North Carolina-class battleship

The ''North Carolina'' class were a pair of fast battleships, and , built for the United States Navy in the late 1930s and early 1940s.

In planning a new battleship class in the 1930s, the US Navy was heavily constrained by international treaty limitations, which included a requirement that all new capital ships have a standard displacement of under . This restriction meant that the navy could not construct a ship with the firepower, armor, and speed that they desired, and the balancing uncertainty that resulted meant that the navy considered fifty widely varying designs.

Eventually, the General Board of the United States Navy declared its preference for a battleship with a speed of , faster than any in US service, with a main battery of nine /50 caliber Mark B guns. The board believed that these ships would be balanced enough to effectively take on a multitude of roles. However, the acting Secretary of the Navy authorized a modified version of a different design, which in its original form had been rejected by the General Board. This called for a ship with twelve 14-inch guns in quadruple turrets and protection against guns of the same caliber. In a major departure from traditional American design practices, this design prioritized firepower at the cost of speed and protection. After construction had begun, the United States invoked a so-called "escalator clause" in the international treaty to increase the class' main armament to nine /45 caliber Mark 6 guns.

Both ''North Carolina'' and ''Washington'' saw extensive service during the Second World War in a variety of roles, primarily in the Pacific Theater where they escorted fast carrier task forces, such as during the Battle of the Philippine Sea, and conducted shore bombardments. ''Washington'' also participated in a surface engagement, the Naval Battle of Guadalcanal, where its radar-directed main batteries fatally damaged the Japanese battleship . Both battleships were damaged during the war, with ''North Carolina'' taking a torpedo hit in 1942 and ''Washington'' colliding with in 1944. After the end of the war, both ships remained in commission for a brief time before being laid up in reserve. In the early 1960s, ''North Carolina'' was sold to the state of North Carolina as a museum ship, and ''Washington'' was broken up for scrap.

Background

After the end of the First World War, several navies continued and expanded naval construction programs that they had started during the conflict. The United States' 1916 program called for six s and five battleships; in December 1918, the administration of President Woodrow Wilson called for building an additional ten battleships and six battlecruisers. The 1919–1920 General Board proposals planned for slightly smaller, but still significant, acquisitions beyond the 1916 plan: two battleships and a battlecruiser for the fiscal year 1921, and three battleships, a battlecruiser, four aircraft carriers and thirty destroyers between the fiscal years 1922 and 1924. The United Kingdom was in the final stages of ordering eight capital ships (the G3 battlecruisers, with the first's keel laying in 1921, and N3-class battleships, to be laid down beginning in 1922). Imperial Japan was, by 1920, attempting to build up to an 8-8 standard of eight battleships and eight battlecruisers or cruisers with the , , , and classes. Two ships from these designs were to be laid down per year until 1928.

With the staggering costs associated with such programs, the United States' Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes invited delegations from the major maritime powers—France, Italy, Japan, and the United Kingdom—to come together in Washington, D.C. to discuss, and hopefully end, the naval arms race. The subsequent Washington Naval Conference resulted in the 1922 Washington Naval Treaty. Along with many other provisions, it limited all future battleships to a standard displacement of and a maximum gun caliber of 16 inches. It also decreed that the five countries could not construct another capital ship for ten years and could not replace any ship that survived the treaty until it was at least twenty years old. The 1936 Second London Naval Treaty kept many of the Washington treaty's requirements but restricted gun size on new warships to 14 inches.

The treaties heavily influenced the design of the ''North Carolina'' class, as can be attested to in the long quest to find a ship that incorporated everything the US Navy considered necessary while remaining under 35,000 long tons.

Design

Early

The General Board began preparations for a new class of battleships in May–July 1935, and three design studies were submitted to them. "A" would be armed with nine guns in triple turrets, all forward of the bridge; capable of 30 knots; and armored against 14-inch shells. "B" and "C" would both be over , able to reach , and armored against 14-inch shells. The major difference between the two was the planned main battery, as "B" had twelve 14-inch guns in triple turrets, while "C" had eight 16-inch/45-caliber guns in dual turrets. "A" was the only one to remain within the 35,000-ton displacement limit set in the Washington Naval Treaty and reaffirmed in the Second London Naval Treaty. When the Bureau of Ordnance introduced a "super-heavy" 16-inch shell, the ships were redesigned in an attempt to provide protection against it, but this introduced severe weight problems; two of the designs were nearly over the treaty limit.

