The Pentagon Papers, officially titled United States – Vietnam
Relations, 1945–1967: A Study Prepared by the Department of Defense,
United States Department of Defense
United States Department of Defense history of the United States'
political and military involvement in
Vietnam from 1945 to 1967. The
papers were released by Daniel Ellsberg, who had worked on the study;
they were first brought to the attention of the public on the front
page of The
New York Times
New York Times in 1971. A 1996 article in The New
York Times said that the
Pentagon Papers had demonstrated, among other
things, that the Johnson Administration "systematically lied, not only
to the public but also to Congress".
More specifically, the papers revealed that the U.S. had secretly
enlarged the scope of its actions in the
Vietnam War with the bombings
Cambodia and Laos, coastal raids on North Vietnam, and
Marine Corps attacks, none of which were reported in the mainstream
For his disclosure of the Pentagon Papers, Ellsberg was initially
charged with conspiracy, espionage, and theft of government property,
but the charges were later dismissed after prosecutors investigating
Watergate scandal discovered that the staff members in the Nixon
White House had ordered the so-called
White House Plumbers
White House Plumbers to engage
in unlawful efforts to discredit Ellsberg.
In June 2011, the entirety of the
Pentagon Papers was declassified and
1.1 Actual objective of the
Vietnam War: Containment of China
1.2 Internal affairs of Vietnam
1.2.1 Role of the United States in the rise of President Diem
1.2.2 Role of the United States in the overthrow of Diem's regime
1.3 Proposed operations
2.1 The Nixon administration's restraint of the media
2.2 The Supreme Court allows further publication
2.3 Legal charges against Ellsberg
4 Full release in 2011
5 In films and television
6 See also
7.1 Works cited
8 Further reading
9 External links
Shortly after their release in June 1971, the
Pentagon Papers were
featured on the cover of TIME magazine for revealing "The Secret War"
of the United States in Vietnam.
Secretary of Defense
Robert McNamara created the
Vietnam Study Task
Force on June 17, 1967, for the purpose of writing an "encyclopedic
history of the
Vietnam War". McNamara claimed that he wanted to
leave a written record for historians, to prevent policy errors in
future administrations. McNamara neglected to inform either
Lyndon Johnson or Secretary of State
Dean Rusk about the
study. One report claimed that McNamara planned to give the work to
his friend Robert F. Kennedy, who sought the Democratic presidential
nomination in 1968. McNamara later denied this, although he
admitted that he should have informed Johnson and Rusk.
Instead of using existing
Defense Department historians, McNamara
assigned his close aide and
Assistant Secretary of Defense John T.
McNaughton to collect the papers. McNaughton died in a plane crash
one month after work began in June 1967, but the project continued
under the direction of
Defense Department official Leslie H. Gelb.
Thirty-six analysts—half of them active-duty military officers, the
rest academics and civilian federal employees—worked on the
study. The analysts largely used existing files in the Office of
the Secretary of Defense. In order to keep the study secret from
others, including National Security Advisor Walt W. Rostow, conducted
no interviews or consultations with the armed forces, with the White
House, or with other federal agencies.
McNamara left the
Defense Department in February 1968, and his
Clark M. Clifford
Clark M. Clifford received the finished study on January 15,
1969, five days before Richard Nixon's inauguration, although Clifford
claimed he never read it. The study consisted of 3,000 pages of
historical analysis and 4,000 pages of original government documents
in 47 volumes, and was classified as "Top Secret – Sensitive".
("Sensitive" is not an official security designation; it meant that
access to the study should be controlled.) The task force published 15
copies; the think tank
RAND Corporation received two of the copies
Morton Halperin and Paul Warnke, with access granted if at
least two of the three approved.
Actual objective of the
Vietnam War: Containment of China
China containment policy
As laid out by U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, the Chinese
containment policy of the United States was a long-run strategic
effort to surround
Beijing with the USSR, its satellite states, as
a) The Japan–
b) The India–
Pakistan front, and
Southeast Asia front
Lyndon B. Johnson
Lyndon B. Johnson stated that the aim of the
Vietnam War was to secure an "independent, non-
Vietnam", a January 1965 memorandum by Secretary of Defense Robert
McNamara stated that an underlying justification was "not to help a
friend, but to contain China".
