Vedanta
Advaita
Vishishtadvaita
Dvaita

Dvaita Vedanta
Bhedabheda
Dvaitadvaita
Achintya Bheda Abheda
Shuddhadvaita
Heterodox
Charvaka
Ājīvika
Buddhism
Jainism
Other schools
Vaishnava
Smarta
Shakta
Īśvara
Shaiva: Pratyabhijña
Pashupata
Siddhanta
Tantra
Teachers (Acharyas)
Nyaya
Akṣapāda Gotama
Jayanta Bhatta
Raghunatha Siromani
Mīmāṃsā
Jaimini
Kumārila Bhaṭṭa
Prabhākara
Advaita Vedanta
Gaudapada
Adi Shankara
Vācaspati Miśra
Vidyaranya
Sadananda
Madhusūdana Sarasvatī
Vijnanabhiksu
Ramakrishna
Vivekananda
Ramana Maharshi
Siddharudha
Chinmayananda
Nisargadatta
Vishishtadvaita
Nammalvar
Alvars
Yamunacharya
Ramanuja
Vedanta

Vedanta Desika
Pillai Lokacharya
Manavala Mamunigal
Dvaita
Madhvacharya
Jayatirtha
Vyasatirtha
Sripadaraja
Vadirajatirtha
Vijayendra Tirtha
Raghavendra Swami
Padmanabha Tirtha
Naraharitirtha
Achintya Bheda Abheda
Chaitanya Mahaprabhu
Jiva Goswami
Bhaktisiddhanta Sarasvati
Prabhupada
Tantra
Shakta
Abhinavagupta
Nigamananda Paramahansa
Ramprasad Sen
Bamakhepa
Kamalakanta Bhattacharya
Anandamayi Ma
Others
Samkhya
Kapila
Yoga
Patanjali
Vaisheshika
Kanada, Prashastapada
Dvaitadvaita
Nimbarka
Shuddhadvaita
Vallabha

Vallabha Acharya
Major texts
Sruti
Smriti
Vedas
Rigveda
Yajurveda
Samaveda
Atharvaveda
Upanishads
Principal Upanishads
Minor Upanishads
Other scriptures
Bhagavat Gita
Agama (Hinduism)
Shastras and Sutras
Brahma

Brahma Sutras
Samkhya

Samkhya Sutras
Mimamsa

Mimamsa Sutras
Nyāya

Nyāya Sūtras
Vaiśeṣika Sūtra
Yoga

Yoga Sutras
Pramana

Pramana Sutras
Puranas
Dharma

Dharma Shastra
Artha

Artha Śastra
Kamasutra
Tirumurai
Shiva

Shiva Samhita
Hinduism
Other Indian philosophies
v
t
e
Mimamsa

Mimamsa (IAST: Mīmāṃsā) is a
Sanskrit

Sanskrit word that means
"reflection" or "critical investigation".[1][2] Also known as
Pūrva-
Mīmāṃsā

Mīmāṃsā or Karma-Mīmāṃsā,[3]) it is one of six
orthodox (astika) schools of Hinduism. The school is known for its
philosophical theories on the nature of dharma, based on hermeneutics
of the Vedas.[4] The
Mīmāṃsā

Mīmāṃsā school was foundational and
influential for the vedāntic schools, which were also known as
Uttara-Mīmāṃsā. The differences were that the
Mīmāṃsā

Mīmāṃsā school
developed and emphasized karmakāṇḍa, or the study of ritual
actions, using the four early Vedas, while the Vedānta schools
developed and emphasized jñanakāṇḍa, the study of knowledge and
spirituality, using the later parts of
Vedas

Vedas like the Upaniṣads.[4]
Mīmāṃsā

Mīmāṃsā has several sub-schools, each defined by its
epistemology. The Prābhākara sub-school, which takes its name from
the seventh-century philosopher Prabhākara, described the five
epistemically reliable means to gaining knowledge: pratyakṣa or
perception; anumāna or inference; upamāṇa, by comparison and
analogy; arthāpatti, the use of postulation and derivation from
circumstances; and śabda, the word or testimony of past or present
reliable experts.[5][6] The Bhāṭṭa sub-school, from philosopher
Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, added a sixth means to its canon; anupalabdhi
meant non-perception, or proof by the absence of cognition (e.g., the
lack of gunpowder on a suspect's hand)[5][7]
The school of
Mīmāṃsā

Mīmāṃsā consists of both atheistic and theistic
doctrines, but the school showed little interest in systematic
examination of the existence of God. Rather, it held that the soul is
an eternal, omnipresent, inherently active spiritual essence, and
focused on the epistemology and metaphysics of dharma.[3][8][9] For
the
Mīmāṃsā

Mīmāṃsā school, dharma meant rituals and social duties, not
devas, or gods, because gods existed only in name.[3] The
Mīmāṃsakas also held that
Vedas

Vedas are "eternal, authorless, [and]
infallible", that Vedic vidhi, or injunctions and mantras in rituals
are prescriptive kārya or actions, and the rituals are of primary
importance and merit. They considered the
Upaniṣads

Upaniṣads and other texts
related to self-knowledge and spirituality as subsidiary, a
philosophical view that Vedānta disagreed with.[4][3]
Mīmāṃsā

Mīmāṃsā gave rise to the study of philology and the philosophy of
language.[10] While their deep analysis of language and linguistics
influenced other schools of Hinduism,[11] their views were not shared
by others. Mīmāṃsakas considered the purpose and power of language
was to clearly prescribe the proper, correct and right. In contrast,
Vedāntins extended the scope and value of language as a tool to also
describe, develop and derive.[3] Mīmāṃsakas considered orderly,
law driven, procedural life as central purpose and noblest necessity
of dharma and society, and divine (theistic) sustenance means to that
end.
The
Mīmāṃsā

Mīmāṃsā school is a form of philosophical realism.[12] A key
text of the
Mīmāṃsā

Mīmāṃsā school is the
Mīmāṃsā

Mīmāṃsā
Sūtra

Sūtra of
Jaimini.[3][13]
Contents
1 Terminology
2 Darśana (philosophy) – central concerns
3 Epistemology
3.1 Pratyaksa
3.2 Anumana
3.3 Upamana
3.4 Arthapatti
3.5 Anupalabdhi
3.6 Sabda
3.7 Relation to
Vedanta

Vedanta school
4 Metaphysics and beliefs
4.1 Atheism
4.2 Dharma
4.3 Relation to Vedānta
5 History
6
Mimamsa

Mimamsa texts
7 See also
8 References
8.1 Bibliography
9 Further reading
10 External links
Terminology[edit]
Mīmāṃsā, also romanised Mimansa[14] or Mimamsa,[2] means
"reflection, consideration, profound thought, investigation,
examination, discussion" in Sanskrit.[15] It also refers to the
"examination of the Vedic text"[15] and to a school of Hindu
philosophy that is also known as Pūrva
Mīmāṃsā

