Madhyamika

Mādhyamaka ("middle way" or "centrism"; ; Tibetan: དབུ་མ་པ ; ''dbu ma pa''), otherwise known as Śūnyavāda ("the emptiness doctrine") and Niḥsvabhāvavāda ("the no ''svabhāva'' doctrine"), refers to a tradition of Buddhist philosophy and practice founded by the Indian Buddhist monk and philosopher Nāgārjuna (c. 150 – c. 250 CE).Wynne, Alexander (2015) ''Early Buddhist Teaching as Proto-śūnyavāda.'' Journal of the Oxford Centre for Buddhist Studies, 6. pp. 213-241. The foundational text of the Mādhyamaka tradition is Nāgārjuna's ''Mūlamadhyamakakārikā'' ("Root Verses on the Middle Way"). More broadly, Mādhyamaka also refers to the ultimate nature of phenomena as well as the non-conceptual realization of ultimate reality that is experienced in meditation.

Mādhyamaka thought had a major influence on the subsequent development of the Mahāyāna Buddhist tradition. It is the dominant interpretation of Buddhist philosophy in Tibetan Buddhism and has also been influential in East Asian Buddhist thought.

According to the classical Indian Mādhyamika thinkers, all phenomena (''dharmas'') are empty (''śūnya'') of "nature," of any "substance" or "essence" ( ''svabhāva'') which could give them "solid and independent existence," because they are dependently co-arisen. But this "emptiness" itself is also "empty": it does not have an existence on its own, nor does it refer to a transcendental reality beyond or above phenomenal reality.

Etymology

''Madhya'' is a Sanskrit word meaning "middle". It is cognate with Latin ''med-iu-s'' and English ''mid''. The ''-ma'' suffix is a superlative, giving ''madhyama'' the meaning of "mid-most" or "medium". The ''-ka'' suffix is used to form adjectives, thus ''madhyamaka'' means "middling". The ''-ika'' suffix is used to form possessives, with a collective sense, thus ''mādhyamika'' mean "belonging to the mid-most" (the ''-ika'' suffix regularly causes a lengthening of the first vowel and elision of the final ''-a'').

In a Buddhist context, these terms refer to the "middle path" (''madhyama pratipada''), which refers to right view (''samyagdṛṣṭi'') which steers clear of the metaphysical extremes of annihilationism (''ucchedavāda'') and eternalism (''śassatavāda''). For example, the Sanskrit ''Kātyāyanaḥsūtra'' states that though the world "relies on a duality of existence and non-existence", the Buddha teaches a correct view which understands that:

Arising in the world, Kātyayana, seen and correctly understood just as it is, shows there is no non-existence in the world. Cessation in the world, Kātyayana, seen and correctly understood just as it is, shows there is no permanent existence in the world. Thus avoiding both extremes the Tathāgata teaches a dharma by the middle path (''madhyamayā pratipadā''). That is: this being, that becomes; with the arising of this, that arises. With ignorance as condition there is volition ... o be expanded with the standard formula of the 12 links of dependent origination��

Though all Buddhist schools saw themselves as defending a middle path in accord with the Buddhist teachings, the name ''madhyamaka'' refers to a school of Mahayana philosophy associated with Nāgārjuna and his commentators. The term ''mādhyamika'' refers to adherents of the madhyamaka school.

Note that in both words the stress is on the first syllable.

Philosophical overview

Svabhāva, what madhyamaka denies

Central to madhyamaka philosophy is ''śūnyatā'', "emptiness", and this refers to the central idea that dharmas are empty of ''svabhāva''. This term has been translated variously as essence, intrinsic nature, inherent existence, own being and substance. Furthermore, according to Richard P. Hayes, svabhava can be interpreted as either "identity" or as "causal independence". Likewise, Westerhoff notes that ''svabhāva'' is a complex concept that has ontological and cognitive aspects. The ontological aspects include ''svabhāva'' as essence, as a property which makes an object what it is, as well as ''svabhāva'' as substance, meaning, as the madhyamaka thinker Candrakirti defines it, something that does "not depend on anything else".

It is substance- ''svabhāva'', the objective and independent existence of any object or concept, which madhyamaka arguments mostly focus on refuting. A common structure which madhyamaka uses to negate ''svabhāva'' is the ''catuṣkoṭi'' ("four corners" or tetralemma), which roughly consists of four alternatives: a proposition is true; a proposition is false; a proposition is both true and false; a proposition is neither true nor false. Some of the major topics discussed by classical madhyamaka include causality, change, and personal identity.

