost immediately after the Lowestoft raid,
Reinhard Scheer began planning another foray into the North
Sea. He had initially intended to launch the operation in mid-May, but
the mine damage to Seydlitz had proved difficult to repair—Scheer
was unwilling to embark on a major raid without his battlecruiser
forces at full strength. On May 22, the
reported the ship to be fit for duty, but tests carried out that night
showed that the broadside torpedo flat that had been damaged by the
mine was still not watertight, and there were still leaks in the fore
and aft transverse bulkheads. Further repairs were necessary, and so
the operation was postponed another week, by which time the
Wilhelmshaven dockyard assured Scheer that the ship would be
ready. At noon on 28 May, the repairs to Seydlitz were finally
completed, and the ship returned to the I Scouting Group.
On the night of 30 May 1916, Seydlitz and the other four
battlecruisers of the
I Scouting Group
I Scouting Group lay in anchor in the Jade
roadstead. The following morning, at 02:00 CET,[g] the ships
slowly steamed out towards the
Skagerrak at a speed of 16 knots
(30 km/h). By this time, Hipper had transferred his flag from
Seydlitz to the newer battlecruiser Lützow. Seydlitz took her place
in the center of the line, to the rear of Derfflinger and ahead of
Moltke. The II Scouting Group, consisting of the light cruisers
Frankfurt, Boedicker's flagship, Wiesbaden, Pillau, and Elbing, and 30
torpedo boats of the II, VI, and IX Flotillas, accompanied Hipper's
An hour and a half later, the
High Seas Fleet
High Seas Fleet under the command of
Scheer left the Jade; the force was composed of 16 dreadnoughts.[h]
High Seas Fleet
High Seas Fleet was accompanied by the IV Scouting Group, composed
of the light cruisers Stettin, München, Hamburg, Frauenlob, and
Stuttgart, and 31 torpedo boats of the I, III, V, and VII Flotillas,
led by the light cruiser Rostock. The six pre-dreadnoughts of the II
Battle Squadron had departed from the Elbe roads at 02:45, and
rendezvoused with the battle fleet at 5:00.
Shortly before 16:00, Hipper's force encountered Beatty's
battlecruiser squadron. The German ships were the first to open fire,
at a range of approximately 15,000 yards (14,000 m). The
British rangefinders had misread the range to their German targets,
and so the first salvos fired by the British ships fell a mile past
the German battlecruisers. As the two lines of battlecruisers deployed
to engage each other, Seydlitz began to duel with her opposite in the
British line, Queen Mary. By 16:54, the range between the ships
decreased to 12,900 yards (11,800 m), which enabled Seydlitz's
secondary battery to enter the fray. She was close enough to the ships
of the British 9th and 10th Destroyer Flotillas that her secondary
guns could effectively engage them. The other four German
battlecruisers employed their secondary battery against the British
Between 16:55 and 16:57, Seydlitz was struck by two heavy caliber
shells from Queen Mary. The first shell penetrated the side of the
ship five feet above the main battery deck, and caused a number of
small fires. The second shell penetrated the barbette of the aft
superfiring turret. Four propellant charges were ignited in the
working chamber; the resulting fire flashed up into the turret and
down to the magazine. The anti-flash precautions that had been put in
place after the explosion at
Dogger Bank prevented any further
propellant explosions. Regardless, the turret was destroyed and most
of the gun crew had been killed in the blaze.
Queen Mary explodes after gunfire from Seydlitz and Derfflinger
By 17:25, the British battlecruisers were taking a severe battering
from their German opponents. Indefatigable had been destroyed by a
salvo from Von der Tann approximately 20 minutes before, and Beatty
sought to turn his ships away by 2 points in order to regroup, while
the Queen Elizabeth-class battleships of the 5th Battle Squadron
arrived on the scene and provided covering fire. As the British
battlecruisers began to turn away, Seydlitz and Derfflinger were able
to concentrate their fire on Queen Mary. Witnesses reported at least 5
shells from two salvos hit the ship, which caused an intense explosion
that ripped the Queen Mary in half. Shortly after the destruction
of Queen Mary, both British and German destroyers attempted to make
torpedo attacks on the opposing lines. One British torpedo struck
Seydlitz at 17:57. The torpedo hit the ship directly below the fore
turret, slightly aft of where she had been mined the month before. The
explosion tore a hole 40 feet long by 13 feet wide (12 m × 4.0 m),
and caused a slight list. Despite the damage, the ship was still able
to maintain her top speed, and kept position in the line.
