Iran nuclear deal

The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA; fa, برنامه جامع اقدام مشترک , barnāmeye jāme'e eqdāme moshtarak (, ''BARJAM'')), commonly known as the Iran nuclear deal or Iran deal, is an agreement on the Iranian nuclear program reached in Vienna on 14 July 2015, between Iran and the P5+1 (the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council—China, France, Russia, United Kingdom, United States—plus Germany) together with the European Union.

Formal negotiations toward JCPOA began with the adoption of the Joint Plan of Action, an interim agreement signed between Iran and the P5+1 countries in November 2013. Iran and the P5+1 countries engaged in negotiations for the next 20 months and, in April 2015, agreed on an "Iran nuclear deal framework" for the final agreement. In July 2015, Iran and the P5+1 confirmed agreement on the plan, along with the "Roadmap Agreement" between Iran and the IAEA.

After the Trump administration twice certified Iran's compliance in 2017, in May 2018 the United States withdrew from JCPOA as Trump pledged he would negotiate a better deal. Trump left office without fulfilling that pledge and analysts determined Iran had moved closer to developing a nuclear weapon since the American withdrawal.

Timeline

Under the JCPOA, Iran agreed to eliminate its stockpile of medium-enriched uranium, cut its stockpile of low-enriched uranium by 98%, and reduce by about two-thirds the number of its gas centrifuges for 13 years. For the next 15 years, Iran agreed to enrich uranium only up to 3.67%. Iran also agreed not to build any new heavy-water facilities for the same period of time. Uranium-enrichment activities will be limited to a single facility using first-generation centrifuges for 10 years. Other facilities will be converted to avoid proliferation risks. To monitor and verify Iran's compliance with the agreement, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) will have regular access to all Iranian nuclear facilities. The agreement provides that in return for verifiably abiding by its commitments, Iran will receive relief from the U.S., European Union, and United Nations Security Council nuclear-related sanctions.

On 12 October 2017, U.S. President Donald Trump announced that the United States would not make the certification provided for under U.S. domestic law, but stopped short of terminating the deal.

In 2018, IAEA inspectors spent an aggregate of 3,000 calendar days in Iran, installing tamper-proof seals and collecting surveillance camera photos, measurement data, and documents for further analysis. IAEA Director Yukiya Amano stated (in March 2018) that the organization has verified that Iran is implementing its nuclear-related commitments. On 30 April 2018 the United States and Israel said that Iran had not disclosed a past covert nuclear weapons program to the IAEA, as required by the 2015 deal.

On 8 May 2018, Trump announced United States withdrawal from JCPOA. Following the U.S. withdrawal, the EU enacted an updated blocking statute on 7 August 2018 to nullify U.S. sanctions on countries trading with Iran. In November 2018 U.S. sanctions came back into effect intended to force Iran to dramatically alter its policies, including its support for militant groups in the region and its development of ballistic missiles.

In May 2019, the IAEA certified that Iran was abiding by the deal's main terms, though questions were raised about how many advanced centrifuges Iran was allowed to have, as that was only loosely defined in the deal.

On 1 July 2019, Iran announced that it had breached the limit set on its stockpile of low-enriched uranium, which the IAEA confirmed.

On 5 January 2020, in the aftermath of the Baghdad Airport Airstrike that targeted and killed Iranian general Qassem Soleimani, Iran declared that it would no longer abide by the deal's limitations but would continue to coordinate with the IAEA, leaving open the possibility of resuming compliance. In December 2020, Iranian officials expressed further willingness to rejoin the deal, provided that U.S. officials make assurances regarding lifting sanctions and also rejoin the deal.

Background

Nuclear technology

A nuclear weapon uses a fissile material to cause a nuclear chain reaction. The most commonly used materials have been uranium 235 (U-235) and plutonium 239 (Pu-239). Both uranium 233 (U-233) and reactor-grade plutonium have also been used. The amount of uranium or plutonium needed depends on the sophistication of the design, with a simple design requiring approximately 15 kg of uranium or 6 kg of plutonium, and a sophisticated design requiring as little as 9 kg of uranium or 2 kg of plutonium. Plutonium is almost nonexistent in nature, and natural uranium is about 99.3% uranium 238 (U-238) and 0.7% U-235. Therefore, to make a weapon, either uranium must be enriched, or plutonium must be produced. Uranium enrichment is also frequently necessary for nuclear power. For this reason, uranium enrichment is a dual-use technology, a technology that "can be used both for civilian and for military purposes". Key strategies to prevent proliferation of nuclear arms include limiting the number of operating uranium enrichment plants and controlling the export of nuclear technology and fissile material.

Iranian nuclear activity, conflict with IAEA and Western countries, 1970–2006

Iranian development of nuclear technology began in the 1970s, when the U.S. Atoms for Peace program began providing assistance to Iran, which was then led by the Shah."Country Profiles: Iran: Nuclear"
, Nuclear Threat Initiative (last updated July 2015). Iran signed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in 1968 as a non-nuclear weapons state and ratified the NPT in 1970.

In 1979 the Iranian Revolution took place, and Iran's nuclear program, which had developed some baseline capacity, fell into disarray as "much of Iran's nuclear talent fled the country in the wake of the Revolution." Furthermore, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini initially opposed nuclear technology, and Iran engaged in a costly war with Iraq from 1980 to 1988.

In the late 1980s Iran reinstated its nuclear program, with assistance from Pakistan (which entered into a bilateral agreement with Iran in 1992), China (which did the same in 1990), and Russia (which did the same in 1992 and 1995), and from the A.Q. Khan network. Iran "began pursuing an indigenous nuclear fuel cycle capability by developing a uranium mining infrastructure and experimenting with uranium conversion and enrichment".