Mīmāṃsā ("prior" inquiry,
also Karma-Mīmāṃsā), in contrast to Uttara Mīmāṃsā
("posterior" inquiry, also Jñana-Mīmāṃsā) – the opposing
school of Vedanta. This division is based on classification of the
Vedic texts into karmakāṇḍa, the early sections of the Veda
treating of mantras and rituals (Samhitas and Brahmanas), and the
jñānakāṇḍa dealing with the meditation, reflection and
knowledge of Self, Oneness,
Brahman

Brahman (the Upaniṣads).[4][13] Between
the Samhitas and Brahmanas, the
Mīmāṃsā

Mīmāṃsā school places greater
emphasis to the Brahmanas - the part of
Vedas

Vedas that is a commentary on
Vedic rituals.[16]
Donald Davis translates
Mīmāṃsā

Mīmāṃsā as the "desire to think", and in
colloquial historical context as "how to think and interpret
things".[17] In the last centuries of the 1st-millennium BCE, the word
Mīmāṃsā

Mīmāṃsā began to denote the thoughts on and interpretation of the
Vedas, first as Pūrva-
Mīmāṃsā

Mīmāṃsā for rituals portions in the
earlier layers of texts in the Vedas, and as Uttara-
Mīmāṃsā

Mīmāṃsā for
the philosophical portions in the last layers.[17][18] Over time,
Pūrva-
Mīmāṃsā

Mīmāṃsā was just known as the
Mīmāṃsā

Mīmāṃsā school, and the
Uttara-
Mīmāṃsā

Mīmāṃsā as the
Vedanta

Vedanta school.[18]
The scholars of
Mīmāṃsā

Mīmāṃsā school are referred to as
Mīmāṃsākas.[19]
Darśana (philosophy) – central concerns[edit]
Further information:
Hindu

Hindu philosophy
Mimamsa

Mimamsa is one of the six classical
Hindu

Hindu darśanas. It is among the
earliest schools of
Hindu

Hindu philosophies.[2] It has attracted relatively
less scholarly study, although its theories and particularly its
questions on exegesis and theology have been highly influential on all
classical Indian philosophies.[20][21][22] Its analysis of language
has been of central importance to the legal literature of India.[23]
Ancient Mimamsa's central concern was epistemology (pramana), that is
what are the reliable means to knowledge. It debated not only "how
does man ever learn or know, whatever he knows", but also whether the
nature of all knowledge is inherently circular, whether those such as
foundationalists who critique the validity of any "justified beliefs"
and knowledge system make flawed presumptions of the very premises
they critique, and how to correctly interpret and avoid incorrectly
interpreting dharma texts such as the Vedas.[24] It asked questions
such as "what is devata (god)?", "are rituals dedicated to devatas
efficacious?", "what makes anything efficacious?", and "can it be
proved that the Vedas, or any canonical text in any system of thought,
fallible or infallible (svatah pramanya, intrinsically valid)?, if so,
how?" and others.[25][26] To
Mimamsa

Mimamsa scholars, the nature of
non-empirical knowledge and human means to it are such that one can
never demonstrate certainty, one can only falsify knowledge claims, in
some cases.[27] According to Francis Clooney, a professor at Harvard
Divinity School specializing on Hinduism, the
Mimamsa

Mimamsa school is "one
of the most distinctively
Hindu

Hindu forms of thinking; it is without real
parallel elsewhere in the world".[19]
The central text of the
Mimamsa

Mimamsa school is Jamini's
Mimamsa

Mimamsa Sutras,
along with the historically influential commentaries on this sutra by
Sabara and by Kumarila Bhatta.[19][28] Together, these texts develop
and apply the rules of language analysis (such as the rules of
contradiction), asserting that one must not only examine injunctive
propositions in any scripture, but also examine the alternate related
or reverse propositions for better understanding. They suggested that
to reach correct and valid knowledge it is not only sufficient to
demand proof of a proposition, it is important to give proof of a
proposition's negative as well as declare and prove one's own
preferred propositions. Further, they asserted that whenever
perception is not the means of direct proof and knowledge, one cannot
prove such non-empirical propositions to be "true or not true", rather
one can only prove a non-empirical proposition is "false, not false,
or uncertain".[29]
For example, the Mimamsakas welcome not only the demand for proof of
an injunctive proposition such as "agnihotra ritual leads one to
heaven", but suggest that one must examine and prove alternate
propositions such as "ritual does not lead one to heaven", "something
else leads one to heaven", "there is heaven", "there is no heaven" and
so on. The
Mimamsa

Mimamsa literature states that if satisfactory, verifiable
proof for all of such propositions cannot be found by its proponents
and its opponents, then the proposition needs to be accepted as a part
of a "belief system".[28][30] Beliefs, such as those in the scriptures
(Vedas), must be accepted to be true unless its opponents can
demonstrate the proof of validity of their own texts or teacher(s)
these opponents presume to be prima facie justified, and until these
opponents can demonstrate that the scriptures they challenge are
false. If they do not try to do so, it is hypocrisy; if they try to do
so, it can only lead to infinite regress, according to the
Mimamsakas.[24][31] Any historic scripture with widespread social
acceptance, according to Mimamsaka, is an activity of communication
(vyavaharapravrtti) and is accepted as authoritative because it is
socially validated practice, unless perceptually verifiable evidence
emerges that proves parts or all of it as false or harmful.[32]
The Mimamsakas were predominantly concerned with the central
motivation of human beings, the highest good, and actions that make
this possible.[33] They stated that human beings seek niratisaya priti
(unending ecstatic pleasure, joy, happiness) in this life and the
next. They argued that this highest good is the result of one's own
ethical actions (dharma), that such actions are what the Vedic
sentences contain and communicate, and therefore it important to
properly interpret and understand Vedic sentences, words and
meaning.[33][34] The
Mimamsa

Mimamsa scholarship was centrally concerned with
the philosophy of language, how human beings learn and communicate
with each other and across generations with language in order to act
in a manner that enables them to achieve that which motivates
them.[35][36] The
Mimamsa

Mimamsa school focussed on dharma, deriving ethics
and activity from the karma-kanda (rituals) part of the Vedas, with
the argument that ethics for this life and efficacious action for
svarga (heaven) cannot be derived from sense-perception, and can only
be derived from experience, reflection and understanding of past
teachings.[37]
In every human activity, the motivating force to perform an action is
his innate longing for priti (pleasure, happiness[38]),
whether at the lowest level or the highest level.
At the highest level, it is nothing but an unsurpassed state of priti,
which is ensured only by performing ethical actions.
– Sabara, 2nd century
Mimamsa

Mimamsa scholar[39]
According to Daniel Arnold, the
Mimamsa

Mimamsa scholarship has "striking
affinities" with that of William Alston, the 20th century Western
philosopher, along with some notable differences.[40] The Mimamsakas
subjected to a radical critique, more than two thousand years ago,
states Francis Clooney, the notions such as "God," the "sacred text,"
the "author" and the "anthropocentric ordering of reality".[41]
Epistemology[edit]
In the field of epistemology, later Mīmāṃsākas made some notable
contributions. Unlike the
Nyaya

