Human rights in the United Kingdom

Human rights in the United Kingdom concern the fundamental rights in law of every person in the United Kingdom. An integral part of the UK constitution, human rights derive from common law, from statutes such as Magna Carta, the Bill of Rights 1689 and the Human Rights Act 1998, from membership of the Council of Europe, and from international law.

Codification of human rights is recent, but the UK law had one of the world's longest human rights traditions. Today the main source of jurisprudence is the Human Rights Act 1998, which incorporated the European Convention on Human Rights into domestic litigation.

History

Codification of human rights is recent, but before the Human Rights Act 1998 and the European Convention on Human Rights, UK law had one of the world's longest human rights traditions. The Magna Carta 1215 bound the King to require Parliament's consent before any tax, respect the right to a trial "by lawful judgment of his Peers, or by the Law of the Land", stated that "We will sell to no man, we will not deny or defer to any man either Justice or Right", guaranteed free movement for people, and preserved common land for everyone. It implicitly supported what became the writ of habeas corpus, safeguarding individual freedom against unlawful imprisonment with right to appeal. After the first representative English parliament in 1265, the emergence of petitioning in the 13th century is some of the earliest evidence of parliament being used as a forum to address the general grievances of ordinary people.

During the early 17th century, the Petition of Right 1628 reasserted the values of the Magna Carta against King Charles I. The idea of freely debating rights to political representation took form during the Putney Debates of 1647. After the English Civil War the Bill of Rights 1689 in England and Wales, and the Claim of Rights Act 1689 in Scotland, enshrined principles of representative democracy, no tax without Parliament, freedom of speech in Parliament, and no "cruel and unusual punishment". Philosophers began to think of rights not as privileges to be granted by the government or the law, but as a fundamental part of what it means to be a person. John Locke (1632–1704), one of the most influential of Enlightenment thinkers, argued that protection of "property" – which to him meant "life, liberty and estates" – were the very reasons that society existed. He articulated that every person is created equal and free but, in return for the advantages of living in an organised society, a person may need to give up some of this freedom.

During the 18th century, the landmark case of '' Entick v Carrington'', following Locke almost exactly, established that the state and government could do nothing that is not expressly provided for by law, and that people could do anything but that which is prohibited by law. In '' Somerset v Stewart'', Lord Mansfield held that slavery was unlawful at common law so that a person who had purportedly been enslaved in Boston, Massachusetts had to be freed in England. This was a severe grievance of southern colonies in the run up to the US Declaration of Independence. By 1789, ideas of inherent rights had evolved and inspired both the US Bill of Rights, and the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen after the American and French Revolutions. Although some labelled natural rights as "nonsense upon stilts", more legal rights were slowly developed by Parliament and the courts. In 1792, Mary Wollstonecraft began the British movement for women's rights and equality, while movements behind the Tolpuddle martyrs and the Chartists drove reform for labour and democratic freedom.

Upon the catastrophe of World War II and the Holocaust, the new international law order put the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948 at its centre, enshrining civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights. Though a UN General Assembly Declaration, not a treaty, the rights are binding ''jus cogens'' norms in international law, and the UK ratified two further treaties which recast the Universal Declaration: the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of 1966. In 1950, the UK co-authored the European Convention on Human Rights, enabling people to appeal to the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg even against Acts of Parliament: Parliament has always undertaken to comply with basic principles of international law. Because this appeals process was long, Parliament legislated to "bring rights home" with the Human Rights Act 1998, so that people can raise human rights claims in UK courts based on the Convention directly. The Convention contains the rights to life, rights against torture, against forced labour, to marry, to an effective remedy, and the right to suffer no discrimination in those rights. Most case law concerns the rights to liberty, privacy, freedom of conscience and expression, and to freedom of association and assembly. The UK also enshrines rights to fair labour standards, social security, and a multitude of social and economic rights through its legislation.

In May 2019, the British government announced to appoint its first human rights ambassador. Foreign Secretary Jeremy Hunt appointed Rita French, Hunt's former principal private secretary, to promote UK's work at the United Nations Human Rights Council and internationally.

European Convention on Human Rights

The UK played an important role in the drafting of the Convention, with figures such as Arthur Goodhart, John Foster and the UK-based Hersch Lauterpacht providing the impetus for the creation of the Council of Europe in 1949 as a means of guarding against the rise of new dictatorships and to provide the citizens of Soviet-occupied countries with a beacon of hope. The initiative in producing a legally binding human rights agreement had already been taken by the International Council of the European Movement, an organisation whose cause had been championed by Winston Churchill and Harold Macmillan, and whose international juridical section (counting Lauterpacht and Maxwell Fyfe amongst its members) had produced a draft convention.

