The Info List - Mukden Incident

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Japanese victory

Japanese invasion of Manchuria


Republic of China Empire of Japan

Commanders and leaders

Zhang Xueliang Ma Zhanshan Feng Zhanhai

Shigeru Honjō Jirō Minami


160,000 30,000–66,000

v t e

Second Sino-Japanese War

Major engagements in bold

Begun in 1931–37

Mukden Manchuria

Jiangqiao Nenjiang Bridge Jinzhou Harbin

(1932) Pacification of Manchukuo Rehe Great Wall Inner Mongolia


Begun in 1937–39

Marco Polo Bridge Beiping–Tianjin Chahar Shanghai

Sihang Warehouse

Beiping–Hankou Railway Tianjin–Pukou Railway Taiyuan

Pingxingguan Xinkou

Nanjing Xuzhou


N.-E. Henan


Amoy Chongqing Wuhan




Nanchang Suixian–Zaoyang


1st Changsha S. Guangxi

Kunlun Pass

Winter Offensive

West Suiyuan Wuyuan

Begun in 1940–42

Zaoyang–Yichang Hundred Regiments N. Vietnam C. Hubei S.Henan W. Hebei Shanggao S.Shanxi 2nd Changsha 3rd Changsha Yunnan-Burma Road

Tachiao Oktwin Toungoo Yenangyaung

Zhejiang–Jiangxi Sichuan invasion

Begun in 1943–45

W.Hubei N.Burma-W.Yunnan Changde Ichi-Go

C.Henan 4th Changsha Hengyang Guilin–Liuzhou

Mt. Song W. Henan–N. Hubei W.Hunan 2nd Guangxi


Aerial engagements

The Mukden Incident, or Manchurian Incident, was a staged event engineered by Japanese military personnel as a pretext for the Japanese invasion in 1931 of northeastern China, known as Manchuria.[1][2][3] On 18 September 1931, Lt. Suemori Kawamoto detonated a small quantity of dynamite[4] close to a railway line owned by Japan's South Manchuria
Railway near Mukden (now Shenyang).[5] The explosion was so weak that it failed to destroy the track, and a train passed over it minutes later. The Imperial Japanese Army
Imperial Japanese Army
accused Chinese dissidents of the act and responded with a full invasion that led to the occupation of Manchuria, in which Japan established its puppet state of Manchukuo
six months later. The deception was soon exposed by the Lytton Report
Lytton Report
of 1932, leading Japan to diplomatic isolation and its March 1933 withdrawal from the League of Nations.[6] The bombing act is known as the "Liutiaohu Incident" (simplified Chinese: 柳条湖事变; traditional Chinese: 柳條湖事變; pinyin: Liǔtiáohú Shìbiàn, Japanese: 柳条湖事件, Ryūjōko-jiken), and the entire episode of events is known in Japan as the "Manchurian Incident" (Kyūjitai: 滿洲事變, Shinjitai: 満州事変, Manshū-jihen) and in China as the "September 18 Incident"(simplified Chinese: 九一八事变; traditional Chinese: 九一八事變; pinyin: Jiǔyībā Shìbiàn).


1 Background 2 Events 3 Incident 4 Invasion of Manchuria 5 Aftermath 6 Controversy 7 Remembrance 8 In popular culture 9 See also 10 References