Madhyamaka's denial of ''svabhāva'' does not mean a nihilistic denial of all things, for in a conventional everyday sense, madhyamaka does accept that one can speak of "things", and yet ''ultimately'' these things are empty of inherent existence. Furthermore, "emptiness" itself is also "empty": it does not have an existence on its own, nor does it refer to a transcendental reality beyond or above phenomenal reality.

''Svabhāva'''s cognitive aspect is merely a superimposition (''samāropa'') that beings make when they perceive and conceive of things. In this sense then, emptiness does not exist as some kind of primordial reality, but it is simply a corrective to a mistaken conception of how things exist. This idea of ''svabhāva'' that madhyamaka denies is then not just a conceptual philosophical theory, but it is a cognitive distortion that beings automatically impose on the world, such as when we regard the five aggregates as constituting a single self. Candrakirti compares it to someone who suffers from vitreous floaters that cause the illusion of hairs appearing in their visual field. This cognitive dimension of ''svabhāva'' means that just understanding and assenting to madhyamaka reasoning is not enough to end the suffering caused by our reification of the world, just like understanding how an optical illusion works does not make it stop functioning. What is required is a kind of cognitive shift (termed ''realization'') in the way the world appears and therefore some kind of practice to lead to this shift. As Candrakirti says:

For one on the road of cyclic existence who pursues an inverted view due to ignorance, a mistaken object such as the superimposition (''samāropa'') on the aggregates appears as real, but it does not appear to one who is close to the view of the real nature of things.

Much of madhyamaka philosophy centers on showing how various essentialist ideas have absurd conclusions through ''reductio ad absurdum'' arguments (known as ''prasanga'' in Sanskrit). Chapter 15 of Nāgārjuna's ''Mūlamadhyamakakārikā'' centers on the words svabhava parabhava bhava and abhava. According to Peter Harvey:

An important element of madhyamaka refutation is that the classical Buddhist doctrine of dependent arising (the idea that every phenomena is dependent on other phenomena) cannot be reconciled with "a conception of self-nature or substance" and that therefore essence theories are contrary not only to the Buddhist scriptures but to the very ideas of causality and change. Any enduring essential nature would prevent any causal interaction, or any kind of origination. For things would simply always have been, and will always continue to be, without any change. As Nāgārjuna writes in the MMK:

We state that conditioned origination is emptiness. It is mere designation depending on something, and it is the middle path. (24.18)

Since nothing has arisen without depending on something, there is nothing that is not empty. (24.19)

The two truths

Beginning with Nāgārjuna, madhyamaka discerns two levels of truth, conventional truth (everyday commonsense reality) and ultimate truth (emptiness).Rje Tsong Khapa; Garfield, Jay; Geshe Ngawang Samten (translators), Ocean of Reasoning: A Great Commentary on Nagarjuna's Mulamadhyamakakarika, Oxford University Press, 2006, p. xx. Ultimately, madhyamaka argues that all phenomena are empty of ''svabhava'' and only exist in dependence on other causes, conditions and concepts. Conventionally, madhyamaka holds that beings do perceive concrete objects which they are aware of empirically. In madhyamaka this phenomenal world is the limited truth - '' saṃvṛti satya,'' which means "to cover", "to conceal", or "obscure." (and thus it is a kind of ignorance) Saṃvṛti is also said to mean "conventional", as in a customary, norm based, agreed upon truth (like linguistic conventions) and it is also glossed as ''vyavahāra-satya'' (transactional truth). Finally, Chandrakirti also has a third explanation of saṃvṛti, which is “mutual dependence” (''parasparasaṃbhavana'').

This seeming reality does not ''really'' exist as the highest truth realized by wisdom which is '' paramartha satya'' (''parama'' is literally "supreme or ultimate," and ''artha'' means "object, purpose, or actuality"), and yet it has a kind of conventional reality which has its uses for reaching liberation. This limited truth includes everything, including the Buddha himself, the teachings (dharma), liberation and even Nāgārjuna's own arguments. This two truth schema which did not deny the importance of convention allowed Nāgārjuna to defend himself against charges of nihilism; understanding both correctly meant seeing the middle way:

"Without relying upon convention, the ultimate fruit is not taught. Without understanding the ultimate, nirvana is not attained."

