President and General Secretary Xi Jinping
Vice-chairman of the Central Military Commission
Air Force General Xu Qiliang
Vice-chairman of the Central Military Commission
General Zhang Youxia
Minister of National Defense
General Wei Fenghe
Chief of the Joint Staff Department
General Li Zuocheng
Manpower
Military age
20+
Conscription
Compulsory by law, but usually not enforced
Active personnel
2,000,000 active (2018)
Reserve personnel
2,300,000 reserve (2018)[1]
Expenditures
Budget
US$175 billion (2018) (official budget)[2] (ranked 2nd)
Percent of GDP
1.5% (2018)
Related articles
History
History of the PLA
Modernization of the PLA
Historical Chinese wars and battles
List of wars the
People's Republic of China

People's Republic of China involved in
Ranks
Army ranks
Navy ranks
Air force ranks
People's Liberation Army
Simplified Chinese
中国人民解放军
Traditional Chinese
中國人民解放軍
Literal meaning
"Chinese People's Liberation Army"
Transcriptions
Standard Mandarin
Hanyu Pinyin
Zhōngguó Rénmín Jiěfàngjūn
Wade–Giles
Chung1-kuo2 Jen2-min2 Chieh3-fang4-chün1
IPA
[ʈʂʊ́ŋ.kwǒ ɻə̌n.mǐn tɕjè.fǎŋ.tɕýn]
Yue: Cantonese
Yale Romanization
Jūng-gwok Yàhn-màhn Gáai-fong-gwān
IPA
[tsóŋ.kʷɔ̄ːk̚ jɐ̏n.mɐ̏n kǎːi.fɔ̄ːŋ.kʷɐ́n]
Jyutping
Zung1-gwok3 Jan4-man4 Gaai2-fong3-gwan1
The Chinese
People's Liberation Army

People's Liberation Army (PLA) is the armed forces of the
People's Republic of China

People's Republic of China (PRC) and
Communist Party of China

Communist Party of China (CPC).
The PLA consists of five professional service branches: the Ground
Force, Navy, Air Force, Rocket Force, and the Strategic Support Force.
It also has a militia service branch, the PLA Militia.
The PLA is the world's largest military force, with a strength of
approximately 2,285,000 personnel, 0.18% of the country's population.
It is the fastest modernising military power in the world, with
significant defense projection capabilities. Recently, it has been
rapidly developing and commissioning new arsenals, with numerous
technological advancements and breakthroughs.[3] It boasts the second
largest defence budget in the world, although many authorities –
including
SIPRI

SIPRI and the
U.S. Department of Defense

U.S. Department of Defense – argue that
China

China does not report its real level of military spending, which is
allegedly much higher than the official budget.[4][5]
In September 2015, Xi Jinping, the General Secretary of the Communist
Party of
China

China and the commander-in-chief of the PLA, announced a
reduction of the number of military personnel by 300,000: from 2,3 to
2 million.[6] The PLA's insignia consists of a roundel with a red star
bearing the Chinese characters for Eight One, referring to the
Nanchang uprising

Nanchang uprising which began on August 1, 1927.
The PLA is under the command of the Central Military Commission (CMC)
of the CPC. It is legally obliged to follow the principle of civilian
control of the military, although in practical terms this principle
has been implemented in such a way as to ensure the PLA is under the
absolute control of the Communist Party of China. Its commander in
chief is the
Chairman of the Central Military Commission

Chairman of the Central Military Commission (usually the
General Secretary of the Communist Party of China). The Ministry of
National Defense, which operates under the State Council, does not
exercise any authority over the PLA and is far less powerful than the
CMC. A system of political officers embedded within the military
ensures party authority over the armed forces so that the primary role
of the Ministry of Defense is that of a liaison office with foreign
militaries rather than a commanding authority. The political and
military leadership have made a concerted effort to create a
professional military force, the duties of which are restricted to
national defence and to the provision of assistance in domestic
economic construction and emergency relief. This conception of the
role of the PLA requires the promotion of specialised officers who can
understand modern weaponry and handle combined arms operations. Units
around the country are assigned to one of five Theater commands by
geographical location.
Military service

Military service is compulsory by law; however, compulsory military
service in
China

China has never been enforced due to large numbers of
military and paramilitary personnel. In times of national emergency,
the
People's Armed Police
_cap_insignia.svg/500px-Chinese_People's_Armed_Police_Force_(CAPF)_cap_insignia.svg.png)
People's Armed Police and the
People's Liberation Army militia

People's Liberation Army militia act
as a reserve and support element for the PLAGF.
The PLA on 1 August 2017 marked the 90th year anniversary since its
establishment, before the big anniversary it mounted its biggest
parade yet and the first outside of Beijing, held in the Zhurihe
Training Base in the
Northern Theater Command

Northern Theater Command (within the Inner
Mongolia Autonomous Region), the first time it had ever been done to
mark PLA Day as past parades had already been on 1 October, National
Day of the PRC.
Contents
1 Mission statement
2 History
2.1 Second Sino-Japanese War
2.2 1950s, 1960s and 1970s
2.3 Since 1980
2.4 Peacekeeping operations
2.5 Notable events
3 Organization
3.1 National military command
3.2 Military leadership
3.3 Central Military Commission
3.4 2016 military reforms
3.5 Theater commands
4 Service branches
4.1 Ground Force
4.1.1 Separate Headquarters for Army Ground Force
4.2 Navy
4.3 Air Force
4.4 Rocket Force
4.5 Strategic Support Force
5
Conscription

Conscription and terms of service
6 Military intelligence
6.1 Joint Staff Department
6.1.1 Second Department
6.1.2 Third Department
6.1.2.1 Monitoring stations
6.1.3 Fourth Department
6.2 Liaison Department
6.3
Special

Special forces
6.4 Other branches
7 Weapons and equipment
7.1 Cyberwarfare
7.2 Nuclear weapons
7.3 Space-based warfare
8 Military budget
9 Commercial interests
10 Anthem
11 See also
12 References
13 Further reading
14 External links
Mission statement[edit]
Former CMC chairman
Hu Jintao

Hu Jintao had defined the missions of the PLA
as:[7]
To consolidate the ruling status of the Communist Party
To ensure China's sovereignty, territorial integrity, and domestic
security to continue national development
To safeguard China's national interests
To help maintain world peace
History[edit]
Main article: History of the People's Liberation Army
Further information: Military history of
China

China before 1911
Second Sino-Japanese War[edit]
Further information:
Chinese Civil War

Chinese Civil War and Second Sino-Japanese War
The
People's Liberation Army

People's Liberation Army was founded on 1 August 1927 during the
Nanchang uprising

Nanchang uprising when troops of the
Kuomintang

Kuomintang (KMT) rebelled under
the leadership of Zhu De, He Long,
Ye Jianying

Ye Jianying and
Zhou Enlai
.jpg/440px-Zhou_Enlai_in_1940s(color).jpg)
Zhou Enlai after
the massacre of the Communists by Chiang Kai-shek. They were then
known as the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army, or simply the
Red Army. Between 1934 and 1935, the Red Army survived several
campaigns led against it by Chiang Kai-Shek and engaged in the Long
March.
During the
Second Sino-Japanese War

Second Sino-Japanese War from 1937 to 1945, the Communist
military forces were nominally integrated into the National
Revolutionary Army of the
Republic of China

Republic of China forming two main units
known as the
Eighth Route Army

Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army. During this
time, these two military groups primarily employed guerrilla tactics,
generally avoiding large-scale battles with the Japanese with some
exceptions while at the same time consolidating their ground by
absorbing nationalist troops and paramilitary forces behind Japanese
lines into their forces. After the Japanese surrendered in 1945, the
Communist Party merged the
Eighth Route Army

Eighth Route Army and New Fourth Army,
renaming the new million-strong force the "People's Liberation Army".
They eventually won the Chinese Civil War, establishing the People's
Republic of China

Republic of China in 1949. The PLA then saw a huge reorganisation with
the establishment of the Air Force leadership structure in November
1949 followed by the Navy leadership the following April. In 1950, the
leadership structures of the artillery, armoured troops, air defence
troops, public security forces, and worker–soldier militias were
also established. The chemical warfare defence forces, the railroad
forces, the communications forces, and the strategic forces, as well
as other separate forces (like engineering and construction, logistics
and medical services), were established later on, all these depended
on the leadership of the Communist Party and the National People's
Congress via the Central Military Commission (and until 1975 the
National Defense Council).
1950s, 1960s and 1970s[edit]
Further information: Korean War, Sino-Indian War, and Sino-Soviet
border conflict
Troops of the PLA entering
Beijing

Beijing at some unknown period of time in
1949 during the
Chinese Civil War

Chinese Civil War (between 1945 and 1949)
Chinese troops gathered on a T-34/85 or a Type 58 medium tank leaving
North Korea

North Korea in 1958, 5 years after the
Korean War

Korean War ended with an
armistice (a ceasefire) in 1953. The banner in the background of the
picture bears a slogan (in Chinese) which declares "The Friendship And
Unity Of The North Korean And Chinese Peoples Are Always Steadfast And
Strong!"
During the 1950s, the PLA with Soviet assistance began to transform
itself from a peasant army into a modern one.[8] Part of this process
was the reorganisation that created thirteen military regions in 1955.
The PLA also contained many former
National Revolutionary Army

National Revolutionary Army units
and generals who had defected to the PLA.
Ma Hongbin

Ma Hongbin and his son Ma
Dunjing (1906–1972) were the only two Muslim generals who led a
Muslim unit, the 81st corps, to ever serve in the PLA. Han Youwen, a
Salar Muslim general, also defected to the PLA. In November 1950, some
units of the PLA under the name of the People's Volunteer Army
intervened in the
Korean War

Korean War as United Nations forces under General
Douglas MacArthur

Douglas MacArthur approached the Yalu River. Under the weight of this
offensive, Chinese forces drove MacArthur's forces out of North Korea
and captured Seoul, but were subsequently pushed back south of
Pyongyang north of the 38th Parallel. The war also served as a
catalyst for the rapid modernisation of the PLAAF. In 1962, the PLA
ground force also fought India in the Sino-Indian War, achieving all
objectives.
Prior to the Cultural Revolution, military region commanders tended to
remain in their posts for long periods of time. As the PLA took a
stronger role in politics, this began to be seen as somewhat of a
threat to the party's (or, at least, civilian) control of the
military. The longest-serving military region commanders were Xu
Shiyou in the
Nanjing Military Region