The leading ships of the German battle fleet had by 18:00 come within
effective range of the British ships, and had begun trading shots with
the British battlecruisers and Queen Elizabeth-class battleships.
Between 18:09 and 18:19, Seydlitz was hit by a 380 mm
(15 in) shell from either Barham or Valiant. This shell
struck the face of the port wing turret and disabled the guns. A
second 380 mm shell penetrated the already disabled aft
superfiring turret and detonated the cordite charges that had not
already burned. The ship also had two of her 150 mm guns disabled
from British gunfire, and the rear turret lost its right-hand gun.
As the evening wore on, visibility steadily decreased for the German
ships. Seydlitz's commander,
Kapitän zur See von Egidy, later
"Visibility had generally become unfavorable. There was a dense mist,
so that as a rule only the flashes of the enemy's guns, but not the
ships themselves, could be seen. Our distance had been reduced from
18,000 to 13,000 yards. From north-west to north-east we had before us
a hostile line firing its guns, though in the mist we could only
glimpse the flashes from time to time. It was a mighty and terrible
At around 19:00, Beatty's forces were nearing the main body of the
Grand Fleet, and to delay the discovery of the Grand Fleet's location
by the German fleet, he turned his ships towards the German line, in
order to force them to turn as well. This reduced the distance between
the British and German battlecruisers from 14,000 to 12,000 yards
(13,000 to 11,000 m). Visibility continued to favor the British,
and the German battlecruisers paid the price. Over the next several
minutes, Seydlitz was hit six times, primarily on the forward section
of the ship. A fire started under the ship's forecastle. The
smothering fire from Beatty's ships forced Hipper to temporarily
withdraw his battlecruisers to the southwest. As the ships
withdrew, Seydlitz began taking on more water, and the list to
starboard worsened. The ship was thoroughly flooded above the middle
deck in the fore compartments, and had nearly lost all buoyancy.
By 19:30, the High Seas Fleet, which was by that point pursuing the
British battlecruisers, had not yet encountered the Grand Fleet.
Scheer had been considering retiring his forces before darkness
exposed his ships to torpedo boat attack. He had not yet made a
decision when his leading battleships encountered the main body of the
Grand Fleet. This development made it impossible for Scheer to
retreat, for doing so would have sacrificed the slower pre-dreadnought
battleships of the II Battle Squadron, while using his dreadnoughts
and battlecruisers to cover their retreat would have subjected his
strongest ships to overwhelming British fire. Instead, Scheer
ordered his ships to turn 16 points to starboard, which would bring
the pre-dreadnoughts to the relative safety of the disengaged side of
the German battle line.