Nyaya or the
Vaisheshika systems, the
Prābhākara sub-school of
Mīmāṃsā

Mīmāṃsā recognizes five means of valid
knowledge (Skt. pramāṇa). The Bhāṭṭa sub-school of
Mīmāṃsā

Mīmāṃsā recognizes one additional sixth, namely anuapalabdhi,
just like Advaita
Vedanta

Vedanta school of Hinduism. These six epistemically
reliable means of gaining knowledge are:
Pratyaksa[edit]
Main article : Pratyaksha
Pratyakṣa (प्रत्यक्ष्य) means perception. It
is of two types in
Mimamsa

Mimamsa and other schools of Hinduism: external and
internal. External perception is described as that arising from the
interaction of five senses and worldly objects, while internal
perception is described by this school as that of inner sense, the
mind.[42][43] The ancient and medieval Indian texts identify four
requirements for correct perception:[44] Indriyarthasannikarsa (direct
experience by one's sensory organ(s) with the object, whatever is
being studied), Avyapadesya (non-verbal; correct perception is not
through hearsay, according to ancient Indian scholars, where one's
sensory organ relies on accepting or rejecting someone else's
perception), Avyabhicara (does not wander; correct perception does not
change, nor is it the result of deception because one's sensory organ
or means of observation is drifting, defective, suspect) and
Vyavasayatmaka (definite; correct perception excludes judgments of
doubt, either because of one's failure to observe all the details, or
because one is mixing inference with observation and observing what
one wants to observe, or not observing what one does not want to
observe).[44] Some ancient scholars proposed "unusual perception" as
pramana and called it internal perception, a proposal contested by
other Indian scholars. The internal perception concepts included
pratibha (intuition), samanyalaksanapratyaksa (a form of induction
from perceived specifics to a universal), and jnanalaksanapratyaksa (a
form of perception of prior processes and previous states of a 'topic
of study' by observing its current state).[45] Further, some schools
of
Hinduism

Hinduism considered and refined rules of accepting uncertain
knowledge from Pratyakṣa-pramana, so as to contrast nirnaya
(definite judgment, conclusion) from anadhyavasaya (indefinite
judgment).[46]
Anumana[edit]
Main article : Anumana
Anumāṇa

Anumāṇa (अनुमान) means inference. It is described as
reaching a new conclusion and truth from one or more observations and
previous truths by applying reason.[47] Observing smoke and inferring
fire is an example of Anumana.[42] In all except one Hindu
philosophies,[48] this is a valid and useful means to knowledge. The
method of inference is explained by Indian texts as consisting of
three parts: pratijna (hypothesis), hetu (a reason), and drshtanta
(examples).[49] The hypothesis must further be broken down into two
parts, state the ancient Indian scholars: sadhya (that idea which
needs to proven or disproven) and paksha (the object on which the
sadhya is predicated). The inference is conditionally true if sapaksha
(positive examples as evidence) are present, and if vipaksha (negative
examples as counter-evidence) are absent. For rigor, the Indian
philosophies also state further epistemic steps. For example, they
demand Vyapti - the requirement that the hetu (reason) must
necessarily and separately account for the inference in "all" cases,
in both sapaksha and vipaksha.[49][50] A conditionally proven
hypothesis is called a nigamana (conclusion).[51]
Upamana[edit]
Main article : Upamāṇa
Upamāṇa means comparison and analogy.[5][6] Some
Hindu

Hindu schools
consider it as a proper means of knowledge.[52] Upamana, states
Lochtefeld,[53] may be explained with the example of a traveller who
has never visited lands or islands with endemic population of
wildlife. He or she is told, by someone who has been there, that in
those lands you see an animal that sort of looks like a cow, grazes
like cow but is different from a cow in such and such way. Such use of
analogy and comparison is, state the Indian epistemologists, a valid
means of conditional knowledge, as it helps the traveller identify the
new animal later.[53] The subject of comparison is formally called
upameyam, the object of comparison is called upamanam, while the
attribute(s) are identified as samanya.[54] Thus, explains Monier
Monier-Williams, if a boy says "her face is like the moon in
charmingness", "her face" is upameyam, the moon is upamanam, and
charmingness is samanya. The 7th century text
Bhaṭṭikāvya
.jpg/250px-Ramapanchayan,_Raja_Ravi_Varma_(Lithograph).jpg)
Bhaṭṭikāvya in
verses 10.28 through 10.63 discusses many types of comparisons and
analogies, identifying when this epistemic method is more useful and
reliable, and when it is not.[54] In various ancient and medieval
texts of Hinduism, 32 types of Upanama and their value in epistemology
are debated.
Arthapatti[edit]
Main article: Arthapatti
Arthāpatti

Arthāpatti (अर्थापत्ति) means postulation,
derivation from circumstances.[5][6] In contemporary logic, this
pramana is similar to circumstantial implication.[55] As example, if a
person left in a boat on river earlier, and the time is now past the
expected time of arrival, then the circumstances support the truth
postulate that the person has arrived. Many Indian scholars considered
this pramana as invalid or at best weak, because the boat may have
gotten delayed or diverted.[56] However, in cases such as deriving the
time of a future sunrise or sunset, this method was asserted by the
proponents to be reliable. Another common example for arthapatti found
in the texts of
Mīmāṃsā

Mīmāṃsā and other schools of
Hinduism

Hinduism is, that if
"Devadatta is fat" and "Devadatta does not eat in day", then the
following must be true: "Devadatta eats in the night". This form of
postulation and deriving from circumstances is, claim the Indian
scholars, a means to discovery, proper insight and knowledge.[57] The
Hindu

Hindu schools that accept this means of knowledge state that this
method is a valid means to conditional knowledge and truths about a
subject and object in original premises or different premises. The
schools that do not accept this method, state that postulation,
extrapolation and circumstantial implication is either derivable from
other pramanas or flawed means to correct knowledge, instead one must
rely on direct perception or proper inference.[58]
Anupalabdhi[edit]
Main article : Anupalabdhi, See also: Abhava
Anupalabdi (अनुपलब्धि), accepted only by Kumarila
Bhatta sub-school of Mīmāṃsā, means non-perception,
negative/cognitive proof.[59]
Anupalabdhi

Anupalabdhi pramana suggests that
knowing a negative, such as "there is no jug in this room" is a form
of valid knowledge. If something can be observed or inferred or proven
as non-existent or impossible, then one knows more than what one did
without such means.[60] In the two schools of
Hinduism

Hinduism that consider
Anupalabdhi

Anupalabdhi as epistemically valuable, a valid conclusion is either
sadrupa (positive) or asadrupa (negative) relation - both correct and
valuable. Like other pramana, Indian scholars refined Anupalabdi to
four types: non-perception of the cause, non-perception of the effect,
non-perception of object, and non-perception of contradiction. Only
two schools of
Hinduism