Although these original three studies were all "fast" battleships, the General Board was not committed to the higher maximum speeds. It posed questions to the Naval War College, asking for their opinion as to whether the new class should be a "conventional" ship with an eight-nine, 16-inch main battery, or rather one akin to "A", "B" or "C".

Five more design studies were produced in late September 1935, which had characteristics of 23–30.5 knots, eight or nine 14- or 16-inch guns, and a standard displacement between . Designs "D" and "E" were attempts at fast battleships with 16-inch guns and protections against the same, but their displacement was greater than the Washington Naval Treaty allowed. Design "F" was a radical attempt at a hybrid battleship-carrier, with three catapults mounted fore and eight 14-inch guns aft. It was reportedly favored by President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, but as aircraft launched from catapults were necessarily inferior to most carrier- or land-based aircraft because of the floats used to land, nothing came of the design. Designs "G" and "H" were slower 23-knot ships with nine 14-inch guns; in particular, "H" was thought to be a very well balanced design by the Preliminary Design section of the Bureau of Construction and Repair. However, the General Board finally decided to use faster ships, which "G" and "H" were not.

These studies demonstrated the difficulty the designers faced with a displacement of 35,000 tons. They could choose a faster ship, able to steam at 30 knots, but that would force them to mount a lighter armament and armor than contemporary foreign battleships. Alternatively, they could choose a lower maximum speed and mount heavier guns, but fitting in adequate protection against newer 16-inch guns would be extremely difficult. The Preliminary Design section drew up five more studies in October, based upon "A" with additional armor or a scaled-down "B"; all used 14-inch guns and called for at least 30 knots. Two called for four turrets, but they would be too heavy and mount less armor. Another, "K," would have a belt and deck, giving it a immune zone against the United States' super-heavy 14-inch shell. While "K" was liked by the naval constructors, its designed standard displacement of 35,000 tons left little room for error, modifications, or improvements . The final two designs, "L" and "M," would use quadruple turrets to save weight (similar to the French ) while still mounting 12 guns.

Many officers in the United States Navy supported the construction of three or four fast battleships for carrier escorts and to counter Japan's . These included the acting Secretary of the Navy and Chief of Naval Operations Admiral William Standley, the president of the Naval War College Admiral William S. Pye, a small majority (9–7) of senior officers at sea, and five of six line officers engaged in strategic planning as part of the War Plans Division, although at least one officer believed that an aerial attack would also be capable of sinking the ''Kongō''s. With the above recommendations, the General Board selected "K" to undergo further development.

Final

At least 35 different final designs were proposed. All numbered with Roman numerals ("I" through "XVI-D"), the first five were completed on 15 November 1935. They were the first to employ so-called "paper" weight reductions: not counting certain weights towards the ship's 35,000 long ton treaty limit that were not specifically part of the definition of standard displacement. In this case, even though there was designed storage room for 100 shells per main battery gun and an extra 100 rounds, the weight of the rounds did not figure toward the treaty-mandated limit.

These final designs varied greatly in everything but their standard displacements and speeds. Just one was over the treaty displacement limit; every other design called for 35,000 long tons. Only five planned for a top speed of under ; of those, only one was lower than : "VII", with . "VII" returned to a lower speed to obtain more firepower (twelve 14-inch guns in triple turrets) and protection; as such, the design called for only and a length of only . Most other plans called for or , although a few had lengths between and . Several different gun mountings were examined, including eight, nine, ten, eleven, and twelve 14-inch guns; eight 14-inch guns in two quadruple turrets, and even one design with two quadruple 16-inch guns.