The limited, perceived reality is an experiential reality or a nominal reality which beings impute on the ultimate reality. It is not an ontological reality with substantial or independent existence. Hence, the two truths are not two metaphysical realities; instead, according to Karl Brunnholzl, "the two realities refer to just what is experienced by two different types of beings with different types and scopes of perception."Brunnholzl, 2004, p. 74. As Candrakirti says:

It is through the perfect and the false seeing of all entities

That the entities that are thus found bear two natures.

The object of perfect seeing is true reality,

And false seeing is seeming reality.

This means that the distinction between the two truths is primarily epistemological and dependent on the cognition of the observer, not ontological. As Shantideva writes, there are "two kinds of world," "the one of yogins and the one of common people." The seeming reality is the world of samsara because conceiving of concrete and unchanging objects leads to clinging and suffering. As Buddhapalita states: "unskilled persons whose eye of intelligence is obscured by the darkness of delusion conceive of an essence of things and then generate attachment and hostility with regard to them."

According to Hayes, the two truths may also refer to two different goals in life: the highest goal of nirvana, and the lower goal of "commercial good". The highest goal is the liberation from attachment, both material ''and'' intellectual.

The nature of ultimate reality

According to Paul Williams, Nāgārjuna associates emptiness with the ultimate truth but his conception of emptiness is not some kind of Absolute, but rather it is the very absence of true existence with regards to the conventional reality of things and events in the world. Because the ultimate is itself empty, it is also explained as a "transcendence of deception" and hence is a kind of apophatic truth which experiences the lack of substance.

Because the nature of ultimate reality is said to be empty, empty even of "emptiness" itself, both the concept of "emptiness" and the very framework of the two truths are also mere conventional realities, not part of the ultimate. This is often called "the emptiness of emptiness" and refers to the fact that even though madhyamikas speak of emptiness as the ultimate unconditioned nature of things, this emptiness is itself empty of any real existence.

The two truths themselves are therefore just a practical tool used to teach others, but do not exist within the actual meditative equipoise that realizes the ultimate. As Candrakirti says: "the noble ones who have accomplished what is to be accomplished do not see anything that is delusive or not delusive." From within the experience of the enlightened ones there is only one reality which appears non-conceptually, as Nāgārjuna says in the Sixty stanzas on reasoning: "that nirvana is the sole reality, is what the Victors have declared." Bhāvaviveka's ''Madhyamakahrdayakārikā'' describes the ultimate truth through a negation of all four possibilities of the ''catuskoti'':

Its character is neither existent, nor nonexistent, / Nor both existent and nonexistent, nor neither. / Centrists should know true reality / That is free from these four possibilities.

Atisha describes the ultimate as "here, there is no seeing and no seer, no beginning and no end, just peace.... It is nonconceptual and nonreferential ... it is inexpressible, unobservable, unchanging, and unconditioned." Because of the non-conceptual nature of the ultimate, according to Brunnholzl, the two truths are ultimately inexpressible as either "one" or "different."

The Middle Way

As noted by Roger Jackson, some non-Buddhist writers, like some Buddhist writers both ancient and modern, have argued that the madhyamaka philosophy is nihilistic. This claim has been challenged by others who argue that it is a Middle Way (''madhyamāpratipad'') between nihilism and eternalism. Madhyamaka philosophers themselves explicitly rejected the nihilist interpretation from the outset: Nāgārjuna writes: "through explaining true reality as it is, the seeming ''samvrti'' does not become disrupted." Candrakirti also responds to the charge of nihilism in his '' Lucid Words'':

Therefore, emptiness is taught in order to completely pacify all discursiveness without exception. So if the purpose of emptiness is the complete peace of all discursiveness and you just increase the web of discursiveness by thinking that the meaning of emptiness is nonexistence, you do not realize the purpose of emptiness t all

This although some scholars (e.g., Murti) interpret emptiness as described by Nāgārjuna as a Buddhist transcendental absolute, other scholars (such as David Kalupahana) consider this claim a mistake, since then emptiness teachings could not be characterized as a middle way.Jorge Noguera Ferrer, ''Revisioning Transpersonal Theory: A Participatory Vision of Human Spirituality.'' SUNY Press, 2002, page 102-103.