Nanjing Military Region (1954–74),
Yang Dezhi

Yang Dezhi in the
Jinan Military Region

Jinan Military Region (1958–74),
Chen Xilian in the Shenyang
Military Region (1959–73), and
Han Xianchu

Han Xianchu in the Fuzhou Military
Region (1960–74). The establishment of a professional military force
equipped with modern weapons and doctrine was the last of the Four
Modernizations announced by
Zhou Enlai
.jpg/440px-Zhou_Enlai_in_1940s(color).jpg)
Zhou Enlai and supported by Deng Xiaoping.
In keeping with Deng's mandate to reform, the PLA has demobilised
millions of men and women since 1978 and has introduced modern methods
in such areas as recruitment and manpower, strategy, and education and
training. In 1979, the PLA fought
Vietnam

Vietnam over a border skirmish in
the
Sino-Vietnamese War

Sino-Vietnamese War where both sides claimed victory.
During the Sino-Soviet split, strained relations between
China

China and
Soviet
Russia

Russia resulted in bloody border clashes and mutual backing of
each other's enemies.
China

China and Afghanistan had neutral relations with
each other during the King's rule. When the pro-Soviet Afghan
Communists seized power in Afghanistan in 1978, relations between
China

China and the Afghan communists quickly turned hostile. The Afghan
pro-Soviet communists supported China's enemies in
Vietnam

Vietnam and blamed
China

China for supporting Afghan anti-communist militants.
China

China responded
to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan by supporting the Afghan
mujahideen and ramping up their military presence near Afghanistan in
Xinjiang.
China

China acquired military equipment from the United States to
defend itself from Soviet attack.[9]
The
People's Liberation Army Ground Force

People's Liberation Army Ground Force trained and supported the
Afghan Mujahidin during the Soviet war in Afghanistan, moving its
training camps for the mujahideen from Pakistan into
China

China itself.
Hundreds of millions of dollars worth of anti-aircraft missiles,
rocket launchers and machine guns were given to the Mujahidin by the
Chinese. Chinese military advisors and army troops were also present
with the Mujahidin during training.[10]
Since 1980[edit]
In the 1980s,
China

China shrunk its military considerably to free up
resources for economic development, resulting in the relative decline
in resources devoted to the PLA. Following the PLA's suppression of
the Tiananmen Square protests of 1989, ideological correctness was
temporarily revived as the dominant theme in Chinese military affairs.
Reform and modernisation have today resumed their position as the
PLA's primary objectives, although the armed forces' political loyalty
to the CPC has remained a leading concern. Another area of concern to
the political leadership was the PLA's involvement in civilian
economic activities. These activities were thought to have impacted
PLA readiness and has led the political leadership to attempt to
divest the PLA from its non-military business interests.
Beginning in the 1980s, the PLA tried to transform itself from a
land-based power centred on a vast ground force to a smaller, more
mobile, high-tech one capable of mounting operations beyond its
borders. The motivation for this was that a massive land invasion by
Russia

Russia was no longer seen as a major threat, and the new threats to
China

China are seen to be a declaration of independence by Taiwan, possibly
with assistance from the United States, or a confrontation over the
Spratly Islands. In 1985, under the leadership of the Central
Committee of the
Communist Party of China

Communist Party of China and the CMC, the PLA changed
from being constantly prepared to "hit early, strike hard and to fight
a nuclear war" to developing the military in an era of peace. The PLA
reoriented itself to modernization, improving its fighting ability,
and to become a world-class force.
Deng Xiaoping
.jpg/440px-Deng_Xiaoping_and_Jimmy_Carter_at_the_arrival_ceremony_for_the_Vice_Premier_of_China._-_NARA_-_183157-restored(cropped).jpg)
Deng Xiaoping stressed that the PLA
needed to focus more on quality rather than on quantity. The decision
of the Chinese government in 1985 to reduce the size of the military
by one million was completed by 1987. Staffing in military leadership
was cut by about 50 percent. During the Ninth Five Year Plan
(1996–2000) the PLA was reduced by a further 500,000. The PLA had
also been expected to be reduced by another 200,000 by 2005. The PLA
has focused on increasing mechanisation and informatization so as to
be able to fight a high-intensity war.[11]
PLA in Beijing, 2007
Former CMC chairman
Jiang Zemin

Jiang Zemin in 1990 called on the military to
"meet political standards, be militarily competent, have a good
working style, adhere strictly to discipline, and provide vigorous
logistic support" (Chinese:
部队要做到政治合格、军事过硬、作风优良、纪律严明、保障有力;
pinyin: bùduì yào zuò dào zhèngzhì hégé, jūnshì guòyìng,
zuòfēng yōuliáng, jìlǜ yánmíng, bǎozhàng yǒulì).[12] The
1991
Gulf War

Gulf War provided the Chinese leadership with a stark realisation
that the PLA was an oversized, almost-obsolete force. The possibility
of a militarised Japan has also been a continuous concern to the
Chinese leadership since the late 1990s. In addition, China's military
leadership has been reacting to and learning from the successes and
failures of the American military during the Kosovo War, the 2001
invasion of Afghanistan, the 2003 invasion of Iraq, and the Iraqi
insurgency. All these lessons inspired
China

China to transform the PLA from
a military based on quantity to one based on quality. Chairman Jiang
Zemin officially made a "Revolution in Military Affairs" (RMA) part of
the official national military strategy in 1993 to modernise the
Chinese armed forces. A goal of the RMA is to transform the PLA into a
force capable of winning what it calls "local wars under high-tech
conditions" rather than a massive, numbers-dominated ground-type war.
Chinese military planners call for short decisive campaigns, limited
in both their geographic scope and their political goals. In contrast
to the past, more attention is given to reconnaissance, mobility, and
deep reach. This new vision has shifted resources towards the navy and
air force. The PLA is also actively preparing for space warfare and
cyber-warfare.
For the past 10 to 20 years, the PLA has acquired some advanced
weapons systems from Russia, including Sovremenny class destroyers,
Sukhoi Su-27

Sukhoi Su-27 and
Sukhoi Su-30

Sukhoi Su-30 aircraft, and Kilo-class diesel-electric
submarines. It has also started to produce several new classes of
destroyers and frigates including the
Type 052D
.jpg/600px-CNS_Kunming_(DDG-172).jpg)
Type 052D class guided missile
destroyer. In addition, the
PLAAF

PLAAF has designed its very own Chengdu
J-10 fighter aircraft and a new stealth fighter, the
Chengdu

Chengdu J-20. The
PLA launched the new Jin class nuclear submarines on 3 December 2004
capable of launching nuclear warheads that could strike targets across
the Pacific Ocean and have two aircraft carriers, one commissioned in
2012 and a second launched in 2017.
In 2015, the PLA formed new units including the PLA Ground Force, the
PLA Rocket Force and the PLA Strategic Support Force.[13]
Peacekeeping operations[edit]
The
People's Republic of China

People's Republic of China has sent the PLA to various hotspots as
part of China's role as a prominent member of the United Nations. Such
units usually include engineers and logistical units and members of
the paramilitary
People's Armed Police
_cap_insignia.svg/500px-Chinese_People's_Armed_Police_Force_(CAPF)_cap_insignia.svg.png)
People's Armed Police and have been deployed as part
of peacekeeping operations in Lebanon,[14] the Republic of the
Congo,[15] Sudan,[16] Ivory Coast,[17] Haiti,[18] and more recently,
Mali and South Sudan.
Vintage Chinese propaganda poster, showing the PLA. The caption reads,
"The People's Army is invincible". The pilot (on top) holds a
flagstaff and a copy of Selected Works of Chairman Mao Zedong.
Notable events[edit]
1927–1950: Chinese Civil War
1937–1945: Second Sino-Japanese War
1949:
Yangtze incident

Yangtze incident against British warships on the Yangtze river.
1949: Incorporation of
Xinjiang
_(_all_claims_hatched).svg/550px-Xinjiang_in_China_(de-facto)_(_all_claims_hatched).svg.png)
Xinjiang into the People's Republic of China
1950: Incorporation of Tibet into the People's Republic of China
1950–1953:
Korean War

Korean War under the banner of the Chinese People's
Volunteer Army.
1954–1955: First
Taiwan

Taiwan Strait Crisis.
1955–1970:
Vietnam

Vietnam War.
1958: Second
Taiwan

Taiwan Strait Crisis at
Quemoy

Quemoy and Matsu.
1962: Sino-Indian War.
1967: Border skirmishes with India.
1969–1978: Sino-Soviet border conflict.
1974:
Battle of the Paracel Islands

Battle of the Paracel Islands with Vietnam.
1979: Sino-Vietnamese War.
1979–1990: Sino-Vietnamese conflicts 1979–1990.
1988:
Johnson South Reef Skirmish

Johnson South Reef Skirmish with Vietnam.
1989: Enforcement of martial law in
Beijing

Beijing during the Tiananmen
Square protests of 1989.
1990: Baren Township riot.
1995–1996: Third
Taiwan

Taiwan Strait Crisis.
1997: PLA Control of Hong Kong's Military Defense
1999: PLA Control of Macau's Military Defense
2009–present: Anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden
2014–present: Conflict against the Islamic State of Iraq and the
Levant
2014: Search and rescue efforts for Flight MH370
2014: UN Peacekeeping operations in Mali
2015:
UNMISS

UNMISS peacekeeping operations in South Sudan
Organization[edit]
National military command[edit]
The state military system upholds the principle of the CPC's absolute
leadership over the armed forces. The party and the State jointly
established the CMC that carries out the task of supreme military
leadership over the armed forces. The 1954 Constitution stated that
the State President directs the armed forces and made the State
President the chairman of the Defense Commission. The Defense
Commission is an advisory body and does not hold any actual power over
the armed forces. On 28 September 1954, the Central Committee of the
Chinese Communist Party re-established the CMC as the commanding organ
of the PLA. From that time onward, the current system of a joint
system of party and state leadership of the military was established.
The Central Committee of the Communist Party leads in all military
affairs. The State President directs the state military forces and the
development of the military forces which is managed by the State
Council.
To ensure the absolute leadership of the Communist Party over the
armed forces, every level of party committee in the military forces
implements the principles of democratic centralism. In addition,
division-level and higher units establish political commissars and
political organisations, ensuring that the branch organisations are in
line. These systems combined the party organisation with the military
organisation to achieve the party's leadership and administrative
leadership. This is seen as the key guarantee to the absolute
leadership of the party over the military.
In October 2014 the
PLA Daily