10.1 Citations 10.2 Sources

11 External links


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Japanese economic presence and political interest in Manchuria
had been growing ever since the end of the Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905). The Treaty of Portsmouth
Treaty of Portsmouth
that ended the war had granted Japan the lease of the South Manchuria
Railway branch (from Changchun to Lüshun) of the China Far East Railway. The Japanese government, however, claimed that this control included all the rights and privileges that China granted to Russia in the 1896 Li–Lobanov Treaty, as enlarged by the Kwantung Lease Agreement of 1898. This included absolute and exclusive administration within the South Manchuria
Railway Zone. Japanese railway guards were stationed within the zone to provide security for the trains and tracks; however, these were regular Japanese soldiers, and they frequently carried out maneuvers outside the railway areas. There were many reports of raids on local Chinese villages by bored Japanese soldiers, and all complaints from the Chinese government were ignored.[citation needed] Meanwhile, the newly formed Chinese government was trying to recover the rights of nation. They started to claim that treaties between China and Japan were invalid. China also announced new acts, so the Japanese people
Japanese people
(including Koreans and Taiwanese at this time) who settled frontier lands, opened stores or built their own houses in China were expelled without any compensation.[7][8] Manchurian warlord Zhang Zuolin
Zhang Zuolin
tried to deprive Japanese concessions too, but he was assassinated by the Japanese Kwantung Army. Zhang Xueliang, Zhang Zuolin's son and successor, joined the Nanjing
Government led by Chiang Kai-shek
Chiang Kai-shek
from anti-Japanese sentiment. Official Japanese objections to the oppression against Japanese nationals within China were rejected by the Chinese authorities.[7][9]. The 1929 Sino-Soviet War (July–November) over the Chinese Eastern Railroad (CER) further increased the tensions in the Northeast that would lead to the Mukden Incident. The Soviet Red Army victory over Zhang Xueiliang’s forces not only reasserted Soviet control over the CER in Manchuria
but revealed Chinese military weaknesses that Japanese Kwantung Army
Kwantung Army
officers were quick to note.[10] The Soviet Red Army performance also stunned Japanese officials. Manchuria
was central to Japan’s East Asia policy. Both the 1921 and 1927 Imperial Eastern Region Conferences reconfirmed Japan’s commitment to be the dominant power in Manchuria. The 1929 Red Army victory shook that policy to the core and reopened the Manchurian problem. By 1930, the Kwantung Army
Kwantung Army
realized they faced a Red Army that was only growing stronger. The time to act was drawing near and Japanese plans to conquer the Northeast were accelerated.[11] In Nanjing
in April 1931, a national leadership conference of China was held between Chiang Kai-shek
Chiang Kai-shek
and Zhang Xueliang. They agreed to assert China's sovereignty in Manchuria
strongly.[12] On the other hand, some officers of the Kwantung Army
Kwantung Army
began to plot to invade Manchuria
secretly. There were other officers who wanted to support plotters in Tokyo. Events[edit] Believing that a conflict in Manchuria
would be in the best interests of Japan, and acting in the spirit of the Japanese concept of gekokujō, Kwantung Army
Kwantung Army
Colonel Seishirō Itagaki
Seishirō Itagaki
and Lieutenant Colonel Kanji Ishiwara
Kanji Ishiwara
independently devised a plan to prompt Japan to invade Manchuria
by provoking an incident from Chinese forces stationed nearby. However, after the Japanese Minister of War Jirō Minami dispatched Major General Yoshitsugu Tatekawa
Yoshitsugu Tatekawa
to Manchuria
for the specific purpose of curbing the insubordination and militarist behavior of the Kwantung Army, Itagaki and Ishiwara knew that they no longer had the luxury of waiting for the Chinese to respond to provocations, but had to stage their own.[13] Itagaki and Ishiwara chose to sabotage the rail section in an area near Liutiao Lake (柳條湖; liǔtiáohú). The area had no official name and was not militarily important, but it was only eight hundred metres away from the Chinese garrison of Beidaying (北大營; běidàyíng), where troops under the command of the "Young Marshal" Zhang Xueliang
Zhang Xueliang
were stationed. The Japanese plan was to attract Chinese troops by an explosion and then blame them for having caused the disturbance in order to provide a pretext for a formal Japanese invasion. In addition, they intended to make the sabotage appear more convincing as a calculated Chinese attack on an essential target, thereby making the expected Japanese reaction appear as a legitimate measure to protect a vital railway of industrial and economic importance. The Japanese press labeled the site "Liǔtiáo Ditch" (柳條溝; liǔtiáogōu) or "Liǔtiáo Bridge" (柳條橋; liǔtiáoqiáo), when in reality, the site was a small railway section laid on an area of flat land. The choice to place the explosives at this site was to preclude the extensive rebuilding that would have been necessitated had the site actually been a railway bridge.[14] Incident[edit]