In August 2002 the Paris-based National Council of Resistance of Iran, an Iranian dissident group, publicly revealed the existence of two undeclared nuclear facilities, the Arak heavy-water production facility and the Natanz enrichment facility."Iran nuclear talks: timeline"
''The Guardian'' (14 July 2015). In February 2003 Iranian President Mohammad Khatami acknowledged the existence of the facilities and asserted that Iran had undertaken "small-scale enrichment experiments" to produce low-enriched uranium for nuclear power plants. In late February International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors visited Natanz. In May 2003 Iran allowed IAEA inspectors to visit the Kalaye Electric Company but refused to allow them to take samples.

In June 2003, an IAEA report concluded that Iran had failed to meet its obligations under the safeguards agreement, and Iran, faced with the prospect of being referred to the UN Security Council, entered into diplomatic negotiations with France, Germany, and the United Kingdom (the EU 3). The United States refused to be involved in these negotiations. In October 2003 the Tehran Declaration was reached between Iran and the EU 3; under this declaration Iran agreed to cooperate fully with the IAEA, sign the Additional Protocol, and temporarily suspend all uranium enrichment. In September and October 2003 the IAEA conducted several facility inspections. This was followed by the Paris Agreement in November 2004, in which Iran agreed to temporarily suspend enrichment and conversion activities, "including the manufacture, installation, testing, and operation of centrifuges, and committed to working with the EU-3 to find a mutually beneficial long-term diplomatic solution".

In August 2005, the newly elected president of Iran, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, promptly accused Iranian negotiators who had negotiated the Paris Accords of treason. Over the next two months, the EU 3 agreement fell apart as talks over the EU 3's proposed Long Term Agreement broke down; the Iranian government "felt that the proposal was heavy on demands, light on incentives, did not incorporate Iran's proposals, and violated the Paris Agreement". Iran notified the IAEA that it would resume uranium conversion at Esfahan.

In February 2006 Iran ended its voluntary implementation of the Additional Protocol and resumed enrichment at Natanz, prompting the IAEA Board of Governors to refer Iran to the UN Security Council. After the vote, Iran announced it would resume enrichment of uranium. In April 2006 Ahmadinejad announced that Iran had nuclear technology but said that it was purely for power generation, not weapons. In June 2006 the EU 3 joined China, Russia, and the United States, to form the P5+1. The following month, July 2006, the UN Security Council passed its first resolution (nr. 1696), demanding Iran stop uranium enrichment and processing, because of "serious concern" about "a number of outstanding issues and concerns on Iran's nuclear programme, including topics which could have a military nuclear dimension". Another UN Security Council resolution followed in December 2006 (nr. 1737); others followed later. The legal authority for the IAEA Board of Governors referral and the Security Council resolutions derived from the IAEA Statute and the United Nations Charter. The resolutions demanded that Iran cease enrichment activities, and the second resolution (Dec. 2006) also imposed sanctions on Iran, including bans on the transfer of nuclear and missile technology to the country and freezes on the assets of certain Iranian individuals and entities, in order to pressure the country.

In July 2006, Iran opened the Arak heavy water production plant, which led to one of the Security Council resolutions.

Prolonged conflict of Iran with U.S. and European countries, 2007–2015

Four more UN Security Council resolutions concerning Iran's nuclear program followed: 1747 (March 2007), 1803 (March 2008), 1835 (September 2008), and 1929 (June 2010). In Resolution 1803 and elsewhere the Security Council acknowledged Iran's rights under Article IV of the NPT, which provides for "the inalienable right ... to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes".Paul K. Kerry
"Iran's Nuclear Program: Tehran's Compliance with International Obligations"
Congressional Research Service (25 June 2015).

In a February 2007 interview with the ''Financial Times'', IAEA director-general Mohamed ElBaradei said that military action against Iran "would be catastrophic, counterproductive" and called for negotiations between the international community and Iran over the Iranian nuclear program.Daniel Dombey
Transcript of the Director General's Interview on Iran and DPRK
''Financial Times'' (19 February 2007). ElBaradei specifically proposed a "double, simultaneous suspension, a time out" as "a confidence-building measure", under which the international sanctions would be suspended and Iran would suspend enrichment. ElBaradei also said, "if I look at it from a weapons perspective there are much more important issues to me than the suspension of nrichment" naming his top priorities as preventing Iran from "go ngto industrial capacity until the issues are settled"; building confidence, with "full inspection" involving Iranian adoption of the Additional Protocol; and "at all costs" preventing Iran from "moving out of the reaty-based non-proliferationsystem".

A November 2007 U.S. National Intelligence Estimate assessed that Iran "halted its nuclear weapons program" in 2003; that estimate and subsequent U.S. Intelligence Community statements also assessed that the Iranian government at the time was "keeping open the 'option' to develop nuclear weapons" in the future.Kenneth Katzman & Paul K. Kerr
"Report: Iran Nuclear Agreement"
Congressional Research Service (30 July 2015).

In September 2009 U.S. President Barack Obama revealed the existence of an underground enrichment facility in Fordow, near Qom, saying, "Iran's decision to build yet another nuclear facility without notifying the IAEA represents a direct challenge to the basic compact at the center of the non-proliferation regime." Israel threatened to take military action against Iran.