Madhyamaka thinkers also argue that since things have the nature of lacking true existence or own being (''niḥsvabhāva''), all things are mere conceptual constructs (''prajñaptimatra'') because they are just impermanent collections of causes and conditions. This also applies to the principle of causality itself, since ''everything'' is dependently originated. Therefore, in madhyamaka, phenomena appear to arise and cease, but in an ultimate sense they do not arise or remain as inherently existent phenomena. This tenet is held to show that views of absolute or eternalist existence (such as the Hindu ideas of Brahman or ''sat-dravya'') and nihilism are both equally untenable. These two views are considered to be the ''two extremes'' that madhyamaka steers clear from. The first is ''essentialism'' or ''eternalism'' (sastavadava) -- a belief that things inherently or substantially exist and are therefore efficacious objects of craving and clinging; Nagarjuna argues that we naively and innately perceive things as substantial, and it is this predisposition which is the root delusion that lies at the basis of all suffering. The second extreme is ''nihilism'' or ''annihilationism'' (ucchedavada) -- encompassing views that could lead one to believe that there is no need to be responsible for one's actions -- such as the idea that one is annihilated at death or that nothing has causal effects -- but also the view that absolutely nothing exists.

The usefulness of reason

In madhyamaka, reason and debate are understood as a means to an end (liberation), and therefore they must be founded on the wish to help oneself and others end suffering. Reason and logical arguments, however (such as those employed by classical Indian philosophers, i.e., ''pramana. Then, the first one is not established, nor are the middle ones, nor the last. If these alid cognitionsare established even without valid cognition, what you say is ruined. In that case, there is an inconsistency, And you ought to provide an argument for this distinction.

Candrakirti comments on this statement by stating that madhyamaka does not completely deny the use of pramanas conventionally, and yet ultimately they do not have a foundation:

Therefore we assert that mundane objects are known through the four kinds of authoritative cognition. They are mutually dependent: when there is authoritative cognition, there are objects of knowledge; when there are objects of knowledge, there is authoritative cognition. But neither authoritative cognition nor objects of knowledge exist inherently.Garfield, Jay L. Turning a Madhyamaka Trick: Reply to Huntington, J Indian Philos (2008) 36:507–527 DOI 10.1007/s10781-008-9045-9

To the charge that if Nāgārjuna's arguments and words are also empty they therefore lack the power to refute anything, Nāgārjuna responds that:

My words are without nature. Therefore, my thesis is not ruined. Since there is no inconsistency, I do not have to state an argument for a distinction.

Nāgārjuna goes on:

Just as one magical creation may be annihilated by another magical creation, and one illusory person by another person produced by an illusionist, this negation is the same.

Shantideva makes the same point: "thus, when one's son dies in a dream, the conception "he does not exist" removes the thought that he does exist, but it is also delusive." In other words, madhyamaka thinkers accept that their arguments, just like all things, are not ''ultimately'' valid in some foundational sense. But one is still able to use the opponent's own reasoning apparatus in the conventional field to refute their theories and help them see their errors. This remedial deconstruction does not replace false theories of existence with other ones, but simply dissolves all views, including the very fictional system of epistemic warrants (''pramanas'') used to establish them. The point of madhyamaka reasoning is not to establish any abstract validity or universal truth, it is simply a pragmatic project aimed at ending delusion and suffering.

Nāgārjuna also argues that madhyamaka only negates things conventionally, since ultimately, there is nothing there to negate: "I do not negate anything and there is also nothing to be negated." Therefore, it is only from the perspective of those who cling to the existence of things that it seems as if something is being negated. In truth, madhyamaka is not annihilating something, merely elucidating that this so-called existence never existed in the first place.

Thus, madhyamaka uses language to make clear the limits of our concepts. Ultimately, reality cannot be depicted by concepts. According to Jay Garfield, this creates a sort of tension in madhyamaka literature, since it has use some concepts to convey its teachings.

Soteriology

For madhyamaka, the realization of emptiness is not just a satisfactory theory about the world, but a key understanding which allows one to reach liberation or nirvana. As Nāgārjuna's Mūlamadhyamakakārikā ("Root Verses on the Middle Way") puts it:

With the cessation of ignorance, formations will not arise. Moreover, the cessation of ignorance occurs through right understanding. Through the cessation of this and that, this and that will not come about. The entire mass of suffering thereby completely ceases.