Chaired by Maxwell Fyfe and the former French Resistance leader Pierre-Henri Teitgen, the Legal Committee of the Council of Europe's Consultative Assembly proposed that the Council's Committee of Ministers draw up a convention which would take in and ensure the effective enjoyment of the rights proclaimed in the United Nations' Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 10 December 1948, as well as establishing a European Court and Commission of Human Rights. The Committee agreed and the text of what was to become the European Convention of Human Rights was in the main drafted by Sir Oscar Dowson, a retired senior legal adviser to the Home Office.

Ratification

There was reluctant support for the Convention back in the UK where Attlee's Labour government were in power. The Lord Chancellor Jowitt, the Colonial Secretary Griffiths and the Chancellor Sir Stafford Cripps disapproved of ratification on the basis of the loss of sovereignty that would result. Jowitt also saw a threat to the domestic system of common law and the risk in allowing judgments to be made by an unknown foreign court. He nevertheless believed that ratification was necessary from a political point of view as a refusal would be, in his view, difficult to justify at home and abroad. Political pressure aside, the overall government view was that the Convention was only aimed at preventing a totalitarian takeover and not human rights issues within a functioning democracy. In essence, it was thought that Britain had little to lose from ratification but rejection could risk some loss of face in Europe. The Convention had more support among Conservative party politicians, in particular Winston Churchill who believed that it could help unify Europe on the basis of the rule of law.

The UK became the first state to deposit its instrument of ratification of the Convention on 8 March 1951, with the Convention taking effect on 3 September 1953 after the tenth ratification was deposited. No legislation was introduced and no steps were taken to give effect to the Convention's rights in domestic law until the passing of the Human Rights Act 1998.

Right of petition

Two aspects of the Convention gave the United Kingdom's representatives to the Council of Europe cause for concern: the establishment of a European Court of Human Rights and the right of individual petition to the Court. It was thought that the possibility to submit complaints was open to abuse and could be used for political purposes, notably by members of the Communist Party, rather than for genuine grievances. In addition, it was feared that the consequences of accepting individual petition would be to cause instability in the British colonies as Britain's authority could be undermined. Britain's attempts to exclude the provisions relating to these two issues were unsuccessful but it managed to ensure that they were optional.

The Conservative government elected in 1951 ratified the First Protocol to the ECHR in 1953 relating to the rights to property, education and free elections, but resisted the right of petition on the grounds that the common law would come under scrutiny by an international court. Labour's election in 1964 led to reconsideration of the issue and this time the only senior dissenting voice was that of the Home Secretary, Frank Soskice. Although willing to accept the right of petition, he objected to the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court on the basis that it would deprive the United Kingdom of a degree of flexibility in dealing with petitions and could lead to political embarrassment. Nonetheless, by 1965 a majority of government ministers believed that the Court would not pose a significantly greater threat to national sovereignty or to political survival than the Commission of Human Rights to which the United Kingdom was subject. Further pressure for acceptance came from the British judge and President of the Court, Arnold McNair, 1st Baron McNair, the Secretary General of the Council of Europe Peter Smithers, Terence Higgins MP and various non-governmental organisations.

As had been the case for ratification in 1950, the Labour government concluded in 1965 that there was little to be lost from giving in to the pressure to recognise the Court and the right of petition. In December 1965, Wilson informed the House of Commons that the right of petition would be recognised for an initial period of three years. At the time the government were concerned that the Burmah Oil Company would take advantage of the new right to contest the legality of the War Damage Act 1965 depriving the company of the right to compensation for damage caused during World War II as recognised by a House of Lords' decision, the acceptance was timed to fall outside the six-month limitation period for challenges to the Act and the United Kingdom's acceptance also explicitly stated that it applied only to claims arising after its effective date. The declarations of acceptance were deposited by Robert Boothby MP with the Secretary General of the Council of Europe on 14 January 1966.

Campaign for incorporation

The first public call for the incorporation of the Convention into national law was made in 1968 by Anthony Lester who published a pamphlet entitled ''Democracy and Individual Rights''. Then in 1974 Lord Scarman called for an entrenched instrument to challenge the sovereignty of Parliament and protect basic human rights. The following year a Charter of Human Rights was unveiled by the Labour Party National Executive Committee, although this was regarded as insufficient by certain Conservative politicians including Leon Brittan, Geoffrey Howe and Roy Jenkins who saw an entrenched Bill of Rights as more effective in preventing abuses by the executive of individual rights.