In March 2013 the United States began a series of secret bilateral talks with Iranian officials in Oman, led by William J. Burns and Jake Sullivan on the American side and Ali Asghar Khaji on the Iranian side. In June 2013 Hassan Rouhani was elected president of Iran. Rouhani has been described as "more moderate, pragmatic and willing to negotiate than Ahmadinejad". But in a 2006 nuclear negotiation with European powers, Rouhani said that Iran had used the negotiations to dupe the Europeans, saying that during the negotiations, Iran managed to master the conversion of uranium yellowcake at Isfahan. The conversion of yellowcake is an important step in the nuclear fuel process. In August 2013, three days after his inauguration, Rouhani called for a resumption of serious negotiations with the P5+1 on the Iranian nuclear program."Timeline of Nuclear Diplomacy With Iran"
Arms Control Association (July 2015). In September 2013 Obama and Rouhani spoke by telephone, the first high-level contact between U.S. and Iranian leaders since 1979, and U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry met with Iranian foreign minister Mohammad Javad Zarif, signaling that the two countries were open to cooperation. Former officials alleged that, in order to advance the deal, the Obama administration shielded Hezbollah from the Drug Enforcement Administration's Project Cassandra investigation regarding drug smuggling and from the Central Intelligence Agency. As a result of the ''Politico'' report, Attorney General Jeff Sessions ordered an investigation to determine the veracity of the allegations.

On 24 November 2013, after several rounds of negotiations, the Joint Plan of Action, an interim agreement on the Iranian nuclear program, was signed between Iran and the P5+1 countries in Geneva, Switzerland. It consisted of a short-term freeze of portions of Iran's nuclear program in exchange for decreased economic sanctions on Iran, as the countries work towards a long-term agreement. The IAEA began "more intrusive and frequent inspections" under this interim agreement. The agreement was formally activated on 20 January 2014. That day, the IAEA issued a report stating that Iran was adhering to the terms of the interim agreement, including stopping enrichment of uranium to 20%, beginning the dilution process (to reduce half of the stockpile of 20% enriched uranium to 3.5%), and halting work on the Arak heavy-water reactor.

A major focus on the negotiations was limitations on Iran's key nuclear facilities: the Arak IR-40 heavy water reactor and production plant (which was under construction, but never became operational, as Iran agreed as part of the November 2013 Joint Plan of Action (interim agreement) not to commission or fuel the reactor); the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant; the Gachin uranium mine; the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant; the Isfahan uranium-conversion plant; the Natanz uranium enrichment plant; and the Parchin military research and development complex."Iran's key nuclear sites"
BBC News (14 July 2015).

A July 2015 Congressional Research Service report said, "statements from the U.S. intelligence community indicate that Iran has the technological and industrial capacity to produce nuclear weapons at some point, but the U.S. government assesses that Tehran has not mastered all of the necessary technologies for building a nuclear weapon."

Negotiations (2013–2015)

The agreement between the P5+1+EU and Iran on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) is the culmination of 20 months of "arduous" negotiations.Michael R. Gordon & David E. Sanger
"Deal Reached on Iran Nuclear Program; Limits on Fuel Would Lessen With Time"
''The New York Times'' (14 July 2015).

The agreement followed the Joint Plan of Action (JPA), an interim agreement between the P5+1 powers and Iran that was agreed to on 24 November 2013 at Geneva. The Geneva agreement was an interim deal, in which Iran agreed to roll back parts of its nuclear program in exchange for relief from some sanctions. This went into effect on 20 January 2014. The parties agreed to extend their talks with a first extension deadline on 24 November 2014 and a second extension deadline set to 1 July 2015.

An Iran nuclear deal framework was reached on 2 April 2015. Under this framework Iran agreed tentatively to accept restrictions on its nuclear program, all of which would last for at least a decade and some longer, and to submit to an increased intensity of international inspections under a framework deal. These details were to be negotiated by the end of June 2015. The negotiations toward a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action were extended several times until the final agreement, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, was finally reached on 14 July 2015. The JCPOA is based on the framework agreement from three months earlier.

Subsequently the negotiations between Iran and the P5+1 continued. In April 2015 a framework deal was reached at Lausanne. Intense marathon negotiations then continued, with the last session in Vienna at the Palais Coburg lasting for seventeen days.Karen DeYoung & Carol Morello
"The path to a final Iran nuclear deal: Long days and short tempers"
''The Washington Post'' (15 July 2015). At several points, negotiations appeared to be at risk of breaking down, but negotiators managed to come to agreement. As the negotiators neared a deal, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry directly asked Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif to confirm that he was "authorized to actually make a deal, not just by the ranianpresident, but by the supreme leader?" Zarif gave assurances that he was.

Ultimately, on 14 July 2015 all parties agreed to a landmark comprehensive nuclear agreement. At the time of the announcement, shortly before 11:00 GMT, the agreement was released to the public.

The final agreement's complexity shows the impact of a public letter written by a bipartisan group of 19 U.S. diplomats, experts, and others in June 2015, written when negotiations were still ongoing."Public Statement on U.S. Policy Toward the Iran Nuclear Negotiations Endorsed by a Bipartisan Group of American Diplomats, Legislators, Policymakers, and Experts"
Washington Institute for Near East Policy (24 June 2015). The letter outlined concerns about the several provisions in the then-unfinished agreement and called for a number of improvements to strengthen the prospective agreement and win their support for it. After the final agreement was reached, one of the early negotiators, Robert J. Einhorn, a former U.S. Department of State official now at the Brookings Institution, said of the agreement: "Analysts will be pleasantly surprised. The more things are agreed to, the less opportunity there is for implementation difficulties later on."

The final agreement is based upon (and buttresses) "the rules-based nonproliferation regime created by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and including especially the IAEA safeguards system".