Hinduism accepted and developed the concept
"non-perception" as a pramana. The schools that endorsed Anupalabdi
affirmed that it as valid and useful when the other five pramanas fail
in one's pursuit of knowledge and truth.[61]
Abhava

Abhava (अभाव) means non-existence. Some scholars consider
Anupalabdi to be same as Abhava,[5] while others consider Anupalabdi
and
Abhava

Abhava as different.[61][62] Abhava-pramana has been discussed in
ancient
Hindu texts

Hindu texts in the context of
Padārtha (पदार्थ,
referent of a term). A Padartha is defined as that which is
simultaneously Astitva (existent), Jneyatva (knowable) and
Abhidheyatva (nameable).[63] Specific examples of padartha, states
Bartley, include dravya (substance), guna (quality), karma
(activity/motion), samanya/jati (universal/class property), samavaya
(inherence) and vishesha (individuality).
Abhava

Abhava is then explained as
"referents of negative expression" in contrast to "referents of
positive expression" in Padartha.[63] An absence, state the ancient
scholars, is also "existent, knowable and nameable", giving the
example of negative numbers, silence as a form of testimony,
asatkaryavada theory of causation, and analysis of deficit as real and
valuable.
Abhava

Abhava was further refined in four types, by the schools of
Hinduism

Hinduism that accepted it as a useful method of epistemology: dhvamsa
(termination of what existed), atyanta-abhava (impossibility, absolute
non-existence, contradiction), anyonya-abhava (mutual negation,
reciprocal absence) and pragavasa (prior, antecedent
non-existence).[63][64]
Sabda[edit]
Main article: Sabda
Śabda (शब्द) means relying on word, testimony of past or
present reliable experts.[5][59] Hiriyanna explains Sabda-pramana as a
concept which means reliable expert testimony. The schools of Hinduism
which consider it epistemically valid suggest that a human being needs
to know numerous facts, and with the limited time and energy
available, he can learn only a fraction of those facts and truths
directly.[65] He must rely on others, his parent, family, friends,
teachers, ancestors and kindred members of society to rapidly acquire
and share knowledge and thereby enrich each other's lives. This means
of gaining proper knowledge is either spoken or written, but through
Sabda (words).[65] The reliability of the source is important, and
legitimate knowledge can only come from the
Sabda of reliable
sources.[59][65] The disagreement between the schools of
Hinduism

Hinduism has
been on how to establish reliability. Some schools, such as Carvaka,
state that this is never possible, and therefore
Sabda is not a proper
pramana. Other schools debate means to establish reliability.[66]
Relation to
Vedanta

Vedanta school[edit]
An interesting feature of the
Mīmāṃsā

Mīmāṃsā school of philosophy is its
unique epistemological theory of the intrinsic validity of all
cognition as such. It is held that all knowledge is ipso facto true
(Skt. svataḥprāmāṇyavāda). Thus, what is to be proven is not
the truth of a cognition, but its falsity. The Mīmāṃsākas
advocate the self-validity of knowledge both in respect of its origin
(utpatti) and ascertainment (jñapti). Not only did the
Mīmāṃsākas make the very great use of this theory to establish
the unchallengeable validity of the Vedas, but later Vedantists also
drew freely upon this particular
Mīmāṃsā

Mīmāṃsā contribution.[citation
needed]
Metaphysics and beliefs[edit]
The core tenets of Pūrva
Mīmāṃsā

Mīmāṃsā are ritualism (orthopraxy),
anti-asceticism and anti-mysticism. The central aim of the school is
elucidation of the nature of dharma, understood as a set ritual
obligations and prerogatives to be performed properly.
Atheism[edit]
Mīmāṃsā

Mīmāṃsā theorists decided that the evidence allegedly proving the
existence of God was insufficient. They argue that there was no need
to postulate a maker for the world, just as there was no need for an
author to compose the
Vedas

Vedas or a God to validate the rituals.[67]
Mīmāṃsā

Mīmāṃsā argues that the Gods named in the
Vedas

Vedas have no existence
apart from the mantras that speak their names. To that regard, the
power of the mantras is what is seen as the power of Gods.[68]
Dharma[edit]
Dharma

Dharma as understood by Pūrva
Mīmāṃsā

Mīmāṃsā can be loosely translated
into English as "virtue", "morality" or "duty". The Pūrva
Mīmāṃsā

Mīmāṃsā school traces the source of the knowledge of dharma
neither to sense-experience nor inference, but to verbal cognition
(i.e. knowledge of words and meanings) according to Vedas. In this
respect it is related to the
Nyāya

Nyāya school, the latter, however,
accepts only four sources of knowledge (pramāṇa) as valid.[69]
The Pūrva
Mīmāṃsā

Mīmāṃsā school held dharma to be equivalent to
following the prescriptions of the Saṃhitās and their Brāhmaṇa
commentaries relating the correct performance of Vedic rituals. Seen
in this light, Pūrva
Mīmāṃsā

Mīmāṃsā is essentially ritualist
(orthopraxy), placing great weight on the performance of karma or
action as enjoined by the Vedas.
Relation to Vedānta[edit]
Emphasis of Yajnic Karmakāṇḍas in Pūrva
Mīmāṃsā

Mīmāṃsā is
erroneously interpreted by some to be an opposition to
Jñānakāṇḍa of Vedānta and Upaniṣads. Pūrva Mīmāṃsā
does not discuss topics related to Jñānakāṇḍa, such as
salvation (mokṣa), but it never speaks against mokṣa. Vedānta
quotes Jaimini's belief in
Brahman

Brahman as well as in mokṣa:
In Uttara-
Mīmāṃsā

Mīmāṃsā or Vedānta (4.4.5-7), Bāḍarāyaṇa cites
Jaimini

Jaimini as saying (ब्राह्मेण
जैमिनिरूपन्यासादिभ्यः) "(The
mukta Puruṣa is united with the Brahman) as if it were like the
Brahman, because descriptions (in
Śruti

Śruti etc) prove so".
In Vedānta (1.2.28), Bāḍarāyaṇa cites
Jaimini

Jaimini as saying that
"There is no contradiction in taking Vaishvānara as the supreme
Brahman".
In 1.2.31,
Jaimini

Jaimini is again quoted by Bāḍarāyana as saying that
the nirguna (attribute-less)
Brahman

Brahman can manifest itself as having a
form.
In 4.3.12, Bādarāyana again cites
Jaimini

Jaimini as saying that the mukta
Purusha attains Brahman.
In Pūrva
Mīmāṃsā

Mīmāṃsā too,
Jaimini

Jaimini emphasises the importance of faith
in and attachment to the Omnipotent Supreme Being Whom
Jaimini