Seydlitz and the other battlecruisers followed the move,[i] which put
them astern of König. Hipper's badly battered ships gained a
temporary moment of respite, and uncertainty over the exact location
and course of Scheer's ships led Admiral Jellicoe to turn his ships
eastward, towards what he thought was the likely path of the German
retreat. The German fleet was instead sailing west, but Scheer
ordered a second 16-point turn, which reversed course and pointed his
ships at the center of the British fleet. The German fleet came
under intense fire from the British line, and Scheer sent Seydlitz,
Von der Tann, Moltke, and Derfflinger at high speed towards the
British fleet, in an attempt to disrupt their formation and gain time
for his main force to retreat. By 20:17, the German battlecruisers
had closed to within 7,700 yards (7,000 m) of Colossus, at which
point Scheer directed the ships to engage the lead ship of the British
line. Seydlitz managed to hit Colossus once, but caused only minor
damage to the ship's superstructure. Three minutes later, the
German battlecruisers turned in retreat, covered by a torpedo boat
Seydlitz; heavily damaged during the battle of Jutland and attempting
to limp home
A pause in the battle at dusk allowed Seydlitz and the other German
battlecruisers to cut away wreckage that interfered with the main
guns, extinguish fires, repair the fire control and signal equipment,
and ready the searchlights for nighttime action. During this
period, the German fleet reorganized into a well-ordered formation in
reverse order, when the German light forces encountered the British
screen shortly after 21:00. The renewed gunfire gained Beatty's
attention, so he turned his battlecruisers westward. At 21:09, he
sighted the German battlecruisers, and drew to within 8,500 yards
(7,800 m) before opening fire at 20:20. In the ensuing melee,
Seydlitz was hit several times; one shell struck the rear gun turret
and other hit the ship's bridge. The entire bridge crew was killed and
several men in the conning tower were wounded. The German ships
returned fire with every gun available, and at 21:32 hit both Lion and
Princess Royal in the darkness. The maneuvering of the German
battlecruisers forced the leading I Battle Squadron to turn westward
to avoid collision. This brought the pre-dreadnoughts of the II Battle
Squadron directly behind the battlecruisers, and prevented the British
ships from pursuing the German battlecruisers when they turned
southward. The British battlecruisers opened fire on the old
battleships; the German ships turned southwest to bring all of their
guns to bear against the British ships.
By 22:15, Hipper was finally able to transfer to Moltke, and then
ordered his ships to steam at 20 knots (37 km/h) towards the head
of the German line. Only Seydlitz and Moltke were in condition to
comply; Derfflinger and Von der Tann could make at most 18 knots
(33 km/h), and so these ships lagged behind. Seydlitz and Moltke
were in the process of steaming to the front of the line when the
ships passed close to Stettin, which forced the ship to drastically
slow down to avoid collision. This forced Frauenlob, Stuttgart, and
München to turn to port, which led them into contact with the 2nd
Light Cruiser Squadron; at a range of 800 yards (730 m), the
cruisers on both sides pummeled each other.
Konteradmiral Ludwig von
Reuter decided to attempt to lure the British cruisers towards Moltke
and Seydlitz. Nearly simultaneously, the heavily damaged British
cruisers broke off the attack. As the light cruisers were
disengaging, a torpedo fired by Southampton struck Frauenlob, and the
ship exploded. The German formation fell into disarray, and in the
confusion, Seydlitz lost sight of Moltke. The ship was no longer able
to keep up with Moltke's 22 knots, and so detached herself to
proceed to the Horns Reef lighthouse independently.
At 00:45, Seydlitz was attempting to thread her way through the
British fleet, but was sighted by the dreadnought Agincourt and noted
as a "ship or Destroyer". Agincourt's captain did not want to risk
giving away his ship's position, and so allowed her to pass. By
01:12, Seydlitz had managed to slip through the British fleet, and she
was able to head for the safety of Horns Reef. At approximately
03:40, she scraped over Horns Reef. Both of the ship's gyro-compasses
had failed, so the light cruiser Pillau was sent to guide the ship
home. By 15:30 on 1 June, Seydlitz was in critical condition; the bow
was nearly completely submerged, and the only buoyancy that remained
in the forward section of the ship was the broadside torpedo room.
Preparations were being made to evacuate the wounded crew when a pair
of pump steamers arrived on the scene. The ships were able to
stabilize Seydlitz's flooding, and the ship managed to limp back to
port. She reached the outer Jade river on the morning of 2 June, and
on 3 June the ship entered Entrance III of the
Wilhelmshaven Lock. At
most, Seydlitz had been flooded by 5,308 tonnes (5,224 long tons) of
A 28 cm gun barrel from Seydlitz damaged in the Battle of
Close to the end of the battle, at 03:55, Hipper transmitted a report
to Scheer informing him of the tremendous damage his ships had
suffered. By that time, Derfflinger and Von der Tann each had only two
guns in operation, Moltke was flooded with 1,000 tons of water,
and Seydlitz was severely damaged. Hipper reported: "I Scouting
Group was therefore no longer of any value for a serious engagement,
and was consequently directed to return to harbor by the
Commander-in-Chief, while he himself determined to await developments
off Horns Reef with the battlefleet."
