Givhan v. Western Line Consolidated School District

''Givhan v. Western Line Consolidated School District'', 439 U.S. 410 (1979), is a United States Supreme Court decision on the free speech rights of public employees. The Court held unanimously in favor of a schoolteacher fired for her critical remarks in conversations with her principal. Justice William Rehnquist wrote the opinion, with a short concurrence by John Paul Stevens.

The petitioner, Bessie Givhan, had believed that various policies and practices of the newly integrated Western Line School District in Mississippi were meant to sustain school segregation. In private meetings with her new principal, she persistently complained about this. The principal in turn recommended the district not rehire her, citing those conversations as well as some other issues. She joined the ongoing desegregation lawsuit as an intervenor, alleging that her First and Fourteenth Amendment rights to free speech and due process had been violated. The district court hearing the case agreed, but then the Fifth Circuit reversed that decision, holding that since she had not spoken publicly she was not entitled to constitutional protection, distinguishing her case from two other recent decisions in which the Supreme Court had ruled in favor of non- tenured teachers let go by their districts following critical statements by noting that in those cases, the criticism had been expressed in a public context.

Rehnquist's opinion rejected that distinction, calling the Fifth Circuit's reading too narrow. He further rejected its claim that Givhan had forced herself on an unwilling listener, since the principal had invited her in. Since the district had cited other, potentially permissible reasons for its action, the Court remanded the case to the district court to apply the ''Mt. Healthy'' test, from one of the other two cases involving teachers, and determine if the district had adequate reason to fire her other than the speech. Three years later, the lower court found that it did not, and ordered Givhan reinstated after a 12-year absence.

The Court has not had to significantly revisit the holding since then, and it has not been subject to much commentary or legal analysis. Four years later, in '' Connick v. Myers'', its next case on the free speech rights of public employees, it began to limit ''Givhan'' and its predecessors by sketching out a test for whether the employee's speech was on a matter of public concern. In the early 21st century, its holding in '' Garcetti v. Ceballos'', that speech made by employees pursuant to their job duties was not protected, appeared to some to complicate ''Givhan'' although the Court said it would not.

Underlying dispute

An African American, Bessie Givhan began teaching junior high school-level English at the all-black Norma O'Bannon School in Greenville, Mississippi, in 1963. As with other school districts in the South in the wake of the Supreme Court's 1955 ''Brown v. Board of Education'' decision, a lawsuit had been brought to desegregate schools in the state. In the middle of 1970, the schools in the Greenville area were formally integrated per the Supreme Court's order in ''Alexander v. Holmes County Board of Education''''Alexander v. Holmes County Board of Education'', that Southern schools desegregate immediately. She was reassigned to Riverside High School in Avon, away.

At the beginning of the 1971 school year she was transferred again, to Glen Allan High School, near Avon. Years later she described Glen Allan as a "stepchild" within the newly created Western Line Consolidated School District. With a larger proportion of black students and faculty than the other two high schools in the new district, it was short of fundamental resources compared to them. "You could not compare hem, she recalled in 2006.

She complained frequently to the principal, a white former teacher named James Leach. "I requested a pointer for my blackboard and an eraser, things of this sort that I needed as a teacher," she said. This did not endear her to Leach or the district administration. "I was labeled 'hostile' and 'unreasonable.'" At the end of the year she was informed that her contract would not be renewed. Leach told the superintendent that although she was "a competent teacher" she often had "an insulting and hostile attitude" and made "petty and unreasonable demands."
Ayers v. Western Line Consol. Sch. Dist.
', 555 F.2d 1309, 1312 (5th Cir., 1977) She insisted that she be told why, and in a letter to her the district cited her refusal to administer standardized tests, her refusal to cooperate with the administration and an "antagonistic and hostile attitude ... throughout the school year."''Givhan v. Western Line Consolidated School District'',

In lower courts

Givhan's case was heard first in federal district court, as part of the larger desegregation action against the school district. After it ruled in her favor, the school district appealed and won a partial reversal.

District court

Givhan joined the ongoing lawsuit in federal court for the Northern District of Mississippi over the integration of the school districts within its jurisdiction as an intervenor.
Singleton et al v. Jackson Municipal Separate School District et al
', 419 F.2d 1211 (5th Cir., 1970) She alleged that her dismissal violated not only the terms of that case, which required that the district develop nonracial objective criteria for the retention of teachers and staff, something which it had failed to do, but her own rights to free speech and due process under the First and Fourteenth amendments.

During the two-day bench trial, the district offered other reasons that it claimed justified her dismissal, not all of them speech-related, in addition to the standardized tests she did not administer (at the time, Givhan had argued that students had insufficient time to prepare for them). She had supposedly walked out of a meeting on the desegregation plan along with other teachers in 1969 and blown their car horns in an effort to disrupt the meeting; and in 1970 she and other teachers had threatened not to come to work after the midyear integration. Lastly, they said, she had helped a student conceal a knife he was in possession of during a search while at Riverside.''Givhan'', at 412n2.