On November 3, 1965, McNamara sent a memorandum to President Johnson,
in which he explained the "major policy decisions with respect to our
course of action in Vietnam". The memorandum begins by disclosing the
rationale behind the bombing of North
Vietnam in February 1965:
The February decision to bomb North
Vietnam and the July approval of
Phase I deployments make sense only if they are in support of a
long-run United States policy to contain China.
China of harboring imperial aspirations like those of
Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan. According to McNamara, the Chinese
were conspiring to "organize all of Asia" against the United States:
China—like Germany in 1917, like Germany in the West and
the East in the late 30's, and like the USSR in 1947—looms as a
major power threatening to undercut our importance and effectiveness
in the world and, more remotely but more menacingly, to organize all
of Asia against us.
To encircle the Chinese, the United States aimed to establish "three
fronts" as part of a "long-run effort to contain China":
There are three fronts to a long-run effort to contain China
(realizing that the USSR “contains”
China on the north and
(a) the Japan–
(b) the India–
Pakistan front; and
Southeast Asia front.
However, McNamara admitted that the containment of
ultimately sacrifice a significant amount of America's time, money and
Internal affairs of Vietnam
1950 (1950): The United States provided large-scale military
equipment to the French in its fight against the communist Viet
1954 (1954): The United States began to engage in "acts of
sabotage and terror warfare" in the defense of South
communist North Vietnam
1955 (1955): The United States encouraged and directly assisted
South Vietnamese President Ngô Đình Diệm's rise to power
1963 (1963): The United States encouraged and directly assisted
the overthrow of the South Vietnamese President Ngô Đình Diệm
August 2, 1964 (1964-08-02): Following the Gulf of
Tonkin incident, the United States manipulated public opinion in its
preparation for open warfare against a communist takeover of South
Years before the 2 August 1964
Gulf of Tonkin incident
Gulf of Tonkin incident occurred, the
U.S. government was indirectly or directly involved in Vietnam's
Under President Harry S. Truman, the U.S. government aided France in
its war against the communist-led
Viet Minh during the First Indochina
Under President Dwight D. Eisenhower, the U.S. government played a
"direct role in the ultimate breakdown of the Geneva settlement" in
1954 by supporting the fledgling South
Vietnam and covertly
undermining the communist country of North Vietnam.
Under President John F. Kennedy, the U.S. government transformed its
Vietnam from a limited "gamble" to a broad
Under President Lyndon B. Johnson, the U.S. government began waging
covert military operations against communist North
Vietnam in defense
of South Vietnam.
Role of the United States in the rise of President Diem
Dwight D. Eisenhower
Dwight D. Eisenhower greets South Vietnam's President
Ngo Dinh Diem, whose rise to power was backed by the United States,
according to the Pentagon Papers
In a section of the
Pentagon Papers titled "Kennedy Commitments and
Programs," America's commitment to South
Vietnam was attributed to the
creation of the country by the United States. As acknowledged by the
"We must note that South
Vietnam (unlike any of the other countries in
Southeast Asia) was essentially the creation of the United States.
In a sub-section titled "
Special American Commitment to Vietnam", the
papers emphasized once again the role played by the United States:
"Without U.S. support [Ngo Dinh] Diem almost certainly could not have
consolidated his hold on the South during 1955 and 1956."
"Without the threat of U.S. intervention, South
Vietnam could not have
refused to even discuss the elections called for in 1956 under the
Geneva settlement without being immediately overrun by the Viet Minh
"Without U.S. aid in the years following, the Diem regime certainly,
and an independent South
Vietnam almost as certainly, could not have
More specifically, the United States sent US$28.4 million worth of
equipment and supplies to help the Diem regime strengthen its army. In
addition, 32,000 men from South Vietnam's Civil Guard were trained by
the United States at a cost of US$12.7 million. It was hoped that
Diem's regime, after receiving a significant amount of U.S.
assistance, would be able to withstand the Viet Cong.