During the course of the battle, Seydlitz was hit 21 times by
heavy-caliber shells, twice by secondary battery shells, and once by a
torpedo. The ship suffered a total of 98 of her crew killed and 55
wounded. Seydlitz herself fired 376 main battery shells and scored
approximately 10 hits.
On 15 June 1916, repair work to Seydlitz began in the Imperial
Dockyard in Wilhelmshaven, and continued until 1 October. The ship
then underwent individual training, and rejoined the fleet in
November. With his previous flagship Lützow at the bottom of the
North Sea, Hipper again raised his flag in Seydlitz. On 4 November,
Seydlitz and Moltke, along with the II Division, I Battle Squadron,
the III Battle Squadron, and the new battleship Bayern sailed to
Bovbjerg on the Danish coast, in order to retrieve the stranded
U-boats U-20 and U-30.
Late 1917 saw the
High Seas Fleet
High Seas Fleet beginning to conduct anti-convoy
raids in the
North Sea between Britain and Norway. In October and
December 1917, two British convoys to Norway were intercepted and
destroyed by German cruisers and destroyers, prompting Beatty, now the
Commander in Chief of the Grand Fleet, to detach several battleships
and battlecruisers to protect convoys. This presented to Scheer
the opportunity for which he had been waiting the entire war: the
chance to isolate and eliminate a portion of the Grand Fleet. At
05:00 on 23 April 1918, the
High Seas Fleet
High Seas Fleet left harbor with the
intention of intercepting one of the heavily escorted convoys.
Wireless radio traffic was kept to a minimum to prevent the British
from learning of the operation. By 14:10, the convoy had still not yet
been located, and so Scheer turned the
High Seas Fleet
High Seas Fleet back towards
Seydlitz, followed by the remaining five German battlecruisers,
Moltke, Hindenburg, Derfflinger, and Von der Tann steaming into
internment at Scapa Flow
Seydlitz capsized in Scapa Flow
Seydlitz was to have taken part in what would have amounted to the
"death ride" of the
High Seas Fleet
High Seas Fleet shortly before the end of World
War I. The bulk of the
High Seas Fleet
High Seas Fleet was to have sortied from their
Wilhelmshaven to engage the British Grand Fleet; Scheer—by
Großadmiral of the fleet—intended to inflict as much damage
as possible on the British navy, in order to retain a better
bargaining position for Germany, whatever the cost to the fleet.
While the fleet was consolidating in Wilhelmshaven, war-weary sailors
began deserting en masse. As Von der Tann and Derfflinger passed
through the locks that separated Wilhelmshaven's inner harbor and
roadstead, some 300 men from both ships climbed over the side and
On 24 October 1918, the order was given to sail from Wilhelmshaven.
Many of the war-weary sailors felt the operation would disrupt the
peace process and prolong the war. Starting on the night of 29
October, sailors on several battleships mutinied; three ships from the
III Squadron refused to weigh anchors, and acts of sabotage were
committed on board the battleships Thüringen and Helgoland. The
unrest ultimately forced Hipper and Scheer to cancel the
operation. Informed of the situation, the Kaiser stated "I no
longer have a navy." The
Wilhelmshaven mutiny spread to Kiel, and
fueled a larger German Revolution that continued after the end of the
war. Germany's military position was hopeless, and so Generals Paul
von Hindenburg and
Erich Ludendorff convinced the government to sign
the Armistice to end the war.
Following the capitulation of Germany in November 1918, most of the
High Seas Fleet, under the command of Reuter, were interned in the
British naval base in Scapa Flow. Prior to the departure of the
German fleet, Admiral
Adolf von Trotha made clear to Reuter that he
could not allow the Allies to seize the ships, under any
conditions. The fleet rendezvoused with the British light cruiser
Cardiff, which led the ships to the Allied fleet that was to escort
the Germans to Scapa Flow. The massive flotilla consisted of some 370
British, American, and French warships. Once the ships were
interned, their guns were disabled through the removal of their breech
blocks, and their crews were reduced to 200 officers and men.