One specific design, "XVI," was a , ship with twelve 14-inch guns, a belt, and a deck thick. Produced on 20 August 1936, the Bureau of Ordnance found many problems in it. For example, model tests showed that at high speeds, waves generated by the hull would leave certain lower parts of the ship uncovered by water or adequate armor, including around the explosive magazines, and the Bureau believed that hits around this part of the hull were easily possibly when fighting at ranges between . Other problems included the design's defense against aircraft-dropped bombs, as the Bureau thought the formula used to calculate its effectiveness was not realistic, and the tapering of a fore bulkhead below the waterline could worsen underwater shell hits because the mostly unarmored bow could easily be penetrated. The proposed solutions for these issues were all impractical: added patches of armor around the magazines could neutralize the effectiveness of the ship's torpedo-defense system, and deepening the belt near the bow and stern would put the ships over the 35,000 long ton limit. The General Board detested this design, saying it was "not ... a true battleship" due to its speed and armor problems.

To address these problems, a final set of designs was presented by the Preliminary Design section in October 1936. Designated "XVI-B" through "XVI-D," they were all modifications of the "XVI" plan. These added an extra of length to "XVI" for greater speed, but the resulting weight increase meant that only eleven 14-inch guns could be mounted with a thin belt. Another gun could be traded for a belt, and yet another could be swapped for more speed and an extra tenth of an inch of belt armor; this became design "XVI-C". The General Board liked "XVI-C" very much, seeing in it a ship that had enough protection to fight—and survive—in a battle line formed with the US' older battleships while also having enough speed to operate in a detached wing with aircraft carrier or cruiser commerce raiding groups.Friedman, ''U.S. Battleships'', 263

However, one member of the Board, Admiral Joseph Reeves—one of the principal developers of the United States' aircraft carrier strategy—disliked "XVI-C" because he believed that it was not fast enough to work with the fast carriers, and it was not powerful enough to justify its cost. Instead, he advocated a development of the previously rejected "XVI", adding additional underwater protection and patches of armor within the ship to make the magazines immune to above- and below-water shell hits from and beyond. The immune zone's outer limit was increased from to . After further revisions, Reeves went to Standley, the Chief of Naval Operations, who approved "XVI" in its newly modified form over the hopes of the General Board, who still thought that "XVI-C" should be built. Standley's only addition to the characteristics was to be able to switch from quadruple 14-inch to triple turrets if the "escalator clause" in the Second London Naval Treaty was invoked.

With these parameters now set, "XVI" would become the basis of the ''North Carolina'' class' as-built design despite additional back and forth over the design's final particulars. These included an increase in armor; something allowed by the finding of more on-paper weight savings; the armor's slope was increased from 10° to 13°, and eventually settled at 15°; a months-long debate on the propulsion machinery's layout was finally concluded, and other minor changes.

The "escalator clause"

Although the Second London Naval Treaty stipulated that warship guns could be no larger than 14 inches, a so-called "escalator clause" was included at the urging of American negotiators in case any country that had signed the Washington Naval Treaty refused to adhere to this new limit. The provision allowed signatory countries of the Second London Treaty—France, the United Kingdom and the United States—to raise the limit from 14 to 16 inches if Japan or Italy still refused to sign after 1 April 1937. When figuring potential configurations for the ''North Carolina''s, designers focused most of their planning on 14-inch weaponry; Standley's requirement meant that a switch from 14- to 16-inch, even after the ships' keels had been laid, was possible. Japan formally rejected the 14-inch limit on 27 March 1937, meaning that the "escalator clause" ''could'' be invoked. There were hurdles that still needed to be overcome, though: Roosevelt was under heavy political pressure and, as a result, was reluctant to allow the 16-inch gun.

Admiral Reeves also came out strongly in favor of the larger weapon. In a two-page letter to Secretary of the Navy Claude A. Swanson and indirectly to Roosevelt, Reeves argued that the 16-inch gun's significantly greater armor penetration was of paramount importance, drawing examples from the First World War's Battle of Jutland, where some battleships were able to survive ten or twenty hits from large guns, but other battlecruisers were blown up in three to seven hits because the shells were able to cut through the armor protecting magazines and turrets. Reeves also argued that the larger gun would favor the "indirect method" of shooting then being developed, where airplanes would be used to relay targeting information to allied battleships so that they could bombard targets that were out of their sight or over the horizon, because new battleships being built by foreign powers would have more armor. Reeves believed that if the 14-inch gun was adopted, it would not be able to penetrate this larger amount of protection, whereas the 16-inch would be able to break through.