The words "this" and "that" allude to the mind's profound addiction to dualism, but also and more specifically to the mind that has not yet grasped the reality of dependent origination. The insight of dependent origination -- that nothing arises or happens independently, that everything is rooted in or "made of" something else, and conditioned by other things, each of which are likewise made of and conditioned by other things in the same way, so that nothing at all "is" independently -- is central to the fundamental Buddhist analysis of the arising of suffering and the liberation from it. Therefore, according to Nāgārjuna, the cognitive shift which sees the nonexistence of ''svabhāva'' leads to the cessation of the first link in this chain of suffering, which then leads to the ending of the entire chain of causes and thus, of all suffering. Nāgārjuna adds:

Liberation (''moksa'') results from the cessation of actions (''karman'') and defilements (''klesa''). Actions and defilements result from representations (''vikalpa''). These omefrom false imagining (''prapañca''). False imagining stops in emptiness (''sunyata''). (18.5)

Therefore, the ultimate aim of understanding emptiness is not philosophical insight as such, but the actualization of a liberated mind which does not cling to anything. To encourage this awakening, meditation on emptiness may proceed in stages, starting with the emptiness of self, of objects and of mental states, culminating in a "natural state of nonreferential freedom."

Moreover, the path to understanding ultimate truth is not one that negates or invalidates relative truths (especially truths about the path to awakening). Instead it is only through properly understanding and using relative truth that the ultimate can be attained, as Bhāvaviveka maintains:

In order to guide beginners a method is taught, comparable to the steps of a staircase that leads to perfect Buddhahood. Ultimate reality is only to be entered once we have understood seeming reality.

Does madhyamaka have a position?

Nāgārjuna is famous for arguing that his philosophy was not a view, and that he in fact did not take any position (''paksa'') or thesis (''pratijña'') whatsoever since this would just be another form of clinging to some form of existence. In his ''Vigrahavyāvartanī'' , Nāgārjuna states:

If I had any position, I thereby would be at fault. Since I have no position, I am not at fault at all. If there were anything to be observed through direct perception and the other instances f valid cognition it would be something to be established or rejected. However, since no such thing exists, I cannot be criticized.

Likewise in his ''Sixty Stanzas on Reasoning'', Nāgārjuna says: "By taking any standpoint whatsoever, you will be snatched by the cunning snakes of the afflictions. Those whose minds have no standpoint will not be caught."

Randall Collins argues that for Nāgārjuna, ultimate reality is simply the idea that "no concepts are intelligible", while Ferrer emphasizes that Nāgārjuna criticized those whose mind held any "positions and beliefs", ''including'' the view of emptiness. As Nāgārjuna says: "The Victorious Ones have announced that emptiness is the relinquishing of all views. Those who are possessed of the view of emptiness are said to be incorrigible."Randall Collins, ''The Sociology of Philosophies: A Global Theory of Intellectual Change.'' Harvard University Press, 2000, pages 221-222. Aryadeva echoes this idea in his Four Hundred Verses:

"First, one puts an end to what is not meritorious. In the middle, one puts an end to identity. Later, one puts an end to all views. Those who understand this are skilled."

Other writers, however, do seem to affirm emptiness as a specific madhyamaka thesis or view. Shantideva for example says "one cannot uphold any faultfinding in the thesis of emptiness" and Bhavaviveka's ''Blaze of Reasoning'' says: "as for our thesis, it is the emptiness of nature, because this is the nature of phenomena." Jay Garfield notes that Nāgārjuna and Candrakirti both make positive arguments, and cites both the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā ("Root Verses on the Middle Way") --"There does not exist anything that is not dependently arisen. Therefore there does not exist anything that is not empty" -- and Candrakirti's commentary on it: "We assert the statement, 'Emptiness itself is a designation.'"

These positions are not really in contradiction, however, since madhyamaka can be said to have the "thesis of emptiness" only conventionally, in the context of debating or explaining it. According to Karl Brunnholzl, even though madhyamaka thinkers may express a thesis pedagogically, what they deny is that "they have any thesis that involves real existence or reference points, or any thesis that is to be defended from their own point of view."

Brunnholzl underlines that madhyamaka analysis applies to all systems of thought, ideas and concepts, including madhyamaka itself. This is because the nature of madhyamaka is "the deconstruction of any system and conceptualization whatsoever, including itself". In the Root verses on the Middle Way, Nāgārjuna illustrates this point:

By the flaw of having views about emptiness, those of little understanding are ruined, just as when incorrectly seizing a snake or mistakenly practicing an awareness-mantra.

