Operation Frühlingserwachen

Operation Spring Awakening (german: Unternehmen Frühlingserwachen) was the last major German offensive of World War II. The operation was referred to in Germany as the Plattensee offensive and in the Soviet Union as the Balaton defensive operation. It took place in Western Hungary on the Eastern Front and lasted from 6 March until 15 March, 1945. The objective was to secure the last significant oil reserves still available to the European Axis powers and prevent the Red Army from advancing towards Vienna. It was a failure for Nazi Germany.

The operation, initially planned for 5 March, began after German units were moved in great secrecy to the Lake Balaton (german: Plattensee) area. Many German units were involved, including the 6th Panzer Army and its subordinate Waffen-SS divisions after being withdrawn from the failed Ardennes offensive on the Western Front. The Germans attacked in three prongs: ''Frühlingserwachen'' in the Balaton-Lake Velence-Danube area, ''Eisbrecher'' south of Lake Balaton, and ''Waldteufel'' south of the Drava-Danube triangle. The advance stalled on 15 March, and on 16 March the Red Army and allied units began their delayed Vienna offensive.

Background

On 12 January Hitler received confirmation that the Soviet Red Army had begun a massive winter offensive through Poland named the Vistula–Oder offensive. Hitler ordered OB West Field Marshal Gerd Von Rundstedt to withdraw the following units from active combat in the Battle of the Bulge: I SS Panzer Corps with 1st SS Panzer Division Leibstandarte and 12th SS Panzer Division Hitlerjugend, along with II SS Panzer Corps with 2nd SS Panzer Division Das Reich and 9th SS Panzer Division Hohenstaufen. These units were to be refitted by 30 January and attached to the 6th Panzer Army under the command of Sepp Dietrich for the upcoming Operation Spring Awakening. Hitler wanted to secure the extremely vital Nagykanizsa oil fields of southern Hungary, as this was the most strategically valuable asset remaining on the Eastern Front. The deadline of 30 January proved impossible for refitting to be completed.

As Operation Spring Awakening would be of great importance, lengthy preparation and strategic care was taken so as to not reveal the offensive. But while the 6th Panzer Army was refitting in Germany, Hitler ordered a preliminary offensive with a similar object to be conducted, resulting in Operation Konrad III beginning 18 January. The objectives of Konrad III included relieving besieged Budapest and the recapturing of the Transdanubia region. By 21 January, only 5 days into Operation Konrad III, the Germans had taken the towns of Dunapentele and Adony which are on the Western shore of the Danube. Their push resulted in the annihilation of the Soviet 7th Mechanized Corps. This sudden and savage push caused the Soviet command to actually contemplate an evacuation to the opposite shore. Before the end of the 4th day, the Germans had recaptured 400 square kilometers of territory, an achievement comparable to the initial German gains during the Ardennes offensive and the Western Front in December 1944. At the height of Operation Konrad III, February 26, the Axis front lines had reached within 20 km of Buda's Southern perimeter, and within about 10 km the Northern perimeter, but their forces were exhausted.

From 27 January through 15 February, the Soviets conducted numerous successful counter-attacks, forcing the Germans to give up the greater portion of their territorial gains, pushing the front line back to the area between Lake Velence, the village of Csősz, and Lake Balaton. This area had the Margit Line running right through it, and would see more fighting in the upcoming Operation Spring Awakening. By mid-February, the Soviet bridgehead across the Garam River (Hron was identified as a threat. This bridgehead would jeopardize the upcoming Spring Awakening's South-Eastern push past Lake Balaton to secure the southern Hungarian oilfields while also exposing a straight route towards Vienna. Thus beginning on 17 February, Operation Southwind began the effort to secure the Garam bridgehead from the 2nd Ukrainian Front, and by 24 February the task was successfully achieved, proving to be the very last successful German offensive of the war.