Givhan admitted this last incident, but the district court found it to be unrelated to her dismissal as the superintendent did not seem to have considered it when deciding whether to retain it or not. The evidence on the other three allegations was inconclusive. The court found in her favor and ordered her reinstatement.''Givhan'', at 412.

Not only had her demands not been "constant" as the district claimed, the judge wrote " e school district's motivation in failing to renew Givhan's contract was almost entirely a desire to rid themselves of a vocal critic of the district's policies and practices which were capable of interpretation as embodying racial discrimination." And under the Supreme Court's decision in ''Pickering v. Board of Education'', in which it had ruled in favor of an Illinois teacher fired for writing a letter to the editor of a local newspaper critical of the school board,''Pickering v. Board of Education'', Givhan's complaints to Leach were protected by the First Amendment as speech on a matter of public concern.''Ayers'', 1314

The district appealed to the Fifth Circuit. Givhan's case was heard along with several other teachers challenging their dismissals in the absence of the criteria that were supposed to have been developed to govern them. Judges Walter Pettus Gewin, Paul Hitch Roney and James Clinkscales Hill were empaneled to hear their cases.

Appeals court

In 1977, six years after Givhan's dismissal, the court reached its decision. Gewin wrote for a majority that first considered, per the Supreme Court's holding earlier that year in ''Mt. Healthy City School District Board of Education v. Doyle'', an Ohio case also involving a nontenured high school teacher fired over critical speech,''Mt. Healthy City School District Board of Education v. Doyle'', It required that the court consider whether, if there were other reasons for the adverse personnel action that did not violate the plaintiff's constitutional rights, they would have been enough to justify it.

Gewin was skeptical. "Appellants seem to argue that the preponderance of the evidence shows that the same decision would have been justified, but that is not the same as proving that the same decision would have been made," he wrote. The alleged incidents did not seem from the record to have been much of a factor in the district's decision at the time Givhan was let go. "Therefore appellants failed to make a successful 'same decision anyway' defense"''Ayers'', 1315.

However, the crucial question for Givhan was not that, it was whether her discussions with Leach enjoyed First Amendment protection. And on that score, Gewin began, " t all expression by a government employee is constitutionally protected." ''Pickering'' had held that the employee's constitutional interest had to be balanced against the government's interest in running the school system in an efficient and orderly manner. The court, he continued, had not found any of the cases in the party's briefs helpful in deciding whether it was, so it turned to "general free speech principles."''Ayers'', 1316–17.

In '' Pickering'', ''Mt. Healthy'' and '' Perry v. Sindermann'', the "trilogy" of cases brought by educators alleging unconstitutional retaliatory firings that served as precedent for Givhan, Gewin observed, the crucial factor had been that the plaintiffs' speech was ''public'': Pickering had written a letter to the editor, Doyle had shared a memo with a local radio station that then reported its contents as news, and Sindermann had been a public critic of the state college's governing board. He found another recent case of a public employee's speech rights, '' Madison School District v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission'', followed this pattern. There, the Court had held that the right of a nonunion teacher to speak at a public meeting prevailed over a provision of state labor law that forbade negotiations with anyone not in the bargaining unit.'' Madison School District v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission'', Other prominent recent free-speech cases, Gewin also found, emphasized the public context of the speech entitled to protection.''Ayers'', 1317–18.

Further, Gewin wrote, two other recent cases established that the First Amendment did not give speakers the right to compel that their speech be heard. '' Rowan v. U.S. Post Office Dept.'' had upheld a postal regulation allowing customers to refuse to receive potentially obscene advertising or advertising for such products or periodicals.'' Rowan v. U.S. Post Office Dept.'' '' Lehman v. Shaker Heights'' had held that a public transit system had no obligation to carry political advertisements.'' Lehman v. Shaker Heights'', Based on these two precedents, Gewin wrote:

These general principles lead us to conclude that teacher Givhan did not engage in constitutionally protected speech in her expressions to principal Leach. Neither a teacher nor a citizen has a constitutional right to single out a public employee to serve as the audience for his or her privately expressed views, at least in the absence of evidence that the public employee was given that task by law, custom, or school Board decision. There is no evidence here that Givhan sought to disseminate her views publicly, to anyone willing to listen. Rather, she brought her complaints to Leach alone. Neither is there evidence that the Board or Mississippi law delegated to Leach the task of entertaining complaints from all comers and that he discriminated in choosing to reject her complaints and not to rehire her because she impressed him into such service.''Ayers'', 1319.

To explain further, Gewin invoked the legal saying that hard cases make bad law. While he agreed that the substance of Givhan's complaints to Leach might well have been seen as "laudable" by some observers, " otection of the First Amendment, however, does not turn on the social worth of ideas. If we held Givhan's expressions constitutionally protected, we would in effect force school principals to be ombudsmen, for damnable as well as laudable expressions." While such a policy might not be such a bad idea, he continued, it would be better being adopted by the school board or legislature, rather than being imposed by a court.