Participants

According to the U.S. State Department (Assistant Secretary for Legislative Affairs Julia Frifield), "The JCPOA is not a treaty or an executive agreement, and is not a signed document. The JCPOA reflects political commitments between Iran, the P5+1, and the EU."

and Mr. Majid akht-Ravanchi"

File:Wang Yi 2014 (cropped).jpg,
China
Wang Yi (politician), Wang Yi, Foreign Minister
File:Laurent Fabius January 2015.jpg,
France
Laurent Fabius, Foreign Minister
File:Frank-Walter Steinmeier Feb 2014 (cropped).jpg,
Germany
Frank-Walter Steinmeier, Minister of Foreign Affairs
File:Federica Mogherini Official.jpg,
European Union
Federica Mogherini, High Representative
File:Mohammad Javad Zarif 2014.jpg,
Iran
Mohammad Javad Zarif, Minister of Foreign Affairs
File:Sergey Lavrov 2014.jpg,
Russia
Sergey Lavrov, Foreign Minister
File:Philip Hammond, Secretary of State for Defence.jpg,
United Kingdom
Philip Hammond, Foreign Secretary
File:John Kerry official Secretary of State portrait.jpg,
United States
John Kerry, Secretary of State

JCPOA timetable

The JCPOA is part of UN Security Council Resolution 2231. The members of the UN Security Council voted on it on 20 July 2015, and adopted it on 18 October (Adoption Day). It came into effect on 16 January 2016 (Implementation Day). The JCPOA stays in effect for eight years from Adoption Day or upon receipt by the Security Council of an IAEA report stating that the IAEA has reached the Broader Conclusion that all nuclear material in Iran remains in peaceful activities (Transition Day), and terminates ten years from Adoption Day (Termination Day).

JCPOA provisions

The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) runs to 109 pages, including five annexes. The major provisions are:

Nuclear

* Iran's stockpile of low-enriched uranium was reduced by 97%, from 10,000 kg to 300 kg. This reduction will be maintained for 15 years.Eric Bradner
"What's in the Iran nuclear deal? 7 key points"
CNN (2 April 2015).Eyder Peralta
"6 Things You Should Know About The Iran Nuclear Deal"
NPR (14 July 2015)."Key Excerpts of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)"
Office of the Press Secretary (14 July 2015). For the same 15-year period, Iran will be limited to enriching uranium to 3.67%, a percentage sufficient for civilian nuclear power and research, but not for building a nuclear weapon."Press Availability on Nuclear Deal With Iran"
U.S. Department of State (14 July 2015). However, the number of centrifuges is sufficient for a nuclear weapon, but not for nuclear power. This is a "major decline" in Iran's previous nuclear activity; before watering down its stockpile pursuant to the Joint Plan of Action interim agreement, Iran had enriched uranium to near 20% (medium-enriched uranium). These enriched uranium in excess of 300 kg of up to 3.67% will be down blended to natural uranium level or be sold in return for natural uranium, and the uranium enriched to between 5% and 20% will be fabricated into fuel plates for the Tehran Research Reactor or sold or diluted to an enrichment level of 3.67%. P5+1 will facilitate the implementation of the commercial contracts. After fifteen years, all physical limits on enrichment will be removed, including limits on the type and number of centrifuges, Iran's stockpile of enriched uranium, and where Iran may have enrichment facilities. According to Belfer, at this point Iran could "expand its nuclear program to create more practical overt and covert nuclear weapons options".
* For ten years, Iran will place over two-thirds of its centrifuges in storage, from its current stockpile of 19,000 centrifuges (of which 10,000 were operational) to no more than 6,104 operational centrifuges, with only 5,060 allowed to enrich uranium, with the enrichment capacity being limited to the Natanz plant. The centrifuges there must be IR-1 centrifuges, the first-generation centrifuge type which is Iran's oldest and least efficient; Iran will give up its advanced IR-2M centrifuges in this period. The non-operating centrifuges will be stored in Natanz and monitored by IAEA, but may be used to replace failed centrifuges. Iran will not build any new uranium-enrichment facilities for fifteen years.
* Iran may continue research and development work on enrichment, but that work will take place only at the Natanz facility and include certain limitations for the first eight years. This is intended to keep the country to a one-year breakout time.
* With cooperation from the "Working Group" (the P5+1 and possibly other countries), Iran is to modernise and rebuild the Arak heavy water research reactor based on an agreed design to support its peaceful nuclear research and production needs and purposes, but in such a way to minimise the production of plutonium and not to produce weapons-grade plutonium. The thermal power of the redesigned reactor will not exceed 20 MW. The P5+1 parties will support and facilitate the timely and safe construction of the Arak complex. All spent fuel will be sent out of the country. All excess heavy water which is beyond Iran's needs for the redesigned reactor will be made available for export to the international market based on international prices. In exchange, Iran received 130 tonnes of uranium in 2015 and in late 2016 was approved to receive 130 tonnes in 2017. For 15 years Iran will not engage in, or research, spent fuel reprocessing. Iran will also not build any additional heavy-water reactors or accumulate heavy water for 15 years.
* Iran's Fordow facility will stop enriching uranium and researching uranium enrichment for at least fifteen years; the facility will be converted into a nuclear physics and technology center. For 15 years Fordow will maintain no more than 1,044 IR-1 centrifuges in six cascades in one wing of Fordow. "Two of those six cascades will spin without uranium and will be transitioned, including through appropriate infrastructure modification," for stable radioisotope production for medical, agricultural, industrial, and scientific use. "The other four cascades with all associated infrastructure will remain idle." Iran will not be permitted to have any fissile material in Fordow.
* Iran is implementing an Additional Protocol that will continue in perpetuity for as long as Iran remains a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The signing of the Additional Protocol represents a continuation of the monitoring and verification provisions "long after the comprehensive agreement between the P5+1 and Iran is implemented"."Factsheet: Iran and the Additional Protocol"
Center for Arms Control and Non-proliferation (14 July 2015).
* A comprehensive inspections regime will be implemented in order to monitor and confirm that Iran is complying with its obligations and is not diverting any fissile material.
** The IAEA will have multilayeredOren Dorell
"High-tech scrutiny key to Iran nuclear deal"
''USA Today'' (16 July 2015). oversight "over Iran's entire nuclear supply chain, from uranium mills to its procurement of nuclear-related technologies".Ishaan Tharoor
"How the nuclear deal can keep Iran from 'cheating,' according to a former U.N. inspector"
''The Washington Post'' blogs (15 July 2015). For declared nuclear sites such as Fordow and Natanz, the IAEA will have "round-the-clock access" to nuclear facilities and will be entitled to maintain continuous monitoring (including via surveillance equipment) at such sites.Rebecca Kaplan
"Obama says inspectors get access to 'any' site in Iran. Is it true?"
CBS News (14 June 2015). The agreement authorizes the IAEA to make use of sophisticated monitoring technology, such as fiber-optic seals on equipment that can electronically send information to the IAEA; infrared satellite imagery to detect covert sites, "environmental sensors that can detect minute signs of nuclear particles"; tamper-resistant, radiation-resistant cameras.William J. Broad
"Iran Accord's Complexity Shows Impact of Bipartisan Letter"
''The New York Times'' (14 July 2015). Other tools include computerized accounting programs to gather information and detect anomalies, and big data sets on Iranian imports, to monitor dual-use items.
** The number of IAEA inspectors assigned to Iran will triple, from 50 to 150 inspectors.
** If IAEA inspectors have concerns that Iran is developing nuclear capabilities at any non-declared sites, they may request access "to verify the absence of undeclared nuclear materials and activities or activities inconsistent with" the agreement, informing Iran of the basis for their concerns. The inspectors would only come from countries with which Iran has diplomatic relations. Iran may admit the inspectors to such site or propose alternatives to inspection that might satisfy the IAEA's concerns. If such an agreement cannot be reached, a process running to a maximum of 24 days is triggered. Under this process, Iran and the IAEA have 14 days to resolve disagreements among themselves. If they fail to, the Joint Commission (including all eight parties) would have one week in which to consider the intelligence which initiated the IAEA request. A majority of the Commission (at least five of the eight members) could then inform Iran of the action that it would be required to take within three more days.Carol Morello & Karen DeYoung
"Historic deal reached with Iran to limit nuclear program"
''The Washington Post'' (14 July 2015). The majority rule provision "means the United States and its European allies—Britain, France, Germany and the EU—could insist on access or any other steps and that Iran, Russia or China could not veto them". If Iran did not comply with the decision within three days, sanctions would be automatically reimposed under the snapback provision (see below).