In 1976, a draft Bill of Rights was moved in the House of Lords by Lord Wade and in 1978 a House of Lords Select committee published a report recommending incorporation which was debated in the Lords leading to an amendment being moved which was requesting that the government introduce legislation on the matter. Lord Wade succeeded in securing the Lords' approval for a draft bill but it did not make any progress in the Commons where Alan Beith's unsuccessful attempt to secure a second reading was poorly attended. There was concern at the time about judges deciding cases involving human rights which could lead them from their traditionally impartial role to political issues In 1986 Lord Broxbourne secured the Lords' approval for his incorporation bill, but was unsuccessful in the Commons, even though a second reading had been obtained. Edward Gardner's 1989 bill to incorporate the Convention also failed on its second reading. At the time, official Conservative party policy was in favour of maintaining the existing constitutional arrangements which it saw as ensuring a high standard of protection of individual rights.

By 1991 the momentum for incorporation had grown, garnering support from organisations such as Charter88, Liberty and the Institute for Public Policy Research – the latter two having published proposals for a British Bill of Rights incorporating the rights. Incorporation was also advocated by senior members of the judiciary, both past and present, including Lord Gardiner, Lord Hailsham, Lord Taylor and Lord Bingham, by the Law Society and the Bar Council. Following the election of John Smith as Labour Party leader in 1992, Labour policy towards the Convention – which had been against it before and during the 1992 General Election – began to change in favour of incorporation. Smith gave a speech on 1 March 1993 entitled "A Citizen's Democracy" in which he called for a "new constitutional settlement, a new deal between the people and the state that puts the citizen centre stage". This was followed by the Labour Party Conference in October 1993 which agreed in a two-stage policy whereby the Convention would be incorporated into law followed by the enactment of a Bill of Rights. It was planned to entrench Convention rights using a "notwithstanding clause" similar to that in Section Thirty-three of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which would have led to the Convention prevailing over legislation passed by Parliament unless stated otherwise. A human rights commission would also be set up to monitor and promote human rights.

In November 1994 Lord Lester introduced a bill in the Lords which was based on the New Zealand Bill of Rights which would give the Convention a similar status in UK law as that accorded to European Community law by allowing courts to disapply future and existing Acts of Parliament which were incompatible with it, imposing a duty on public authorities to comply and making provision for effective remedies including damages for breaches. Introduced during a period of concern over the impact of European Community law on the Parliamentary sovereignty, the bill did not receive support from the Conservative government and failed in the Commons due to lack of time.

On 18 December 1996, the shadow Labour Home Secretary Jack Straw and Paul Boateng published a Consultation Paper headed "Bringing Rights Home" which set out Labour's plans to incorporate the Convention if it won the next election. The paper focused on the first stage of Labour's human rights policy and how the Convention should be incorporated, notably as regards its ability to override statutory law. On 5 March 1997 a Labour and Liberal Democrat Consultative Committee on Constitutional Reform chaired by Robin Cook and Robert Maclennan published a report calling for the creation of a "Human Rights Commissioner" to oversee the operation of the legislation and to bring cases on behalf of those seeking protection of their rights.

Passage through Parliament

The election of Labour in May 1997 led to the publication of a white paper on the bill – "Rights Brought Home: The Human Rights Bill".

The bill was introduced by Lord Irvine to the House of Lords on 3 November 1997. In response to a question from Lord Simon, Lord Irvine confirmed that the bill did not in fact incorporate the Convention, but rather gave "further effect in the United Kingdom to convention rights". Lord Irvine also rejected a proposed amendment by the Conservative Lord Kingsland which would have had the effect of obliging the domestic courts to apply the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights, stating that the obligation to take it into account was sufficient. The Liberal Democrats supported the bill, as did several crossbenchers including Lord Bingham, Lord Scarman, Lord Wilberforce, Lord Ackner, Lord Cooke and Lord Donaldson. The bill was opposed by the Conservative Party, although some backbenchers rebelled against the party line, most notably Lord Renton and Lord Windlesham.

The second reading in the House of Commons took place on 16 February 1998 where the bill was introduced by Jack Straw who stated that it was "the first major Bill on human rights for more than 300 years". In addition to the incorporation of the Convention in domestic law, Jack Straw indicated that the bill was intended to have two other significant effects: the modernisation and democratisation of the political system by bringing about "a better balance between rights and responsibilities, between the powers of the state and the freedom of the individual" and the introduction of a culture of awareness of human rights by public authorities. Amendments rejected included giving courts a greater degree of flexibility with regard to Strasbourg case-law and referring to the margin of appreciation accorded to states by the Court, as well as limiting the obligation to interpret legislation compatibly with Convention rights only when it was 'reasonable' to do so. A successful amendment was tabled by Labour backbencher Kevin McNamara which had the effect of incorporating into the bill Articles 1 and 2 of Protocol 6 of the Convention abolishing the death penalty in peacetime.

The bill successfully negotiated the Commons and the Lords and entered into force on 2 October 2000 as the Human Rights Act 1998.