In a final vain attempt, Roosevelt's Secretary of State Cordell Hull sent a telegram on 4 June to the Ambassador to Japan Joseph Grew instructing him that the United States would still accept a cap of 14-inch guns if he could get Japan to as well. The Japanese replied that they could not accept this unless the number of battleships was also limited; they wanted the United States and the United Kingdom to agree to having an equal number of battleships with Japan, but this was a condition that the two countries refused to accept. On 24 June, the two ''North Carolina''s were ordered with the 14-inch weapons, but on 10 July, Roosevelt directed that they be armed with triple 16-inch instead.

Specifications

General characteristics

The ''North Carolina'' was long at the waterline and long overall. The maximum beam was while waterline beam was due to the inclination of the armor belt. In 1942, the standard displacement was while full load displacement was , while maximum draft was . At design combat displacement of , the mean draft was and (GM) metacentric height was . As designed, the crew complement was 1,880 with 108 officers and 1,772 enlisted. By 1945, the considerable increase in anti-aircraft armament and their crew accommodations had increased full load displacement to , while crew complement increased to 2,339 with 144 officers and 2,195 enlisted. After the end of World War II, the crew complement was reduced to 1,774.Garzke and Dulin, ''United States Battleships'', 62–56

The ''North Carolina'' class hull feature a bulbous bow and had an unusual stern design for the time by placing the two inboard propulsion shafts in skegs. This was theorized to improve flow conditions to the propellers. Initial model basin testing for various stern configurations suggested that the skeg arrangement could reduce resistance, although later testing during the design process of the battleship would indicate an increase in drag. The skegs improved the structural strength of the stern by acting as girders and also provided structural continuity for the torpedo bulkheads. However, the skegs also contributed to severe vibration problems with the class that required extensive testing and modifications to mitigate. The problem was particularly acute near the aft main battery director, which required additional reinforcing braces due to the vibrations. Nevertheless, skegs would be improved and incorporated in the designs of all subsequent American battleships, with vibration problems largely eliminated on the ''Iowa'' class battleships.

Armament

''North Carolina'' and ''Washington'' were principally armed with nine /45 caliber (cal) Mark 6 guns and twenty /38 cal Mark 12 guns. Their lighter armament consisted of varying numbers of /75 caliber, .50 caliber machine guns, Bofors 40 mm and Oerlikon 20 mm.

Main battery

Mounted on both the ''North Carolina'' class and the follow-up , the nine 16 in/45 were improved versions of the guns mounted on the s, hence the designation of "Mark 6". A major alteration from the older guns was the Mark 6's ability to fire a new armor-piercing (AP) shell developed by the Bureau of Ordnance. At full charge with a brand-new gun, the heavy shell would be expelled at a muzzle velocity of .Campbell ''Naval Weapons of World War Two'', pp. 114, 117 At a reduced charge, the same shell would be fired at . Barrel life—the approximate number of rounds a gun could fire before needing to be relined or replaced—was 395 shells when using AP, although if only practice shells were used this figure was significantly higher: 2,860. Turning at 4 degrees a second, each turret could train to 150 degrees on either side of the ship.DiGiulian, "16"/45 (40.6 cm) Mark 6" The guns could be elevated to a maximum inclination of 45 degrees; turrets one and three could depress to −2 degrees, but due to its superfiring position, the guns on turret two could only depress to 0 degrees.Campbell ''Naval Weapons of World War Two'', p. 117

Each gun was long overall; its bore and rifling length were and , respectively. Maximum range with the heavy AP shell was obtained at an inclination of 45 degrees: . At the same elevation a lighter high capacity (HC) shell would travel . The guns weighed not including the breech; the turrets weighed .