Since the court had found against Givhan on her constitutional claims, it reversed the Northern District. However, the district court had not reached a verdict on her claims that the ongoing desegregation suit had been violated by her dismissal, so the case was remanded for further proceedings to decide that issue.''Ayers'', 1320.

Supreme Court

Instead of returning to district court, Givhan petitioned the Supreme Court for '' certiorari''. It was granted, and the Court heard oral arguments in November 1978. Givhan herself, who was working at a community counseling organization as she could not find another teaching job due to the ongoing litigation, flew to Washington to watch those proceedings in person.

The Court announced its decision two months later, at the beginning of 1979. All nine justices had sided with Givhan, holding that her conversations with Leach were indeed, per ''Pickering'', protected speech on a matter of public concern. Justice William Rehnquist wrote the opinion.''Givhan v. Western Line Consolidated School District'',

Opinion of the Court

Rehnquist responded harshly to the Fifth Circuit's opinion. After quoting its concern that ruling for Givhan would force principals to be "ombudsmen", he said that the justices were "unable to agree that private expression of one's views is beyond constitutional protection, and therefore reverse the Court of Appeals' judgment and remand the case so that it may consider the contentions of the parties freed from this erroneous view of the First Amendment."''Givhan'', 413–16, Rehnquist, J.

Gewin had further erred in distinguishing Givhan's case from the '' Pickering''–''Perry''–'' Mt. Healthy'' trilogy by the fact that those three had involved public expression rather than private discussions. Rehnquist looked to the text of the amendment itself in response:

While he speculated that, based on its citation to another one of its cases, the Fifth Circuit had also seen the fact that Givhan was speaking to her principal rather than the school board as significant in assessing its disruptive effect on district operations, as per ''Pickering'', Rehnquist did not see a difference there, either.In a footnote to this section of the opinion, Rehnquist conceded that while in a public context only the content of the speech matters for that side of the ''Pickering'' balancing test, " ivate expression, however, may in some situations bring additional factors to the ''Pickering'' calculus. When a government employee personally confronts his immediate superior, the employing agency's institutional efficiency may be threatened not only by the content of the employee's message but also by the manner, time, and place in which it is delivered." (''Givhan'', 415n4)

The facts of the case dispensed with the Fifth Circuit's other grounds for excluding Givhan's speech from constitutional protection. "Nor is the Court of Appeals' view supported by the 'captive audience' rationale. Having opened his office door to petitioner, the principal was hardly in a position to argue that he was the "''unwilling'' recipient" of her views."

Since ''Mt. Healthy'' had not been decided when the district court had tried the case, the burden-shifting mandated by that decision was not yet part of the process. Therefore, Rehnquist noted, the school district had not been allowed to prove that Givhan's other alleged misconduct was sufficient to fire her if the protected conversations could not be considered.He allowed in a footnote that, unlike the Fifth Circuit, the justices believed that that cause existed if some of the documented incidents had actually occurred. (''Givhan'', 417n5) The Court thus instructed that it be considered on remand to the trial court. Justice John Paul Stevens added a short concurrence clarifying that the district court could make that finding on the basis of the existing record, without retrying the case, if it so chose.''Givhan'', 417–18.

Subsequent proceedings

Later that year, the district court applied the ''Mt. Healthy'' test and again held for Givhan. It stated that the school district's other reasons for the firing were just rationalizations it found afterwards and ordered not only that she be reinstated but given full back pay and attorney's fees. The school district appealed again to the Fifth Circuit, but in 1982 it upheld the district court's decision.

Aftermath and legacy

Although she had not taught for the 12 years it had taken her to win her case, Givhan decided to return. "It was really a big decision," she said in 2006. "It was like the show, ''Deal or No Deal''. It was a tough call." Ultimately she decided to do so for the other teachers in the district. "For them, I went on back to see if I could make positive change."

She taught for another five years, then retired. Several years later she was ordained a Methodist minister, a position she has also since retired from. In her 2006 interview, she said it still "blows my mind in a positive way" that she won at the Supreme Court. "It gave me more faith in the justice system ... I believe justice can be done. It can prevail if it gets into the right hands."

Subsequent jurisprudence

There have not been many cases that have dealt further with the issues raised by ''Givhan''. The Supreme Court has heard two other cases that turned on speech on a matter of public concern by a public employee within the workplace, and there have been some cases in the appeals court cases that have relied in some measure on ''Givhan'' or discussed it at length.

Supreme Court

The Court's two most important post-''Givhan'' cases where a public employee spoke privately resulted in rulings for the employers and narrowed the circumstances under which employees can make a First Amendment claim. Both however distinguished themselves from ''Givhan'', emphasizing that the speech in that case was still protected.

''Connick v. Myers''

Four years after ''Givhan'', the Court considered another case where a public employee sought damages for her dismissal over a private speech act on a matter of public concern. In '' Connick v. Myers'' the respondent, Sheila Myers, a former prosecutor working for Harry Connick Sr., Orleans Parish