As a result of the above, the "breakout time"—the time in which it would be possible for Iran to make enough material for a single nuclear weapon—will increase from two to three months to one year, according to U.S. officials and U.S. intelligence.Obama: Iran Will Face Longer 'Breakout Time,' Though Not Indefinitely
''All Things Considered'', NPR (11 August 2015). See als
"Transcript: President Obama's Full NPR Interview On Iran Nuclear Deal"
NPR (7 April 2015). An August 2015 report published by a group of experts at Harvard University's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs concurs in these estimates, writing that under the JCPOA, "over the next decade would be extended to roughly a year, from the current estimated breakout time of 2 to 3 months". The Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation also accepts these estimates."Factsheet: Longevity of Major Iran Nuclear Agreement Provisions"
Center for Arms Control and Proliferation (14 July 2015). By contrast, Alan J. Kuperman, coordinator of the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Project at the University of Texas at Austin, disputed the one-year assessment, arguing that under the agreement, Iran's breakout time "would be only about three months, not much longer than it is today".

The longer breakout time would be in place for at least ten years; after that point, the breakout time would gradually decrease. By the 15th year, U.S. officials say the breakout time would return to the pre-JCPOA status quo of a few months. The Belfer Center report states: "Some contributors to this report believe that breakout time by year 15 could be comparable to what it is today—a few months—while others believe it could be reduced to a few weeks."

Exemptions

Reuters reported that exemptions were granted to Iran prior to 16 January 2016. The reported purpose of the exemptions was so that sanctions relief and other benefits could start by that date, instead of Iran being in violation. The exemptions included: (a) Iran able to exceed the 300 kg of 3.5% LEU limit in the agreement; (b) Iran able to exceed the zero kg of 20% LEU limit in the agreement; (c) Iran to keep operating 19 "hot cells" that exceed the size limit in the agreement; (d) Iran to maintain control of 50 tonnes of heavy water that exceed the 130 tonne limit in the agreement by storing the excess at an Iran-controlled facility in Oman. In December 2016, the IAEA published decisions of the Joint Commission that spell out these clarifications of the JCPOA.