When firing the same shell, the 16-inch/45 Mark 6 had a slight advantage over the 16-inch/50 Mark 7 when hitting deck armor—a shell from a 45 cal gun would be slower, meaning that it would have a steeper trajectory as it descended. At , a shell from a 45 cal would strike a ship at an angle of 47.5 degrees, as opposed to 38 degrees with the 50 cal.Campbell ''Naval Weapons of World War Two'', pp. 117–118

Secondary battery

The ''North Carolina''s carried ten Mark 28 Mod 0 enclosed base ring mounts, each supporting twin 5-inch/38-caliber Mark 12 gunsDiGiulian
5"/38 (12.7 cm) Mark 12
/ref> Originally designed to be mounted on destroyers built in the 1930s, these guns were so successful that they were added to a myriad of American ships during the Second World War, including every major ship type and many smaller warships constructed between 1934 and 1945. They were considered to be "highly reliable, robust and accurate" by the Navy's Bureau of Ordnance.

The 5-inch/38 functioned as a dual purpose gun. However, this did not mean that it possessed inferior anti-air abilities; as established during 1941 gunnery tests conducted on board ''North Carolina'', the gun possessed the ability to consistently shoot down aircraft flying at , which was twice as far as the effective range of the earlier single purpose 5-inch/25 anti-air gun.

Each 5-inch/38 weighed almost without the breech. The entire mount weighed . It was long overall, had a bore length of , and had a rifling length of . The gun could fire shells at about ; about 4,600 could be fired before the barrel needed to be replaced. Minimum and maximum elevations were −15 and 85 degrees, respectively. The guns' elevation could be raised or lowered at about 15 degrees per second. Loading was possible at any elevation. The mounts closest to the bow and stern could aim from −150 to 150 degrees; the others were restricted to −80 to 80 degrees. They could be turned at about 25 degrees per second.

Smaller weaponry

The remaining weaponry on board the two ''North Carolina''s was composed of differing numbers of 1.1"/75 caliber guns, .50 caliber machine guns, Bofors 40 mm and Oerlikon 20 mm cannons. Although the ships were originally designed to carry only four quadruple 1.1 in and twelve .50 caliber, this was greatly increased and upgraded during the war.Friedman, ''U.S. Battleships'', 276–277

On both ships, two more quadruple sets of 1.1 in guns were added in place of two searchlights amidships. After it was torpedoed in 1942, ''North Carolina'' had these removed and ten quadruple sets of 40 mm guns added. Fourteen were present by June 1943, while a fifteenth mount was added on top of the third main turret that November. ''Washington'' retained its six 1.1 in quads until the middle of 1943, when ten quad 40 mm guns replaced them. By August, it had fifteen. The two ships carried these through to the close of the war.

The .50 caliber machine guns did not have the range or power needed to combat modern aircraft and were scheduled for replacement by equal numbers of 20 mm guns, but nothing immediately came of the proposal. In fact, both ''North Carolina'' and ''Washington'' carried 20 mm and .50 caliber guns for most of 1942. In April, ''North Carolina'' had, respectively, forty and twelve, while ''Washington'' had twenty and twelve. Two months later, the number of 20 mm guns remained the same, but twelve .50 caliber guns had been added. By September, ''Washington'' had twenty more 20 mm guns added, for a total of forty, but five were removed—along with all of the .50 caliber guns—shortly thereafter when two quadruple sets of 1.1 in guns were added. In its refit after being torpedoed, ''North Carolina'' had an additional six 20 mm guns added and all of its .50 caliber weapons removed. ''Washington'' had sixty-four 20 mm weapons by April 1943, prior to one single mount being replaced by a quadruple mount, and ''North Carolina'' had fifty-three by March 1944. In April 1945, ''North Carolina'' was assigned to have fifty-six 20 mm, while ''Washington'' was assigned seventy-five. In August 1945, the ships both had eight twin 20 mm mounts; ''North Carolina'' also carried twenty single, while ''Washington'' carried one quad and sixty-three single.Friedman, ''U.S. Battleships'', 277

Electronics

Both ''North Carolina'' and ''Washington'', designed prior to radar, were originally fitted with many fire-control and navigational optical range-finders. The former lasted until 1944, when it was replaced by a Mark 27 microwave radar supplemented by a Mark 3 main armament fire control radar. The range-finders were removed in favor of additional 20 mm guns sometime between the end of 1941 and mid-1942. In addition, the ships were commissioned with two Mark 38 directors and were originally fitted with a CXAM air search, two Mark 3s and three Mark 4 secondary armament.Friedman, ''U.S. Battleships'', 276

