First Naval Battle of Guadalcanal

The Naval Battle of Guadalcanal, sometimes referred to as the Third and Fourth Battles of Savo Island, the Battle of the Solomons, the Battle of Friday the 13th, or, in Japanese sources, the , took place from 12 to 15 November 1942, and was the decisive engagement in a series of naval battles between Allied (primarily American) and Imperial Japanese forces during the months-long Guadalcanal Campaign in the Solomon Islands during World War II. The action consisted of combined air and sea engagements over four days, most near Guadalcanal and all related to a Japanese effort to reinforce land forces on the island. The only two U.S. Navy admirals to be killed in a surface engagement in the war were lost in this battle.

Allied forces landed on Guadalcanal on 7 August 1942 and seized an airfield, later called Henderson Field, that was under construction by the Japanese military. There were several subsequent attempts to recapture the airfield by the Imperial Japanese Army and Navy using reinforcements delivered to Guadalcanal by ship, efforts which ultimately failed. In early November 1942, the Japanese organized a transport convoy to take 7,000 infantry troops and their equipment to Guadalcanal to attempt once again to retake the airfield. Several Japanese warship forces were assigned to bombard Henderson Field with the goal of destroying Allied aircraft that posed a threat to the convoy. Learning of the Japanese reinforcement effort, U.S. forces launched aircraft and warship attacks to defend Henderson Field and prevent the Japanese ground troops from reaching Guadalcanal.

In the resulting battle, both sides lost numerous warships in two extremely destructive surface engagements at night. Nevertheless, the U.S. succeeded in turning back attempts by the Japanese to bombard Henderson Field with battleships. Allied aircraft also sank most of the Japanese troop transports and prevented the majority of the Japanese troops and equipment from reaching Guadalcanal. Thus, the battle turned back Japan's last major attempt to dislodge Allied forces from Guadalcanal and nearby Tulagi, resulting in a strategic victory for the U.S. and its allies and deciding the ultimate outcome of the Guadalcanal campaign in their favor. It was the last major naval battle in the Pacific War for the next one-and-a-half years, until the Battle of the Philippine Sea. It was one of the costliest naval battles of the Second World War in terms of lives lost.

Background

The six-month Guadalcanal campaign began on 7 August 1942, when Allied (primarily U.S.) forces landed on Guadalcanal, Tulagi, and the Florida Islands in the Solomon Islands, a pre-war colonial possession of Great Britain. The landings were meant to prevent the Japanese using the islands as bases from which to threaten the supply routes between the U.S. and Australia, to secure the islands as starting points for a campaign to neutralize the major Imperial Japanese military base at Rabaul, and to support the Allied New Guinea campaign. The Japanese had occupied Tulagi in May 1942 and began constructing an airfield on Guadalcanal in June 1942.

By nightfall on 8 August, the 11,000 Allied troops secured Tulagi, the nearby small islands, and a Japanese airfield under construction at Lunga Point on Guadalcanal (later renamed Henderson Field). Allied aircraft operating out of Henderson were called the " Cactus Air Force" (CAF) after the Allied code name for Guadalcanal. To protect the airfield, the U.S. Marines established a perimeter defense around Lunga Point. Additional reinforcements over the next two months increased the number of U.S. troops at Lunga Point to more than 20,000 men.

In response, the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters assigned the Imperial Japanese Army's 17th Army, a corps-sized command based at Rabaul and under the command of Lieutenant-General Harukichi Hyakutake, with the task of retaking Guadalcanal. Units of the 17th Army began to arrive on Guadalcanal on 19 August, to drive Allied forces from the island.

Because of the threat posed by CAF aircraft based at Henderson Field, the Japanese were unable to use large, slow transport ships to deliver troops and supplies to the island. Instead, they used warships based at Rabaul and the Shortland Islands. The Japanese warships—mainly light cruisers or destroyers from the Eighth Fleet under the command of Vice Admiral Gunichi Mikawa—were usually able to make the round trip down " The Slot" to Guadalcanal and back in a single night, thereby minimizing their exposure to air attack. Delivering the troops in this manner prevented most of the soldiers' heavy equipment and supplies—such as heavy artillery, vehicles, and much food and ammunition—from being carried to Guadalcanal with them. These high-speed warship runs to Guadalcanal occurred throughout the campaign and came to be known as the " Tokyo Express" by Allied forces and "Rat Transportation" by the Japanese.