Japanese experts inspect the scene of the 'railway sabotage' on South Manchurian Railway

Colonel Seishirō Itagaki, Lieutenant Colonel Kanji Ishiwara, Colonel Kenji Doihara, and Major Takayoshi Tanaka had completed plans for the incident by 31 May 1931.[15]

A section of the Liǔtiáo Railway. The caption reads "railway fragment".

The plan was executed when 1st Lieutenant Suemori Komoto of the Independent Garrison
Unit (独立守備隊) of the 29th Infantry Regiment, which guarded the South Manchuria
Railway, placed explosives near the tracks, but far enough away to do no real damage. At around 10:20 pm (22:20), 18 September, the explosives were detonated. However, the explosion was minor and only a 1.5-meter section on one side of the rail was damaged. In fact, a train from Changchun
passed by the site on this damaged track without difficulty and arrived at Shenyang
at 10:30 pm (22:30).[16] Invasion of Manchuria[edit] Main article: Japanese invasion of Manchuria On the morning of 19 September, two artillery pieces installed at the Mukden officers' club opened fire on the Chinese garrison nearby, in response to the alleged Chinese attack on the railway. Zhang Xueliang's small air force was destroyed, and his soldiers fled their destroyed Beidaying barracks, as five hundred Japanese troops attacked the Chinese garrison of around seven thousand. The Chinese troops were no match for the experienced Japanese troops. By the evening, the fighting was over, and the Japanese had occupied Mukden at the cost of five hundred Chinese lives and only two Japanese lives.[17] At Dalian
in the Kwantung Leased Territory, Commander-in-Chief
of the Kwantung Army
Kwantung Army
General Shigeru Honjō
Shigeru Honjō
was at first appalled that the invasion plan was enacted without his permission,[18] but he was eventually convinced by Ishiwara to give his approval after the fact. Honjō moved the Kwantung Army
Kwantung Army
headquarters to Mukden and ordered General Senjurō Hayashi of the Chosen Army of Japan
Chosen Army of Japan
in Korea
to send in reinforcements. At 04:00 on 19 September, Mukden was declared secure. Zhang Xueliang, under implicit instructions from Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist Government
Nationalist Government
to adhere to a non-resistance policy in order to battle the Chinese Communists, had already urged his men not to put up a fight and to store away any weapons in case the Japanese invaded (a piece of information that the Japanese advisors to Zhang's army knew ahead of time, hence facilitating the planning). Therefore, the Japanese soldiers proceeded to occupy and garrison the major cities of Changchun
and Antung and their surrounding areas with minimal difficulty. However, in November, Muslim General Ma Zhanshan, the acting governor of Heilongjiang, began resistance with his provincial army, followed in January by Generals Ting Chao
Ting Chao
and Li Du with their local Jilin
provincial forces. Despite this resistance, within five months of the Mukden Incident, the Imperial Japanese Army
Imperial Japanese Army
had overrun all major towns and cities in the provinces of Liaoning, Jilin, and Heilongjiang.[19] Aftermath[edit] Chinese public opinion strongly criticized Zhang Xueliang
Zhang Xueliang
for his non-resistance to the Japanese invasion, even though the Kuomintang central government was responsible for this policy. While the Japanese presented a legitimate threat, the Kuomintang
focused their efforts mainly on eradicating the communist party. Many charged that Zhang's Northeastern Army of nearly a quarter million could have withstood the Kwantung Army
Kwantung Army
of only 11,000 men. In addition, his arsenal in Manchuria
was considered the most modern in China, and his troops had possession of tanks, around 60 combat aircraft, 4000 machine guns, and four artillery battalions. Zhang Xueliang's seemingly superior force was undermined by several factors. First was that the Kwantung Army
Kwantung Army
had a strong reserve force that could be transported by railway from Korea, which was a Japanese colony, directly adjacent to Manchuria. Secondly, more than half of Zhang's troops were stationed south of the Great Wall
Great Wall
in Hebei Province, while the troops north of the wall were scattered throughout Manchuria. Therefore, deploying Zhang's troops north of the Great Wall lacked the concentration needed to effectively fight the Japanese. Most of Zhang's troops were under-trained, poorly led, and had poor morale and questionable loyalty compared to their Japanese counterparts. Japanese secret agents had permeated Zhang's command because of his past (and his father, Zhang Zuolin's) reliance on Japanese military advisers. The Japanese knew the Northeastern Army very well and were able to conduct operations with ease.[20] The Chinese government was preoccupied with numerous internal problems, including the issue of the newly independent Guangzhou government of Hu Hanmin, Communist Party of China
Communist Party of China
insurrections, and terrible flooding of the Yangtze River
Yangtze River
that created tens of thousands of refugees. Moreover, Zhang himself was not in Manchuria
at the time, but was in a hospital in Beijing
to raise money for the flood victims. However, in the Chinese newspapers, Zhang was ridiculed as "General Nonresistance" (Chinese: 不抵抗將軍; pinyin: Bù Dǐkàng Jiāngjūn).