PLA Daily reminded readers of the Gutian Congress,
which stipulated the basic principle of the Party controlling the
military, and called for vigilance as "[f]oreign hostile forces preach
the nationalization and de-politicization of the military, attempting
to muddle our minds and drag our military out from under the Party's
flag."[19]
Military leadership[edit]
The leadership by the CPC is a fundamental principle of the Chinese
military command system. The PLA reports not to the State Council but
rather to two Central Military Commissions, one belonging to the state
and one belonging to the party.
In practice, the two central military commissions usually do not
contradict each other because their membership is usually identical.
Often, the only difference in membership between the two occurs for a
few months every five years, during the period between a party
congress, when Party CMC membership changes, and the next ensuing
National People's Congress, when the state CMC changes. The CMC
carries out its responsibilities as authorised by the Constitution and
National Defense Law.[20]
The leadership of each type of military force is under the leadership
and management of the corresponding part of the Central Military
Commission of the CPC Central Committee. Forces under each military
branch or force such as the subordinate forces, academies and schools,
scientific research and engineering institutions and logistical
support organisations are also under the leadership of the CMC. This
arrangement has been especially useful as
China

China over the past several
decades has moved increasingly towards military organisations composed
of forces from more than one military branch. In September 1982, to
meet the needs of modernisation and to improve co-ordination in the
command of forces including multiple service branches and to
strengthen unified command of the military, the CMC ordered the
abolition of the leadership organisation of the various military
branches. Today, the PLA has air force, navy and second artillery
leadership organs.
In 1986, the People's Armed Forces Department, except in some border
regions, was placed under the joint leadership of the PLA and the
local authorities. Although the local party organisations paid close
attention to the People's Armed Forces Department, as a result of some
practical problems, the CMC decided that from 1 April 1996, the
People's Armed Forces Department would once again fall under the
jurisdiction of the PLA.
According to the Constitution of the People's Republic of China, the
CMC is composed of the following: the Chairman, Vice-Chairmen and
Members. The
Chairman of the Central Military Commission

Chairman of the Central Military Commission has overall
responsibility for the commission.
the Central Military Commission of the Communist Party of China
Chairman
Xi Jinping
_(cropped).jpg/440px-Xi_Jinping_October_2013_(cropped)_(cropped).jpg)
Xi Jinping (also General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party,
President of the People's Republic of China, and Commander-in-chief of
the PLA)
Vice Chairmen
Air Force General Xu Qiliang
General Zhang Youxia
Members
General Wei Fenghe
Chief of the Joint staff – General Li Zuocheng
Director of the Political Work Department – Admiral Miao Hua
Secretary of the
Central Commission for Discipline Inspection

Central Commission for Discipline Inspection –
General Zhang Shengmin
the Central Military Commission of the People's Republic of China
Chairman
Xi Jinping
_(cropped).jpg/440px-Xi_Jinping_October_2013_(cropped)_(cropped).jpg)
Xi Jinping (also General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party,
President of the People's Republic of China, and Commander-in-chief of
the PLA)
Vice Chairmen
Air Force General Xu Qiliang
General Zhang Youxia
Members
Minister of National Defense – General Chang Wanquan
General
Fang Fenghui

Fang Fenghui – Former Chief of the Joint staff
General Zhang Yang – Former Director of the Political Work
Department
General
Zhao Keshi – Former Director of the Logistic Support
Department
General
Zhang Youxia
_3.jpg/440px-Zhang_Youxia_(2017-12-07)_3.jpg)
Zhang Youxia – Former Director of the Equipment Development
Department
Admiral Wu shengli – Former Commander of the PLA Navy
Air Force General
Ma Xiaotian

Ma Xiaotian – Former Commander of the PLA Air
Force
General
Wei Fenghe

Wei Fenghe – Former Commander of the PLA Rocket Force
Central Military Commission[edit]
In December 1982, the fifth
National People's Congress
.svg/260px-National_Emblem_of_the_People's_Republic_of_China_(2).svg.png)
National People's Congress revised the
state constitution to state that the State Central Military Commission
leads all the armed forces of the state. The chairman of the State CMC
is chosen and removed by the full NPC while the other members are
chosen by the NPC standing committee. However, the CMC of the Central
Committee of the Chinese Communist Party remained the party
organisation that directly commands the military and all the other
armed forces.
In actual practice, the party CMC, after consultation with the
democratic parties, proposes the names of the State CMC members of the
NPC so that these people after going through the legal processes can
be elected by the NPC to the State Central Military Commission. That
is to say, that the CMC of the Central Committee and the CMC of the
State are one group and one organisation. However, looking at it
organizationally, these two CMCs are subordinate to two different
systems – the party system and the state system. Therefore, the
armed forces are under the absolute leadership of the Communist Party
and are also the armed forces of the state. This is a unique joint
leadership system that reflects the origin of the PLA as the military
branch of the Communist Party. It only became the national military
when the
People's Republic of China

People's Republic of China was established in 1949.
By convention, the chairman and vice-chairman of the Central Military
Commission are civilian members of the Communist Party of China, but
they are not necessarily the heads of the civilian government. Both
Jiang Zemin

Jiang Zemin and
Deng Xiaoping
.jpg/440px-Deng_Xiaoping_and_Jimmy_Carter_at_the_arrival_ceremony_for_the_Vice_Premier_of_China._-_NARA_-_183157-restored(cropped).jpg)
Deng Xiaoping retained the office of chairman even
after relinquishing their other positions. All of the other members of
the CMC are uniformed active military officials. Unlike other nations,
the Minister of National Defense is not the head of the military, but
is usually a vice-chairman of the CMC.
In 2012, to attempt to reduce corruption at the highest rungs of the
leadership of the Chinese military, the commission banned the service
of alcohol at military receptions.[21]
2016 military reforms[edit]
On 1 January 2016, The Central Military Commission (CMC) released a
guideline[22] on deepening national defense and military reform, about
a month after CMC Chairman
Xi Jinping
_(cropped).jpg/440px-Xi_Jinping_October_2013_(cropped)_(cropped).jpg)
Xi Jinping called for an overhaul of the
military administration and command system at a key meeting.
On 11 January 2016, the PLA created a joint staff directly attached to
the Central Military Commission (CMC), the highest leadership
organization in the military. The previous four general headquarters
of the PLA were disbanded and completely reformed. They were divided
into 15 functional departments instead — a significant expansion
from the domain of the General Office, which is now a single
department within the Central Military Commission .
General Office (办公厅)
Joint Staff Department (联合参谋部)
Political Work Department (政治工作部)
Logistic Support Department (后勤保障部)
Equipment Development Department (装备发展部)
Training and Administration Department (训练管理部)
National Defense Mobilization Department (国防动员部)
Discipline Inspection Commission (纪律检查委员会)
Politics and Legal Affairs Commission (政法委员会)
Science and Technology Commission (科学技术委员会)
Office for Strategic Planning (战略规划办公室)
Office for Reform and Organizational Structure
(改革和编制办公室)
Office for International Military Cooperation
(国际军事合作办公室)
Audit Office (审计署)
Agency for Offices Administration (机关事务管理总局)
Included among the 15 departments are three commissions. The CMC
Discipline Inspection Commission is charged with rooting out
corruption.
Theater commands[edit]
The five theater commands of the PLA.[citation needed]
Main article: Theater commands of the People's Liberation Army
Until 2016, China's territory was divided into seven military regions,
but they were reorganized into five theater commands in early 2016.
This reflects a change in their concept of operations from primarily
ground-oriented to mobile and coordinated movement of all
services.[23] The five new theatre commands are:
Eastern Theater Command
Western Theater Command
Northern Theater Command
Southern Theater Command
Central Theater Command
The PLA garrisons in Hong Kong and
Macau

Macau both come under the Southern
Theater Command.
The military reforms have also introduced a major change in the areas
of responsibilities. Rather than separately commanding their own
troops, service branches are now primarily responsible for
administrative tasks (like equipping and maintaining the troops). It
is the theater commands now that have the command authority. This
should, in theory, facilitate the implementation of joint operations
across all service branches.[24]
Coordination with civilian national security groups such as the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs is achieved primarily by the leading
groups of the Communist Party of China. Particularly important are the
leading groups on foreign affairs, which include those dealing with
Taiwan.
Service branches[edit]
v
t
e
Branches of the People's Liberation Army
People's Liberation Army
People's Liberation Army

People's Liberation Army Ground Force
People's Liberation Army

People's Liberation Army Navy
People's Liberation Army

People's Liberation Army Air Force
People's Liberation Army

People's Liberation Army Rocket Force
People's Liberation Army

People's Liberation Army Strategic Support Force
See also:
People's Armed Police
_cap_insignia.svg/500px-Chinese_People's_Armed_Police_Force_(CAPF)_cap_insignia.svg.png)
People's Armed Police (non-PLA)
The PLA encompasses five main service branches: the Ground Force, the
Navy, the Air Force, the Rocket Force, and the Strategic Support
Force. Following the 200,000 troop reduction announced in 2003, the
total strength of the PLA has been reduced from 2.5 million to just
under 2.3 million. Further reforms will see an additional 300,000
personnel reduction from its current strength of 2.28 million
personnel. The reductions will come mainly from non-combat ground
forces, which will allow more funds to be diverted to naval, air, and
strategic missile forces. This shows China's shift from ground force
prioritisation to emphasising air and naval power with high-tech
equipment for offensive roles over disputed coastal territories.[25]
In recent years, the PLA has paid close attention to the performance
of US forces in Afghanistan and Iraq. As well as learning from the
success of the US military in network-centric warfare, joint
operations, C4ISR, and hi-tech weaponry, the PLA is also studying
unconventional tactics that could be used to exploit the
vulnerabilities of a more technologically advanced enemy. This has
been reflected in the two parallel guidelines for the PLA ground
forces development. While speeding up the process of introducing new
technology into the force and retiring the older equipment, the PLA
has also placed an emphasis on asymmetric warfare, including exploring
new methods of using existing equipment to defeat a technologically
superior enemy.
In addition to the four main service branches, the PLAGF is supported
by two paramilitary organisations: the
People's Armed Police
_cap_insignia.svg/500px-Chinese_People's_Armed_Police_Force_(CAPF)_cap_insignia.svg.png)
People's Armed Police and the
People's Liberation Army

People's Liberation Army militia.
Ground Force[edit]
A Type 99 Main battle tank in service with the PLAGF.
Main article:
People's Liberation Army