The first Japanese attempt to recapture Henderson Field failed when a 917-man force was defeated on 21 August in the Battle of the Tenaru. The next attempt took place from 12 to 14 September, ending in the defeat of the 6,000 men under the command of Major General Kiyotake Kawaguchi at the Battle of Edson's Ridge.

In October, the Japanese again tried to recapture Henderson Field by delivering 15,000 more men—mainly from the Army's 2nd Infantry Division—to Guadalcanal. In addition to delivering the troops and their equipment by Tokyo Express runs, the Japanese successfully pushed through one large convoy of slower transport ships. Enabling the approach of the transport convoy was a nighttime bombardment of Henderson Field by two battleships on 14 October that heavily damaged the airfield's runways, destroyed half of the CAF's aircraft, and burned most of the available aviation fuel. In spite of the damage, Henderson personnel were able to restore the two runways to service and replacement aircraft and fuel were delivered, gradually restoring the CAF to its prebombardment level over the next few weeks.

The next Imperial attempt to retake the island with the newly arrived troops occurred from 20 to 26 October and was defeated with heavy losses in the Battle for Henderson Field. At the same time, Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto (the commander of the Japanese Combined Fleet) engaged U.S. naval forces in the Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands, which resulted in a tactical victory for the Japanese. However, the Americans won a strategic victory as the Japanese navy failed in its objectives and the Japanese carriers were forced to retreat because of losses to carrier aircraft and aircrewmen. Thereafter, Yamamoto's ships returned to their main bases at Truk in Micronesia, where he had his headquarters, and Rabaul while three carriers returned to Japan for repairs and refitting.

The Japanese Army planned another attack on Guadalcanal in November 1942, but further reinforcements were needed before the operation could proceed. The Army requested assistance from Yamamoto to deliver the needed reinforcements to the island and to support their planned offensive on the Allied forces guarding Henderson Field. Yamamoto provided 11 large transport ships to carry 7,000 army troops from the 38th Infantry Division, their ammunition, food, and heavy equipment from Rabaul to Guadalcanal. He also sent a warship support force from Truk on 9 November which included the battleships and . Equipped with special fragmentation shells, they were to bombard Henderson Field on the night of 12–13 November and destroy it and the aircraft stationed there in order to allow the slow, heavy transports to reach Guadalcanal and unload safely the next day. The warship force was commanded from ''Hiei'' by recently promoted Vice Admiral Hiroaki Abe.
Because of the constant threat posed by Japanese aircraft and warships, it was difficult for Allied forces to resupply their forces on Guadalcanal, which often came under attack from Imperial land and sea forces in the area. In early November 1942, Allied intelligence learned that the Japanese were preparing again to try to retake Henderson Field. Therefore, the U.S. sent Task Force 67 (TF 67)—a large reinforcement and re-supply convoy, split into two groups and commanded by Rear Admiral Richmond K. Turner—to Guadalcanal on 11 November. The supply ships were protected by two task groups—commanded by Rear Admirals Daniel J. Callaghan and Norman Scott—and aircraft from Henderson Field on Guadalcanal. The transport ships were attacked several times on 11 and 12 November near Guadalcanal by Japanese aircraft based at Buin, Bougainville, in the Solomons, but most were unloaded without serious damage. Twelve Japanese aircraft were shot down by antiaircraft fire from the U.S. ships or by fighter aircraft flying from Henderson Field.

First Naval Battle of Guadalcanal, 13 November

Prelude

Abe's warship force assembled north of Indispensable Strait and proceeded towards Guadalcanal on 12 November with an estimated arrival time for the warships of early morning of 13 November. The convoy of slower transport ships and 12 escorting destroyers, under the command of Raizō Tanaka, began its run down New Georgia Sound (known as "the Slot") from the Shortlands with an estimated arrival time at Guadalcanal during the night of 13 November.