German plan

Creation of Operation Spring Awakening

During a Situation Conference on 7 January, 1945 at which both Hermann Göring and OB West Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt were present, Hitler proposed his intention of pulling the 6th SS Panzer Army to form a reserve due to severe Allied air attacks. Von Rundstedt received the withdrawal orders on January 8, and the Panzer Army's divisions began preparations to withdraw from the Front. The slow withdrawal was greatly hampered by Allied air superiority.

On 12 January, the Soviet 1st Ukrainian and 1st Belorussian Fronts began their Vistula–Oder offensive with over 2 million men placing considerable new pressure on the Eastern Front. When this news reached Hitler, he immediately began to plan a major offensive on this Front. Meanwhile, during 14 January on the Western Front, the 2nd and 9th SS Panzer divisions had to be recommitted back from reserves due to successful Allied fighting. On 20 January, Hitler ordered Von Rundstedt to withdraw forces from the ongoing Battle of the Bulge; the 1st SS, 2nd SS and 12th SS Divisions managed to disengage and withdraw the same day. Almost all support units of the 6th SS Panzer Army were pulled from the Ardennes by 22 January, while the 9th SS Panzer Division was the last to leave on 23 January.

On this same day, 22 January, Hitler decided that the 6th SS Panzer Army should not be sent back to the Western Front, but rather to Hungary, a view Heinz Guderian ( OKH) partially agreed with; Guderian wanted the 6th SS Panzer Army on the Eastern Front, but mainly to protect Berlin. A glimpse of the ensuing verbal exchange during this argument was captured in Alfred Jodl's ( OKW) post-war interrogation where he quotes Hitler saying: "''You want to attack without oil – good, we'll see what happens when you attempt that''".

However, the main reason for sending the 6th SS Panzer Army south into Hungary can be understood through the list of main strategic points listed in a Situation in the East conference held on January 23: 1) The Hungarian oil region and Vienna oil region which made up 80% of reserves, without which the war effort could not be continued; 2) the Danzig estuary vital for U-boat operations and Upper Silesian industrial region for the war economy and coal production. Two quotes illustrate how seriously Hitler viewed this ruling: “''Hitler considered the protection of Vienna and Austria as of vital importance and that he would rather see Berlin fall than lose the Hungarian oil area and Austria''”, "''He'' itler''accepted the risk of the Russian threat to the Oder east of Berlin''".

On 27 January, Guderian was tasked by Hitler to stop the 3rd Ukrainian Front in the vicinity on the Margit Line in order to protect the vital oil fields. The following day, 28 January, this operation received its preliminary name, Operation Süd (G: South). The main objectives of the operation were as follows: 1) the security of vital raw materials such as oil, bauxite, and manganese for iron, 2) arable land for food and crops, the Austrian military industrial complex, and the city of Vienna, 3) to stop the Soviet Advance. Interestingly, an additional side-objective was the hope that serious pressure on the Southern Soviet Fronts in Hungary would force the Soviet Command to divert some forces from its northern offensives headed to Berlin towards Hungary.

Operation Süd was scheduled to start after a path to Budapest had been established. The operation would be considered a success if 1) Operation Konrad III could pin the Soviets between the Vértes mountains and the Danube, 2) the 8th Army could secure its Front in Northern Hungary, 3) if the incoming panzer armies could be refitted during transit to create the advantage of surprise.

Four plans for Operation Süd were produced by high-ranking officials from Army Group South, the 6th SS Panzer Army, and the 6th Army: “Lösung A” by Fritz Krämer of the 6th SS Panzer Army; “Lösung B” and “Lösung C2” by Helmuth Von Grolman of Army Group South; and “Lösung C1” by Heinrich Gaedcke of the 6th Army. There was much fighting and bickering as to which plan should be implemented. The commander of Army Group South, Otto Wöhler, chose “Lösung B”.