People's Liberation Army Ground Force
The PLA has the world's largest ground force, currently totalling some
1.6 million personnel, or about 60 percent of the PLA's total
manpower of 2.3 million. The ground forces are divided among the
five theatre commands as named above. In times of crisis, the PLA
Ground Force will be reinforced by numerous reserve and paramilitary
units. The PLAGF reserve component has about 510,000 personnel divided
into 30 infantry and 12 anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) divisions. Two
amphibious mechanised divisions were also established in
Nanjing

Nanjing and
Guangzhou MR. At least 40 percent of PLA divisions and brigades are
now mechanised or armoured, almost double the percentage before the
troop reduction.
While much of the
PLA Ground Force

PLA Ground Force was being reduced over the past few
years, technology-intensive elements such as special operations forces
(SOF), army aviation, surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), and electronic
warfare units have all been rapidly expanded. The latest operational
doctrine of the PLA ground forces highlights the importance of
information technology, electronic and information warfare, and
long-range precision strikes in future warfare. The older generation
telephone/radio-based command, control, and communications (C3)
systems are being replaced by an integrated battlefield information
networks featuring local/wide-area networks (LAN/WAN), satellite
communications, unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV)-based surveillance and
reconnaissance systems, and mobile command and control centres.[26]
Separate Headquarters for Army Ground Force[edit]
On 1 January 2016, as part of Military reforms,
China

China created for the
first time a separate headquarters for the ground forces.[27] China's
ground forces have never had their own headquarters until now.
Previously, the People's Liberation Army's Four General Departments
served as the de facto army headquarters, functioning together as the
equivalent of a joint staff, to which the navy, air force and the
newly renamed Rocket Force would report.
The Commander of the
PLA Ground Force

PLA Ground Force is Han Weiguo
The Political Commissar is Liu Lei
P
LAN

LAN sailors in Shanghai
Navy[edit]
Main article:
People's Liberation Army

People's Liberation Army Navy
Until the early 1990s, the navy performed a subordinate role to the
PLA Land Forces. Since then it has undergone rapid modernisation. The
255,000 strong
People's Liberation Army Navy

People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is organised into
three major fleets: the
North Sea Fleet

North Sea Fleet headquartered at Qingdao, the
East Sea Fleet

East Sea Fleet headquartered at Ningbo, and the South Sea Fleet
headquartered in Zhanjiang. Each fleet consists of a number of surface
ship, submarine, naval air force, coastal defence, and marine units.
The navy includes a 10,000 strong Marine Corps (organised into two
brigades), a 26,000 strong Naval Air Force operating several hundred
helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft, plus a 25,000 strong Coastal
Defense Force. As part of its overall programme of naval
modernisation, the P
LAN

LAN has been developing a blue water navy. The
Navy also uses the CJ-10 naval cruise missile system, which made its
first public appearance during late 2009.
Air Force[edit]
Chengdu J-20

Chengdu J-20 5th generation stealth fighter.
Main article:
People's Liberation Army

People's Liberation Army Air Force
The 398,000 strong
People's Liberation Army Air Force

People's Liberation Army Air Force is organised
into five Theater Command Air Forces (TCAF) and 24 air divisions. The
largest operational units within the Aviation Corps is the air
division, which has 2 to 3 aviation regiments, each with 20 to 36
aircraft. The surface-to-air missile (SAM) Corps is organised into SAM
divisions and brigades. There are also three airborne divisions manned
by the PLAAF.
Rocket Force[edit]
DF-21D on 2015
China

China WWII Parade.
Main article:
People's Liberation Army

People's Liberation Army Rocket Force
The
People's Liberation Army Rocket Force

People's Liberation Army Rocket Force is the main strategic
missile force of the PLA. It controls China's nuclear and conventional
strategic missiles. China's total nuclear arsenal size is estimated to
be between 100 and 400 nuclear weapons. The PLARF has approximately
100,000 personnel and six ballistic missile divisions (missile corps
bases). The six divisions are independently deployed in different
theater commands and have a total of 15 to 20 missile brigades.
Strategic Support Force[edit]
Main article:
People's Liberation Army

People's Liberation Army Strategic Support Force
Founded on December 31, 2015 as part of the first wave of reforms of
the PLA, the
People's Liberation Army Strategic Support Force

People's Liberation Army Strategic Support Force is the
newest branch of the PLA. Initial announcements regarding the
Strategic Support Force did not provide much detail, but Yang Yujun of
the Chinese Ministry of Defense described it as a combination of all
support forces. Additionally, commentators speculate that it will
include high-tech operations forces such as space, cyberspace and
electronic warfare operations units, independent of other branches of
the military.[28] Another expert, Yin Zhuo, said that "the major
mission of the PLA Strategic Support Force is to give support to the
combat operations so that the PLA can gain regional advantages in the
astronautic war, space war, network war and electromagnetic space war
and ensure smooth operations."[29]
Conscription

Conscription and terms of service[edit]
Technically, military service with the PLA is obligatory for all
Chinese citizens. However, in practice, it is entirely voluntary;
because of China's large population and of the large number of
individuals who volunteer to join the regular armed forces, the
authorities seldom enforce compulsory military service. All
18-year-old males have to register themselves with the government
authorities, in a way similar to the
Selective Service System

Selective Service System of the
United States.[30] The main exception to this system applies to
potential university students (male and female), who must undergo
military training (usually for the duration of one to four weeks)
before or one year after the commencement of their courses.[citation
needed]
Article 55 of the Constitution of the People's Republic of China
prescribes conscription by stating: "It is a sacred duty of every
citizen of the
People's Republic of China

People's Republic of China to defend his or her
motherland and resist invasion. It is an honoured obligation of the
citizens of the
People's Republic of China

People's Republic of China to perform military service
and to join the militia forces."[31] As of 2010[update] the 1984
Military Service Law spells out the legal basis of conscription,
describing military service as a duty for "all citizens without
distinction of race... and religious creed". This law has not been
amended since it came into effect.
Conscription

Conscription has only existed
officially since the establishment of the People's Republic in 1949,
and, theoretically, all Chinese citizens have had the duty of
performing military service. Technically, those 18–22 years of age
enter selective compulsory military service, with a 24-month service
obligation. This includes 18–19 years of age for female high-school
graduates who meet requirements for specific military jobs. Military
service is normally performed in the regular armed forces, but the
1984 law does allow for conscription into the reserve forces.
Residents of the Hong Kong and
Macau

Macau SAR however, as of 1997 and 1999
are exempted from joining the military.
Military intelligence[edit]
Joint Staff Department[edit]
The Joint Staff Department carries out staff and operational functions
for the PLA and had major responsibility for implementing military
modernisation plans. Headed by chief of general staff, the department
serves as the headquarters for the entire PLA and contained
directorates for the five armed services: Ground Forces, Air Force,
Navy, Strategic Force and Support Forces. The Joint Staff Department
included functionally organised subdepartments for artillery, armoured
units, engineering, operations, training, intelligence, mobilisation,
surveying, communications, quartermaster services, and politics.
Navy Headquarters controlled the North Sea Fleet, East Sea Fleet, and
South Sea Fleet. Air Force Headquarters generally exercised control
through the commanders of the seven military regions. Nuclear forces
were directly subordinate to the Joint Staff Department through the
Strategic Forces commander and political commissar. Conventional main,
regional, and militia units were controlled administratively by the
military region commanders, but the Joint Staff Department in Beijing
could assume direct operational control of any main-force unit at
will. Thus, broadly speaking, the Joint Staff Department exercises
operational control of the main forces, and the military region
commanders controlled the regional forces and, indirectly, the
militia. The post of principal intelligence official in the top
leadership of the Chinese military has been taken up by a number of
people of several generations, from Li Kenong in the 1950s to Xiong
Guangkai in the late 1990s; and their public capacity has always been
assistant to the deputy chief of staff or assistant to the chief of
staff.
Ever since the CPC officially established the system of "major
military regions" for its army in the 1950s, the intelligence agencies
inside the Army have, after going through several major evolutions,
developed into the present three major military intelligence setups:
The central level is composed of the Second and Third Departments
under the Joint Staff Headquarters and the Liaison Department under
the Political Work Department.
At the major military regions intelligence activities consist of the
Second Bureau established at the same level as the Operation
Department under the headquarters, and the Liaison Department
established under the Political Work Department.
The third system includes a number of communications stations directly
established in the garrison areas of all the major military regions by
the Third Department of the Joint Staff Headquarters.
The Second Bureau under the headquarters and the Liaison Department
under the Political Department of major military regions are only
subjected to the "professional leadership" of their "counterpart"
units under the Central Military Commission and are still considered
the direct subordinate units of the major military region
organizationally. Those entities whose names include the word
"institute", all research institutes under the charge of the Second
and the Third Departments of the Joint Staff Headquarters, including
other research organs inside the Army, are at least of the
establishment size of the full regimental level. Among the deputy
commanders of a major Theater command in China, there is always one
who is assigned to take charge of intelligence work, and the
intelligence agencies under his charge are directly affiliated to the
headquarters and the political department of the military region.
The Conference on Strengthening Intelligence Work held from 3
September 1996 – 18 September 1996 at the Xishan Command Center of
the Ministry of State Security and the General Staff Department. Chi
Haotian delivered a report entitled "Strengthen Intelligence Work in a
New International Environment To Serve the Cause of Socialist
Construction." The report emphasised the need to strengthen the
following four aspects of intelligence work:
Efforts must be made to strengthen understanding of the special nature
and role of intelligence work, as well as understanding of the close
relationship between strengthening intelligence work on the one hand,
and of the
Four Modernizations of the motherland, the reunification of
the motherland, and opposition to hegemony and power politics on the
other.
The United States and the West have all along been engaged in
infiltration, intervention, sabotage, and intelligence gathering
against
China

China on the political, economic, military, and ideological
fronts. The response must strengthen the struggle against their
infiltration, intervention, sabotage, and intelligence gathering.
Consolidating intelligence departments and training a new generation
of intelligence personnel who are politically reliable, honest and
upright in their ways, and capable of mastering professional skills,
the art of struggle, and advanced technologies.
Strengthening the work of organising intelligence in two international
industrial, commercial, and financial ports—Hong Kong and Macau.
Although the four aspects emphasised by Chi Haotian appeared to be
defensive measures, they were in fact both defensive and offensive in
nature.
Second Department[edit]
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The Second Department of the Joint Staff Headquarters is responsible
for collecting military intelligence. Activities include military
attachés at Chinese embassies abroad, clandestine special agents sent
to foreign countries to collect military information, and the analysis
of information publicly published in foreign countries.
The Second Department oversees military human intelligence (HUMINT)
collection, widely exploits open source (OSINT) materials, fuses
HUMINT, signals intelligence (SIGINT), and imagery intelligence data,
and disseminates finished intelligence products to the CMC and other
consumers. Preliminary fusion is carried out by the Second
Department's Analysis Bureau which mans the National Watch Center, the
focal point for national-level indications and warning. In-depth
analysis is carried out by regional bureaus. Although traditionally
the Second Department of the Joint Staff Department was responsible
for military intelligence, it is beginning to increasingly focus on
scientific and technological intelligence in the military field,
following the example of Russian agencies in stepping up the work of
collecting scientific and technological information.
The research institute under the Second Department of the Joint Staff
Headquarters is publicly known as the Institute for International
Strategic Studies; its internal classified publication "Foreign
Military Trends" (《外军动态》, Wai Jun Dongtai) is published
every 10 days and transmitted to units at the division level.
The PLA Institute of International Relations at
Nanjing