The papers identified General Edward Lansdale, who served in the
Office of Strategic Services
Office of Strategic Services (OSS) and worked for the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA), as a "key figure" in the establishment of
Ngo Dinh Diem
Ngo Dinh Diem as the President of South Vietnam, and the backing of
Diem's regime thereafter. As written by Lansdale in a 1961 memorandum:
"We (the U.S.) must support
Ngo Dinh Diem
Ngo Dinh Diem until another strong
executive can replace him legally."
Role of the United States in the overthrow of Diem's regime
The body of President Diệm after he was assassinated in the 1963
South Vietnamese coup, which was backed by the United States
According to the Pentagon Papers, the U.S. government played a key
role in the 1963 South Vietnamese coup, in which President Ngo Dinh
Diem was assassinated. While maintaining "clandestine contact" with
Vietnamese generals planning a coup, the U.S. cut off its aid to
President Diem and openly supported a successor government in what the
authors called an "essentially leaderless Vietnam":
"For the military coup d'etat against Ngo Dinh Diem, the U.S. must
accept its full share of responsibility. Beginning in August 1963 we
variously authorized, sanctioned and encouraged the coup efforts of
the Vietnamese generals and offered full support for a successor
In October we cut off aid to Diem in a direct rebuff, giving a green
light to the generals. We maintained clandestine contact with them
throughout the planning and execution of the coup and sought to review
their operational plans and proposed new government.
Thus, as the nine-year rule of Diem came to a bloody end, our
complicity in his overthrow heightened our responsibilities and our
commitment in an essentially leaderless Vietnam."
As early as 23 August 1963, an unnamed U.S. representative had met
with Vietnamese generals planning a coup against President Diem.
According to The New York Times, this U.S. representative was later
identified to be CIA agent Lucien Conein.
The Director of Central Intelligence, John A. McCone, proposed the
following categories of military action:
Category 1 – Air raids on major
Viet Cong supply centers, conducted
simultaneously by South Vietnam's air force and the United States Air
Force (codenamed Farmgate)
Category 2 – Cross-border raids on major
Viet Cong supply centers,
conducted by South Vietnamese units and US military advisors.
Category 3 – Limited air strikes on North Vietnamese targets by
unmarked planes flown exclusively by non-US aircrews.
However, McCone did not believe these military actions alone could
lead to an escalation of the situation because the "fear of escalation
would probably restrain the Communists". In a memorandum addressed
to President Johnson on July 28, 1964, McCone explained:
In response to the first or second categories of action, local
Communist military forces in the areas of actual attack would react
vigorously, but we believe that none of the
Communist powers involved
would respond with major military moves designed to change the nature
of the conflict...
Air strikes on North
Vietnam itself (
Category 3) would evoke sharper
Communist reactions than air strikes confined to targets in Laos, but
even in this case fear of escalation would probably restrain the
Communists from a major military response..."
Barely a month after the
Gulf of Tonkin incident
Gulf of Tonkin incident on August 2, 1964,
National Security Advisor
McGeorge Bundy warned that further
provocations should not be undertaken until October, when the
government of South
Vietnam (GVN) would become fully prepared for a
full-scale war against North Vietnam. In a memorandum addressed to
President Johnson on September 8, 1964, Bundy wrote:
The main further question is the extent to which we should add
elements to the above actions that would tend deliberately to provoke
a DRV reaction, and consequent retaliation by us.
Examples of actions to be considered were running US naval patrols
increasingly close to the North Vietnamese coast and/or [sic]
associating them with 34A operations.
We believe such deliberately provocative elements should not be added
in the immediate future while the GVN is still struggling to its feet.
By early October, however, we may recommend such actions depending on
GVN progress and
Communist reaction in the meantime, especially to US
While maritime operations played a key role in the provocation of
North Vietnam, U.S. military officials had initially proposed to fly a
Lockheed U-2 reconnaissance aircraft over the country, but this was to
be replaced by other plans.