The four plans were sent to Guderian on 22 February for review, and Army Group South informed Army Group F commander Maximilian von Weichs on 23 February that the operation would commence on 5 March, in anticipation that Operation Südwind (G: South Wind) would have finished successfully by 24 February. If Operation Südwind was successful, Operation Süd's start could be deferred by 8–9 days. On 25 February, Hitler ordered Otto Wöhler, Maximilian von Weichs, and Sepp Dietrich to personally present the plans for Operation Süd to him, along with Guderian ( OKH) and Alfred Jodl ( OKW), at the Reich Chancellery in Berlin, where he ultimately chose “Lösung C2”. Guderian then ordered Otto Wöhler to increase the daily fuel allowance from 400 to 500 cubic meters (400k to 500k liters) of fuel on February 26, and by February 28 the specifics of the operation, now officially named “Operation Frühlingserwachen” (G:Spring Awakening), were completed. As per “Lösung C2”, 3 offensive prongs were planned, with the main attack of the 6th Army and 6th SS Panzer Army “Frühlingserwachen” being directed towards the Danube through Lakes Velence and Balaton; the 2nd Panzer Army’s “Eisbrecher” (G: Icebreaker) attacking eastward from the western end of Lake Balaton; and the LXXXXI Corps’ “Waldteufel” (G: Forest Devil) attacking north from the Drava River.

Overarching German military structure

OKW (''Oberkommando der Wehrmacht)'' was the overarching military command for the German army in WW2, while the OKH (''Oberkommando des Heeres)'' was officially a high command operating under OKW. Adolf Hitler was the Commander-in-chief of OKH, while also being the supreme commander of OKW. Finding itself issuing more and more direct orders, OKW eventually became responsible for Western and Southern commands, while OKH was responsible for Eastern commands. This operational overlap caused by the centralized command led to disagreements, shortages, waste, inefficiencies, and delays, often escalating to the point where Hitler himself would have to give the final ruling on a matter.

For Operation Spring Awakening, the area for the new offensive was set on the borderline between OKW (Army Group F) and OKH (Army Group South), and this would cause troubles. Army Group E wanted to assemble its troops north of the Drava River by February 25, but Army Group South was not prepared to start the offensive this early due to the ongoing Operation Southwind; subsequently, the OKW and Hitler grew more impatient. The chosen course of action on 25 February, "Lösung C2", favored the quicker and farther-reaching joint operation of the 2nd Panzer Army and 6th SS Panzer Army, while "Lösung B" opted to first secure the left flank of the main thrust "Frühlingserwachen" (between Lake Velence and the Danube) before moving south toward the 2nd Panzer army. Guderian was in favor of "Lösung C2" because this plan would shorten the time the 6th SS Panzer Division would need to stay in Hungary. The OKW and OKH did not use common terminology for parts of the offensive, as OKH referred to the entire offensive as Frühlingserwachen, while the OKW referred to the operation attacking north of the Drava as "Waldteufel".

Army Group South and the OKH could not agree on how to best utilize the 1st Cavalry Corps. OKH wanted to send the Corps south-west to the 2nd Panzer army, a move Army Group South Commander Otto Wöhler saw of little use since the 2nd Panzer army would have a lower chance of success compared to the main attacking thrust of “Frühlingserwachen”. Wöhler wanted to use the 1st Cavalry Corps on the eastern shore of Lake Balaton, as German intelligence reported that "''the enemy is still the weakest between Lake Balaton and the Sárviz Channel''".

To further complicate matters, due to the limited number of newly trained personnel this late in the war, units under Waffen-SS command were often kept at acceptable capacity levels using Wehrmacht personnel. For instance, only 1/3 of the 6th SS Panzer Army's staff were actually from the Waffen-SS.

Arrival into the Hungarian theater

When withdrawing from the Western Front, elements of the III. Flak-Korps were tasked with protecting the 6th SS Panzer Army while en route to Zossen south of Berlin. From here the units' possible de-training locations would seem to be the cities along the Oder River, however this was a calculated misinformation measure to confuse enemy forces who actually attacked these cities. The real plan for the units of 6th SS Panzer Army was to travel south through Vienna to their first Hungarian destination, the city of Győr and its surrounding area. Other units from other armies were also sent to the Hungarian theater, for example the 16th SS Panzer Grenadier Division Reichsführer-SS who was brought up from Italy through the Brenner straight and sent to the 2nd Panzer Army. Some units necessary for the major offensive did not arrive in Hungary until just a few days before its start, the last being the 9th SS Panzer Division Hohenstaufen arriving in Győr at the beginning of March. Many of the incoming units also received cover names to help further mask the build-up of forces from the enemy.