Abe's force consisted of:

(d, damaged; D, crippled; S, sunk; s, sunk soon after)

* 2 fast battleships: (Ds),
* 1 light cruiser:
* 11 destroyers:
** 1 :
** 2 : (d),
** 1 :
** 4 : , (d), , (Ds)
** 3 : (d), , (S)

Three more destroyers (, , and ) would provide a rear guard in the Russell Islands during Abe's foray into the waters of Savo Sound around and near Savo Island off the north coast of Guadalcanal that would soon be nicknamed "Ironbottom Sound" as a result of the numerous ships sunk in this succession of battles and skirmishes. U.S. reconnaissance aircraft spotted the approach of the Japanese ships and passed a warning to the Allied command. Thus warned, Turner detached all usable combat ships to protect the troops ashore from the expected Japanese naval attack and troop landing and ordered the supply ships at Guadalcanal to depart by the early evening of 12 November. Callaghan was a few days senior to the more experienced Scott, and therefore was placed in overall command.

Callaghan prepared his force to meet the Japanese that night in the sound. His force consisted of:

* 2 heavy cruisers
** 1 : (D)
** 1 : (D)
* 3 light cruisers
** 1 :
** 2 : (Ds), (ds)
* 8 destroyers
** 2 : ,
** 2 : (D), (S)
** 2 : (S), (S)
** 1 : (D)
** 1 : (S)

Admiral Callaghan commanded from ''San Francisco''.

During their approach to Guadalcanal, the Japanese force passed through a large and intense rain squall which, along with a complex formation plus some confusing orders from Abe, split the formation into several groups. The U.S. force steamed in a single column in Ironbottom Sound, with destroyers in the lead and rear of the column, and the cruisers in the center. Five ships had the new, far-superior SG radar, but Callaghan's deployment put none of them in the forward part of the column, nor did he choose one for his flagship. Callaghan did not issue a battle plan to his ship commanders.

Action

Confused approach

At about 01:25 on 13 November, in near-complete darkness due to the bad weather and dark moon, the ships of the Imperial Japanese force entered the sound between Savo Island and Guadalcanal and prepared to bombard Henderson Field with the special ammunition loaded for the purpose.Frank, ''Guadalcanal'', pp. 437–438. The ships arrived from an unexpected direction, coming not down the slot but from the west side of Savo Island, thus entering the sound from the northwest rather than the north. Unlike their American counterparts, the Japanese sailors had drilled and practiced night fighting extensively, conducting frequent live-fire night gunnery drills and exercises. This experience would be telling in not only the pending encounter, but in several other fleet actions off Guadalcanal in the months to come.

Several of the U.S. ships detected the approaching Japanese on radar, beginning at about 01:24, but had trouble communicating the information to Callaghan due to problems with radio equipment, lack of discipline regarding communications procedures, and general inexperience in operating as a cohesive naval unit. Messages were sent and received but did not reach the commander in time to be processed and used. With his limited understanding of the new technology,Frank, ''Guadalcanal'', p. 438. Callaghan wasted further time trying to reconcile the range and bearing information reported by radar with his limited sight picture, to no avail. Lacking a modern combat information center (CIC), where incoming information could be quickly processed and coordinated, the radar operator was reporting on vessels that were not in sight, while Callaghan was trying to coordinate the battle visually, from the bridge. (Post battle analysis of this and other early surface actions would lead directly to the introduction of modern CICs early in 1943.)

Several minutes after initial radar contact the two forces sighted each other, at about the same time, but both Abe and Callaghan hesitated ordering their ships into action. Abe was apparently surprised by the proximity of the U.S. ships, and with decks stacked with San Shiki special bombardment (rather than armor penetrating) munitions, was momentarily uncertain if he should withdraw to give his battleships time to rearm, or continue onward. He decided to continue onward. Callaghan apparently intended to attempt to cross the T of the Japanese, as Scott had done at Cape Esperance, but—confused by the incomplete information he was receiving, plus the fact that the Japanese formation consisted of several scattered groups—he gave several confusing orders on ship movements, and delayed too long in acting.