Daniel Ellsberg knew the leaders of the task force well. He had worked
as an aide to McNaughton from 1964 to 1965, had worked on the study
for several months in 1967, and Gelb and Halperin approved his access
to the work at RAND in 1969. Now opposing the war, Ellsberg and his
friend Anthony Russo photocopied the study in October 1969
intending to disclose it. Ellsberg approached Nixon's National
Security Advisor Henry Kissinger, Senators
William Fulbright and
George McGovern, and others, but none were interested.
In February 1971, Ellsberg discussed the study with The New York Times
reporter Neil Sheehan, and gave 43 of the volumes to him in March.
Before publication, The
New York Times
New York Times sought legal advice. The
paper's regular outside counsel, Lord Day & Lord, advised against
publication, but in-house counsel
James Goodale prevailed with his
argument that the press had a First Amendment right to publish
information significant to the people's understanding of their
New York Times
New York Times began publishing excerpts on June 13, 1971; the
first article in the series was titled "
Vietnam Archive: Pentagon
Study Traces Three Decades of Growing US Involvement". The study was
Pentagon Papers during the resulting media
publicity. Street protests, political controversy, and lawsuits
To ensure the possibility of public debate about the papers' content,
on June 29, US Senator Mike Gravel, an Alaska Democrat, entered 4,100
pages of the papers into the record of his Subcommittee on Public
Buildings and Grounds. These portions of the papers, which were edited
for Gravel by
Howard Zinn and Noam Chomsky, were subsequently
published by Beacon Press, the publishing arm of the Unitarian
Universalist Association of Congregations. A federal grand jury
was subsequently empaneled to investigate possible violations of
federal law in the release of the report. Leonard Rodberg, a Gravel
aide, was subpoenaed to testify about his role in obtaining and
arranging for publication of the Pentagon Papers. Gravel asked the
court (in Gravel v. United States) to quash the subpoena on the basis
Speech or Debate Clause
Speech or Debate Clause in Article I, Section 6 of the United
That clause provides that "for any Speech or Debate in either House,
[a Senator or Representative] shall not be questioned in any other
Place", meaning that Gravel could not be prosecuted for anything said
on the Senate floor, and, by extension, for anything entered to the
Congressional Record, allowing the papers to be publicly read without
threat of a treason trial and conviction. When Gravel's request was
reviewed by the U.S. Supreme Court, the Court denied the request to
extend this protection to Gravel or his legislative aide, Leonard
Rodberg, because the grand jury subpoena served on them related to a
third party rather than any act they themselves committed for the
preparation of materials later entered into the Congressional Record.
Nevertheless, the grand jury investigation was halted, and the
publication of the papers was never prosecuted.
Later, Ellsberg said the documents "demonstrated unconstitutional
behavior by a succession of presidents, the violation of their oath
and the violation of the oath of every one of their subordinates."
He added that he leaked the Papers to end what he perceived to be "a
The Nixon administration's restraint of the media
President Nixon at first planned to do nothing about publication of
the study since it embarrassed the Johnson and Kennedy administrations
rather than his. But
Henry Kissinger convinced the president that not
opposing the publication set a negative precedent for future
secrets. The administration argued Ellsberg and Russo were guilty
of a felony under the Espionage Act of 1917, because they had no
authority to publish classified documents. After failing to
persuade the Times to voluntarily cease publication on June 14,
John N. Mitchell
John N. Mitchell and Nixon obtained a federal court
injunction forcing the Times to cease publication after three
articles. Times publisher
Arthur Ochs Sulzberger
Arthur Ochs Sulzberger said:
Newspapers, as our editorial said this morning, were really [(sic),
possibly "revealing"] a part of history that should have been made
available, considerably longer ago. I just didn't feel there was any
breach of national security, in the sense that we were giving secrets
to the enemy.
The newspaper appealed the injunction, and the case
New York Times
New York Times Co.
v. United States (403 U.S. 713) quickly rose through the U.S. legal
system to the Supreme Court.