By 7 February, on orders of Hitler, strict secrecy rulings were put into place: death penalty for command infractions, license plates were to be covered, insignia on vehicles and uniforms to be covered, no reconnaissance in forward combat areas, unit movements only by night or overcast conditions, no radio traffic, and the units were not to appear on situation maps.

Prior to these measures, on 30 January, 1st SS Panzer Division Leibstandarte was ordered to follow many of the same secrecy measures, including the temporary removal of their cuff titles.

Objectives of the German forces

As per the selected "Lösung C2", the Germans planned to attack Soviet General Fyodor Tolbukhin's 3rd Ukrainian Front. On 27 February, Army Group South hosted a Chiefs-of-Staff conference to which the Chiefs-of-staff of the 2nd Panzer Army, 6th SS Panzer Army, 6th Army, 8th Army, and Luftflotte 4 attended; here the plans for Operation Spring Awakening were laid out. The offensive would consist of four forces, three were to be attack forces while one was to be a defense force. Below are the units under their respective command as discussed on 27 February.

On 28 February, the start date for Operation Spring Awakening was finally moved back to 6 March, though many commanders felt that a greater delay was necessary. During the first days of March, alarming reports about road and terrain conditions due to the spring thaw flooded Army Group South Headquarters. Such thaws had previously badly affected 3 other operations in the area: planned Operation Spätlese in December, Operation Southwind, and the “Waldteufel” attack forcing a change of location for the attack bridgehead from Osijek to Donji Miholjac. Despite the start of the operation being so close, some additional plans were thought up to help the sluggish assembly speeds of incoming units. On 3 March, the 6th SS Panzer Army suggested that a naval assault across Lake Balaton itself could be implemented to help the 1st Cavalry Corps on the southeastern edge, but this turned out to be impossible as the spring storms had blown the pack ice against the southern shore. On 5 March, the 6th SS Panzer Army took over command of the Hungarian II Corps, along with its 20th Hungarian Division and 9th replacement Division, hereby becoming responsible for the northern shore of Lake Balaton.

The 6th Panzer Army was responsible for the primary thrust of the offensive, “Frühlingserwachen”. It was to advance from an area north of Lake Balaton, through the two lakes (Balaton and Velence), and southeast to capture territory from the Sió Channel to the Danube. After reaching the Danube, one part of the army would turn north creating a northern spearhead and move along the Danube River to retake Budapest, which had been captured on 13 February 1945. Another part of 6th SS Panzer Army would then turn south and create a southern spearhead. The southern spearhead would move along the Sió to link up with units from German Army Group E, which was to thrust north through Mohács. However, the commanding staff of Army Group E was pessimistic about the LXXXXI Corps' ability to reach Mohács due to the unfavorable terrain and sole dependence on infantry. Nonetheless, if successful, it was envisioned that the meeting of Army Group E's “Waldteufel” and the 6th SS Panzer Army's “Frühlingserwachen” would encircle both the Soviet 26th Army and the Soviet 57th Army.

The 6th Army would join the 6th SS Panzer Army in its thrust southeast to the Danube, then turn north to cover the flank of “Frühlingserwachen”. The 2nd Panzer Army's “Eisbrecher” would advance from an area southwest of Lake Balaton and progress towards Kaposvár to engage the Soviet 57th Army. All this time, the Hungarian Third Army would hold the area west of Budapest along the Vértes Mountains.

Soviet preparation

Interrupted Soviet offensive preparations

On 17 February 1945, the Soviet High Command ( Stavka) instructed the 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian Fronts to prepare for an offensive towards Vienna which would begin on March 15. However, from 17 to 18 February, the 2nd Ukrainian Front noticed the 1st SS Panzer division Leibstandarte and the 12th SS Panzer division Hitlerjugend fighting at the Garam River (S:Hron

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