Origins and sources

The madhyamaka school is usually considered to have been founded by Nāgārjuna, though it may have existed earlier. Various scholars have noted that some of themes in the work of Nāgārjuna can also be found in earlier Buddhist sources.

Early Buddhist Texts

It is well known that the only sutra that Nāgārjuna explicitly cites in his ''Mūlamadhyamakakārikā'' (Chapter 15.7) is the "Advice to Kātyāyana.". He writes, "according to the Instructions to Kātyāyana, both existence and nonexistence are criticized by the Blessed One who opposed being and non-being." This appears to have been a Sanskrit version of the ''Kaccānagotta Sutta'' ( Saṃyutta Nikāya ii.16-17 / SN 12.15, with parallel in th
Chinese ''Saṃyuktāgama'' 301
. The ''Kaccānagotta Sutta'' itself says:

This world, Kaccāna, for the most part depends on a duality–upon the notion of existence and the notion of nonexistence. But for one who sees the origin of the world as it really is with correct wisdom, there is no notion of nonexistence in regard to the world. And for one who sees the cessation of the world as it really is with correct wisdom, there is no notion of existence in regard to the world.

Joseph Walser also points out that verse six of chapter 15 contains an allusion to the "''Mahahatthipadopama sutta''", another early sutra of the ''Nidanavagga'', the collection which also contains the '' Kaccānagotta,'' and which contains various sutras that focus on the avoidance of extreme views, which are all held to be associated with either the extreme of eternality (''sasvata'') or the extreme of disruption (''uccheda''). Another allusion to an early Buddhist text noted by Walser occurs in Nāgārjuna's ''Ratnavali'' chapter 1, where he makes reference to a statement in the ''Kevaddha sutta.''

Some scholars, like Tillman Vetter and Luis Gomez, have also seen some passages from the early ''Aṭṭhakavagga'' (Pali, "Octet Chapter") and the ''Pārāyanavagga'' (Pali, "Way to the Far Shore Chapter"), which focusing on letting go of all views, as teaching a kind of "Proto-Mādhyamika." Other scholars such as Paul Fuller and Alexander Wynne have rejected the arguments of Gomez and Vetter.

Finally, the '' Dazhidulun'', a text attributed to Nāgārjuna in the Chinese tradition (though this attribution has been questioned), cites the Sanskrit ''Arthavargīya sūtra'' (which parallels the ''Aṭṭhakavagga'') in its discussion of ultimate truth.

Abhidharma and early Buddhist schools

The madhyamaka school has been perhaps simplistically regarded as a reaction against the development of Buddhist abhidharma, however according to Joseph Walser, this is problematic. In abhidharma, dharmas are characterized by defining traits (''lakṣaṇa'') or own-existence ( ''svabhāva''). The '' Abhidharmakośabhāṣya'' states for example: "''dharma'' means 'upholding,' amely upholding intrinsic nature (''svabhāva'')", while the '' Mahāvibhāṣā'' states "intrinsic nature is able to uphold its own identity and not lose it". However this does not mean that all abhidharma systems hold that dharmas exist independently in an ontological sense, since all Buddhist schools hold that (most) dharmas are dependently originated, this doctrine being a central core Buddhist view. Therefore, in abhidharma, ''svabhāva'' is typically something which arises dependent on other conditions and qualities.

''Svabhāva'' in the early abhidharma systems then, is not a kind of ontological essentialism, but it is a way to categorize dharmas according to their distinctive characteristics. According to Noa Ronkin, the idea of ''svabhava'' evolved towards ontological dimension in the Sarvāstivādin Vaibhasika school's interpretation, which began to also use the term ''dravya'' which means "real existence". This then, may have been the shift which Nagarjuna sought to attack when he targets certain Sarvastivada tenets.

However, the relationship between madhyamaka and abhidharma is complex, as Joseph Walser notes, "Nagarjuna's position vis-à-vis abhidharma is neither a blanket denial nor a blanket acceptance. Nagarjuna's arguments entertain certain abhidharmic standpoints while refuting others." One example can be seen in Nagarjuna's ''Ratnavali'' which supports the study of a list of 57 moral faults which Nagarjuna takes from the ''Ksudravastuka'' (an abhidharma texts that is part of the Sarvastivada ''Dharmaskandha'')''.'' Abhidharmic analysis figures prominently in madhyamaka treatises, and authoritative commentators like Candrakīrti emphasize that abhidharmic categories function as a viable (and favored) system of conventional truths - they are more refined than ordinary categories, and they are not dependent on either the extreme of eternalism or on the extreme view of the discontinuity of karma, as the non-Buddhist categories of the time did.