Human Rights Act 1998

The Human Rights Act 1998 seeks to give direct effect to the European Convention on Human Rights in domestic law by enabling claimants to bring an action in national courts instead of having to take their case before the European Court of Human Rights, as had previously been the case. The Act makes it unlawful for a public authority to act in a manner contrary to certain rights prescribed by the Convention and allows a UK court to award a remedy in the event of a breach. In principle, the Act has vertical effect in that it operates only vis-à-vis public bodies and not private parties. There are however certain situations in which the Act can be indirectly invoked against a private person.

Section 3 of the Act requires primary and secondary legislation to be given effect in a way which is compatible with the Convention insofar as this is possible. If the legislation cannot be interpreted in a manner which is compatible, this does not affect its validity, continuing operation or enforcement. In such a situation, section 4 of the Act allows a court to make a declaration of incompatibility which has no direct effect on the legislation nor any practical consequences for the case in which it is made; it allows Parliament to take remedial action without being obliged to do so.

Human rights in Scotland are given legal effect through the Scotland Act 1998. Section 57(2) of the Act states: "A member of the Scottish Executive has no power to make any subordinate legislation, or to do any other act, so far as the legislation or act is incompatible with any of the Convention rights...”

UK human rights legislation has been criticised by some for what they perceive as excessive attention to the human rights of offenders at the expense of those of victims; high-profile cases, such as those of Learco ChindamoDavid Cameron: Scrap the Human Rights Act
24 August 2007, ''Daily Telegraph'' and the 2006 Afghan hijackers,Hijacker ruling draws criticism
BBC News, 12 May 2006 have attracted controversy, sparking calls for the review of the Human Rights Act 1998 and other legislation. David Cameron in his second ministry announced plans to replace the Human Rights Act with a " British Bill of Rights".

On 9 May 2022, more than 50 organisations warned the UK government that tearing up the Human Rights Act would have “dire consequences” including removing obligations to properly address violence against women and girls and destabilising peace in Northern Ireland.

Rights in domestic law

Both the common law and the Human Rights Act 1998 are domestic sources of rights. Since 1998, through judicial development, the two have increasingly converged as the dominant view is that the ordinary rules of tort, equity, contract or property can accommodate human rights. As Lord Bingham put it in 2008,

The modern law contrasts to the older view, represented by A. V. Dicey that "at no time has there in England been any proclamation of the right to liberty of thought or to freedom of speech, ..it can hardly be said that our constitution knows of such a thing as any specific right of public meeting".

Life

The common law ensures the protection of the right to life and that no person is deprived of life intentionally. This is achieved primarily through the criminal law and the crimes of murder and manslaughter. Some protection is also offered by the civil law where, for example, the Fatal Accidents Act 1976 allows relatives of those killed by the wrongdoing of others to recover damages. Capital punishment had by 1998 been abolished in respect of all offences. Under the Coroners Act 1988 there is a duty in certain circumstances for deaths to be investigated by a coroner.

The law also attaches importance to the preservation of life: aiding and abetting a suicide is a criminal offence under the Suicide Act 1961 and euthanasia is unlawful (see the Bland case). Furthermore, there is a duty upon medical professionals to keep patients alive unless to do so would be contrary to the patient's best interests based on professional medical opinion (the Bolam Test), taking into account their quality of life in the event that treatment is continued. The Abortion Act 1967 permits the termination of a pregnancy under certain conditions and the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 requires the storage of embryos to be licensed.

There is also an obligation on the state to prevent destitution and neglect by providing relief to persons who may otherwise starve to death.

No forced labour

Slavery was abolished throughout much of the British Empire by the Slavery Abolition Act 1833 but as early as 1706 the common law had recognised that as soon as a slave came to England, he became free. The courts did not recognise contracts which were equivalent to slavery or servitude.

The courts have been reluctant to force individuals to work and have declined to enforce contracts of service. Forced labour is however permitted in certain limited circumstances: the Crown can theoretically compel persons to undertake naval service and prisoners can be forced to work whilst serving their sentences.

The Supreme Court of the United Kingdom considered the forced labour prohibition in Caitlin Reilly and Jamieson Wilson v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions, where it ruled that the Department for Work and Pensions' workfare policy under which the unemployed work in return for their benefit payments were not forced labour but were nevertheless legally flawed.

Liberty

The right to liberty of the person, to be free from the domination or servitude of others, and only to lose one's liberty 'by lawful judgment of his Peers, or by the Law of the Land' has been fundamental to UK and English law since the Magna Carta. This said, slavery and serfdom took until the 16th century to break down in England, and was maintained at least until 1833 within the British Empire, before full abolition of forced labour was passed, extending the writ of habeas corpus (the right to one's own body) to everyone. Benjamin Franklin's alleged adage, that people who sacrifice liberty for security will lose both and deserve neither, is reflected in human rights law. Like international law, the European Convention on Human Rights article 5 states no 'one shall be deprived of heirliberty' unless law expressly allows that person's detention after conviction, a lawful arrest or detention on suspicion of an offence, detention of a minor for education, detention for health or stopping infectious diseases spreading, or for lawful deportation or extradition. People must be told reasons for any detention, be put on trial in a reasonable time, or released immediately with compensation if detention was unlawful. In practice, every power of the police or the state to maintain order and security 'inevitably means a corresponding reduction in the liberty of the individual', and the UK has among the highest spending on policing in the world. For this reason the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, and the limits to police powers, is a key legislative guardian of liberty in the UK today.