Jaimini calls
"The Omnipotent Pradhaana" (The Main):
Pūrva
Mīmāṃsā

Mīmāṃsā 6.3.1: "sarvaśaktau pravṛttiḥ syāt
tathābhūtopadeśāt" (सर्वशक्तौ
प्रवृत्तिः स्यात्
तथाभूतोपदेशात्). The term upadeśa here
means instructions of the śāstras as taught. We should tend towards
the omnipotent supreme being. In the context of Pūrva Mīmāṃsā
6.3.1 shown above, next two sutras becomes significant, in which this
Omnipotent Being is termed as "pradhāna", and keeping away from Him
is said to be a "doṣa", hence all beings are asked to get related
("abhisambandhāt" in tadakarmaṇi ca doṣas tasmāt tato
viśeṣaḥ syāt pradhānenābhisambandhāt;
Jaimini

Jaimini 6, 3.3) to the
"Omnipotent Main Being" (api vāpy ekadeśe syāt pradhāne hy
arthanirvṛttir guṇamātram itarat tadarthatvāt;
Jaimini

Jaimini 6, 3.2).
Karma-
Mīmāṃsā

Mīmāṃsā supports the Vedas, and Rgveda says that one Truth
is variously named by the sages. It is irrelevant whether we call Him
as Pradhāna or
Brahman

Brahman or Vaishvānara or
Shiva

Shiva or God.
History[edit]
The school's origins lie in the scholarly traditions of the final
centuries BCE, when the priestly ritualism of Vedic sacrifice was
being marginalized by
Buddhism
.jpeg/440px-Gandhara_Buddha_(tnm).jpeg)
Buddhism and Vedanta.[citation needed] To
counteract this challenge, several groups emerged dedicated to
demonstrating the validity of the Vedic texts by rigid formulation of
rules for their interpretation. The school gathers momentum in the
Gupta period

Gupta period with Śābara, and reaches its apex in the 7th to 8th
centuries with
Kumārila Bhaṭṭa

Kumārila Bhaṭṭa and Prabhākara.[citation needed]
The school for some time in the Early Middle Ages exerted
near-dominant influence on learned
Hindu

Hindu thought, and is credited as a
major force contributing to the decline of
Buddhism
.jpeg/440px-Gandhara_Buddha_(tnm).jpeg)
Buddhism in India, but it
has fallen into decline in the High Middle Ages and today is all but
eclipsed by Vedanta.[70]
Mimamsa

Mimamsa texts[edit]
The foundational text for the
Mīmāṃsā

Mīmāṃsā school is the Purva
Mīmāṃsā

Mīmāṃsā Sutras of
Jaimini

Jaimini (ca. 3rd to 1st century BCE). A major
commentary was composed by
Śābara in ca. the 5th or 6th century CE.
The school reaches its height with
Kumārila Bhaṭṭa

Kumārila Bhaṭṭa and
Prabhākara (fl. ca. 700 CE). Both Kumarila Bhatta and Prabhākara
(along with Murāri, whose work is no more extant) have written
extensive commentaries on Śābara's Mīmāṃsāsūtrabhāṣyam.
Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, Mandana Miśra, Pārthasārathi Miśra, Sucarita
Miśra,
Ramakrishna

Ramakrishna Bhatta, Madhava Subhodini, Sankara Bhatta,
Krsnayajvan, Anantadeva, Gaga Bhatta, Ragavendra Tirtha, VijayIndhra
Tirtha, Appayya Dikshitar, Paruthiyur
Krishna

Krishna Sastri, Mahomahapadyaya
Sri Ramsubba Sastri, Sri Venkatsubba Sastri, Sri A. Chinnaswami
Sastri, Sengalipuram Vaidhyanatha Dikshitar were some of the Mimamsa
Scholars.
The Mīmāṁsā
Sūtra

Sūtra of
Jaimini

Jaimini (c. 3rd century BCE) has summed up
the general rules of nyāya for Vedic interpretation. The text has 12
chapters, of which the first chapter is of philosophical value. The
commentaries on the Mīmāṁsā
Sūtra

Sūtra by Bhartṛmitra, Bhavadāsa,
Hari and Upavarṣa are no more extant. Śabara (c. 1st century BCE)
is the first commentator of the Mīmāṁsā Sūtra, whose work is
available to us. His bhāṣya is the basis of all later works of
Mīmāṁsā.
Kumārila Bhaṭṭa

Kumārila Bhaṭṭa (7th century CE), the founder of
the first school of the Mīmāṁsā commented on both the
Sūtra

Sūtra and
its Śabara Bhāṣya. His treatise consists of 3 parts, the
Ślokavārttika, the Tantravārttika and the Ṭupṭīkā. Manḍana
Miśra (8th century CE) was a follower of Kumārila, who wrote
Vidhiviveka and Mīmāṁsānukramaṇī. There are several
commentaries on the works of Kumārila. Sucarita Miśra wrote a
Kāśikā (commentary) on the Ślokavārttika. Someśvara Bhatta wrote
Nyāyasudhā, also known as Rāṇaka, a commentary on the
Tantravārttika. Pārthasarathi Miśra wrote Nyāyaratnākara (1300
CE), another commentary on the Ślokavārttika. He also wrote
Śāstradīpikā, an independent work on the Mīmāṁsā and
Tantraratna. Venkaṭa Dīkṣita’s Vārttikabharaṇya is a
commentary on the Ṭupṭīkā.
Prabhākara (8th century CE), the
originator of the second school of the Mīmāṁsā wrote his
commentary Bṛhatī on the Śabara Bhāṣya. Śālikanātha’s
Ṛjuvimalā (9th century CE) is a commentary on the Bṛhatī. His
Prakaraṇapañcikā is an independent work of this school and the
Pariśiṣṭa is a brief explanation of the Śabara Bhāṣya.
Bhavanātha’s Nyāyaviveka deals with the views of this school in
details. The founder of the third school of the Mīmāṁsā was
Murāri, whose works have not reached us.
Āpadeva (17th century) wrote an elementary work on the Mīmāṁsā,
known as Mīmāṁsānyāyaprakaśa or Āpadevī. Arthasaṁgraha of
Laugākṣi Bhāskara is based on the Āpadevī. Vedānta Deśika’s
Śeśvara Mīmāṁsā was an attempt to combine the views of the
Mīmāṁsā and the Vedānta schools.[71]
See also[edit]
Cārvāka
Vaisheshika
Samkhya
Yoga
Nyaya
Vedanta
Śālikanātha
References[edit]
^
Mimamsa