Walser also notes that Nagarjuna's theories have much in common with the view of a sub-sect of the Mahasamgikas called the Prajñaptivadins, who held that suffering was ''prajñapti'' (designation by provisional naming) "based on conditioned entities that are themselves reciprocally designated" (''anyonya prajñapti''). David Burton argues that for Nagarjuna, "dependently arisen entities have merely conceptually constructed existence (''prajñaptisat'')". Commenting on this, Walser writes that "Nagarjuna is arguing for a thesis that the Prajñaptivádins already held, using a concept of prajñapti that they were already using."

Mahāyāna sūtras

According to David Seyfort Ruegg, the main canonical Mahāyāna sutra sources of the Madhyamaka school are the ''Prajñāpāramitā'', ''Ratnakūṭa'' and ''Avataṃsaka'' literature.Ruegg, David Seyfort, ''''The Literature of the Madhyamaka School of Philosophy in India,'''' Otto Harrassowitz Verlag, 1981, p. 7. Other sutras which were widely cited by Madhamikas include the '' Vimalakīrtinirdeṣa'', the '' Śuraṃgamasamādhi,'' the '' Saddharmapuṇḍarīka'', the '' Daśabhūmika'', the '' Akṣayamatinirdeśa'', the '' Tathāgataguhyaka'', and the '' Kāśyapaparivarta''.

Ruegg notes that in Candrakīrti's ''Prasannapadā'' and '' Madhyamakāvatāra'', in addition to the ''Prajñāpāramitā'', "we find the ''Akṣayamatinirdeśa, Anavataptahradāpasaṃkramaṇa, Upāliparipṛcchā, Kāśyapaparivarta, Gaganagañja, Tathāgataguhya, Daśabhūmika, Dṛḍhādhyāśaya, Dhāraṇīśvararāja, Pitāputrasamāgama, Mañjuśrīparipṛcchā, Ratnakūṭa, Ratnacūḍaparipṛcchā, Ratnamegha, Ratnākara, Laṅkāvatāra, Lalitavistara, Vimalakirtinirdesa, Śālistamba, Satyadvayāvatāra'', '' Saddharmapuṇḍarīka'', '' Samādhirāja'' (''Candrapradīpa''), and ''Hastikakṣya''."

Prajñāpāramitā

Madhyamaka thought is also closely related to a number of Mahāyāna sources; traditionally, the ''Prajñāpāramitā'' sūtras are the literature most closely associated with madhyamaka – understood, at least in part, as an exegetical complement to those Sūtras. Traditional accounts also depict Nāgārjuna as retrieving some of the larger Prajñāpāramitā sūtras from the world of the Nāgas (explaining in part the etymology of his name). Prajñā or 'higher cognition' is a recurrent term in Buddhist texts, explained as a synonym of abhidharma, 'insight' (vipaśyanā) and 'analysis of the dharmas' (''dharmapravicaya''). Within a specifically Mahāyāna context, Prajñā figures as the most prominent in a list of Six Pāramitās ('perfections' or 'perfect masteries') that a Bodhisattva needs to cultivate in order to eventually achieve Buddhahood.

Madhyamaka offers conceptual tools to analyze all possible elements of existence, allowing the practitioner to elicit through reasoning and contemplation the type of view that the Sūtras express more authoritatively (being considered word of the Buddha) but less explicitly (not offering corroborative arguments). The vast Prajñāpāramitā literature emphasizes the development of higher cognition in the context of the Bodhisattva path; thematically, its focus on the emptiness of all dharmas is closely related to the madhyamaka approach. Allusions to the prajñaparamita sutras can be found in Nagarjuna's work. One example is in the opening stanza of the MMK, which seem to allude to the following statement found in two prajñaparamita texts:

And how does he wisely know conditioned co-production? He wisely knows it as neither production, nor stopping, neither cut off nor eternal, neither single nor manifold, neither coming nor going away, as the appeasement of all futile discoursings, and as bliss.

The first stanza of Nagarjuna's MMK meanwhile, state:

I pay homage to the Fully Enlightened One whose true, venerable words teach dependent-origination to be the blissful pacification of all mental proliferation, neither production, nor stopping, neither cut off nor eternal, neither single nor manifold, neither coming, nor going away.