Three main issues of police power and liberty are (1) powers of arrest, detention and questioning, (2) powers to enter, search or seize property, and (3) the accountability of the police for abuse of power. First, the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 section 1 allows a constable to stop and search people if a constable 'has reasonable grounds for suspecting' that they will 'find stolen or prohibited articles', they may seize the articles, and they may use reasonable force. The constable must give their name, police station, and grounds for the search. People cannot be made to remove clothing in public, except an outer coat, jacket or gloves. Because of the widespread problem of race discrimination in stop and search, the Home Office Code A says that 'reasonable suspicion cannot be based on generalisations or stereotypical images' of people being involved in crime. It was formerly seen as 'contrary to constitutional principle' to search someone to find whether or not there are grounds for arrest. But since 1994, there is no need for police to show reasonable suspicion to search someone to prevent violence or the carrying of offensive weapons.

In 2015 the Supreme Court held suspicionless searches were held to be compatible with ECHR article 5. Under section 24, constables can arrest people without a warrant if they are committing an offence, or if there are reasonable grounds for suspecting they will. The meaning of 'reasonable grounds' is not exacting, but a police officer must not arrest someone in bad faith, or irrationally, or if a suspect is cooperating and arrest is therefore unnecessary. Otherwise, a justice of the peace may issue a warrant for arrest, require attendance at court, in writing, and it can be executed by a constable. With a warrant, a constable can enter and search premises to make an arrest, or enter and search after an arrest. In addition, any person can make a 'citizens' arrest of another person who is in the act of committing an indictable offence. Anyone being arrested must be told the fact of arrest, and the reasons, or be told as soon as practicable, and if they are not the arrest is unlawful.

People who are arrested must be brought to a police station as soon as practicable, and there must either be released, charged or detained for questioning. People can only be detained without charge for 24 hours, but this can be extended to 36 hours for an indictable offence, or another 36 hours (i.e. 72 hours in total) but only with approval of a magistrate's court where the detainee has a right to legal representation. People can be searched at a police station with an inspector's authority, but can only do intimate searches of orifices if there are reasonable grounds for thinking there is a class A drug or article that could cause injury. A detainee has the right to inform a friend or relative, and consult a solicitor, but this right can be delayed by 36 hours if arrested for an indictable offence or 48 hours for terrorism. Interviews should be recorded, people can be photographed and drug tested without their consent. 'Intimate' samples of bodily fluids, blood and swabs cannot be taken without consent, but courts may draw adverse inferences. When being questioned by police, it is acknowledged that the right to silence is ultimately 'at the heart' of a fair trial, and 'particular caution srequired before a domestic court houldinvoke an accused's silence against him.' No statement or confession is admissible unless it is voluntarily given. A clear exception, however, is that a vehicle owner can be required to reveal the identity of a driver, and this does not breach ECHR article 6.

Second, police officers have no right to trespass upon property without a lawful warrant, because as Lord Camden said in '' Entick v Carrington'' by 'the law of England every invasion of private property, be it ever so minute, is a trespass.' Here a sheriff searched and seized property at the home of a journalist, John Entick, but the 'warrant' used by the sheriff had no legal basis. The Court held that the sheriff had to pay damages. Today, under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 section 8 enables officers to enter premises and search but only based on a warrant granted by a justice of the peace. There is no right to search communications between lawyer and a client, or confidential personal records, some medical materials, and confidential journalistic material, unless there is an order of a judge. A common law power to enter premises to stop a breach of peace was held in '' McLeod v UK'' to have unjustifiably violated the right to privacy under ECHR article 8, because the police used it to help an ex-husband recover property when an ex-wife was absent from a home. Under section 19, an officer can seize material if they have reasonable grounds to believe it was obtained by committing an offence, or if it is evidence, but not if it is subject to legal privilege. Third, although 'the law does not encourage' someone to 'resist the authority of... an officer of the law', there is an inherent right to resist an unlawful arrest, but it is an offence to resist a lawful arrest. By contrast, before being formally arrested, in ''R v Iqbal'' a man accused of drug offences was detained and handcuffed by police while attending a friend's trial, but before being arrested he broke free and escaped. He was caught again, and convicted for escaping lawful custody, but the Lord Chief Justice overturned the conviction because there was no lawful arrest, and the offence could not be widened 'by making it apply to those whose arrest has been deliberately postponed.'