The U.S. ship formation began to fall apart, apparently further delaying Callaghan's order to commence firing as he first tried to ascertain and align his ships' positions. Meanwhile, the two forces' formations began to overlap as individual ship commanders on both sides anxiously awaited permission to open fire.

''Akatsuki'' and ''Atlanta'' receive the opening blows

At 01:48, ''Akatsuki'' and ''Hiei'' turned on large searchlights and illuminated ''Atlanta'' only away—almost point-blank range for the battleship's main guns. Several ships on both sides spontaneously began firing, and the formations of the two adversaries quickly disintegrated.Frank, ''Guadalcanal'', p. 439. Realizing that his force was almost surrounded by Japanese ships, Callaghan issued the confusing order, "Odd ships fire to starboard, even ships fire to port", though no pre-battle planning had assigned any such identity numbers to reference, and the ships were no longer in coherent formation. Most of the remaining U.S. ships then opened fire, although several had to quickly change their targets to attempt to comply with Callaghan's order. As the ships from the two sides intermingled, they battled each other in an utterly confused and chaotic short-range mêlée in which superior Japanese optic sights and well-practiced night battle drill proved deadly effective. Indeed, the battle was so close-quarters that at one point opposing warships, the battleship ''Hiei'' and destroyer ''Laffey'' passed within ' of each other. An officer on ''Monssen'' likened it afterwards to "a barroom brawl after the lights had been shot out".Frank, ''Guadalcanal'', p. 441.

At least six of the U.S. ships—including ''Laffey'', ''O'Bannon'', ''Atlanta'', ''San Francisco'', ''Portland'', and ''Helena''—fired at ''Akatsuki'', which drew attention to herself with her illuminated searchlight. The Japanese destroyer was hit repeatedly and blew up and sank within a few minutes.

Perhaps because it was the lead cruiser in the U.S. formation, ''Atlanta'' was the target of fire and torpedoes from several Japanese ships—probably including ''Nagara'', ''Inazuma'', and ''Ikazuchi''—in addition to ''Akatsuki''. The gunfire caused heavy damage to ''Atlanta'', and a type 93 torpedo strike cut all of her engineering power. The disabled cruiser drifted into the line of fire of ''San Francisco'', which accidentally fired on her, causing even greater damage. Scott and many of the bridge crew were killed. Without power and unable to fire her guns, ''Atlanta'' drifted out of control and out of the battle as the Japanese ships passed her by. The lead U.S. destroyer, ''Cushing'', was also caught in a crossfire between several Japanese destroyers and perhaps ''Nagara''. She too was hit heavily and stopped dead in the water.

Attention shifts to ''Hiei'', ''San Francisco'' is mauled

''Hiei'', with her nine lit searchlights, huge size, and course taking her directly through the U.S. formation, became the focus of gunfire from many of the U.S. ships. The destroyer ''Laffey'' passed so close to ''Hiei'' that they missed colliding by , only avoiding the collision by accelerating. ''Hiei'' was unable to depress her main or secondary batteries low enough to hit ''Laffey'', but ''Laffey'' was able to rake the Japanese battleship with shells and machine gun fire, causing heavy damage to the superstructure and bridge, wounding Abe and killing his chief of staff. Abe was thus limited in his ability to direct his ships for the rest of the battle. ''Sterett'' and ''O'Bannon'' likewise fired several salvos into ''Hiei''s superstructure from close range, and perhaps one or two torpedoes into her hull, causing further damage before both destroyers escaped into the darkness.