Nanjing comes under
the Second Department of the Joint Staff Department and is responsible
for training military attachés, assistant military attachés and
associate military attachés as well as secret agents to be posted
abroad. It also supplies officers to the military intelligence
sections of various military regions and group armies. The Institute
was formed from the PLA "793"
Foreign Language

Foreign Language Institute, which moved
from
Zhangjiakou

Zhangjiakou after the
Cultural Revolution

Cultural Revolution and split into two
institutions at
Luoyang

Luoyang and Nanjing.
The Institute of International Relations was known in the 1950s as the
School for
Foreign Language

Foreign Language Cadres of the Central Military Commission,
with the current name being used since 1964. The training of
intelligence personnel is one of several activities at the Institute.
While all graduates of the Moscow Institute of International Relations
were employed by the KGB, only some graduates of the
Beijing

Beijing Institute
of International Relations are employed by the Ministry of State
Security. The former Institute of International Relations, since been
renamed the Foreign Affairs College, is under the administration of
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and is not involved in secret
intelligence work. The former Central Military Commission foreign
language school had foreign faculty members who were either Communist
Party sympathizers or were members of foreign communist parties. But
the present Institute of International Relations does not hire foreign
teachers, to avoid the danger that its students might be recognised
when sent abroad as clandestine agents.
Those engaged in professional work in military academies under the
Second Department of the Joint Staff Headquarters usually have a
chance to go abroad, either for advanced studies or as military
officers working in the military attaché's office of Chinese
embassies in foreign countries. People working in the military
attaché's office of embassies are usually engaged in collecting
military information under the cover of "military diplomacy". As long
as they refrain from directly subversive activities, they are
considered as well-behaved "military diplomats".
Some bureaus under the Second Department which are responsible for
espionage in different regions, of which the First Bureau is
responsible for collecting information in the
Special

Special Administrative
Regions of Hong Kong and Macau, and also in Taiwan. Agents are
dispatched by the Second Department to companies and other local
corporations to gain cover.
The "Autumn Orchid" intelligence group assigned to Hong Kong and Macau
in the mid-1980s mostly operated in the mass media, political,
industrial, commercial, and religious circles, as well as in
universities and colleges. The "Autumn Orchid" intelligence group was
mainly responsible for the following three tasks:
Finding out and keeping abreast of the political leanings of officials
of the Hong Kong and
Macau

Macau governments, as well as their views on
major issues, through social contact with them and through information
provided by them.
Keeping abreast of the developments of foreign governments' political
organs in Hong Kong, as well as of foreign financial, industrial, and
commercial organisations.
Finding out and having a good grasp of the local media's sources of
information on political, military, economic, and other developments
on the mainland, and deliberately releasing false political or
military information to the media to test the outside response.
The "Autumn Orchid" intelligence group was awarded a Citation for
Merit, Second Class, in December 1994. It was further awarded another
Citation for Merit, Second Class, in 1997. Its current status is not
publicly known. During the 2008 Chinese New Year celebration CCTV held
for Chinese diplomatic establishments, the head of the Second
Department of the Joint Headquarters was revealed for the first time
to the public: the current head was
Major General

Major General Yang Hui (杨晖)
Third Department[edit]
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The Third Department of the Joint Staff Department is responsible for
monitoring the telecommunications of foreign armies and producing
finished intelligence based on the military information collected.
The communications stations established by the Third Department of the
Joint Staff Headquarters are not subject to the jurisdiction of the
provincial military district and the major military region of where
they are based. The communications stations are entirely the agencies
of the Third Department of the Joint Staff Headquarters which have no
affiliations to the provincial military district and the military
region of where they are based. The personnel composition, budgets,
and establishment of these communications stations are entirely under
the jurisdiction of the Third Department of the General PLA General
Staff Headquarters, and are not related at all with local troops.
China

China maintains the most extensive
SIGINT

SIGINT network of all the countries
in the Asia-Pacific region. As of the late 1990s,
SIGINT

SIGINT systems
included several dozen ground stations, half a dozen ships,
truck-mounted systems, and airborne systems. Third Department
headquarters is in the vicinity of the GSD First Department
(Operations Department), AMS, and NDU complex in the hills northwest
of the Summer Palace. As of the late 1990s, the Third Department was
allegedly manned by approximately 20,000 personnel, with most of their
linguists trained at the
Luoyang

Luoyang Institute of Foreign Languages.
Ever since the 1950s, the Second and Third Departments of the Joint
Staff Headquarters have established a number of institutions of
secondary and higher learning for bringing up "special talents." The
PLA
Foreign Language

Foreign Language Institute at
Luoyang

Luoyang comes under the Third
Department of the Joint Staff Department and is responsible for
training foreign language officers for the monitoring of foreign
military intelligence. The Institute was formed from the PLA "793"
Foreign Language

Foreign Language Institute, which moved from
Zhangjiakou

Zhangjiakou after the
Cultural Revolution

Cultural Revolution and split into two institutions at
Luoyang

Luoyang and
Nanjing.
Though the distribution order they received upon graduation indicated
the "Joint Staff Headquarters", many of the graduates of these schools
found themselves being sent to all parts of the country, including
remote and uninhabited backward mountain areas. The reason is that the
monitoring and control stations under the Third Department of the PLA
General Staff Headquarters are scattered in every corner of the
country.
The communications stations located in the
Shenzhen

Shenzhen base of the PLA
Hong Kong
Garrison

Garrison started their work long ago. In normal times, these
two communications stations report directly to the Central Military
Commission and the Joint Staff Headquarters. Units responsible for
co-ordination are the communications stations established in the
garrison provinces of the military regions by the Third Department of
the PLA General Staff Headquarters.
By taking direct command of military communications stations based in
all parts of the country, the CPC Central Military Commission and the
Joint Staff Headquarters can not only ensure a successful interception
of enemy radio communications, but can also make sure that none of the
wire or wireless communications and contacts among major military
regions can escape the detection of these communications stations,
thus effectively attaining the goal of imposing a direct supervision
and control over all major military regions, all provincial military
districts, and all group armies.
Monitoring stations[edit]
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China's main
SIGINT

SIGINT effort is in the Third Department of the Joint
Staff Department of the Central Military Commission, with additional
capabilities, primarily domestic, in the Ministry of State Security
(MSS).
SIGINT

SIGINT stations, therefore, are scattered through the country,
for domestic as well as international interception. Prof. Desmond
Ball, of the Australian National University, described the largest
stations as the main Technical Department
SIGINT

SIGINT net control station
on the northwest outskirts of Beijing, and the large complex near Lake
Kinghathu in the extreme northeast corner of China.
As opposed to other major powers,
China

China focuses its
SIGINT

SIGINT activities
on its region rather than the world. Ball wrote, in the eighties, that
China

China had several dozen
SIGINT

SIGINT stations aimed at Russia, Japan,
Taiwan, Southeast Asia and India, as well as internally. Of the
stations apparently targeting Russia, there are sites at Jilemutu and
Jixi

Jixi in the northeast, and at Erlian and Hami near the Mongolian
border. Two Russian-facing sites in Xinjiang, at
Qitai
.png/500px-Location_of_Qitai_within_Xinjiang_(China).png)
Qitai and
Korla

Korla may
be operated jointly with resources from the US CIA's Office of SIGINT
Operations, probably focused on missile and space activity. Other
stations aimed at South and Southeast Asia are on a net controlled by
Chengdu, Sichuan. There is a large facility at Dayi, and, according to
Ball, "numerous" small posts along the Indian border. Other
significant facilities are located near Shenyang, near
Jinan

Jinan and in
Nanjing

Nanjing and Shanghai. Additional stations are in the
Fujian
.svg/550px-Fujian_in_China_(_all_claims_hatched).svg.png)
Fujian and
Guangdong
.svg/550px-Guangdong_in_China_(_all_claims_hatched).svg.png)
Guangdong military districts opposite Taiwan.
On Hainan Island, near Vietnam, there is a naval
SIGINT

SIGINT facility that
monitors the South
China

China sea, and a ground station targeting US and
Russian satellites.
China

China also has ship and aircraft platforms in this
area, under the
South Sea Fleet

South Sea Fleet headquarters at
Zhanjiang

Zhanjiang immediately
north of the island. Targeting here seems to have an
ELINT

ELINT as well as
COMINT

COMINT flavor. There are also truck-mounted mobile ground systems, as
well as ship, aircraft, and limited satellite capability. There are at
least 10 intelligence-gathering auxiliary vessels.
As of the late nineties, the Chinese did not appear to be trying to
monitor the
United States Pacific Command

United States Pacific Command to the same extent as does
Russia. In future, this had depended, in part, on the status of
Taiwan.
Fourth Department[edit]
Main article: Fourth Department of the General Staff Headquarters
Department
The Fourth Department (ECM and Radar) of the Joint Staff Headquarters
Department has the electronic intelligence (ELINT) portfolio within
the PLA's
SIGINT

SIGINT apparatus. This department is responsible for
electronic countermeasures, requiring them to collect and maintain
data bases on electronic signals. 25
ELINT

ELINT receivers are the
responsibility of the Southwest Institute of Electronic Equipment
(SWIEE). Among the wide range of SWIEE
ELINT

ELINT products is a new KZ900
airborne
ELINT

ELINT pod. The GSD 54th Research Institute supports the ECM
Department in development of digital
ELINT

ELINT signal processors to
analyse parameters of radar pulses.
Liaison Department[edit]
The Political Work Department maintains the CPC structure that exists
at every level of the PLA. It is responsible for overseeing the
political education, indoctrination and discipline that is a
prerequisite for advancement within the PLA. The PWD controls the
internal prison system of the PLA. The International Liaison
Department of the Political Work Department is publicly known as the
"
China