Mimamsa Meriam-Webster Dictionary (2011)
^ a b c
Mimamsa

Mimamsa Encyclopædia Britannica (2014)
^ a b c d e f Chris Bartley (2013), Purva Mimamsa, in Encyclopaedia of
Asian Philosophy (Editor: Oliver Leaman), Routledge, 978-0415862530,
page 443-445
^ a b c d Oliver Leaman (2006), Shruti, in Encyclopaedia of Asian
Philosophy, Routledge, ISBN 978-0415862530, page 503
^ a b c d e f DPS Bhawuk (2011), Spirituality and Indian Psychology
(Editor: Anthony Marsella), Springer, ISBN 978-1-4419-8109-7,
page 172
^ a b c Gavin Flood, An Introduction to Hinduism, Cambridge University
Press, ISBN 978-0521438780, page 225
^ John A. Grimes, A Concise Dictionary of Indian Philosophy: Sanskrit
Terms Defined in English, State University of New York Press,
ISBN 978-0791430675, page 238
^ Neville, Robert (2001). Religious truth. SUNY Press.
^ Worthington, Vivian (1982). A history of yoga. Routledge.
p. 66. ISBN 9780710092588.
^ Peter M. Scharf, The Denotation of Generic Terms in Ancient Indian
Philosophy (1996), Chapter 3
^ Annette Wilke and Oliver Moebus (2011), Sound and Communication: An
Aesthetic Cultural History of
Sanskrit

Sanskrit Hinduism, Walter de Gruyter
GmbH (Berlin), ISBN 978-3110181593, pages 23-24, 551-663
^ M. Hiriyanna (1993), Outlines of Indian Philosophy, Motilal
Banarsidass, ISBN 978-8120810860, page 323-325
^ a b M. Hiriyanna (1993), Outlines of Indian Philosophy, Motilal
Banarsidass, ISBN 978-8120810860, page 298-335
^ M.C. Nyayaratna (1863). The Mimansa Darsana. Bishop's College Press.
pp. Cover Page.
^ a b Mimamsa, Monier Williams Sanskrit-English Dictionary, Cologne
Digital
Sanskrit

Sanskrit Lexicon (Germany)
^ M. Hiriyanna (1993), Outlines of Indian Philosophy, Motilal
Banarsidass, ISBN 978-8120810860, page 299
^ a b Donald R. Davis, Jr (2010). The Spirit of
Hindu

Hindu Law. Cambridge
University Press. pp. 47–48. ISBN 978-1-139-48531-9.
^ a b
Francis Xavier Clooney

Francis Xavier Clooney (1990). Thinking Ritually: Rediscovering
the Pūrva
Mīmāṃsā

Mīmāṃsā of Jaimini. De Nobili, Vienna.
pp. 25–28. ISBN 978-3-900271-21-3.
^ a b c Francis X. Clooney 1997, p. 337.
^ Francis X. Clooney 1997, pp. 337-340.
^ Daniel Arnold 2001, pp. 26-31.
^ Dan Arnold 2008, pp. 57-61, 89-98.
^ Maurice Winternitz (1963). History of Indian Literature. Motilal
Banarsidass. pp. 511–512. ISBN 978-81-208-0056-4.
^ a b Daniel Arnold 2001, pp. 28-32.
^ Daniel Arnold 2001, pp. 26-33.
^ Francis X. Clooney 1997, pp. 337-342.
^ Daniel Arnold 2001, pp. 27, 29-30.
^ a b Daniel Arnold 2001, pp. 27-29.
^ Daniel Arnold 2001, pp. 28-35.
^ Dan Arnold 2008, pp. 57-79.
^ Dan Arnold 2008, pp. 89-114.
^ Daniel Arnold 2001, pp. 31-33, 36-38.
^ a b Prasad 1994, pp. 317-318.
^ P. T. Raju 1985, pp. 17, 41-47, 61-63, Quote (p. 62): "The
ideal life, according to the Mimamsa, is thus a life of continuous
ethical activity and enjoyment of its fruits.".
^ Prasad 1994, pp. 317-319.
^ J.F. Staal 1976, pp. 112-117.
^ Shyam Ranganathan 2007, pp. 298-302, 348-349.
^ Jan Gonda, Johannes Bronkhorst and Elisa Freschi translate "priti"
as happiness; e.g. see, Elisa Freschi (2012). Duty, Language and
Exegesis in Prabhakara Mimamsa. BRILL Academic. p. 380.
ISBN 978-90-04-22260-1.
^ Prasad 1994, p. 339 note 5, Mimamsasutrabhasya 4.3.15.
^ Daniel Arnold 2001, pp. 41-43.
^ Francis X. Clooney (1987). "Why the
Veda

Veda Has No Author: Language as
Ritual

Ritual in Early
Mīmāṃsā

Mīmāṃsā and Post-Modern Theology". Journal of the
American Academy of Religion. Oxford University Press. 55 (4):
660–661. doi:10.1093/jaarel/lv.4.659.
^ a b MM Kamal (1998), The
Epistemology

Epistemology of the
Carvaka Philosophy,
Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies, 46(2): 13-16
^ B Matilal (1992), Perception: An Essay in Indian Theories of
Knowledge, Oxford University Press, ISBN 978-0198239765
^ a b Karl Potter (1977), Meaning and Truth, in Encyclopedia of Indian
Philosophies, Volume 2, Princeton University Press, Reprinted in 1995
by Motilal Banarsidass, ISBN 81-208-0309-4, pages 160-168
^ Karl Potter (1977), Meaning and Truth, in Encyclopedia of Indian
Philosophies, Volume 2, Princeton University Press, Reprinted in 1995
by Motilal Banarsidass, ISBN 81-208-0309-4, pages 168-169
^ Karl Potter (1977), Meaning and Truth, in Encyclopedia of Indian
Philosophies, Volume 2, Princeton University Press, Reprinted in 1995
by Motilal Banarsidass, ISBN 81-208-0309-4, pages 170-172
^ W Halbfass (1991), Tradition and Reflection, State University of New
York Press, ISBN 0-7914-0362-9, page 26-27
^
Carvaka school is the exception
^ a b James Lochtefeld, "Anumana" in The Illustrated Encyclopedia of
Hinduism, Vol. 1: A-M, Rosen Publishing. ISBN 0-8239-2287-1, page
46-47
^ Karl Potter (2002), Presuppositions of India's Philosophies, Motilal
Banarsidass, ISBN 81-208-0779-0
^ Monier Williams (1893), Indian Wisdom - Religious, Philosophical and
Ethical Doctrines of the Hindus, Luzac & Co, London, page 61
^ VN Jha (1986), "The upamana-pramana in Purvamimamsa", SILLE, pages
77-91
^ a b James Lochtefeld, "Upamana" in The Illustrated Encyclopedia of
Hinduism, Vol. 2: N-Z, Rosen Publishing. ISBN 0-8239-2287-1, page
721
^ a b Monier Williams (1893), Indian Wisdom - Religious, Philosophical
and Ethical Doctrines of the Hindus, Luzac & Co, London, pages
457-458
^
Arthapatti