By November 1942, ''North Carolina'' had an additional Mark 4 and a SG surface search radar added. The normal battleship configuration was present aboard ''North Carolina'' in April 1944, with SK and SG radars (air and surface search, respectively), a backup SG, and Mark 8s to direct its main battery. All of the Mark 4s remained for the secondary battery, and one of the older Mark 3s was still present, possibly as a backup for the Mark 8s. An SK-2 dish replaced the older SK radar and Mark 12s and 22s superseded the Mark 4s in September of that year. Aside from never receiving an SK-2, ''Washington'' was the recipient of similar upgrades.

Both ships underwent extensive refits near the end or after the war. ''North Carolina'' received a secondary air search set (SR) and a SCR-720 zenith search radar on the forward funnel. At the end of the war, it had an SP surface-search, a SK-2 air-search, a Mark 38 main battery fire control system with Mark 13 and 27 radars, a Mark 37 secondary battery fire control system with Mark 12, 22 and 32 radars, and a Mark 57 smaller weaponry fire control system, with a Mark 34 radar. In March 1946, ''Washington'' had a SK fore and a SR aft, a SG both fore and aft, and a TDY jammer (which could scramble radar on other ships).Garzke and Dulin, ''United States Battleships'', 56

Propulsion

The ships in the ''North Carolina'' class were equipped with four General Electric geared turbines and eight Babcock & Wilcox three-drum express type boilers. The ships' powerplant incorporated several recent developments in turbine equipment, including double helical reduction gears and high-pressure steam technology. ''North Carolina''s boilers supplied steam at and as hot as . To meet the design requirement of , the engine system was originally designed to supply , but the new technologies increased this output to . Despite this increase, the maximum speed for the ships did not change, since the modifications to the powerplant were incorporated later in the design process. The turbines that had already been installed could not fully take advantage of the higher pressure and temperature steam, and so the level of efficiency was not as high as it should have been. When going astern, the engines provided .Whitley, ''Battleships'', 291

The engine system was divided into four engine rooms, all on the centerline. Each room contained a turbine and two boilers, without any division between the boilers and turbines. This was done to limit the risk of capsizing should the ship sustain heavy flooding in the engine rooms. The engine rooms alternated in their layout: the first and third engine rooms were arranged with the turbine on the starboard side and its corresponding boilers on the port, this was reversed in the second and fourth rooms. The forward-most engine room powered the starboard outer shaft, the second turbine drove the outer screw on the port side, the third engine supplied power to the inner starboard propeller, and the fourth turbine drove the port-side inner screw. All four screws had four blades; the two outer propellers were in diameter and the inner pair were wide. Steering was controlled by a pair of rudders.

At the time of their commissioning, the ships had a top speed of , though by 1945, with the addition of other equipment, such as anti-aircraft weaponry, their maximum speed was reduced to . The increases in weight also reduced the ships' cruising range. In 1941, the ships could steam for at a cruising speed of ; by 1945, the range at that speed was reduced to . At , the range was considerably lower, at .

Electrical power was supplied by eight generators. Four were turbo-generators designed for naval use; these provided 1,250 kilowatts each. The other four were diesel generators that supplied 850 kilowatts each. Two smaller diesel generators—each provided 200 kilowatts—supplied emergency power should the main system be damaged. Total electrical output was 8,400 kilowatts, not including the emergency generators, at 450 volts on an alternating current.

Armor

The ''North Carolina'' class incorporated " all or nothing" armor which weighed 41% of the total displacement; it consisted of an "armored raft" that extended from just forward of the first gun turret to just aft of the rear gun turret. They had a main armored belt of Class A armor that was thick amidships, inclined at 15°, and backed by Special Treatment Steel (STS). This tapered down to on the lower edge of the belt. The ships had three armored decks; their main deck was thick. The second, thickest deck was of Class B armor laminated on STS for a total of . In the outboard sections of the hull the plating was Class B laminated on STS. The third and thinnest deck was thick inboard, and outboard. The first deck was designed to cause delay-fuzed projectiles to detonate, while the thicker second deck would protect the ships' internals. The third deck was intended to protect against shell splinters that might have penetrated the second deck; it also acted as the upper support for the torpedo bulkheads. The conning tower was connected to the armored citadel by a thick communications tube. Armor thickness for the conning tower itself ranged from on both sides to on the front and rear. The roof was thick and the bottom was thick.Whitley, ''Battleships'', 290