Sanctions

* Following the issuance of a IAEA report verifying implementation by Iran of the nuclear-related measures, the UN sanctions against Iran and some EU sanctions will terminate and some will be suspended. Once sanctions are lifted, Iran will recover approximately $100 billion of its assets (U.S. Treasury Department estimate) frozen in overseas banks.
** Eight years into the agreement, EU sanctions against a number of Iranian companies, individuals and institutions (such as the Revolutionary Guards) will be lifted.Felicia Schwartz
"When Sanctions Lift, Iranian Commander Will Benefit"
''The Wall Street Journal'' blogs (15 July 2015).
* The United States will "cease" application of its nuclear-related ''secondary'' sanctionsEllie Geranmayeh
"Explainer: The Iran nuclear deal"
European Council on Foreign Relations (17 July 2015) by presidential action or executive waiver. ''Secondary'' sanctions are those that sanction other countries for doing business with Iran. ''Primary'' U.S. sanctions, which prohibit U.S. firms from conducting commercial transactions with few exceptions, are not altered by the JCPOA.
** This step is not tied to any specific date, but is expected to occur "roughly in the first half of 2016".
** Sanctions relating to ballistic missile technologies would remain for eight years; similar sanctions on conventional weapon sales to Iran would remain for five years.
* However, all ''U.S.'' sanctions against Iran related to alleged human rights abuses, missiles, and support for terrorism are not affected by the agreement and will remain in place. U.S. sanctions are viewed as more stringent, since many have extraterritorial effect (i.e., they apply worldwide). EU sanctions, by contrast, apply only in Europe.
* No new UN or EU nuclear-related sanctions or restrictive measures will be imposed.Jessica Simeone & Anup Kaphle
"Here Are The Highlights of the Iran Nuclear Agreement"
Buzzfeed News (14 July 2015).
* If Iran violates the agreement, any of the P5+1 can invoke a "snap back" provision, under which the sanctions "snap back" into place (i.e., are reimplemented).
**Specifically, the JCPOA establishes the following dispute resolution process: if a party to the JCPOA has reason to believe that another party is not upholding its commitments under the agreement, then the complaining party may refer its complaint to the Joint Commission, a body created under the JCPOA to monitor implementation.Ankit Panda
"How the Iran Deal's 'Snap Back' Mechanism Will Keep Tehran Compliant"
''The Diplomat'' (15 July 2015). If a complaint made by a non-Iran party is not resolved to the satisfaction of the complaining party within 35 days of referral, then that party may treat the unresolved issue as grounds to cease performing its commitments under the JCPOA, notify the United Nations Security Council that it believes the issue constitutes significant nonperformance, or both. The Security Council would then have 30 days to adopt a resolution to continue the lifting of sanctions. If such a resolution is not adopted within those 30 days, then the sanctions of all the pre-JCPOA nuclear-related UN Security Council resolutions would automatically be reimposed. Iran has stated that in such a case, it would cease performing its nuclear obligations under the deal. The effect of this rule is that any permanent member of the Security Council (United States, United Kingdom, China, Russia or France) can veto any ongoing sanctions relief, but no member can veto the reimposition of sanctions.
**Snapback sanctions "would not apply with retroactive effect to contracts signed between any party and Iran or Iranian individuals and entities prior to the date of application, provided that the activities contemplated under and execution of such contracts are consistent with this JCPOA and the previous and current UN Security Council resolutions".

Ankit Panda of ''The Diplomat'' has said that this will make impossible any scenario where Iran is noncompliant with the JCPOA yet escapes reimposition of sanctions. But Mark Dubowitz of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (which opposes the agreement) has argued that because the JCPOA provides that Iran could treat reinstatement of sanctions (in part or entirely) as grounds for leaving the agreement, the U.S. would be reluctant to impose a "snapback" for smaller violations: "The only thing you'll take to the Security Council are massive Iranian violations, because you're certainly not going to risk the Iranians walking away from the deal and engaging in nuclear escalation over smaller violations."

15-year term

After the 15 years, many provisions of the JCPOA will expire, including most restrictions on Iran's enrichment program. At that time, in 2030, most people involved in the 1979 revolution will no longer be politically active. Some critics of the treaty consider it plausible that Iran could then make a nuclear bomb. But Iran should also have ratified the Additional Protocol and will thus be subject to enhanced inspection and oversight by the IAEA.

International reaction

The JCPOA received a mixed international reaction. Many countries expressed hope that it could achieve the denuclearization of Iran,"Iran deal 'sufficiently robust' for 10 years, says France's foreign minister Laurent Fabius"
, ''The Economic Times'', Reuters (14 July 2015). while some of Iran's neighbouring countries, including Israel, and some U.S. lawmakers expressed distrust of the agreement, seeing it as seriously defective.Adam Wollner
"How the 2016 Presidential Candidates Are Reacting to the Iran Deal"
''National Journal'' (14 July 2015). Zarif's "Never threaten an Iranian!" remark during the nuclear negotiations gained attention from numerous global news agencies, with mixed reviews.

Records

According to several commentators, JCPOA is the first of its kind in the annals of non-proliferation and is in many aspects unique. The 159-page JCPOA document and its five appendices, is the most spacious text of a multinational treaty since World War II, according to BBC Persian.

This is the first time that the United Nations Security Council has recognized the nuclear enrichment program of a developing country and backs an agreement signed by several countries within the framework of a resolution ( United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231). For the first time in the history of the United Nations, a country—Iran—was able to abolish 6 UN resolutions against it— 1696, 1737, 1747, 1803, 1835, 1929—without even one day of implementing them. Sanctions against Iran were also lifted for the first time.

Throughout the history of international law, this is the first and only time that a country subject to Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter has managed to end its case and stop being subject to this chapter through diplomacy. All other cases have ended through either regime change, war or full implementation of the Security Council's decisions by the country.

Gary Sick states that during the history of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), no country other than Iran has ever voluntarily agreed to put such extraordinary restrictions on its nuclear activities.

During the final negotiations, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry stayed in Vienna for 17 days, making him the top American official devoting time to a single international negotiation in more than four decades. Mohammad Javad Zarif broke the record of an Iranian Foreign Minister being far from home with 18-days stay in Vienna, and set the record of 106 days of negotiations in 687 days, a number higher than any other chief nuclear negotiator in 12 years. The negotiations became the longest continuous negotiations with the presence of all foreign ministers of the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council.

The negotiations included 'rare events' in Iran–United States relations not only since the 1979 Iranian Revolution, but also in the history of the bilateral relations. The U.S. Secretary of State and Iranian Foreign Minister met on 18 different dates—sometimes multiple occasions a day—and in 11 different cities, unprecedented since the beginning of the relations. On 27 April 2015, Kerry visited the official residence of the Permanent Representative of Iran to the United Nations to meet his counterpart. The encounter was the first of its kind since the Iran hostage crisis. On the sidelines of the 70th session of the United Nations General Assembly, President Obama shook hands with Zarif, marking the first such event in history. The event was also noted in form of diplomatic ranks, as a head of state shook hands with a minister. Obama is reported to have said in the meeting: "Too much effort has been put into the JCPOA and we all should be diligent to implement it."