Chinese delegate addresses the League of Nations
League of Nations
after the Mukden Incident in 1932.

Because of these circumstances, the central government turned to the international community for a peaceful resolution. The Chinese Foreign Ministry issued a strong protest to the Japanese government and called for the immediate stop to Japanese military operations in Manchuria, and appealed to the League of Nations, on 19 September. On 24 October, the League of Nations
League of Nations
passed a resolution mandating the withdrawal of Japanese troops, to be completed by 16 November. However, Japan rejected the League of Nations
League of Nations
resolution and insisted on direct negotiations with the Chinese government. Negotiations went on intermittently without much result.[21] On 20 November, a conference in the Chinese government was convened, but the Guangzhou
faction of the Kuomintang
insisted that Chiang Kai-shek step down to take responsibility for the Manchurian debacle. On 15 December, Chiang resigned as the Chairman of the Nationalist Government and was replaced as Premier of the Republic of China
Premier of the Republic of China
(head of the Executive Yuan) by Sun Fo, son of Sun Yat-sen. Jinzhou, another city in Liaoning, was lost to the Japanese in early January 1932. As a result, Wang Jingwei
Wang Jingwei
replaced Sun Fo
Sun Fo
as the Premier.[22] On 7 January 1932, United States Secretary of State Henry Stimson issued his Stimson Doctrine, that the United States would not recognize any government that was established as the result of Japanese actions in Manchuria. On 14 January, a League of Nations commission, headed by Victor Bulwer-Lytton, 2nd Earl of Lytton, disembarked at Shanghai
to examine the situation. In March, the puppet state of Manchukuo
was established, with the former emperor of China, Puyi, installed as head of state.[23] On 2 October, the Lytton Report
Lytton Report
was published and rejected the Japanese claim that the Manchurian invasion and occupation was an act of self-defense, although it did not assert that the Japanese had perpetrated the initial bombing of the railroad. The report ascertained that Manchukuo
was the product of Japanese military aggression in China, while recognizing that Japan had legitimate concerns in Manchuria
because of its economic ties there. The League of Nations refused to acknowledge Manchukuo
as an independent nation. Japan resigned from the League of Nations
League of Nations
in March 1933.[24][25] Colonel Kenji Doihara
Kenji Doihara
used the Mukden Incident
Mukden Incident
to continue his campaign of disinformation. Since the Chinese troops at Mukden had put up such a poor resistance, he told Manchukuo
Emperor Puyi
that this was proof that the Chinese remained loyal to him. Japanese intelligence used the incident to continue the campaign to discredit the murdered Zhang Zuolin
Zhang Zuolin
and his son Zhang Xueliang
Zhang Xueliang
for "misgovernment" of Manchuria. In fact, drug trafficking and corruption had largely been suppressed under Zhang Zuolin.[26] Controversy[edit]