The main battery turrets were heavily armored: the turret faces were thick, the sides were thick, the rear sides were thick, and the roofs were thick. Sixteen–inch-thick armor was the maximum width factories were able to produce at the time of the ships' design; by 1939, however, it was possible to create -thick plates. These were not installed because it was estimated that the conversion would delay completion of the ships by 6 to 8 months. The barbettes that held the turrets were also strongly protected. The front portion was , the sides increased to 16 in, and the rear portion reduced to . The 5-inch gun turrets, along with their ammunition magazines, were armored with STS plates.

The side protection system incorporated five compartments divided by torpedo bulkheads and a large anti-torpedo bulge that ran the length of the "armored raft". The outer two compartments, the innermost compartment and the bulge would remain empty, while the third and fourth compartments would be filled with liquid. The system was reduced in depth at either end by the forward and rear gun turrets. In these areas, the fifth compartment was deleted; instead, there was an outer empty compartment and two liquid-filled spaces, backed by another empty compartment. To compensate for the reduced underwater protection system, these sections received additional armor plating, up to in thickness. The complete system was deep and designed to withstand warheads of up to of TNT. Underwater protection was rounded out by a triple bottom that was deep. The bottom layer was thick and was kept filled with fluid, while the upper thick layer was kept empty. The triple bottom was also heavily subdivided to prevent catastrophic flooding should the upper layer be penetrated.

Service

Construction

Two ships, each to cost about $50 million, were authorized in January 1937. Five shipyards submitted bids to build one of the two planned ships. Three were privately run corporations: Bethlehem Shipbuilding, New York Shipbuilding and Newport News Shipbuilding. The other two, the New York Naval Shipyard and Philadelphia Naval Shipyard, were run by the government. When bids were reviewed, the privately run shipyards' submissions ranged from $46 to 50 million, while their government counterparts came in at $37 million. Newport News was unique among these in refusing any fixed monetary value in favor of a "cost-plus %" price, but this led to the rejection of their bid out of hand.Muir, "Gun Calibers and Battle Zones," 28

The bids from private companies were heavily influenced by the legislation of the New Deal. The Vinson-Trammell Act limited profit from a ship's construction to 10 percent, while the Walsh-Healey Public Contracts Act specified a minimum wage and required working conditions for workers. The latter act greatly affected the ability of the navy to acquire steel, as the text of the law caused friction between executives in the industry, who greatly disliked the forty-hour work week and minimum wage requirements, and their workers—who themselves were embroiled in a separate dispute pitting the union of the skilled workers, the American Federation of Labor, against the union of the unskilled, the Congress of Industrial Organizations. Amid the unrest, the navy ran into difficulties trying to acquire 18 million pounds of steel to build six destroyers and three submarines; many more pounds than this would be needed for the new battleships.McBride, "The Unstable Dynamics of a Strategic Technology," 417–418

The private shipyards, however, had their own labor problems, so much so that one author described the navy's issues as "minimal" compared to their shipbuilding counterparts. This increased the price of the battleships to $60 million each, so the Bureau of Steam Engineering and Bureau of Construction and Repair recommended to their superiors that the $37 million tenders from the two navy yards be accepted. This was confirmed by Roosevelt, as the private shipyards' bids were seen as unjustly inflated. The contracts for ''North Carolina'' and ''Washington''—names had been officially chosen on 3 May 1937—were sent to the New York and Philadelphia yards, respectively, on 24 June 1937. Shortly after this announcement, Roosevelt was bombarded with heavy lobbying from citizens and politicians from Camden and the state of New Jersey, in an ultimately futile attempt to have the construction of ''North Carolina'' shifted to Camden's New York Shipbuilding; such a contract would keep many men employed in that area. Roosevelt refused, saying that the disparity in price was too great. Instead, the company was awarded two destroyer tenders in December 1937, and .