Anyone can bring a claim against police for unlawful conduct, the chief constable is vicariously liable for constables' conduct, and exemplary damages are available for 'oppressive, arbitrary or unconstitutional actions'. Evidence illegally obtained, such as a confession, and certainly anything through 'torture, inhuman or degrading treatment and the use or threat of violence' must be excluded, and a court can refuse evidence if it would have an adverse effect on the fairness of proceedings. Since 2011, Police and Crime Commissioners are directly elected in England and Wales (on low turnouts) and have a duty to 'secure that the police force is efficient and effective'. The Home Secretary is meant to issue a 'strategic policing document' that chief constables pay regard to, but can intervene and require 'special measures' if there is mismanagement. This means the Home Secretary is ultimately politically responsible, but administration is largely local. Commissioners have a duty to enforce the law, but decisions about how to allocate scarce resources mean that police forces can choose to prioritise tackling some kinds of crime (e.g. violence) over others (e.g. drugs). Generally police forces will not be liable in tort for failing to stop criminal acts, but positive duties do exist to take preventative measures or properly investigate allegations.

Other persons who may be detained include those in need of care and attention under the National Assistance Act 1948, and children in the care of a local authority in secure accommodation, those suffering from infectious diseases under the Public Health Act of 1984 and those detained by the British Armed Forces abroad. The courts have powers to sentence offenders and deprive them of their liberty, as well as detain mental patients under the provisions of the Mental Health Act 1983. They may also order the payment of compensation to persons who have been unlawfully detained and the Home Secretary may award payments to victims of miscarriages of justice.

Fair trial

Article 6 of the Convention requires a fair trial, with a presumption of innocence, and legal aid if justice requires it, according to principles of natural justice. Article 7 prohibits criminal offences applying retroactively to acts done before something was made criminal. This follows the law since Magna Carta that everyone has the right to "trial by one's Peers, or the law of the land". Several principles also combine to guarantee an individual a certain level of protection by law. These are often known as the rules of natural justice and comprise the principles nemo iudex in causa sua and audi alteram partem. A fair hearing implies that each party has the opportunity to present their own case to an impartial tribunal. Courts must generally sit in public and decisions may be challenged on the grounds of actual or apparent bias. Although judges are under a common law duty to give reasons for their decisions, there is no such rule for non-judicial decision-makers.

Certain specific rights apply in criminal cases. Persons in custody have the right to consult a solicitor by virtue of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 and the Access to Justice Act 1999 allows an individual to request confidential and free legal advice. The prosecution is under a common law duty to disclose all relevant evidence including that which may assist the defendant. The accused also benefits from a limited right to silence and the privilege against self-incrimination. Confessions are admissible as evidence under certain conditions laid down in the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. The accused additionally benefits from a presumption of innocence. In discharging the burden of proof, the onus is on the prosecution as established in Woolmington v DPP. For example, in R v Wang it was held that it was never permissible for a judge to direct a jury to find a defendant guilty. There is also a right to jury trial, the accused should be able to follow proceedings and they have a right to be present during proceedings. The application of the double jeopardy rule was limited by the Criminal Justice Act 2003.

Courts have jurisdiction to prevent abuses of process if it would be unfair to try a defendant or a fair trial would not be possible.

Privacy

The constitutional importance of privacy, of one's home, belongings, and correspondence, has been recognised since 1604, when Sir Edward Coke wrote that the 'house of every one is to him as his castle and fortress'. Today it is clear that common law recognises "the tort of invasion of privacy".''PJS v News Group Newspapers Ltd'' 016UKSC 26, 2/ref> While rights to liberty and a fair trial also protect against unjustified search or seizure, the European Convention on Human Rights article 8 enshrines the right to one's 'private and family life', 'home' and 'correspondence' unless interference is 'in accordance with the law' and 'necessary in a democratic society' for public security, safety, economic well-being, preventing crime, protecting health or morals or rights of others.

The law of trespass, as in '' Entick v Carrington'', traditionally protected against unjustified physical violations of people's homes, but given extensive powers of entry, and with modern information technology the central concerns of privacy are electronic surveillance, both by the state and by private corporations aiming to profit from data or 'surveillance capitalism'. The four main fields of law relating to privacy concern (1) listening devices and interference with private property, (2) interception of mail, email or web communications by government, (3) mass data storage and processing by corporations or state bodies, and (4) other breaches of confidence and privacy, particularly by the press.