The Mukden Incident
Mukden Incident
Museum (literally, "September 18th History Museum") in Shenyang

Different opinions still exist as to who caused the explosion on the Japanese railroad at Mukden. Strong evidence points to young officers of the Kwantung Army
Kwantung Army
having conspired to cause the blast, with or without direct orders from Tokyo. Post-war investigations confirmed that the original bomb planted by the Japanese failed to explode, and a replacement had to be planted. The resulting explosion enabled the Japanese Kwantung Army
Kwantung Army
to accomplish their goal of triggering a conflict with Chinese troops stationed in Manchuria
and the subsequent establishment of the puppet state of Manchukuo. The 9.18 Incident Exhibition Museum at Shenyang
opened by the People's Republic of China on 18 September 1991, takes the position that the explosives were planted by Japan. The Yūshūkan
museum, located within Yasukuni Shrine
Yasukuni Shrine
in Tokyo, also places the blame on members of the Kwantung Army. David Bergamini's book Japan's Imperial Conspiracy (1971) has a detailed chronology of events in both Manchuria
and Tokyo
surrounding the Mukden Incident. Bergamini concludes that the greatest deception was that the Mukden Incident
Mukden Incident
and Japanese invasion were planned by junior or hot-headed officers, without formal approval by the Japanese government. However, historian James Weland has concluded that senior commanders had tacitly allowed field operatives to proceed on their own initiative, then endorsed the result after a positive outcome was assured.[27] In August 2006, the Yomiuri Shimbun, Japan's top-selling newspaper, published the results of a year-long research project into the general question of who is responsible for the "Shōwa war". With respect to the Manchurian Incident, the newspaper blamed ambitious Japanese militarists, as well as politicians who were impotent to rein them in or prevent their insubordination.[28][29] Debate has also focused on how the incident was handled by the League of Nations and the subsequent Lytton Report. A. J. P. Taylor
A. J. P. Taylor
wrote that "In the face of its first serious challenge", the League buckled and capitulated. The Washington Naval Conference
Washington Naval Conference
(1921) guaranteed a certain degree of Japanese hegemony in the Far East. Any intervention on the part of America would be a breach of the already mentioned agreement. Furthermore, Britain was in crisis, having been recently forced off the gold standard. Although a power in the Far East, Britain was incapable of decisive action. The only response from these powers was "moral condemnation".[30] Remembrance[edit] Each year at 10:00 am on 18 September, air-raid sirens sound for several minutes in numerous major cities across China. Provinces include Heilongjiang, Jilin, Liaoning, Hainan, and others.[31][32] American expatriates report that the air-raid sirens sound on the third Saturday of September, from 10:00 AM until 10:23 AM in the cities of Shanghai
and Tianjin.[33] In popular culture[edit]

The Mukden Incident
Mukden Incident
is depicted in The Adventures of Tintin
The Adventures of Tintin
comic The Blue Lotus, although the book places the bombing near Shanghai. Here it is performed by Japanese agents and the Japanese exaggerate the incident. The Chinese patriotic song Along the Sungari River describes the lives of the people who had lost their homeland in Northeast China
Northeast China
after the Mukden Incident. In Akira Kurosawa's 1946 film No Regrets for Our Youth, the subject of the Mukden Incident
Mukden Incident
is debated. See also Junji Kinoshita's play A Japanese Called Otto,[34] which opens with the characters discussing the Mukden Incident. The 2010 Japanese anime Night Raid 1931
Night Raid 1931
is a 13-episode spy/pulp series set in 1931 Shanghai
and Manchuria. Episode 7, "Incident", specifically covers the Mukden Incident. The violent manga Gantz
has a reference when an elder says that an occurrence reminds him of the "Manchurian Incident". Dutch death metal band Hail of Bullets
Hail of Bullets
covers the event in the song "The Mukden Incident" on their 2010 album On Divine Winds, a concept album about the Pacific Ocean theatre of World War II. The television drama Kazoku Game ("Family Game" in English) deals with the history textbook controversy in episode 4, mentioning the Mukden Incident.