The fleet remained in captivity during the negotiations that
ultimately produced the Treaty of Versailles. Reuter believed that the
British intended to seize the German ships on 21 June 1919, which was
the deadline for Germany to have signed the peace treaty. Unaware that
the deadline had been extended to the 23rd, Reuter ordered the ships
to be sunk at the next opportunity. On the morning of 21 June, the
British fleet left
Scapa Flow to conduct training maneuvers, and at
11:20 Reuter transmitted the order to his ships. Seydlitz slipped
beneath the surface at 13:50. On her side and on the bottom in twelve
fathoms of water the wreck was frequently mistaken for a small island,
and was sold in this condition as scrap to the salvage firm of Cox and
Danks, led by Ernest Cox, along with a battleship and twenty-six
destroyers. The ship was raised on 2 November 1928, and while still
inverted was towed south to be scrapped in
Rosyth by 1930. Seydlitz's
bell is on display at the Laboe Naval Memorial.
Salvaging Seydlitz also proved difficult, as the ship sank again
during the first attempt to raise her, wrecking most of the salvage
equipment. Undaunted, Cox tried again, ordering that when she was next
raised, news cameras would be there to capture him witnessing the
moment. The plan nearly backfired when Seydlitz was accidentally
refloated while Cox was holidaying in Switzerland. Cox told the
workers to sink her again, then returned to Britain to be present as
Seydlitz was duly refloated a third time.
One of the ship's 15 cm guns, which had been removed in 1916, was
later mounted aboard the commerce raider Kormoran during World War
^ "SMS" stands for "Seiner Majestät Schiff", or "His Majesty's Ship"
Alfred von Tirpitz
Alfred von Tirpitz referred to the ship as a large cruiser
(Großer Kreuzer) in his annual budgets in an attempt to reduce
opposition from the Reichstag; the ship was not referred to as
battlecruiser (Schlachtkreuzer) until after the war.
Imperial German Navy
Imperial German Navy gun nomenclature, "SK" (Schnelladekanone)
denotes that the gun is quick firing, while the L/50 denotes the
length of the gun. In this case, the L/50 gun is 50 caliber, meaning
that the gun is 50 times as long as it is in diameter.
^ Beatty had intended to retain only the two rearmost light cruisers
from Goodenough's squadron, but Nottingham's signalman misinterpreted
the signal, thinking that it was intended for the whole squadron, and
thus transmitted it to Goodenough, who ordered his ships back into
their screening positions ahead of Beatty's battlecruisers.
^ Thus, Lion on Seydlitz, Tiger on Moltke, Princess Royal on
Derfflinger, and New Zealand on Blücher.
^ The near destruction of Seydlitz revealed the dangers flash fires in
main battery turrets and their working chambers. Following an
investigation into the explosion, the German navy tightened ammunition
and propellant handling procedures, which to a large degree made it
unlikely that a flash fire could destroy a ship. The British navy was
unaware of these dangers, and so did not take similar measures, which
resulted in disastrous consequences for the British battlecruisers at
the Battle of Jutland, where three ships were destroyed by magazine
explosions. See: Tarrant, p. 40.
^ It should be noted that the times mentioned in this section are in
CET, which is congruent with the German perspective. This is one hour
ahead of GMT, the time zone commonly used in British works.
^ SMS König Albert was in dock at the time.
^ With the exception of Lützow, which had lost speed and was unable
to keep up.
^ a b Staff, p. 22.
^ a b Staff, p. 20.
^ a b Staff, p. 21.
^ a b Gröner, p. 55.
^ a b c d e f g h Gröner, p. 56.
^ a b NavWeaps.com (28 cm/50).
^ Staff, pp. 21–22.
^ a b c d Staff, p. 23.
^ Tarrant, p. 26.
^ Massie, p. 107.
^ Strachan, p. 417.
^ Massie, p. 114.
^ a b c Tarrant, p. 30.
^ a b c Tarrant, p. 31.
^ a b Tarrant, p. 32.
^ a b Tarrant, p. 33.