First, the Police Act 1997 sections 92 prohibits 'interference with property or with wireless telegraphy' without authorisation by a chief constable or others. Such listening or bugging devices may only be used 'for the prevention or detection of serious crime' that could lead to over 3 years of jail. A judicial commissioner's approval is further needed if a dwelling, bedroom or office is being bugged, and if refused the police can appeal to the Investigatory Powers Commissioner. On top of this, the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 which also generally allows surveillance by police, intelligence, HMRC and councils to obtain private information ('directed'), or surveillance of a residence or vehicle ('intrusive') if for the purpose of national security, preventing serious crime, or protecting UK economic well-being. Only 'intrusive' surveillance requires approval by a judicial commissioner. This has frequently led to abuse, for instance, in one case with a family being put under surveillance to see if they lived in a catchment area of an oversubscribed school, and in another an intelligence officer infiltrating a protest group and fathering a child, after taking a dead child's identity.

Surveillance in public places does not engage the human right to privacy, according to '' Kinloch v HM Advocate'', where evidence of the defendant money laundering was gathered by police following the suspect in public spaces. Second, although the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 section 2 creates a duty to consider whether means less intrusive to privacy could be used, warrants can be issue for targeted or bulk interception of any data, including to assist other governments, but only to detect serious crime, protect national security, or protect the UK's economic well-being, and this must be proportionate. Applications are made to the Home Secretary or other appropriate ministers, and must be approved by a judicial commissioner with written reasons for any refusal. Warrants can also be issued against Members of Parliament with the consent of the prime minister. Interception should not be disclosed in judicial proceedings. Local councils are able to carry out interceptions, albeit with authority of a justice of the peace. Journalists' material can be intercepted, though only with authority of a judicial commissioner. The government can also require internet service providers retain data, including bulk data, for up to a year. Judicial commissioners must have held high judicial office, while the Investigatory Powers Commissioner audits, inspects and investigates the exercise of public body powers. In 2015, over 3059 warrants were granted, and it is argued by MI5 that bulk data enables security services to 'make the right connections between disparate pieces of information'. The fact of bulk data collection, however, inevitably means people who have nothing to do with serious crime remain under state surveillance.

Third, it has been recognised that the 'right to keep oneself to oneself, to tell other people that certain things are none of their business, is under technological threat' also from private corporations, as well as the state. Through standard form contracts, tech corporations routinely appropriate users' private data for targeted advertising, particularly Google (e.g. search and browsing history, email, locations), Facebook (e.g. personal interactions, hobbies, messages), Microsoft (e.g. emails, or cloud documents) and others. Because people have no choice but to agree to the terms and conditions, consent is defective and contract terms are often unfair, legislation has been increasing in strength to reflect the fundamental 'right to the protection of personal data' in the European Union. The General Data Protection Regulation 2016 requires that all data is processed lawfully, fairly and transparently, and on the basis of 'consent' or a contract. The meaning of 'consent' requires more than the basic rules for commercial contracts, and must be clearly and distinctly identifiable, and revocable at any time. Contract terms may be subject to more protective rights contained in UK law. Whenever a 'data subject' has personal data processed or stored, they have basic rights to be provided with transparent information about the data stored including when they have not given that information themselves, to access the data and rectify any inaccuracies, and to demand that the data is erased when it is no longer necessary for the purpose for which it was originally given.

There is a further right that data must be portable 'to another controller without hindrance', for instance in switching phone contacts. Data may be disclosed for legitimate reasons, so in ''Rugby Football Union v Consolidated Information Services Ltd'' the Supreme Court held that a ticketing agency had no data protection defence against disclosing information to the Rugby Football Union about people who touted tickets against its rules, because the legitimate interest in stopping theft was stronger. Article 32 states a data controller must ensure the security of people's data, and notify supervisory authorities of any breach, including transfers to 'third countries' where the rule of law is defective. However, during the 2016 Brexit referendum the House of Commons fake news committee found that Facebook enabled massive breaches of users' data, being sold onto third parties including Cambridge Analytica, which psychologically targeted voters with political adverts, and this data spread into Russia. The penalties for breach of GDPR rules, since it came into force in May 2018, can be up to 4% of a company's worldwide turnover, or €20m, whichever is higher. There are also databases kept by UK state bodies, including the National Domestic Extremism Database, a DNA Database, and a Police National Computer, Related to this, the Supreme Court held in ''R(L) v Metropolitan Police Commissioner'' that there was no breach of privacy when a primary school's enhanced criminal record check on an applicant for a teaching assistant job showed the applicant's son was put on a child protection register because of neglect, and she was refused a job.