Process

Incorporation into international law by the United Nations Security Council

As provided for in the JCPOA, the agreement was formally endorsed by the UN Security Council."Iran nuclear deal: UN Security Council likely to vote next week: US diplomats to promote deal to UN counterparts in coming days"
CBC, Thomson Reuters (15 July 2015).Somini Sengupta

''The New York Times'' (16 July 2015).CBS News/Associated Press
Iran deal set to become international law
(17 July 2015).Somini Sengupta

''The New York Times'' (20 July 2015). There is disagreement about whether the deal is legally binding on the United States.

On 15 July 2015, the American ambassador to the UN, Samantha Power, circulated a 14-page draft to Council members. On 20 July 2015, the Security Council unanimously approved the resolution—United Nations Security Council resolution 2231"United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015)"
adopted by the Security Council at its 7488th meeting, on 20 July 2015—in a 15–0 vote. The resolution delayed its official implementation for 90 days to allow for U.S. Congressional consideration under the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015. The resolution laid out the steps for terminating sanctions imposed by seven past Security Council resolutions, but retained an arms embargo and ballistic missile technology ban. The resolution did not affect sanctions imposed separately by the United States and the European Union. It also codified the "snapback" mechanism of the agreement, under which all Security Council sanctions will be automatically reimposed if Iran breaches the deal.

Speaking immediately after the vote, Power told the Security Council that sanctions relief would start only when Iran "verifiably" met its obligations. Power also called upon Iran "to immediately release all unjustly detained Americans", specifically naming Amir Hekmati, Saeed Abedini, and Jason Rezaian, who were detained at the time, and Robert A. Levinson, who had been missing in the country. Hekmati, Abedini, and Rezaian were subsequently released in a January 2016 prisoner exchange, which Secretary of State Kerry said had been accelerated by the nuclear agreement.

Approval by European Union

On the same day that the Security Council approved a resolution, the European Union formally approved the JCPOA via a vote of the EU Foreign Affairs Council (the group of EU foreign ministers) meeting in Brussels. This sets into motion the lifting of certain EU sanctions, including those prohibiting the purchase of Iranian oil.Robin Emmott & Francesco Guarascio
"Europe backs Iran nuclear deal in signal to U.S. Congress"
Reuters (20 July 2015). The EU continues its sanctions relating to human rights and its sanctions prohibiting the export of ballistic missile technology. The approval by the EU was seen as a signal to the U.S. Congress.

Review period in the United States Congress

Under U.S. law, the JCPOA is a non-binding political commitment. According to the U.S. State Department, it specifically is not an executive agreement nor a treaty (as defined in U.S. law). There are widespread incorrect reports that it is an executive agreement.Amber Phillips
"Can Congress stop the Iran deal?"
''The Washington Post'' (1 July 2015).Scott Bomboy
"Veto showdown on tap for Congress after Iran nuclear deal"
, National Constitution Center (15 July 2015). In contrast to treaties, which require two-thirds of the Senate to consent to ratification, political commitments require no congressional approval and are not legally binding as a matter of domestic law (although in some cases they may be "treaties" and be binding on the U.S. as a matter of international law).

On 22 May 2015, President Obama signed the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015 into law; this legislation passed the Senate by a 98–1 vote and the House by a 400–25 vote, and was approved by Obama on 22 May 2015. Under the Act, once a nuclear agreement was negotiated with Iran, Congress had 60 days in which to pass a resolution of approval, a resolution of disapproval, or do nothing. The Act also included additional time beyond the 60 days for the president to veto a resolution and for Congress to vote on whether to override or sustain the veto.Kevin Liptak
"Now that he has a deal with Iran, Obama must face Congress"
CNN (14 July 2015). Congress could defeat the deal only if it mustered the two-thirds of both houses needed to override an expected veto by Obama of any resolution of disapproval.

On 19 July 2015, the State Department officially transmitted to Congress the JCPOA, its annexes, and related materials.
United States Department of State (19 June 2015). These documents included the Unclassified Verification Assessment Report on the JCPOA and the Intelligence Community's Classified Annex to the Verification Assessment Report. The 60-day review period began the next day, 20 July,Jonathan Weisman & Julie Hirschfeld Davis
"Republican Lawmakers Vow Fight to Derail Nuclear Deal"
''The New York Times'' (14 July 2005). and ended on 17 September. Senator Ted Cruz introduced a resolution seeking a delay in the review period, arguing that the 60-day congressional review under the Act should not begin until the Senate obtained a copy of all bilateral Iran–IAEA documents. This resolution did not pass. Ultimately a resolution of disapproval was brought to the Senate floor but failed. A resolution of approval was brought to the House floor, but it too failed. As a result, the agreement went into effect following the congressional review period.

=Obama administration

=
The JCPOA was the culmination of many years of international effort as well as a high-priority foreign policy goal of the Obama administration.

In comments made in the East Room of the White House on 15 July 2015, Obama urged Congress to support the agreement, saying "If we don't choose wisely, I believe future generations will judge us harshly, for letting this moment slip away."Michael D. Shear & Julie Hitschfeld Davis
"Obama Begins 60-Day Campaign to Win Over Iran Deal Skeptics at Home and Abroad"
''The New York Times'' (15 July 2015). He said the inspections regime in the agreement was among the most vigorous ever negotiated and criticized opponents of the deal for failing to offer a viable alternative to it. Obama said, "If 99 percent of the world's community and the majority of nuclear experts look at this thing and they say 'this will prevent Iran from getting a nuclear bomb,' and you are arguing either that it does not ... then you should have some alternative to present. And I haven't heard that." The same day, he made a case for the deal on the agreement in an interview with ''New York Times'' columnist Thomas Friedman. Obama stated:

Also on 15 July 2015, Vice President Joe Biden met with Senate Democrats on the Foreign Relations Committee on Capitol Hill, where he made a presentation on the agreement.