Unable to fire her main or secondary batteries at the three destroyers causing her so much trouble, ''Hiei'' instead concentrated on ''San Francisco'', which was passing by only away. Along with ''Kirishima'', ''Inazuma'', and ''Ikazuchi'', the four ships made repeated hits on ''San Francisco'', disabling her steering control and killing Callaghan, Captain Cassin Young, and most of the bridge staff. The first few salvos from ''Hiei'' and ''Kirishima'' consisted of the special fragmentation bombardment shells, which caused less damage to the interior of ''San Francisco'' than armor-piercing shells would have done; this may have saved her from being sunk outright. Not expecting a ship-to-ship confrontation, it took the crews of the two Japanese battleships several minutes to switch to armor-piercing ammunition, and ''San Francisco'', almost helpless to defend herself, managed to momentarily sail clear of the melee. She had landed at least one shell in ''Hiei''s steering gear room during the exchange, flooding it with water, shorting out her power steering generators, and severely inhibiting ''Hiei''s steering capability. ''Helena'' followed ''San Francisco'' to try to protect her from further harm.

Chaotic melee, IJN prevails

Two of the U.S. destroyers met a sudden demise. Either ''Nagara'' or the destroyers ''Teruzuki'' and ''Yukikaze'' came upon the drifting ''Cushing'' and pounded her with gunfire, knocking out all of her systems. Unable to fight back, ''Cushing''s crew abandoned ship. ''Cushing'' sank several hours later. ''Laffey'', having escaped from her engagement with ''Hiei'', encountered ''Asagumo'', ''Murasame'', ''Samidare'', and, perhaps, ''Teruzuki''.Hammel, ''Guadalcanal: Decision at Sea''. The Japanese destroyers pounded ''Laffey'' with gunfire and then hit her with a torpedo which broke her keel. A few minutes later fires reached her ammunition magazines and she blew up and sank.

''Portland''—after helping sink ''Akatsuki''—was hit by a torpedo from ''Inazuma'' or ''Ikazuchi'', causing heavy damage to her stern and forcing her to steer in a circle. After completing her first loop, she was able to fire four salvos at ''Hiei'' but otherwise took little further part in the battle.

''Yūdachi'' and ''Amatsukaze'' independently charged the rear five ships of the U.S. formation. Two torpedoes from ''Amatsukaze'' hit ''Barton'', immediately sinking her with heavy loss of life. ''Amatsukaze'' turned back north and later also hit ''Juneau'' with a torpedo while the cruiser was exchanging fire with ''Yūdachi'', stopping her dead in the water, breaking her keel, and knocking out most of her systems. ''Juneau'' then turned east and slowly crept out of the battle area.

''Monssen'' avoided the wreck of ''Barton'' and steamed onward looking for targets. She was noticed by ''Asagumo'', ''Murasame'', and ''Samidare'' who had just finished blasting ''Laffey''. They smothered ''Monssen'' with gunfire, damaging her severely and forcing the crew to abandon ship. The ship sank some time later.

''Amatsukaze'' approached ''San Francisco'' with the intention of finishing her off. While concentrating on ''San Francisco'', ''Amatsukaze'' did not notice the approach of ''Helena'', which fired several full broadsides at ''Amatsukaze'' from close range and knocked her out of the action. The heavily damaged ''Amatsukaze'' escaped under cover of a smoke screen while ''Helena'' was distracted by an attack by ''Asagumo'', ''Murasame'', and ''Samidare''.

''Aaron Ward'' and ''Sterett'', independently searching for targets, both sighted ''Yūdachi'', which appeared unaware of the approach of the two U.S. destroyers. Both U.S. ships hit ''Yūdachi'' simultaneously with gunfire and torpedoes, heavily damaging the destroyer and forcing her crew to abandon ship. The ship did not sink right away. Continuing on her way, ''Sterett'' was suddenly ambushed by ''Teruzuki'', heavily damaged, and forced to withdraw from the battle area to the east. ''Aaron Ward'' wound up in a one-on-one duel with ''Kirishima'', which the destroyer lost with heavy damage. She tried to retire from the battle area to the east but soon stopped dead in the water because the engines were damaged.

Robert Leckie, a Marine private on Guadalcanal, described the battle:

The star shells rose, terrible and red. Giant tracers flashed across the night in orange arches. ... the sea seemed a sheet of polished obsidian on which the warships seemed to have been dropped and were immobilized, centered amid concentric circles like shock waves that form around a stone dropped in mud.