China Association for International Friendly Contacts". The
department prepares political and economic information for the
reference of the Political Bureau. The department conducts ideological
and political work on foreign armies, explaining China's policies, and
disintegrate enemy armies by dampening their morale. It is also tasked
with instigating rebellions and disloyalty within the
Taiwan

Taiwan military
and other foreign militaries.
The Liaison Office has dispatched agents to infiltrate Chinese-funded
companies and private institutions in Hong Kong. Their mission is
counter-espionage, monitoring their own agents, and preventing and
detecting foreign intelligence services buying off Chinese personnel.
Special

Special forces[edit]
Main article:
People's Liberation Army

People's Liberation Army
Special

Special Operations Forces
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China's special ground force is called PLASF (People's Liberation Army
Special

Special Operations Forces). It includes highly trained soldiers, a
team of commander, assistant commander, sniper, spotter, machine-gun
supporter, bomber, and a pair of assault group. China's
counterterrorist unit is drawn from the police force rather than the
military. The name changes frequently, but as of this writing, it is
known as the
Immediate Action Unit

Immediate Action Unit (IAU). The Chinese Army fields
large number of special operations groups and would appear to have a
vast pool of manpower to choose from. However, it is believed that any
significant terrorist activity within Chinese borders would draw the
attention of the IAU.
China

China has reportedly developed a force capable of carrying out
long-range air-borne operations, long-range reconnaissance, and
amphibious operations. Formed in China's Guangzhou military region and
known by the nickname "Sword of Southern China", the force supposedly
receives army, air force and naval training, including flight
training, and is equipped with "hundreds of high-tech devices",
including global-positioning satellite systems. All of the force's
officers have completed military staff colleges, and 60 percent are
said to have university degrees. Soldiers are reported to be
cross-trained in various specialties, and training is supposed to
encompass a range of operational environments. It is far from clear
whether this unit is considered operational by the Chinese. It is also
not clear how such a force would be employed. Among the missions
mentioned were "responding to contingencies in various regions" and
"cooperating with other services in attacks on islands". According to
the limited reporting, the organisation appears to be in a phase of
testing and development and may constitute an experimental unit. While
no size for the force has been revealed, there have been Chinese media
claims that "over 4,000 soldiers of the force are all-weather and
versatile fighters and parachutists who can fly airplanes and drive
auto vehicles and motor boats".[citation needed]
Other branches[edit]
The Third Department and the Navy co-operate on shipborne intelligence
collection platforms.
PLAAF

PLAAF Sixth Research Institute: Air Force
SIGINT

SIGINT collection is managed
by the
PLAAF

PLAAF Sixth Research Institute in Beijing.
Weapons and equipment[edit]
v
t
e
Missiles of the People's Republic of China
Surface-to-
Surface
Ballistic Missiles
Intercontinental
DF-41
DF-31AG
DF-31A
DF-31
DF-5B
DF-5
DF-4
Intermediate Range
DF-26
DF-3A
DF-3
Medium Range
DF-21
DF-2A
DF-2
Short Range
B-611
P-12
DF-16
DF-15

DF-15 (M-9)
DF-11

DF-11 (M-11)
DF-1
M-7
AR-3
AR-8
WM-120
WS-2 series
WS-3 series
WS-15
WS-22
WS-32
WS-33
WS-35
WS-43
WS-63
A100
A200
A300
SR-5
SY300
SY400
Submarine
_at_Groton,_Connecticut_(USA),_on_15_March_2018_(180315-N-JE719-186).JPG/600px-USS_Colorado_(SSN-788)_at_Groton,_Connecticut_(USA),_on_15_March_2018_(180315-N-JE719-186).JPG)
Submarine Launched
JL-3
JL-2
JL-1
Anti-Ship
DF-26
DF-21D
Hypersonic
_Mach_7_computational_fluid_dynamic_(CFD).jpg/400px-X-43A_(Hyper_-_X)_Mach_7_computational_fluid_dynamic_(CFD).jpg)
Hypersonic Glide Missile
WU-14
Cruise Missiles
Long Range Land Attack
DH-2000
HN-2000
CJ-20
CJ-10
CF-2
CF-1
HN-3
HN-2
HN-1
Short Range Land Attack
YJ-18
CX-1
CM-602G
YJ-62 (C-602)
YJ-85 (C-805)[1]
YJ-12
YJ-22
KD-88
YJ-2
KD-63
YJ-63 (C-603)
YJ-7 (C-701)
C-703
C-704KD
C-705KD
YJ-4
YJ-1
C-611
XW-41
Anti-Ship Supersonic
YJ-12
YJ-18
CX-1
YJ-22
YJ-2
CJ-1
DH-2000
HN-2000
YJ-91
FL-7
HY-3 (C-301)
FL-2 (C-101)
3M-80MBE/E Moskit (SS-N-22)
3M-54E/E1 Klub (SS-N-27)
C-302
C-303
YJ-1
Anti-Ship Subsonic
YJ-100
YJ-62 (C-602)
YJ-8 (C-801)
YJ-82 (C-802)
YJ-83
C-705
C-704
C-703
YJ-7 (C-701)
FL-10
TL-10A
TL-1A
FL-8
TL-6
TL-2
FL-9
SY-1
HY-1
SY-2
HY-2 (C-201)
HY-4 (C-401)
XW-41
Anti-Tank Missiles
CM-501G
AFT-10
HJ-12
HJ-11 (AFT-11)
CM-502KG
HJ-10
BA-9
LJ-7
HJ-9
HJ-8
HJ-73
9K116 Bastion
J-202
J-201
265-I
Anti-Submarine
CY-1
CY-2
CY-3
CY-4
CY-5
CJ-1
WS-3 ASW missile
Air-to-
Surface
Cruise Missiles
Long Range Land Attack
CJ-20
CJ-10
HN-1
HN-2
HN-3
CF-2
CF-1
Short Range Land Attack
YJ-12
YJ-22
YJ-62 (C-602)
CM-802AKG
YJ-2
KD-88
YJ-63 (C-603)
KD-63
CM-400AKG
CM-502KG
YJ-1
BA-7
AKD-10
AR-1
YJ-85 (C-805)[1]
C-704KD
C-705KD
YJ-7 (C-701)
C-703
Kh-59
Kh-29
YJ-4
CS/BBC5
K/YBS500
TL500
QW-1
TB-1
KD1
KD2
LMD-002
LMD-003
Sky Arrow
Sky Arrow 90
TBI
Anti-Ship Supersonic
YJ-12
YJ-22
DH-2000
HN-2000
YJ-2
CM-400AKG
CJ-1
YJ-91
FL-7
HY-3 (C-301)
FL-2 (C-101)
C-302
C-303
3M-80MBE/E Moskit (SS-N-22)
3M-54E/E1 Klub (SS-N-27)
YJ-1
Anti-Ship Subsonic
YJ-7 (C-701)
YJ-100
C-703
C-704
C-705
TL-10
TL-1
TL-6
TL-2
YJ-6 (C-601)
YJ-61 (C-611)
YJ-8K (C-801K)
YJ-82K (C-802K)
YJ-83K
YJ-83KH
Anti-Radiation
CM400AKG
LD10
YJ-12
YJ-91
FL-7
YJ-5 (HQ-61)
Kh-31P
Anti-Tank Missiles
CM-501G
AR-1
CM-502KG
HJ-11 (AFT-11)
LJ-7
HJ-10
BA-9
HJ-9
HJ-8
TB-1
HJ-73
Guided Bombs
CM-506KG
FT series
TD series (TD500-ER)
LS series
CS/BBC5
K/YBS500
TL500
YZ-100 series
YZ-102 series
YZ-200 series
LT series
GB-1
TG-100/250/500/1000-ER
ZD1
KAB-1500Kr
KAB-500Kr
Surface-to-
Air
Anti-Satellite Missile
DN-3
DN-2
SC-19
Anti-Ballistic Missile SAMs
DN-3
DN-2
SC-19
HQ-26
HQ-19
HQ-29
HQ-18
S-300PMU-2
HQ-15
S-300PMU-1 (HQ-10)
HQ-9
KS-2
KS-1
HQ-12
FJ
Anti-(high)Radiation (emitter)platform SAMs
FT-2000
Long Range Area Defence SAMs
HQ-26
HQ-29
HQ-9
FD-2000
FK-3/HQ-22
Sky Dragon 50
HQ-18
HQ-15
S-300PMU-1 (HQ-10)
S-300PMU-2
S-300PMU
S-300FM
Medium Range Area Defence SAMs
DK-10A
DK-10 (PL-12)
LS-II ADS
Sky Dragon 50
DK-10 (LY-60)
PL-12

PL-12 SAM
HQ-16

HQ-16 (Buk/SA-17) / HQ-16A / HQ-16B / LY-80
HQ-12
KS-2
KS-1
S-75 (SA-2) & HQ-1/2/3/4
Short Range Point Defence SAMs
HQ-7

HQ-7 (FM-80)
HQ-64
HQ-6
HQ-61
HQ-6D
LY-60
HQ-17 (Tor)
TY-90
DK-9
CQW-2
FLS-1
FLG-1
FLV-1
FL-2000(V)
FL-2000(V2)/FLV-2
FL-9
SG-2 ADS
LS ADS
YT ADS
FN-6A
FB-6A
ZBL-09 ADS
FL-3000N
HN-5C
TD-2000
TD-2000B
TB-1
Man Portable SAMs
QW-18
QW-11
QW-4
QW-3
QW-2
QW-1
TB-1
FN/FY-6
FN-16/FY-16
HN-5
HQ-5
HN-6
Air-to-Air
Beyond Visual Range AAMs
PL-21
PL-12
SD-10
SD-10A
PL-11
PL-15
PL-4
Within Visual Range AAMs
PL-10
PL-9
PL-8 (Python 3)
PL-7
PL-6
PL-5
PL-3
PL-2
K-5 (PL-1)
HJ-10
TY-90
QW-18
QW-11
QW-4
QW-3
TB-1
QW-2
FN-6
FN-16
HN-6
Notes
[1] Under development
See also: People's Liberation Army
v
t
e
Torpedoes of the People's Republic of China
324mm
Yu-11
Yu-7
ET-52
A244-S
350mm
APR-3E
450mm
Yu-2
533mm
Yu-10
Yu-9
Yu-6
C43
Yu-5
Yu-4
Yu-3
Yu-1
ET32
ET34
ET36
Type 53-65
VA-111 Shkval
650mm
Type 65
Rocket-propelled
CY-1
CY-2
CY-3
CY-4
CY-5
Yu-8
CJ-1
Guided depth charge
S3V
* = Under Development
List of Chinese torpedoes
People's Liberation Army