On 18 July Obama devoted his weekly radio address to the agreement, saying, "this deal will make America and the world safer and more secure" and rebutting "a lot of overheated and often dishonest arguments about it";"Weekly Address: A Comprehensive, Long-Term Deal with Iran"
White House Office of the Press Secretary (18 July 2015). Obama said, "as commander-in-chief, I make no apology for keeping this country safe and secure through the hard work of diplomacy over the easy rush to war." On 23 July Obama met in the White House Cabinet Room with about a dozen undecided House Democrats to speak about the agreement and seek their support.

The debate over the agreement was marked by acrimony between the White House and Republicans inside and outside of Congress. Cruz said that under the agreement "the Obama administration will become the leading financier of terrorism against America in the world."Peter Baker
"Obama Criticizes Huckabee, Trump, Cruz and Other Republicans"
''The New York Times'' (27 July 2015). Former Governor Mike Huckabee of Arkansas, a candidate for the Republican presidential nomination, called the president "naive" and repeatedly invoked the Holocaust, saying that the president's policy would "take the Israelis and march them to the door of the oven".Nick Gass
"Mike Huckabee not backing down after Holocaust remark"
''Politico'' (27 July 2015). This comparison was denounced by the Anti-Defamation League, the National Jewish Democratic Council, and various Israeli government officials. At a 27 July 2015 news conference Obama specifically criticized Huckabee, Cruz, and Cotton, saying that such remarks were "just part of a general pattern we've seen that would be considered ridiculous if it weren't so sad", especially from "leaders in the Republican Party". Obama said, "fling ngout ad hominem attacks like that ... doesn't help inform the American people". "This is a deal that has been endorsed by people like Brent Scowcroft and Sam Nunn ... historic Democratic and Republican leaders on arms control and on keeping America safe. And so when you get rhetoric like this, maybe it gets attention and maybe this is just an effort to push Mr. Trump out of the headlines, but it's not the kind of leadership that is needed for America right now", he added."Remarks by President Obama and Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn of Ethiopia in Joint Press Conference, National Palace Addis Ababa, Ethiopia"
White House Office of the Press Secretary (27 July 2015).

On 5 August Obama gave a speech before an audience of around 200 at American University, marking a new phase in the administration's campaign for the agreement.Julie Hirschfeld Davis
"It's Either Iran Nuclear Deal or 'Some Form of War,' Obama Warns"
''The New York Times'' (5 August 2015).Remarks by the President on the Iran Nuclear Deal, American University, Washington, D.C.
White House Office of the Press Secretary (5 August 2015). Another transcript of this speech was also printed b
''The Washington Post''
He said, "Let's not mince words: The choice we face is ultimately between diplomacy and some form of war—maybe not tomorrow, maybe not three months from now, but soon. How can we in good conscience justify war before we've tested a diplomatic agreement that achieves our objectives?" In his speech, Obama also invoked a speech made by John F. Kennedy at American University in 1963 in favor of the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. Obama also said the opponents of the agreement were the same people who created the "drumbeat of war" that led to the Iraq War and criticized "knee-jerk partisanship that has become all too familiar, rhetoric that renders every decision made to be a disaster, a surrender".

New York Senator Chuck Schumer, a senior Democrat, made a different assessment of prospects for war by distinguishing between nuclear and non-nuclear aspects of the agreement. In each case he asked whether we are better off with the agreement or without it, and his conclusion was: "when it comes to the nuclear aspects of the agreement within ten years, we might be slightly better off with it. However, when it comes to the nuclear aspects after ten years and the non-nuclear aspects, we would be better off without it." Then Schumer assessed the Iranian government, saying, "Who's to say this dictatorship will not prevail for another ten, twenty, or thirty years? To me, the very real risk that Iran will not moderate and will, instead, use the agreement to pursue its nefarious goals is too great." Finally, Schumer concluded: "I will vote to disapprove the agreement, not because I believe war is a viable or desirable option, nor to challenge the path of diplomacy. It is because I believe Iran will not change, and under this agreement it will be able to achieve its dual goals of eliminating sanctions while ultimately retaining its nuclear and non-nuclear power."

In the same 5 August speech, Obama said, "Just because Iranian hard-liners chant ' Death to America' does not mean that that's what all Iranians believe. In fact, it's those hard-liners who are most comfortable with the status quo. It's those hard-liners chanting 'Death to America' who have been most opposed to the deal. They're making common cause with the Republican caucus."Eliza Collins
"President Obama stands by comments linking Republicans to Iranian hard-liners"
''Politico'' (10 August 2015). Congressional Republican leaders criticized this statement. Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell called it "crass political rhetoric" that was a strategy to "Demonize your opponents, gin up the base, get the Democrats all angry, and rally around the president." McConnell said, "This is an enormous national security debate that the president will leave behind, under the Constitution, a year and a half from now, and the rest of us will be dealing with the consequences of it. So I wish he would tone down the rhetoric and let's talk about the facts" and promised that Republicans would discuss the agreement respectfully in September. Republican Senator Bob Corker, the chairman of Foreign Relations Committee, asserted that the president was "trying to shut down debate by saying that those who have legitimate questions, legitimate questions—are somehow unpatriotic, are somehow compared to hardliners in Iran". Obama subsequently stood by his statement, with White House Press Secretary Josh Earnest

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