Ira Wolfert, an American war correspondent, was with the Marines on shore and wrote of the engagement:

The action was illuminated in brief, blinding flashes by Jap searchlights which were shot out as soon as they were turned on, by muzzle flashes from big guns, by fantastic streams of tracers, and by huge orange-colored explosions as two Jap destroyers and one of our destroyers blew up... From the beach it resembled a door to hell opening and closing ... over and over.

After nearly 40 minutes of brutal, close-quarters fighting, the two sides broke contact and ceased fire at 02:26, after Abe and Captain Gilbert Hoover (the captain of ''Helena'' and senior surviving U.S. officer) ordered their respective forces to disengage. Abe had one battleship (''Kirishima''), one light cruiser (''Nagara''), and four destroyers (''Asagumo'', ''Teruzuki'', ''Yukikaze'', and ''Harusame'') with only light damage and four destroyers (''Inazuma'', ''Ikazuchi'', ''Murasame'', and ''Samidare'') with moderate damage. The U.S. had only one light cruiser (''Helena'') and one destroyer (''Fletcher'') that were still capable of effective resistance. Although perhaps unclear to Abe, the way was now open for him to bombard Henderson Field and finish off the U.S. naval forces in the area, thus allowing the troops and supplies to be landed safely on Guadalcanal.

At this crucial juncture, Abe, like Mikawa before him and Kurita after him, chose to abandon the mission and depart the area. Several reasons are conjectured as to why he made this decision. Much of the special bombardment ammunition had been expended in the battle. If the bombardment failed to destroy the airfield, then his warships would be vulnerable to CAF air attack at dawn. His own injuries and the deaths of some of his staff from battle action may have affected Abe's judgement. Perhaps he was also unsure as to how many of his or the U.S. ships were still combat-capable because of communication problems with the damaged ''Hiei''. Furthermore, his own ships were scattered and would have taken some time to reassemble for a coordinated resumption of the mission to attack Henderson Field and the remnants of the U.S. warship force. For whatever reason, Abe called for a disengagement and general retreat of his warships, although ''Yukikaze'' and ''Teruzuki'' remained behind to assist ''Hiei''. ''Samidare'' picked up survivors from ''Yūdachi'' at 03:00 before joining the other Japanese ships in the retirement northwards.Frank, ''Guadalcanal'', p. 452.

Aftermath

At 03:00 on 13 November, Admiral Yamamoto postponed the planned landings of the transports, which returned to the Shortlands to await further orders. Dawn revealed three crippled Japanese (''Hiei'', ''Yūdachi'', and ''Amatsukaze''), and three crippled U.S. ships (''Portland'', ''Atlanta'', and ''Aaron Ward'') in the general vicinity of Savo Island. ''Amatsukaze'' was attacked by U.S. dive bombers but escaped further damage as she headed to Truk, and eventually returned to action several months later. The abandoned hulk of ''Yūdachi'' was sunk by ''Portland'', whose guns were still functioning despite other damage to the ship. The tugboat motored around Ironbottom Sound throughout the day of 13 November, assisting the damaged U.S. ships and rescuing U.S. survivors from the water.

During the morning and early afternoon, IJN carrier under the command of Vice Admiral Kakuji Kakuta, which was located about 200 miles north of the Solomons, dispatched several combat air patrols, consisting of Mitsubishi A6M Zero fighters and Nakajima B5N and Aichi D3A bombers (for navigational aid), to cover the crippled ''Hiei''. In addition, several more patrols were dispatched from ground bases at Rabaul and Buin. These patrols engaged U.S. aircraft that were sent from Henderson Field and from the aircraft carrier , but they could not save ''Hiei''.