A planned NHS patients' database, care.data, was abandoned because of protests about confidentiality and security of data. Finally, claimants may sue any private party on the grounds of breach of confidence, an old equitable action, although one that may be giving way to a tort of misuse of private information. For instance, it was held that it was an unlawful breach of privacy for the ''Daily Mail'' to publish private journals of the Prince of Wales about the handover of Hong Kong to China stolen and leaked by a former employee. It was also held to be unlawful for a newspaper to publish details of an applicant's private sexual life, even though in other countries the story had spread around the internet, because there was no 'public interest... in the disclosure or publication of purely private sexual encounters, even though they involve adultery or more than one person at the same time'. In this way the common law has developed to uphold human rights.

Thought, conscience and religion

Article 9 states that everyone has the right to freedom of conscience, including religion and belief. Only the manifestation of a belief can be limited on justifiable legal grounds as strictly necessary in a democracy.

By contrast, the common law historically required punishment for "erroneous opinions concerning rites or modes of worship" to be provided for in legislation before it could be applied. There were a number of such laws in the 17th and 18th centuries, including the Corporation Act 1661 requiring holders of civic office to be members of the Church of England and the Test Act 1673 requiring holders of military or civil functions to take the oaths of supremacy and allegiance and subscribe to a declaration against transubstantiation. Both Acts were repealed by the Roman Catholic Relief Act 1829 which admitted Catholics into the legal profession and permitted Catholic schools and places of worship. Jews were allowed to enter Parliament under the Jews Relief Act 1858. The Succession to the Crown Act 2013 amended the Act of Settlement 1701 to remove the exclusion from the line of succession and Church in Wales, the Church of England is the established church in England and enjoys certain privileges and rights in law. However, the promotion of anti-Christian views is no longer illegal and the law places no formal restrictions on the freedom of worship. There is no formal legal definition of religion and courts generally abstain from deciding issues of religious doctrine. The common law offences of blasphemy and blasphemous libel were abolished by the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008. A new offence of incitement to religious hatred was created by the Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006 and discrimination on the grounds of religion is regulated by the Employment Equality (Religion or Belief) Regulations 2003.

The Military Service Act 1916 and the National Service (Armed Forces) Act 1939 both provided for the possibility of exemption from military service on the basis of conscientious objection, although the House of Lords has held that there would be no breach of human rights if such a possibility was not provided for.

Expression

The right to freedom of expression is generally seen as being the 'lifeblood of democracy.' After the English Civil War, it was established that a jury could acquit a Quaker who preached to a crowd even against the judge's direction and 'against full and manifest evidence'.

The Bill of Rights 1689 article 9 guaranteed the 'freedom of speech and debates or proceedings in Parliament' and stated they were 'not to be impeached or questioned in any court or place out of Parliament', but the first full, legal guarantees for free speech came from the American Revolution, when the First Amendment to the US Constitution guaranteed 'freedom of speech'. The government and employers suppressed free speech through the French revolution and after the Napoleonic wars, until the repeal of the anti-Catholic laws, and the abolition of restraints on trade union organising, as well as throughout the British Empire. But after World War II, the UK signed the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, and joined the European Convention. Article 10 enshrines the right to freedom of expression which includes the rights 'to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers.' This does not prevent 'the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises.' Like all other rights these are subject to restrictions set out in law, and as necessary in a democratic society, to stop crime, or protect security, territorial integrity, safety, health, morals, the rights of others, and to maintain the judiciary's impartiality.

The practical right to free expression is limited by (1) unaccountable ownership in the media, (2) censorship and obscenity laws, (3) public order offences, and (4) the law of defamation and breach of confidence. First, although anybody can stand on Speakers’ Corner, in Parliament Square, or in Trafalgar Square and speak freely to a crowd, the communication channels with the biggest audiences are owned by large corporate entities: three internet media networks, five television networks, and six corporate owned newspaper groups, almost all of which aim have shareholders that demand to make a profit. This means that most speech, with most reach, is designed to be compatible with generating advertising revenue and shareholder profit for the newspaper, TV, or internet corporation, and controllers choose which speech or images are acceptable, unless the law creates different rights. While there are loose limits on cross-ownership of TV and newspapers, there is no regulation yet separate advertising business and internet media platforms where their interests conflict with public goals. The Communications Act 2003 sections 319–321, regulates television (but not explicitly internet broadcasts, or newspapers) to ensure that diverse views are heard, and to restrict discriminatory viewing, or the stop misleading information, and allows a complaints procedure. The UK's transparent, and publicly accountable system of TV media regulation is consistently held to be compatible with freedom of expression. Two of the UK's TV networks, the BBC and Channel 4, are publicly owned and accountable, through an arm's length appointment process overseen by the government. However most television channels are funded through advertising revenue. There is also effectively no regulation of standards on internet media, although the House of Commons committee on fake news called for the same regulation as on TV to be applied after Facebook data theft and psychologically targeted political ads were used by ‘Vote Leave’ in the 2016 Brexit poll.

Second, censorship and obscenity laws have been a highly traditional limit on freedom of expression. The Theatres Act 1968

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