^ Scheer, p. 70.
^ a b c Tarrant, p. 34.
^ a b Tarrant, p. 35.
^ a b c d Tarrant, p. 36.
^ a b c Tarrant, p. 38.
^ a b c Tarrant, p. 39.
^ a b c Staff, p. 24.
^ Tarrant, p. 40.
^ Tarrant, pp. 40–41.
^ Tarrant, p. 41.
^ Tarrant, p. 42.
^ Halpern, p. 196.
^ a b c Tarrant, p. 52.
^ Tarrant, p. 53.
^ Tarrant, p. 55.
^ Tarrant, p. 58.
^ a b c d e Tarrant, p. 62.
^ Bennett, p. 183.
^ Tarrant, p. 90.
^ Tarrant, p. 92.
^ Tarrant, pp. 92–93.
^ Tarrant, pp. 100–101.
^ Tarrant, p. 113.
^ Tarrant, p. 118.
^ Tarrant, p. 119.
^ Tarrant, p. 122.
^ Tarrant, p. 126.
^ Tarrant, p. 137.
^ Tarrant, p. 150.
^ Tarrant, p. 152.
^ Tarrant, pp. 152–153.
^ Tarrant, pp. 155–156.
^ Tarrant, p. 163.
^ Tarrant, p. 165.
^ Tarrant, p. 173.
^ Tarrant, p. 179.
^ Tarrant, p. 170.
^ Tarrant, p. 181.
^ Tarrant, p. 188.
^ Tarrant, p. 193.
^ Tarrant, p. 194.
^ a b Tarrant, p. 195.
^ Tarrant, p. 213.
^ Tarrant, pp. 213–214.
^ a b Tarrant, p. 214.
^ Battle of Jutland: Official Despatches, p. 93.
^ Tarrant, p. 217.
^ a b Staff, p. 33.
^ a b Tarrant, p. 255.
^ Tarrant, p. 296.
^ Tarrant, p. 298.
^ Massie, p. 747.
^ a b Massie, p. 748.
^ a b Tarrant, pp. 280–281.
^ Massie, p. 775.
^ a b Tarrant, p. 282.
^ Herwig, p. 252.
^ Tarrant, pp. 281–282.
^ a b Herwig, p. 256.
^ Herwig, pp. 254–255.
^ Herwig, p. 255.
^ Fine, p. 130-138.
^ Frame, p. 46.
Battle of Jutland
Battle of Jutland 30th May to 1st June 1916: Official Despatches with
Appendices. London: H.M.S.O. 1920. OCLC 58965862.
Bennett, Geoffrey (2005). Naval Battles of the First World War.
London: Pen & Sword Military Classics.
ISBN 978-1-84415-300-8. OCLC 57750267.
Fine, John Christopher (2004). Lost on the Ocean Floor: Diving the
World's Ghost Ships. Naval Institute Press.
Frame, Tom (1993). HMAS Sydney: Loss and Controversy. Rydalmere, NSW:
Hodder & Stoughton. ISBN 0-340-58468-8.
Gröner, Erich (1990). German Warships: 1815–1945. Annapolis: Naval
Institute Press. ISBN 978-0-87021-790-6.
Halpern, Paul G. (1995). A Naval History of World War I. Annapolis:
Naval Institute Press. ISBN 978-1-55750-352-7.
Herwig, Holger (1998) . "Luxury" Fleet: The Imperial German Navy
1888–1918. Amherst, New York: Humanity Books.
ISBN 978-1-57392-286-9. OCLC 57239454.
Massie, Robert K. (2003). Castles of Steel. New York City: Ballantine
Books. ISBN 978-0-345-40878-5. OCLC 57134223.
Scheer, Reinhard (1920). Germany's
High Seas Fleet
High Seas Fleet in the World War.
Cassell and Company. OCLC 2765294.
Staff, Gary (2006). German Battlecruisers: 1914–1918. Oxford: Osprey
Books. ISBN 978-1-84603-009-3. OCLC 64555761.
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Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-926191-8.
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DiGiulian, Tony (24 April 2008). "German 28 cm/50 (11") SK L/50".