''Hiei'' was attacked repeatedly by Marine Grumman TBF Avenger torpedo planes from Henderson Field, Navy TBFs, and Douglas SBD Dauntless dive-bombers from ''Enterprise'', which had departed Nouméa on 11 November, as well as Boeing B-17 Flying Fortress bombers of the U.S. Army Air Forces' 11th Bombardment Group from Espiritu Santo. Abe and his staff transferred to ''Yukikaze'' at 08:15. ''Kirishima'' was ordered by Abe to take ''Hiei'' under tow, escorted by ''Nagara'' and its destroyers, but the attempt was cancelled because of the threat of submarine attack and ''Hiei''s increasing unseaworthiness. After sustaining more damage from air attacks, ''Hiei'' sank northwest of Savo Island, perhaps after being scuttled by her remaining crew, in the late evening of 13 November.

''Portland'', ''San Francisco'', ''Aaron Ward'', and ''Sterett'' were eventually able to make their way to rear-area ports for repairs. ''Atlanta'', however, sank near Guadalcanal at 20:00 on 13 November. Departing from the Solomon Islands area with ''San Francisco'', ''Helena'', ''Sterett'', and ''O'Bannon'' later that day, ''Juneau'' was torpedoed and sunk by (). ''Juneau''s 100+ survivors (out of a total complement of 697) were left to fend for themselves in the open ocean for eight days before rescue aircraft belatedly arrived. While awaiting rescue, all but ten of ''Juneau''s crew had died from their injuries, the elements, or shark attacks. The dead included the five Sullivan brothers.

Most historians appear to agree that Abe's decision to retreat represented a strategic victory for the United States. Henderson Field remained operational with attack aircraft ready to deter the slow Imperial transports from approaching Guadalcanal with their precious cargoes.Hammel, ''Guadalcanal: Decision at Sea'', p. 400. Plus, the Japanese had lost an opportunity to eliminate the U.S. naval forces in the area, a result which would have taken even the comparatively resource-rich U.S. some time to recover from. Reportedly furious, Admiral Yamamoto relieved Abe of command and later directed his forced retirement from the military. It appears that Yamamoto may have been more angry over the loss of one of his battleships (''Hiei'') than he was over the abandonment of the supply mission and failure to completely destroy the U.S. force. Shortly before noon, Yamamoto ordered Vice Admiral Nobutake Kondō, commanding the Second Fleet at Truk, to form a new bombardment unit around ''Kirishima'' and attack Henderson Field on the night of 14–15 November.

Including the sinking of ''Juneau'', total U.S. losses in the battle were 1,439 dead. The Japanese suffered between 550 and 800 dead. The U.S. ships that were sunk or scuttled during the battle were two light cruisers, ''Atlanta'' and ''Juneau'', and four destroyers, ''Monssen'', ''Cushing'', ''Laffey'', and ''Barton''. Analyzing the effect of this engagement, historian Richard B. Frank states:

This action stands without peer for furious, close-range, and confused fighting during the war. But the result was not decisive. The self-sacrifice of Callaghan and his task force had purchased one night's respite for Henderson Field. It had postponed, not stopped, the landing of major Japanese reinforcements, nor had the greater portion of the (Japanese) Combined Fleet yet been heard from."

Transports approach, 13–14 November

Although the reinforcement effort to Guadalcanal was delayed, the Japanese did not give up trying to complete the original mission, albeit a day later than originally planned. On the afternoon of 13 November, Tanaka and the 11 transports resumed their journey toward Guadalcanal. A Japanese force of cruisers and destroyers from the 8th Fleet (based primarily at Rabaul and originally assigned to cover the unloading of the transports on the evening of 13 November) was given the mission that Abe's force had failed to carry out—the bombardment of Henderson Field. The battleship ''Kirishima'', after abandoning its rescue effort of ''Hiei'' on the morning of 13 November, steamed north between Santa Isabel and Malaita Islands with her accompanying warships to rendezvous with Kondo's Second Fleet, inbound from Truk, to form the new bombardment unit.