Construction of the ''North Carolina'' class was slowed by the aforementioned material issues, the changes made to the basic design after this date—namely the substitution of 16-inch for 14-inch guns—and the need to add both length and strength to the slipways already present in the navy yards. Increased use of welding was proposed as a possible way to reduce weight and bolster the structural design, as it could have reduced the ships' structural weight by 10%, but it was used in only about 30% of the ship. The costs associated with welding and an increase in the time of construction made it impractical.Garzke and Dulin, ''United States Battleships'', 35

''North Carolina''

was laid down on 27 October 1937, the first battleship begun by the United States since the never-completed ''South Dakota'' class of the early 1920s. Although ''North Carolina'' was launched on 13 June 1940 and commissioned on 9 April 1941, it did not go on active duty because of acute longitudinal vibrations from its propeller shafts. A problem shared with its sister ''Washington'' and some other ships like , it was only cured after different propellers were tested aboard ''North Carolina'', including four-bladed and cut-down versions of the original three-bladed. This testing required it to be at sea, and the many resulting trips out of New York Harbor to the Atlantic Ocean caused it to be nicknamed "The Showboat"."''North Carolina''" in the ''Dictionary of American Naval Fighting Ships''Friedman, ''U.S. Battleships'', 274–275"6112175" in the ''Miramar Ship Index''

After a shakedown cruise in the Caribbean Sea and participation in war exercises, ''North Carolina'' transited the Panama Canal ''en route'' to the Pacific War. Joining Task Force (TF) 16, the battleship escorted the aircraft carrier during the invasions of Guadalcanal and Tulagi on 7 August 1942, and continued to accompany the carrier when it moved to be southeast of the Solomons. The Battle of the Eastern Solomons began when Japanese carriers were spotted on 24 August; although American planes were able to strike first by sinking the light carrier , a strike group from a different force, formed around the fleet carriers and , attacked TF 16. In an intense eight-minute battle, ''North Carolina'' shot down 7–14 aircraft and was relatively undamaged, though there were seven near-misses and one crewman was killed by strafing. ''Enterprise'' took three bomb hits.

''North Carolina'' then joined the carrier s screen, and protected it while support was rendered to American troops fighting on Guadalcanal. Although it dodged one torpedo on 6 September, it was not able to avoid another on the 15th. Out of a six-torpedo salvo from the , three hit the carrier , one hit , one missed, and one struck ''North Carolina''. A warhead hit on the port side below the waterline at a point that was just behind the number one turret. It created a hole, allowed about of water into the ship—which had to be offset with counter-flooding, meaning that another entered—killed five men, and wounded twenty. Although ''North Carolina'' could steam at soon after the explosion, it was later forced to slow to to ensure that temporary shoring did not fail. Structural damage beneath the first turret rendered it unable to fire unless in absolute need, and the main search radar failed. As this was the first torpedo to strike a modern American battleship, there was a large amount of interest from various officers and bureaus within the navy in learning more about it. The conclusions were seen as a vindication by some who believed that too much had been sacrificed in the design of the ''North Carolina''s—the torpedo defense system had come close to breaking near one of the most important areas of the ship (a magazine), after all—and the General Board called for the fifth and sixth s, and , to have a torpedo bulge added outside their magazines. However, the new Bureau of Ships opposed this on the basis that the system performed as it was supposed to; in any case, no modifications were made.Whitley, ''Battleships'', 293–294

Repaired and refitted at the facilities in Pearl Harbor, ''North Carolina'' operated as a carrier escort for ''Enterprise'' and ''Saratoga'' for the remainder of 1942 and the majority of 1943 while they provided cover for supply and troop movements in the Solomons. In between, it received advanced fire control and radar gear in March, April and September 1943 at Pearl Harbor. In November, ''North Carolina'' escorted ''Enterprise'' while the carrier launched strikes upon Makin, Tarawa

HOME


Content is Copyleft
Website design, code, and AI is Copyrighted (c) 2014-2017 by Stephen Payne


Consider donating to Wikimedia



As an Amazon Associate I earn from qualifying purchases