Arthapatti Encyclopædia Britannica (2012)
^ James Lochtefeld, "Arthapatti" in The Illustrated Encyclopedia of
Hinduism, Vol. 1: A-M, Rosen Publishing. ISBN 0-8239-2287-1, page
55
^ Stephen Phillips (1996), Classical Indian Metaphysics, Motilal
Banarsidass, ISBN 978-8120814899, pages 41-63
^ DM Datta (1932), The Six Ways of Knowing: A Critical study of the
Advaita theory of knowledge, University of Calcutta, Reprinted in 1992
as ISBN 978-8120835269, pages 221-253
^ a b c
Eliott Deutsche (2000), in Philosophy of Religion : Indian
Philosophy Vol 4 (Editor: Roy Perrett), Routledge,
ISBN 978-0815336112, pages 245-248;
John A. Grimes, A Concise Dictionary of Indian Philosophy: Sanskrit
Terms Defined in English, State University of New York Press,
ISBN 978-0791430675, page 238
^ James Lochtefeld, "Abhava" in The Illustrated Encyclopedia of
Hinduism, Vol. 1: A-M, Rosen Publishing. ISBN 0-8239-2287-1, page
1
^ a b D Sharma (1966), Epistemological negative dialectics of Indian
logic — Abhāva versus Anupalabdhi, Indo-Iranian Journal, 9(4):
291-300
^ Karl Potter (1977), Meaning and Truth, in Encyclopedia of Indian
Philosophies, Volume 2, Princeton University Press, Reprinted in 1995
by Motilal Banarsidass, ISBN 81-208-0309-4, pages 155-174,
227-255
^ a b c Chris Bartley (2013), Padartha, in Encyclopaedia of Asian
Philosophy (Editor: Oliver Leaman), Routledge,
ISBN 978-0415862530, pages 415-416
^ Mohan Lal (Editor), The Encyclopaedia of Indian Literature, Vol. 5,
Sahitya Akademy, ISBN 81-260-1221-8, page 3958
^ a b c M. Hiriyanna (2000), The Essentials of Indian Philosophy,
Motilal Banarsidass, ISBN 978-8120813304, page 43
^ P. Billimoria (1988), Śabdapramāṇa: Word and Knowledge, Studies
of Classical India Volume 10, Springer, ISBN 978-94-010-7810-8,
pages 1-30
^ Neville, Robert (2001). Religious truth. p. 51.
ISBN 9780791447789.
^ Coward, Harold (2008-02-07). The perfectibility of human nature in
eastern and western thought. p. 114.
ISBN 9780791473368.
^ Kapoor, Subodh (2004). The Philosophy Of Vaisnavism. Cosmo
Publications. p. 60. ISBN 978-81-7755-886-9.
^ Göhler (1995), p. 5f.
^ Radhakrishnan, S. Indian Philosophy, Vol. II, Oxford University
Press, New Delhi, 2006, ISBN 0-19-563820-4, pp.376-78
Bibliography[edit]
Daniel Arnold (2001). "Of Intrinsic Validity: A Study on the Relevance
of Pūrva Mīmāṃsā". Philosophy East and West. University of
Hawai'i Press. 51 (1): 26–53. doi:10.1353/pew.2001.0002.
Daniel Arnold (2008). Buddhists, Brahmins, and Belief:
Epistemology

Epistemology in
South Asian Philosophy of Religion. Columbia University Press.
ISBN 978-0-231-13281-7.
Francis X. Clooney (1997). "What's a God? The Quest for the Right
Understanding of devatā in Brāhmaṇical
Ritual

Ritual Theory
(Mīmāṃsā)". International Journal of
Hindu

Hindu Studies. Springer. 1
(2): 337–385. doi:10.1007/s11407-997-0005-x.
Lars Göhler (1995). Wort und Text bei Kumārila Bhaṭṭa: Studie
zur mittelalterlichen indischen Sprachphilophie und Hermeneutik.
Europäische Hochschulschriften. Reihe 20, Philosophie; vol. 468.
Peter Lang.
Prasad, Hari Shankar (1994). "The Context Principle of Meaning in
Prabhākara Mīmāṁsā". Philosophy East and West. University of
Hawai'i Press. 44 (2): 317–346. doi:10.2307/1399597.
P. T. Raju (1985). Structural Depths of Indian Thought. State
University of New York Press. ISBN 978-0-88706-139-4.
Shyam Ranganathan (2007). Ethics and the History of Indian Philosophy.
Motilal Banarsidass. ISBN 978-81-208-3193-3.
J.F. Staal (1976). "
Sanskrit

Sanskrit Philosophy of Language". In Herman
Parret. History of Linguistic Thought and Contemporary Linguistics.
Walter de Gruyter. pp. 102–136.
ISBN 978-3-11-005818-5.
Further reading[edit]
Mahesh Chandra Nyayratna Bhattacharyya, ed. (1889). The Mimansa
Darsana (Bibliotheca Indica). Baptist Mission Press.
Chatterjee, Satischandra; Datta, Dhirendramohan (1984). An
Introduction to Indian Philosophy (Eighth Reprint ed.). Calcutta:
University of Calcutta.
Müeller, Max (1899). Six Systems of Indian Philosophy;
Samkhya

Samkhya and
Yoga, Naya and Vaiseshika. Calcutta: Susil Gupta (India) Ltd.
ISBN 0-7661-4296-5. Reprint edition; Originally published
under the title of The Six Systems of Indian Philosophy.
Radhakrishnan, S.; Moore, CA (1967). A Sourcebook in Indian
Philosophy. Princeton. ISBN 0-691-01958-4.
Ramaswami Shastri, R.A. (1936). A Short History Of The Purva Mimamsa
Shastra. Annamalai University
Sanskrit

Sanskrit Series No. 3.
Potter, Karl H. (2014). Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies: Volume
16: Philosophy of Purva-Mimamsa. Calcutta: Motilal Barnassidas.
Verpoorten, Jean-Marie (1987).
Mimamsa

Mimamsa literature (A History of Indian
literature). Otto Harrassowitz Verlag. ISBN 978-3447026765.
Zimmer, Heinrich (1951). Philosophies of India. New York, New York:
Princeton University Press. ISBN 0-691-01758-1. Bollingen
Series XXVI; Edited by Joseph Campbell.
External links[edit]
The
Mimamsa

Mimamsa Sutras of Jaimini
Introduction to Purva-
Mimamsa

Mimamsa G. Jha (Translator), Asiatic Society of
Bengal
Complete Lectures on
Purva Mimamsa Sutras

Purva Mimamsa Sutras of
Jaimini

Jaimini at
ShastraNethralaya
S. Srikanta Sastri, "The Logical system of Madvacharya" Published in
Poona Oriental Series, No. 75 - "A Volume of Studies in Indology",
presented to Prof
P. V. Kane