See also[edit]

World War II portal Japan portal China portal

False flag Huanggutun incident
Huanggutun incident
(1928) Jinan incident
Jinan incident
(1928) Second Sino-Japanese War

Japanese invasion of Manchuria
Japanese invasion of Manchuria
(1931) January 28 Incident
January 28 Incident
(Shanghai, 1932) Defense of the Great Wall
Defense of the Great Wall
(1933) Marco Polo Bridge Incident
Marco Polo Bridge Incident
(Beijing, 1937)

Gleiwitz incident, the similarly staged pretext for Nazi Germany's invasion of Poland History of Sino-Japanese relations# Second Sino-Japanese War
Second Sino-Japanese War
and World War II History of the Republic of China Military of the Republic of China National Revolutionary Army

References[edit] Citations[edit]

^ The Cambridge History of Japan: The Twentieth Century, p. 294, Peter Duus,John Whitney Hall, Cambridge University Press: 1989 ISBN 978-0-521-22357-7 ^ An instinct for War: Scenes from the battlefields of history, p. 315, Roger J. Spiller, ISBN 978-0-674-01941-6; Harvard University Press ^ Concise dictionary of modern Japanese history, p. 120, Janet Hunter, University of California Press: 1984, ISBN 978-0-520-04557-6 ^ The Cambridge History of Japan: The Twentieth Century, p. 294, Peter Duus, John Whitney Hall, Cambridge University Press: 1989. ISBN 978-0-521-22357-7 ^ Fenby, Jonathan. Chiang Kai-shek: China's Generalissimo and the Nation He Lost. Carroll & Graf: 2003, p. 202 ^ Encyclopedia of war crimes and genocide, p. 128, Leslie Alan Horvitz & Christopher Catherwood, Facts on File
(2011); ISBN 978-0-8160-8083-0 ^ a b Shin'ichi, Yamamuro (1991). "Manshūkoku no Hou to Seiji: Josetsu" (PDF). The Zinbun Gakuhō : Journal of Humanities. 68: 129–152.  ^ Shin'ichi Yamamuro (2006). Manchuria
Under Japanese Dominion. Translated by Joshua A. Fogel. University of Pennsylvania Press. p. 10-13, 21-23. ISBN 978-0-812-23912-6. Retrieved 2017-01-23.  ^ Yamaguchi, Jūji(1967). Kieta Teikoku Manshū. The Mainichi Newspapers Co., Ltd. ASIN B000JA85DK ^ Michael M. Walker, The 1929 Sino-Soviet War: The War Nobody Knew (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2017), p. 290. ^ Michael M. Walker, The 1929 Sino-Soviet War: The War Nobody Knew (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2017), pp. 290-91. ^ Jay Taylor (2009). Government The generalissimo: Chiang Kai-shek
Chiang Kai-shek
and the struggle for modern China. Harvard University Press. p. 93. ISBN 0-674-03338-8. Retrieved 2010-06-28.  ^ Robert H. Ferrell, "The Mukden Incident: September 18–19, 1931." Journal of modern history 27.1 (1955): 66-72. in JSTOR ^ Ferrell, "The Mukden Incident: September 18–19, 1931." Journal of modern history 27.1 (1955): 66-72. ^ Behr, Edward (1987), The Last Emperor, New York: Bantam Books, p. 180, ISBN 0-553-34474-9  ^ CHRONOLOGY OF MAJOR INTERNATIONAL EVENTS FROM 1931 THROUGH 1943, WITH OSTENSIBLE REASONS ADVANCED FOR THE OCCURRENCE THEREOF 78th Congress, 2d Session. "An explosion undoubtedly occurred on or near the railroad between 10 and 10:30 p.m. on