On June 18, 1971,
The Washington Post
The Washington Post began publishing its own series
of articles based upon the Pentagon Papers; Ellsberg had given
portions to the Post reporter Ben Bagdikian. Bagdikian brought the
information to editor Ben Bradlee. That day, Assistant U.S. Attorney
William Rehnquist asked the Post to cease publication. After
the paper refused, Rehnquist sought an injunction in U.S. district
Murray Gurfein declined to issue such an injunction,
writing that "[t]he security of the Nation is not at the ramparts
alone. Security also lies in the value of our free institutions. A
cantankerous press, an obstinate press, a ubiquitous press must be
suffered by those in authority to preserve the even greater values of
freedom of expression and the right of the people to know." The
government appealed that decision, and on June 26 the Supreme Court
agreed to hear it jointly with the
New York Times
New York Times case. Fifteen
other newspapers received copies of the study and began publishing
The Supreme Court allows further publication
New York Times
New York Times Co. v. United States
On June 30, 1971, the Supreme Court decided, 6–3, that the
government failed to meet the heavy burden of proof required for prior
restraint injunction. The nine justices wrote nine opinions
disagreeing on significant, substantive matters.
Only a free and unrestrained press can effectively expose deception in
government. And paramount among the responsibilities of a free press
is the duty to prevent any part of the government from deceiving the
people and sending them off to distant lands to die of foreign fevers
and foreign shot and shell.
— Justice Black
Thomas Tedford and Dale Herbeck summarized the reaction of editors and
journalists at the time:
As the press rooms of the Times and the Post began to hum to the
lifting of the censorship order, the journalists of America pondered
with grave concern the fact that for fifteen days the 'free press' of
the nation had been prevented from publishing an important document
and for their troubles had been given an inconclusive and uninspiring
'burden-of-proof' decision by a sharply divided Supreme Court. There
was relief, but no great rejoicing, in the editorial offices of
America's publishers and broadcasters.
— Tedford and Herbeck, pp. 225–226.
Legal charges against Ellsberg
Ellsberg surrendered to authorities in Boston, and admitted that he
had given the papers to the press: "I felt that as an American
citizen, as a responsible citizen, I could no longer cooperate in
concealing this information from the American public. I did this
clearly at my own jeopardy and I am prepared to answer to all the
consequences of this decision". He was indicted by a grand jury in
Los Angeles on charges of stealing and holding secret documents.
Federal District Judge
William Matthew Byrne, Jr. declared a mistrial
and dismissed all charges against Ellsberg and Russo on May 11, 1973,
after it was revealed that: agents acting on the orders of the Nixon
administration illegally broke into the office of Ellsberg's
psychiatrist and attempted to steal files; representatives of the
Nixon administration approached the Ellsberg trial judge with an offer
of the job of FBI directorship; several irregularities appeared in the
government's case including its claim that it had lost records of
illegal wiretapping against Ellsberg conducted by the White House
Plumbers in the contemporaneous Watergate scandal. Byrne ruled: "The
totality of the circumstances of this case which I have only briefly
sketched offend a sense of justice. The bizarre events have incurably
infected the prosecution of this case." Ellsberg and Russo were freed
due to the mistrial; they were not acquitted of violating the
In March 1972, political scientist Samuel L. Popkin, then assistant
professor of Government at Harvard University, was jailed for a week
for his refusal to answer questions before a grand jury investigating
Pentagon Papers case, during a hearing before the
District Court. The Faculty Council later passed a resolution
condemning the government's interrogation of scholars on the grounds
that "an unlimited right of grand juries to ask any question and to
expose a witness to citations for contempt could easily threaten
Gelb estimated that the Times only published about 5% of the study's
7,000 pages. The
Beacon Press edition was also incomplete. Halperin,
who had originally classified the study as secret, obtained most of
the unpublished portions under the Freedom of Information Act and the
University of Texas
University of Texas published them in 1983. The National Security
Archive published the remaining portions in 2002. The study itself
remained formally classified until 2011.
The Papers revealed that the United States had expanded its war with
the bombing of
Cambodia and Laos, coastal raids on North Vietnam, and
Marine Corps attacks, none of which had been reported by the American
media. The most damaging revelations in the papers revealed that
four administrations (Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson), had
misled the public regarding their intentions. For example, the
Eisenhower administration actively worked against the Geneva Accords.