People's Liberation Army Navy
According to the United States Defense Department,
China

China is developing
kinetic-energy weapons, high-powered lasers, high-powered microwave
weapons, particle-beam weapons, and electromagnetic pulse weapons with
its increase of military fundings.[32]
The PLA has said of reports that its modernisation is dependent on
sales of advanced technology from American allies "Some people have
politicized China's normal commercial cooperation with foreign
countries, smearing our reputation." These contributions include
advanced European diesel engines for Chinese warships, military
helicopter designs from Eurocopter, French anti-submarine sonars and
helicopters,[33] Australian technology for the Houbei class missile
boat,[34] and Israeli supplied American missile, laser and aircraft
technology.[35]
According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute's
data,
China

China became the world's third largest exporter of major arms in
2010–14, an increase of 143 percent from the period 2005–2009.[36]
China's share of global arms exports hence increased from 3 to 5
percent.
China

China supplied major arms to 35 states in 2010–14. A
significant percentage (just over 68 percent) of Chinese exports went
to three countries: Pakistan, Bangladesh and Myanmar.
China

China also
exported major arms to 18 African states. Examples of China's
increasing global presence as an arms supplier in 2010–14 included
deals with Venezuela for armoured vehicles and transport and trainer
aircraft, with Algeria for three frigates, with Indonesia for the
supply of hundreds of anti-ship missiles and with Nigeria for the
supply of a number of unmanned combat aerial vehicles. Following rapid
advances in its arms industry,
China

China has become less dependent on arms
imports, which decreased by 42 percent between 2005–2009 and
2010–14.
Russia

Russia accounted for 61 percent of Chinese arms imports,
followed by France with 16 percent and Ukraine with 13 per cent.
Helicopters formed a major part of Russian and French deliveries, with
the French designs produced under licence in China. Over the years,
China

China has struggled to design and produce effective engines for combat
and transport vehicles. It continued to import large numbers of
engines from
Russia

Russia and Ukraine in 2010–14 for indigenously designed
combat, advanced trainer and transport aircraft, and for naval ships.
It also produced British-, French- and German-designed engines for
combat aircraft, naval ships and armoured vehicles, mostly as part of
agreements that have been in place for decades.[37]
Cyberwarfare[edit]
Main article: Cyberwarfare in the People's Republic of China
There is a belief in the western military doctrines that the PLA have
already begun engaging countries using cyber-warfare.[38][39] There
has been a significant increase in the number of presumed Chinese
military initiated cyber events from 1999 to the present day.[40]
Cyberwarfare has gained recognition as a valuable technique because it
is an asymmetric technique that is a part of Chinese Information
Operations. As is written by two PLAGF Colonels, Qiao Liang and Wang
Xiangsui, "Methods that are not characterised by the use of the force
of arms, nor by the use of military power, nor even by the presence of
casualties and bloodshed, are just as likely to facilitate the
successful realisation of the war's goals, if not more so.[41]
While
China

China has long been suspected of cyber spying, on 24 May 2011
the PLA announced the existence of their cyber security squad.[42]
In February 2013, the media named "Comment Crew" as a hacker military
faction for China's People's Liberation Army.[43] In May 2014, a
Federal
Grand Jury
.jpg/440px-Grand_jury_at_Arcadia_Hotel_fire_(LOC).jpg)
Grand Jury in the United States indicted five Unit 61398
officers on criminal charges related to cyber attacks on private
companies.[44][45]
Nuclear weapons[edit]
Range of medium and intercontinental ballistic missiles (2006)
Main articles:
China

China and weapons of mass destruction and People's
Liberation Army Rocket Force
In 1955,
China

China decided to proceed with a nuclear weapons program. The
decision was made after the United States threatened the use of
nuclear weapons against
China

China should it take action against
Quemoy

Quemoy and
Matsu, coupled with the lack of interest of the Soviet Union for using
its nuclear weapons in defence of China.
After their first nuclear test (
China

China claims minimal Soviet assistance
before 1960) on 16 October 1964,
China

China was the first state to pledge
no-first-use of nuclear weapons. On 1 July 1966, the Second Artillery
Corps, as named by Premier Zhou Enlai, was formed. In 1967, China
tested a fully functional hydrogen bomb, only 32 months after China
had made its first fission device.
China

China thus produced the shortest
fission-to-fusion development known in history.
China

China became a major international arms exporter during the 1980s.
Beijing

Beijing joined the Middle East arms control talks, which began in July
1991 to establish global guidelines for conventional arms transfers,
and later announced that it would no longer participate because of the
US decision to sell 150 F-16A/B aircraft to
Taiwan

Taiwan on 2 September
1992.
It joined the
International Atomic Energy Agency

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1984 and
pledged to abstain from further atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons
in 1986.
China

China acceded to the nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty

Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)
in 1992 and supported its indefinite and unconditional extension in
1995.
Nuclear weapons

Nuclear weapons tests by
China

China ceased in 1996, when it signed
the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and agreed to seek an international
ban on the production of fissile nuclear weapons material.
In 1996,
China

China committed to provide assistance to unsafeguarded
nuclear facilities.
China

China attended the May 1997 meeting of the NPT
Exporters (Zangger) Committee as an observer and became a full member
in October 1997. The
Zangger Committee is a group which meets to list
items that should be subject to IAEA inspections if exported by
countries, which have, as
China

China has, signed the Non-Proliferation
Treaty. In September 1997,
China

China issued detailed nuclear export
control regulations.
China

China began implementing regulations establishing
controls over nuclear-related dual-use items in 1998.
China

China also has
decided not to engage in new nuclear co-operation with
Iran
.jpg/600px-Iran_Population_(1880-2016).jpg)
Iran (even
under safeguards), and will complete existing co-operation, which is
not of proliferation concern, within a relatively short period. Based
on significant, tangible progress with
China

China on nuclear
nonproliferation, President Clinton in 1998 took steps to bring into
force the 1985 US–
China

China Agreement on Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation.
Beijing

Beijing has deployed a modest ballistic missile force, including land
and sea-based intermediate-range and intercontinental ballistic
missiles (ICBMs). It was estimated in 2007 that
China

China has about
100–160 liquid fuelled ICBMs capable of striking the United States
with approximately 100–150 IRBMs able to strike
Russia

Russia or Eastern
Europe, as well as several hundred tactical SRBMs with ranges between
300 and 600 km.[46] Currently, the Chinese nuclear stockpile is
estimated to be between 50 and 75 land and sea based ICBM's.[47]
China's nuclear program follows a doctrine of minimal deterrence,
which involves having the minimum force needed to deter an aggressor
from launching a first strike. The current efforts of
China

China appear to
be aimed at maintaining a survivable nuclear force by, for example,
using solid-fuelled ICBMs in silos rather than liquid-fuelled
missiles. China's 2006 published deterrence policy states that they
will "uphold the principles of counterattack in self-defense and
limited development of nuclear weapons", but "has never entered, and
will never enter into a nuclear arms race with any country". It goes
on to describe that
China

China will never undertake a first strike, or use
nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear state or zone.[46] US
strategists, however, suggest that the Chinese position may be
ambiguous, and nuclear weapons may be used both to deter conventional
strikes/invasions on the Chinese mainland, or as an international
political tool – limiting the extent to which other nations can
coerce
China

China politically, an inherent, often inadvertent phenomenon in
international relations as regards any state with nuclear
capabilities.[48]
Space-based warfare[edit]
Main article: ASAT program of China
The PLA has deployed a number of space-based systems for military
purposes, including the imagery intelligence satellite systems like
the ZiYan series,[49] and the militarily designated JianBing series,
synthetic aperture satellites (SAR) such as JianBing-5, BeiDou
satellite navigation network, and secured communication satellites
with FENGHUO-1.[50]
The PLA is responsible for the Chinese space program. To date, all the
participants have been selected from members of the PLA Air Force.
China

China became the third country in the world to have sent a man into
space by its own means with the flight of
Yang Liwei

Yang Liwei aboard the
Shenzhou 5 spacecraft on 15 October 2003 and the flight of Fei
Junlong and
Nie Haisheng aboard Shenzhou 6 on 12 October 2005 and
Zhai Zhigang, Liu Boming, and
Jing Haipeng

Jing Haipeng aboard Shenzhou 7 on
25 September 2008.
The PLA started the development of an anti-ballistic and
anti-satellite system in the 1960s, code named Project 640, including
ground based lasers and anti-satellite missiles. On 11 January, 2007,
China

China conducted a successful test of an anti-satellite missile, with
an SC-19 class KKV.[51] Its anti ballistic missile test was also
successful.
The PLA has tested two types of hypersonic space vehicles, the
Shenglong Spaceplane and a new one built by
Chengdu

Chengdu Aircraft
Corporation.[52]
Military budget[edit]
Main article: Military budget of the People's Republic of China
Military spending in the
People's Liberation Army

People's Liberation Army has grown about 10
percent annually over the last 15 years.[53] The Stockholm
International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI, estimated China's
military expenditure for 2013 to $188.5 billion US.[54] China's
military budget for 2014 according to IHS Jane's, a defence industry
consulting and analysis company, will be $148 billion US,[55]
which is the second largest in the world. The United States military
budget for 2014 in comparison, is $574.9 billion US.,[56] which
is down from a high of $664.3 billion US in 2012. According to
SIPRI,
China

China became the world's third largest exporter of major arms
in 2010–14, an increase of 143 per cent from the period 2005–2009.
China

China supplied major arms to 35 states in 2010–14. A significant
percentage (just over 68 per cent) of Chinese exports went to three
countries: Pakistan, Bangladesh and Myanmar.
China

China also exported major
arms to 18 African states. Examples of China's increasing global
presence as an arms supplier in 2010–14 included deals with
Venezuela for armoured vehicles and transport and trainer aircraft,
with Algeria for three frigates, with Indonesia for the supply of
hundreds of anti-ship missiles and with Nigeria for the supply of a
number of unmanned combat aerial vehicles. Following rapid advances in
its arms industry,
China

China has become less dependent on arms imports,
which decreased by 42 per cent between 2005–2009 and 2010–14.[37]
China's rise in military spending come at a time when there are
tensions along the South
China

China Sea with territorial disputes involving
the Philippines, Vietnam, and Taiwan, as well as escalating tensions
between
China

China and Japan involving the disputed Diaoyu (Chinese
spelling) and Senkaku (Japanese spelling) islands.
Former-United States Secretary of Defense
Robert Gates