P. V. Kane on his 60th birthday
v
t
e
Hinduism

Hinduism topics
Glossary
Philosophy
Concepts
Brahman
Om
Ishvara
Atman
Maya
Karma
Samsara
Purusharthas
Dharma
Artha
Kama
Moksha
Niti
Ahimsa
Asteya
Aparigraha
Brahmacharya
Satya
Dāna
Damah
Dayā
Akrodha
Schools
Astika: Samkhya
Yoga
Nyaya
Vaisheshika
Mimamsa
Vedanta
Dvaita
Advaita
Vishishtadvaita
Nastika: Charvaka
Texts
Classification
Śruti
Smriti
Vedas
Rigveda
Yajurveda
Samaveda
Atharvaveda
Divisions
Samhita
Brahmana
Aranyaka
Upanishad
Upanishads
Aitareya
Kaushitaki
Brihadaranyaka
Isha
Taittiriya
Katha
Maitri
Shvetashvatara
Chandogya
Kena
Mundaka
Mandukya
Prashna
Upavedas
Ayurveda
Dhanurveda
Gandharvaveda
Sthapatyaveda
Vedanga
Shiksha
Chandas
Vyakarana
Nirukta
Kalpa
Jyotisha
Other
Bhagavad Gita
Agamas
Itihasas
Ramayana
Mahabharata
Puranas
Minor Upanishads
Artha

Artha Shastra
Dharma

Dharma Shastra
Manusmriti
Nāradasmṛti
Yājñavalkya Smṛti
Sutras
Stotras
Subhashita
Tantras
Yoga

Yoga Vasistha
Yoga

Yoga Sutras of Patanjali
Deities
Trimurti
Brahma
Vishnu
Shiva
Ishvara
Devi
Deva
Saraswati
Lakshmi
Parvati
Shakti
Durga
Kali
Ganesha
Kartikeya
Rama
Krishna
Hanuman
Prajapati
Rudra
Indra
Agni
Dyaus
Bhumi
Varuna
Vayu
Practices
Worship
Temple
Murti
Puja
Bhakti
Japa
Bhajana
Naivedhya
Yajna
Homa
Tapa
Dhyana
Tirthadana
Sanskaras
Garbhadhana
Pumsavana
Simantonayana
Jatakarma
Namakarana
Nishkramana
Annaprashana
Chudakarana
Karnavedha
Vidyarambha
Upanayana
Keshanta
Ritushuddhi
Samavartana
Vivaha
Antyeshti
Varnashrama
Varna
Brahmin
Kshatriya
Vaishya
Shudra
Ashrama
Brahmacharya
Grihastha
Vanaprastha
Sanyassa
Festivals
Diwali
Holi
Shivaratri
Raksha Bandhan
Navaratri
Durga
.jpg/440px-Shrinika_performing_Abhinaya_(Kede_Chhanda_Janilu_Tuhi).jpg)
Durga Puja
Ramlila
Vijayadashami

Vijayadashami (Dasara)
Ganesh Chaturthi
Rama

Rama Navami
Janmashtami
Onam
Pongal
Makar Sankranti
New Year
Bihu
Gudi Padwa
Pahela Baishakh
Puthandu
Vaisakhi
Vishu
Ugadi
Kumbha Mela
Ratha Yatra
Teej
Vasant Panchami
Others
Other
Svādhyāya
Namaste
Bindi
Tilaka
Related
Hindu
Denominations
Law
Calendar
Criticism
Gurus, saints, philosophers
Hindu

Hindu studies
Iconography
Mythology
Nationalism
Hindutva
Persecution
Pilgrimage sites
Glossary
Hinduism

Hinduism by country
Category
Portal
v
t
e
Indian philosophy
Topics
Atheism
Atomism
Idealism
Logic
Monotheism
Vedic philosophy
Āstika
Hindu: Samkhya
Nyaya
Vaisheshika
Yoga
Mīmāṃsā
Vedanta
Acintya bheda abheda
Advaita
Bhedabheda
Dvaita
Dvaitadvaita
Shuddhadvaita
Vishishtadvaita
Shaiva
Pratyabhijña
Pashupata Shaivism
Shaiva

Shaiva Siddhanta
Nāstika
Ājīvika
Ajñana
Cārvāka
Jain
Anekantavada
Syādvāda
Buddhist philosophy

Buddhist philosophy and Early Buddhist schools
Śūnyatā
Madhyamaka
Yogacara
Sautrāntika
Svatantrika
Texts
Abhinavabharati
Arthashastra
Bhagavad Gita
Bhagavata Purana
Brahma

Brahma Sutra
Buddhist texts
Dharmashastra
Hindu

Hindu texts
Jain Agamas
Kamasutra
Mimamsa

Mimamsa Sutras
All 108 texts
Principal
Nyāya

Nyāya Sūtras
Nyayakusumanjali
Panchadasi
Samkhyapravachana Sutra
Shiva

Shiva Sutras
Tarka-Sangraha
Tattvacintāmaṇi
Upanishads
Minor
Vaiśeṣika Sūtra
Vedangas
Vedas
Yoga

Yoga Sutras of Patanjali
Yoga

Yoga Vasistha
More...
Philosophers
Avatsara
Uddalaka Aruni
Gautam Buddha
Yajnavalkya
Gargi Vachaknavi
Buddhaghosa
Patanjali
Kanada
Kapila
Brihadratha Ikshvaku
Jaimini
Vyasa
Chanakya
Dharmakirti
Akshapada Gotama
Nagarjuna
Padmasambhava
Vasubandhu
Gaudapada
Adi Shankara
Vivekananda
Dayananda Saraswati
Ramanuja
Vedanta

Vedanta Desika
Raikva
Sadananda
Sakayanya
Satyakama Jabala
Madhvacharya
Mahavira
Guru Nanak
Vidyaranya
More...
Concepts
Abhava
Abhasavada
Abheda
Adarsana
Adrishta
Advaita
Aham
Aishvarya
Akrodha
Aksara
Anatta
Ananta
Anavastha
Anupalabdhi
Apauruṣheyā
Artha
Asiddhatva
Asatkalpa
Ātman
Avyakta
Brahman
Brahmi sthiti
Bhuman
Bhumika
Chaitanya
Chidabhasa
Cittabhumi
Dāna
Devatas
Dharma
Dhi
Dravya
Dhrti
Ekagrata
Guṇa
Hitā
Idam
Ikshana
Ishvaratva
Jivatva
Kama
Karma
Kasaya
Kshetrajna
Lakshana
Mithyatva
Mokṣa
Nididhyasana
Nirvāṇa
Niyama
Padārtha
Paramatman
Paramananda
Parameshashakti
Parinama-vada
Pradhana
Prajna
Prakṛti
Pratibimbavada
Pratītyasamutpāda
Puruṣa
Rājamaṇḍala
Ṛta
Sakshi
Samadhi
Saṃsāra
Sankalpa
Satya
Satkaryavada
Shabda Brahman
Sphoṭa
Sthiti
Śūnyatā
Sutram
Svātantrya
Iccha-mrityu
Syādvāda
Taijasa
Tajjalan
Tanmatra
Tyāga
Uparati
Upekkhā
Utsaha
Vivartavada
Viraj
Yamas
Yoga
More...
Authority control
N