John F. Kennedy
John F. Kennedy administration knew of plans to overthrow South
Ngo Dinh Diem
Ngo Dinh Diem before his death in a November 1963
coup. President Johnson had decided to expand the war while promising
"we seek no wider war" during his 1964 presidential campaign,
including plans to bomb North
Vietnam well before the 1964 Election.
President Johnson had been outspoken against doing so during the
election and claimed that his opponent
Barry Goldwater was the one
that wanted to bomb North Vietnam.
In another example, a memo from the
Defense Department under the
Johnson Administration listed the reasons for American persistence:
"70% – To avoid a humiliating U.S. defeat.
20% – To keep [South Vietnam] (and the adjacent) territory from
10% – To permit the people [of South Vietnam] to enjoy a better,
freer way of life.
ALSO – To emerge from the crisis without unacceptable taint from
NOT – To help a friend"
Another controversy was that President Johnson sent combat troops to
Vietnam by July 17, 1965, before pretending to consult his advisors on
July 21–27, per the cable stating that "Deputy Secretary of Defense
Cyrus Vance informs McNamara that President had approved 34 Battalion
Plan and will try to push through reserve call-up." In 1988, when
that cable was declassified, it revealed "there was a continuing
uncertainty as to [Johnson's] final decision, which would have to
await Secretary McNamara's recommendation and the views of
Congressional leaders, particularly the views of Senator [Richard]
Nixon's Solicitor General
Erwin N. Griswold
Erwin N. Griswold later called the Papers an
example of "massive overclassification" with "no trace of a threat to
the national security." The Papers' publication had little or no
effect on the ongoing war because they dealt with documents written
years before publication.
After the release of the Pentagon Papers, Goldwater said:
During the campaign, President Johnson kept reiterating that he would
never send American boys to fight in Vietnam. As I say, he knew at the
time that American boys were going to be sent. In fact, I knew about
ten days before the Republican Convention. You see I was being called
trigger-happy, warmonger, bomb happy, and all the time Johnson was
saying, he would never send American boys, I knew damn well he
Senator Birch Bayh, who thought the publishing of the Pentagon Papers
was justified, said:
The existence of these documents, and the fact that they said one
thing and the people were led to believe something else, is a reason
we have a credibility gap today, the reason people don't believe the
government. This is the same thing that's been going on over the last
two-and-a-half years of this administration. There is a difference
between what the President says and what the government actually does,
and I have confidence that they are going to make the right decision,
if they have all the facts.
Full release in 2011
On May 4, 2011 the National Archives and Records Administration
announced that the papers would be declassified and released to the
Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum in Yorba Linda,
California on June 13, 2011. The release date included the
Nixon, Kennedy, and Johnson Libraries and the Archives office in
College Park, Maryland.
The full release was coordinated by the Archives's National
Declassification Center (NDC) as a special project to mark the
anniversary of the report. The NDC worked with the agencies having
classification control over the material to prevent the redaction of
the last 11 words of the
Pentagon Papers that would not have been made
available. It is unknown which 11 words were at issue.
The Archives released each volume of the Papers as a separate PDF
file, available on their website.
In films and television
Pentagon Papers (2003), directed by
Rod Holcomb and Executive
Produced by Joshua D. Maurer, is a historical film made for FX, in
Paramount Television and City Entertainment, about
Pentagon Papers and Daniel Ellsberg's involvement in their
publication. The film represents Ellsberg's life, beginning with his
work for RAND Corp. and ending with the day on which his espionage
trial was declared a mistrial by a federal court judge. The film
starred James Spader, Paul Giamatti, Alan Arkin, and Claire Forlani.
The Most Dangerous Man in America:
Daniel Ellsberg and the Pentagon
Papers (2009) is an Oscar nominated documentary film, directed by
Judith Ehrlich and Rick Goldsmith, that follows Ellsberg and explores
the events leading up to the publication of the Pentagon Papers.
Daniel Ellsberg Secrets –
Vietnam and the Pentagon Papers". Voices.