Pyrrhonism

Because of the high degree of similarity between madhyamaka and Pyrrhonism, Thomas McEvilley and Matthew Neale suspect that Nāgārjuna was influenced by Greek Pyrrhonist texts imported into India. Pyrrho of Elis (c. 360-c. 270 BCE), who is credited with founding this school of skeptical philosophy, was himself influenced by Buddhist philosophy during his stay in India with Alexander the Great's army.

Indian madhyamaka

Nāgārjuna

As Jan Westerhoff notes, while Nāgārjuna is "one of the greatest thinkers in the history of Asian philosophy...contemporary scholars agree on hardly any details concerning him". This includes exactly when he lived (it can be narrowed down some time in the first three centuries CE), where he lived (Joseph Walser suggests Amarāvatī in east Deccan) and exactly what constitutes his written corpus.

Numerous texts are attributed to him, but it is at least agreed by some scholars that what is called the "Yukti" (analytical) corpus is the core of his philosophical work. These texts are the "Root verses on the Middle way" (''Mūlamadhyamakakārikā,'' MMK), the "Sixty Stanzas on Reasoning" (''Yuktiṣāṣṭika''), the "Dispeller of Objections" (''Vigrahavyāvartanī''), the "Treatise on Pulverization" (''Vaidalyaprakaraṇa'') and the "Precious Garland" (''Ratnāvalī''). However, even the attribution of each one of these has been question by some modern scholars, except for the MMK which is by definition seen as his major work.

Nāgārjuna's main goal is often seen by scholars as refuting the essentialism of certain Buddhist abhidharma schools (mainly ''Vaibhasika'') which posited theories of ''svabhava'' (essential nature) and also the Hindu Nyāya schools which posited a theory of ontological substances (''dravyatas''). In the MMK he used ''reductio ad absurdum'' arguments (''prasanga'') to show that any theory of substance or essence was unsustainable and therefore, phenomena (''dharmas'') such as change, causality, and sense perception were empty (''sunya'') of any essential existence. Nāgārjuna also famously equated the emptiness of ''dharmas'' with their dependent origination.

Because of his philosophical work, Nāgārjuna is seen by some modern interpreters as restoring the Middle Way of the Buddha, which had become challenged by absolutist metaphysical tendencies in certain philosophical quarters.

Classical madhyamaka figures

Rāhulabhadra was an early madhyamika, sometimes said to be either a teacher of Nagarjuna or his contemporary and follower. He is most famous for his verses in praise of the ''Prajñāpāramitā'' (Skt. ''Prajñāpāramitāstotra'') and Chinese sources maintain that he also composed a commentary on the MMK which was translated by Paramartha.

Nāgārjuna's pupil Āryadeva (3rd century CE) wrote various works on madhyamaka, the most well known of which is his "400 verses". His works are regarded as a supplement to Nāgārjuna's, on which he commented. Āryadeva also wrote refutations of the theories of non-Buddhist Indian philosophical schools.

There are also two commentaries on the MMK which may be by Āryadeva, the ''Akutobhaya'' (which has also been regarded as an auto-commentary by Nagarjuna) as well as a commentary which survives only in Chinese (as part of the ''Chung-Lun'', "Middle treatise", Taisho 1564) attributed to a certain "Ch'ing-mu" (aka Pin-lo-chieh, which some scholars have also identified as possibly being Aryadeva). However, Brian C. Bocking, a translator of the ''Chung-Lung'', also states that it is likely the author of this commentary was a certain Vimalāksa, who was Kumarajiva's old Vinaya-master from Kucha.

An influential commentator on Nāgārjuna was Buddhapālita (470–550) who has been interpreted as developing the prāsaṅgika approach to Nāgārjuna's works in his ''Madhyamakavṛtti'' (now only extant in Tibetan) which follows the orthodox Madhyamaka method by critiquing essentialism mainly through reductio ad absurdum arguments. Like Nāgārjuna, Buddhapālita's main philosophical method is to show how all philosophical positions are ultimately untenable and self-contradictory, a style of argumentation called ''prasanga''.

Buddhapālita's method is often contrasted with that of Bhāvaviveka (c. 500 – c. 578), who argued in his ''Prajñāpadīpa'' (Lamp of Wisdom) for the use of logical arguments using the ''pramana