NavWeaps.com. Retrieved 24 April 2009.
Wikimedia Commons has media related to SMS Seydlitz.
Book: Battlecruisers of Germany
DreadnoughtProject.org three high resolution dockyard drawings.
Preceded by: Moltke class
Followed by: Derfflinger class
List of battlecruisers of Germany
German naval ship classes of World War I
L 20e αX
Kaiser Friedrich III
SMS Von der TannS
SMS Fürst BismarckS
SMS Prinz HeinrichS
SMS Kaiserin AugustaS
Large torpedo boats
Single ship of class
See also: List of ships of the Imperial German Navy
Blohm + Voss
Warships of World War I
SMS Von der Tann
Warships of World War II
Many Type VII, Type XVII, Type XXI and Type XXVI U-boats
Gorch Fock (1933)
USCGC Eagle (WIX-327)
Gorch Fock (1958)
Ocean liners and
other passenger ships
SS Cap Arcona
Deutsche Ost-Afrika Linie
Prinzessin Victoria Luise
MV Wilhelm Gustloff
MV Aurora (1955)
MV Explorer (2001)
Vasco da Gama (F330)
Blohm + Voss Aircraft and projects
Shipwrecks and maritime incidents in 1919
1 Jan: HMY Iolaire
21 Jan: UC-40
30 Jan: Nimrod
7 Feb: HMS Erin's Isle
8 Feb: U-16
10 Feb: UC-91
20 Feb: UC-71
22 Feb: U-21
7 Mar: HNoMS Thor
6 Apr: Vulkan
15 Apr: U-118
17 Apr: USS Freehold
27 Apr: USS Courtney, USS Otis W. Douglas
28 Apr: USS Gypsum Queen, USS James
April (unknown date): Borets za Svobodu
4 May: HMS Cupar
5 May: SMS Leipzig
2 Jun: Rucumilla
9 Jun: HMS L55
16 Jun: HMS Kinross
18 Jun: Oleg
21 Jun: SMS Bayern, SMS Bremse, SMS Brummer, SMS Cöln, SMS
Dresden, SMS Derfflinger, SMS Emden, SMS Friedrich der Grosse, SMS
G38, SMS G39, SMS G40, SMS Hindenburg, SMS Grosser Kurfürst, SMS
Kaiser, SMS Kaiserin, SMS Karlsruhe, SMS König,
SMS König Albert,
SMS Kronprinz Wilhelm, SMS Markgraf, SMS Moltke, SMS Prinzregent
Luitpold, SMS S36, SMS S50, Scuttling of the German fleet in Scapa
Flow, SMS Seydlitz, SMS V45, SMS V46, SMS Von der Tann
28 Jun: Duchess of Richmond
June (unknown date): Erinpura
27 Jul: USS May
30 Jul: USS G-2
13 Aug: Basilicata
18 Aug: Dvina
1 Sep: HMS Vittoria
4 Sep: HMS Verulam
8 Sep: Valbanera
9 Sep: USS St. Sebastian, USS SP-471
10 Sep: USS Coco, USS Katherine
K., USS Patrol No. 1, USS Sea Hawk
11 Sep: USS Helena I
16 Sep: HMS M25, HMS M27
29 Sep: ML-18, ML-62, ML-191, Ossifrage
30 Sep: August Helmerich
3 Oct: Frank O'Connor
7 Oct: Sizergh Castle
9 Oct: Daram
17 Oct: SMS Kaiser Franz Joseph I
18 Oct: HMS H41
31 Oct: Fazilka
22 Nov: Myron
12 Dec: USS Kerwood
18 Dec: Cufic
Unknown date: UB-14
1 Jan: USS Northern Pacific
1 Feb: USS Narragansett
28 Feb: RMS Aquitania
17 Apr: Saxonia
21 Jun: SMS Baden, SMS Emden, SMS Frankfurt, SMS Nürnberg
June (unknown date): USS West Grama
15 Jul: USS Edward Luckenbach
16 Jul: USS Flamingo
16 Sep: USS R-6
18 Oct: HMS Vulcan