September 18th, but the damage, if any, to the railroad did not in fact prevent the punctual arrival of the south-bound train from Changchun, and was not in itself sufficient to justify military action. The military operations of the Japanese troops during this night, ... cannot be regarded as measures of legitimate self-defence..." [Opinion of Commission of Enquiry], ibid., p. 71 ^ Behr 1987, p. 182 ^ Chen, World War II Database ^ Ferrell, "The Mukden Incident: September 18–19, 1931". Journal of modern history 27.1 (1955): 66–72. ^ Ferrell, "The Mukden Incident: September 18–19, 1931". Journal of modern history 27.1 (1955): 66–72. ^ Ferrell, "The Mukden Incident: September 18–19, 1931". Journal of modern history 27.1 (1955): 66–72. ^ Ian Hill Nish, Japan's Struggle with Internationalism: Japan, China, and the League of Nations, 1931–3 (Routledge, 1993). ^ Nish, Japan's Struggle with Internationalism: Japan, China, and the League of Nations, 1931–3 (1993). ^ Nish, Japan's Struggle with Internationalism: Japan, China, and the League of Nations, 1931–3 (1993). ^ Ferrell, "The Mukden Incident: September 18–19, 1931". Journal of modern history 27.1 (1955): 66–72. ^ Behr 1987, pp. 182–183 ^ Weland, James (1994). "Misguided Intelligence: Japanese Military Intelligence Officers in the Manchurian Incident, September 1931". Journal of Military History. 58 (3): 445–460. doi:10.2307/2944134.  ^ "WAR RESPONSIBILITY--delving into the past (1) / Who should bear the most blame for the Showa War?". Yomiuri Shimbun. 2006-08-13. Retrieved 2008-09-18.  ^ "WAR RESPONSIBILITY--delving into the past (1) / Manchuria
start of slide into war". Yomiuri Shimbun. 2006-08-16. Retrieved 2008-09-18.  ^ Taylor, A. J. P. (1962), The Origins of the Second World War, New York: Atheneum, p. 91  ^ http://dream.sdchina.com/NewsArticle_3087737.html ^ http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2010-09-18/213421129732.shtml. ^ Personal experience. ^ Patriots and Traitors: Sorge and Ozaki: A Japanese Cultural Casebook, MerwinAsia: 2009, pp. 101–197


Ferrell, Robert H. "The Mukden Incident: September 18–19, 1931." Journal of modern history 27.1 (1955): 66-72. in JSTOR Lensen, George Alexander (1974). The Damned Inheritance: The Soviet Union and the Manchurian Crises 1924-1935. The Diplomatic Press.  Long-hsuen, Hsu; Chang Ming-kai (1971). History of The Sino-Japanese War (1937–1945) (2nd ed.). 33, 140th Lane, Tung-hwa Street, Taipei, Taiwan: Chung Wu Publishing.  Jowett, Philip (2005). Rays of the Rising Sun, Volume 1: Japan's Asian Allies 1931-45, China and Manchukuo. Helion and Company Ltd. ISBN 1-874622-21-3.  Matsusaka, Yoshihisa Tak (2003). The Making of Japanese Manchuria, 1904-1932. Harvard University Asia Center. ISBN 0-674-01206-2. 

External links[edit]

World War II Database- Manchurian Incident Manchurian Crisis Article on Japanese military cliques and their involvement in The Mukden Incident
Mukden Incident
from Japanese Press Translations 1945-46

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