Robert Gates has urged China
to be more transparent about its military capabilities and intentions
and Chinese state media has agreed that there is a need to
"communicate more often and more effectively" about the issue. They do
not know if the intel is correct but they are risking it.[57][58] The
International Institute for Strategic Studies

International Institute for Strategic Studies in a 2011 report argued
that if spending trends continue
China

China will achieve military equality
with the United States in 15–20 years.[59]
Commercial interests[edit]
PLA Factory No. 6907, Wuhan. The white characters on the blue sign
roughly translate to: "Secret/Classified Area, Do Not Enter Unless
Invited."
Until the mid-1990s the PLA had extensive commercial enterprise
holdings in non-military areas, particularly real estate. Almost all
of these holdings were supposedly spun off in the mid-1990s. In most
cases, the management of the companies remained unchanged, with the
PLA officers running the companies simply retiring from the PLA to run
the newly formed private holding companies.[60]
The history of PLA involvement in commercial enterprises began in the
1950s and 1960s. Because of the socialist state-owned system and from
a desire for military self-sufficiency, the PLA created a network of
enterprises such as farms, guest houses, and factories intended to
financially support its own needs. One unintended side effect of the
Deng-era economic reforms was that many of these enterprises became
very profitable. For example, a military guest house intended for
soldier recreation could be easily converted into a profitable hotel
for civilian use. There were two main factors which increased PLA
commercial involvement in the 1990s. One was that running profitable
companies decreased the need for the state to fund the military from
the government budget. The second was that in an environment where
legal rules were unclear and political connections were important, PLA
influence was very useful.[citation needed]
By the early 1990s party officials and high military officials were
becoming increasingly alarmed at the military's commercial involvement
for a number of reasons. The military's involvement in commerce was
seen to adversely affect military readiness and spread corruption.
Further, there was great concern that having an independent source of
funding would lead to decreased loyalty to the party. The result of
this was an effort to spin off the PLA's commercial enterprises into
private companies managed by former PLA officers, and to reform
military procurement from a system in which the PLA directly controls
its sources of supply to a contracting system more akin to those of
Western countries. The separation of the PLA from its commercial
interests was largely complete by the year 2000. It was met with very
little resistance, as the spinoff was arranged in such a way that few
lost out.[60] The rapidly expanding CEFC
China

China Energy, that bought a
$9 billion stake in Russia's largest oil producer Rosneft,[61] is
linked to the PLA.[62][63]
Anthem[edit]
Military Anthem of the People's Liberation Army
March of the PLA (instrumental, shortened)
Problems playing this file? See media help.
The military anthem of the PLA is the Military Anthem of the People's
Liberation Army (Chinese: 中国人民解放军军歌; pinyin:
Zhōngguó Rénmín Jiěfàngjūn Jūngē). The Central Military
Commission adopted the song on July 25, 1988.
The lyrics of the anthem were written by Gong Mu and the music was
composed by Zheng Lücheng.
See also[edit]
China

China portal
War portal
2015
People's Republic of China

People's Republic of China military reform
China

China as an emerging superpower
Chinese Information Operations and Information Warfare
Chinese Intelligence Operations in the United States
Military Power of the
People's Republic of China

People's Republic of China Annual Report to
Congress
Ministry of National Defense of the People's Republic of China
National Revolutionary Army
New PLA
Type 07

Type 07 uniform
People's Liberation Army

People's Liberation Army (other)
Ranks of the People's Liberation Army

Ranks of the People's Liberation Army Ground Force
Republic of China

Republic of China Armed Forces
Timeline of Cox Report controversy
Titan Rain
References[edit]
^ IISS 2012, pp. 233–242.
^
http://www.janes.com/article/78395/china-announces-8-increase-in-defence-spending
^ Gertz, Bill (7 November 2016). "Report: China's Military
Capabilities Are Growing at a Shocking Speed". The National Interest.
The National Interest.
^ China's defence budget. "Deciphering China's latest defence budget
figures SIPRI". www.sipri.org. SIPRI.
^ "DoD Report: China's Military Investments Continue". U.S. DEPARTMENT
OF DEFENSE. U.S. Department of Defense.
^ Edward Wong; Jane Perlez; Chris Buckley (2 September 2015). "China
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^ Pamphlet number 30-51, Handbook on the Chinese Communist Army (PDF),
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^ The Political System of the People's Republic of China. Chief Editor
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ISBN 7-208-05566-1, Chapter 11 The State Military System.
^ News of the Communist Party of China, Hyperlink . Retrieved 28 March
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^
China

China establishes Rocket Force and Strategic Support Force - China
Military Online
^ 2012-06-21, New Chinese peacekeeping force arrives in Lebanon,
People's Daily
^ 2012-10-20, Chinese peacekeepers to Congo (K) win medals, PLA Daily
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China Economic and Security Review Commission
^ Bernard Yudkin Geoxavier, 2012-09-18,
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China as Peacekeeper: An
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China

China Daily
^ 在弘扬古田会议精神中铸牢军魂, Zài hóngyáng gǔtián
huìyì jīngshén zhōng zhù láo jūn hún
PLA Daily

PLA Daily 27 October
2014
^ The Political System of the People's Republic of China. Chief Editor
Pu Xingzu, Shanghai, 2005, Shanghai People's Publishing House.
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369–392.
^ John Pike. "Strict Changes Announced for
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_(cropped).jpg/440px-Xi_Jinping_October_2013_(cropped)_(cropped).jpg)
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^ "Who’s that 39-year-old paying HK$1.4 billion for three office
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Further reading[edit]
History
Dreyer, Edward L. (1995)
China

China at War 1901-1949 (reprint Routledge,
2014)
Jowett, Philip. (2013) China's Wars: Rousing the Dragon 1894-1949
(Bloomsbury Publishing, 2013).
Li, Xiaobing. (2007) A History of the Modern Chinese Army excerpt
Li, Xiaobing. (2012)
China

China at War: An Encyclopedia excerpt
William W. Whitson, with Chen-hsia Huang. (1973) The Chinese high
command; a history of Communist military politics, 1927-71. Foreword
by Lucian W. Pye.
Recent
You, Ji. China's Military Transformation (Polity Press, 2016). 256 pp.
online review
Wang, P. (2016). Military corruption in China: the role of guanxi in
the buying and selling of military positions. The
China

China Quarterly,
228, 970-991.
Fisher, Richard (2010). China's Military Modernization: Building for
Regional and Global Reach. Stanford Security Studies.
ISBN 0-8047-7195-2
James C. Mulvenon, Andrew N. D. Yang. The
People's Liberation Army

People's Liberation Army as
Organization Reference Volume v1.0, RAND.
Chinese Military Power Council on Foreign Relations Press, May 2003.
Roy Kamphausen, Andrew Scobell. Right Sizing the People's Liberation
Army Exploring the Contours of China's Military. The Strategic Studies
Institute of the US Army War College, September 2007.
Chinese Intelligence Agencies Intelligence Resource Program,
Federation of American Scientists.
International Institute for Strategic Studies; Hackett, James (ed.) (3
February 2010). The Military Balance 2010. London, England: Routledge.
ISBN 1-85743-557-5. CS1 maint: Extra text: authors list
(link)
Mandated by the FY2000 National Defense Authorization Act, this annual
report discusses China's military and security strategies,
technological advancements in its capabilities, military doctrine, and
security issues in the
Taiwan

Taiwan Strait.
The Military Power of the
People's Republic of China

People's Republic of China Annual Report to
Congress 2004, Office of the Secretary of Defense.
The Military Power of the
People's Republic of China

People's Republic of China Annual Report to
Congress 2005, Office of the Secretary of Defense.
The Military Power of the
People's Republic of China

People's Republic of China Annual Report to
Congress 2006, Office of the Secretary of Defense.
The Military Power of the
People's Republic of China

People's Republic of China Annual Report to
Congress 2007, Office of the Secretary of Defense.
The Military Power of the
People's Republic of China

People's Republic of China Annual Report to
Congress 2008, Office of the Secretary of Defense.
The Military Power of the
People's Republic of China

People's Republic of China Annual Report to
Congress 2009, Office of the Secretary of Defense.
The Military Power of the
People's Republic of China

People's Republic of China Annual Report to
Congress 2010, Office of the Secretary of Defense.
The Military Power of the
People's Republic of China

People's Republic of China Annual Report to
Congress 2011, Office of the Secretary of Defense.
The Military Power of the
People's Republic of China

People's Republic of China Annual Report to
Congress 2012, Office of the Secretary of Defense.
The Military Power of the
People's Republic of China

People's Republic of China Annual Report to
Congress 2013, Office of the Secretary of Defense.
The Military Power of the
People's Republic of China

People's Republic of China Annual Report to
Congress 2014, Office of the Secretary of Defense.
Annual Report to Congress 2015
Annual Report to Congress 2016
Andy Bunk. Forgotten A look at the changing roles of the Chinese
militia system in the Communist era from its inception to the present.
Scott Cooper. China's Path to Power Capability guidance, net
assessments and strategic policy development.
Andrew Scobell and Roy D. Kamphausen, editors. Right Sizing the
People's Liberation Army: Exploring the Contours of China's Military
(
Strategic Studies Institute

Strategic Studies Institute and The National Bureau of Asian
Research, September 2007)
Roy D. Kamphausen, Andrew Scobell and Travis Tanner, editors. The
"People" in the PLA: Recruitment, Training, and Education in China's
Military (
Strategic Studies Institute

Strategic Studies Institute and The National Bureau of Asian
Research, September 2008)
Roy Kamphausen, David Lai, Andrew Scobell, editors Beyond the Strait:
PLA Missions other than
Taiwan

Taiwan (
Strategic Studies Institute

Strategic Studies Institute and The
National Bureau of Asian Research, April 2009)
Kamphausen, Lai, and Scobell (ed.s). 'The PLA at Home and Abroad:
Assessing the Operational Capabilities of China's Military,' Strategic
Studies Institute, US Army War College, June 2010
Matthew Boswell. Media Relations in China's Military: The Case of the
Ministry of National Defense Information Office (Asia Policy, July
2009)
International Institute for Strategic Studies; Hackett, James (ed.) (7
March 2012). The Military Balance 2012. London, England: Routledge.
ISBN 1857436423. CS1 maint: Extra text: authors list (link)
External links[edit]
Wikimedia Commons has media related to People's Liberation Army.
Ministry of National Defense The People's Republic of China
PLA Daily

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China

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information and news on China's military power and defence industry,
including weapon systems, organisations, doctrines, etc.
China

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