UCSB Arts & Lectures. January 2003. "In 1971 Defense
Department analyst, former U.S. Marine company commander and
Daniel Ellsberg leaked the
Pentagon Papers to the
media. In this talk, Ellsberg presents an explosive inside account of
how and why he helped bring an end to the
Vietnam War and Richard
Nixon's presidency. He also talks about the current potential for war
with Iraq and why he feels that would be a major mistake for the
United States." Series: Voices [1/2003] [Public Affairs] [Humanities]
[Show ID: 7033]"
The Post (2017) is a historical drama film directed and co-produced by
Steven Spielberg from a script written by Liz Hannah and Josh Singer
about a pair of Washington Post employees who battle the federal
government over their right to publish the Pentagon Papers. The film
Tom Hanks as
Ben Bradlee and
Meryl Streep as Katharine Graham.
Daniel Ellsberg is played by Matthew Rhys.
"The Pentagon Papers,
Daniel Ellsberg and The Times". POV. PBS.
October 5, 2010. "On September 13, 2010, the New York Times
Community Affairs Department and POV presented a panel discussion on
the Pentagon Papers, Daniel Ellsberg, and the Times. The conversation,
featuring Daniel Ellsberg, Max Frankel, former New York Times
executive editor, and Adam Liptak,
New York Times
New York Times Supreme Court
reporter, was moderated by Jill Abramson, managing editor of The New
York Times" and former Washington bureau chief, marking the 35th
anniversary of the Supreme Court ruling. Live podcast
United States portal
Freedom of speech portal
Global surveillance disclosures
James L. Greenfield
United States diplomatic cables leak
^ "The Pentagon Papers". 1971 Year in Review. UPI. 1971. Retrieved
^ Sheehan, Neil (1971-06-13). "
Vietnam Archive: Pentagon Study Traces
3 Decades of Growing U.S. Involvement". The New York Times. New York.
^ Apple, R.W. (1996-06-23). "Pentagon Papers". The New York Times. New
York. Retrieved 2013-10-23.
^ a b Frum, David (2000). How We Got Here: The '70s. New York, New
York: Basic Books. p. 43. ISBN 0-465-04195-7.
^ "The Watergate Story". The Washington Post. Retrieved 26 October
2013. Watergate prosecutors find a memo addressed to John Ehrlichman
describing in detail the plans to burglarize the office of Pentagon
Papers defendant Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist, The Post
^ "Pentagon Papers". History (U.S. TV channel). Retrieved 26 October
^ a b c d e McNamara 1996, p. 280
^ McNamara 1996, p. 256
^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q Correll, John T. "The Pentagon
Papers" Air Force Magazine, February 2007.
^ a b McNamara 1996, p. 282
^ a b "COVER STORY: Pentagon Papers: The Secret War". CNN. Retrieved
26 October 2013.
^ a b c d
Robert McNamara (November 3, 1965). "Draft Memorandum From
Secretary of Defense McNamara to President Johnson". Office of the
^ a b c d e f g h NEIL SHEEHAN (June 13, 1971). "
Pentagon Study Traces 3 Decades of Growing U.S. Involvement". The New
^ a b c d e "Evolution of the War. Counterinsurgency: The Kennedy
Commitments and Programs, 1961" (PDF). National Archives and Records
Administration. Retrieved 28 October 2013.
^ a b "The Pentagon Papers, Vol. 2, Chapter 4, "The Overthrow of Ngo
Dinh Diem, May-November, 1963"" (PDF). National Archives and Records
Administration. Retrieved 2013-10-28.
^ Tim Weiner (June 7, 1998). "Lucien Conein, 79, Legendary Cold War
Spy". The New York Times. He ran agents behind the Iron Curtain in the
early 1950's. He was the C.I.A.'s contact with friendly generals in
Vietnam as the long war took shape there. He was the man through whom
the United States gave the generals tacit approval as they planned the
assassination of South Vietnam's President, Ngo Dinh Diem, in November
^ a b c d e
John A. McCone (July 28, 1964). "Probable Communist
Reactions to Certain US or US-Sponsored Courses of Action in Vietnam
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"Battle for the Pentagon Papers". Top Secret. a resource site
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