The 8th Fleet cruiser force, under the command of Mikawa, included the ''Takao''-class heavy cruisers and , the ''Mogami''-class and the older and smaller ''Aoba''-class , the light cruisers and , and six destroyers: , , , , , . Mikawa's force was able to slip into the Guadalcanal area uncontested, the battered U.S. naval force having withdrawn. ''Suzuya'' and ''Maya'', under the command of Shōji Nishimura, bombarded Henderson Field while the rest of Mikawa's force cruised around Savo Island, guarding against any U.S. surface attack (which in the event did not occur). The 35-minute bombardment caused some damage to various aircraft and facilities on the airfield but did not put it out of operation. The cruiser force ended the bombardment around 02:30 on 14 November and cleared the area to head towards Rabaul on a course south of the New Georgia island group.

At daybreak, aircraft from Henderson Field, Espiritu Santo, and ''Enterprise''—stationed south of Guadalcanal—began their attacks, first on Mikawa's force heading away from Guadalcanal, and then on the transport force heading towards the island. The attacks on Mikawa's force sank ''Kinugasa'', killing 511 of her crew, and damaged ''Maya'', forcing her to return to Japan for repairs. ''Chokai'' suffered damage from near misses, causing some flooding and reduced speed. ''Michishio'' was critically damaged by near misses, losing all propulsion. She had to be towed out of the battle and then all the way back to Japan, arriving in March 1943 with repairs finished in November 1943. Two of ''Isuzu''s boiler rooms were flooded as a result of near misses, reducing her speed.

Repeated air attacks on the transport force overwhelmed the escorting Japanese fighter aircraft, sank six of the transports, and forced one more to turn back with heavy damage, before it later sank. Survivors from the transports were rescued by the convoy's escorting destroyers and returned to the Shortlands. A total of 450 army troops were reported to have perished. The remaining four transports and four destroyers continued towards Guadalcanal after nightfall of 14 November, but stopped west of Guadalcanal to await the outcome of a warship surface action developing nearby (see below) before continuing.

Kondo's ad hoc force rendezvoused at Ontong Java on the evening of 13 November, then reversed course and refueled out of range of Henderson Field's bombers on the morning of 14 November. The U.S. submarine stalked but was unable to attack ''Kirishima'' during refueling. The bombardment force continued south and came under air attack late in the afternoon of 14 November, during which they were also attacked by the submarine , which launched five torpedoes (but scored no hits) before reporting its contact by radio.

''Kinugasa'' was the third and last Japanese heavy cruiser to be sunk in the Solomon Islands campaign. Almost two years passed before the Japanese navy lost another, when 6 were sunk in the Battle of Leyte Gulf within the span of a few days.

Second Naval Battle of Guadalcanal, 14–15 November

Prelude

Kondo's force approached Guadalcanal via Indispensable Strait around midnight on 14 November, and a quarter moon provided moderate visibility of about . The force included ''Kirishima'', heavy cruisers and , light cruisers and ''Sendai'', and nine destroyers, some of the destroyers being survivors (along with ''Kirishima'' and ''Nagara'') of the first night engagement two days prior. Kondo flew his flag in the cruiser ''Atago''.

* 1 fast battleship: (S)
* 2 heavy cruisers: ,
* 2 light cruisers
** 1 :
** 1 :
* 9 destroyers
** 1 :
** 1 :
** 1 :
** 1 :
** 5 : , , , , (S)

Low on undamaged ships, Admiral William Halsey, Jr., detached the new battleships and , of ''Enterprise''s support group, together with four destroyers, as TF 64 under Admiral Willis A. "Ching" Lee to defend Guadalcanal and Henderson Field. It was a scratch force; the battleships had operated together for only a few days, and their four escorts were from four different divisions—chosen simply because, of the available destroyers, they had the most fuel. The U.S. force arrived in Ironbottom Sound in the evening of 14 November and began patrolling around Savo Island. The U.S. warships were in column formation with the four destroyers in the lead, followed by ''Washington'', with ''South Dakota'' bringing up the rear.

* 2 battleships
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** 1 : (S)
** 1 : (S)
** 1 : (Ds)
** 1 : (d)

At 22:55 on 14 November, radar on ''South Dakota'' and ''Washington'' began picking up Kondo's approaching ships near Savo Island, at a distance of around .

Action

Kondo split his force into several groups, with one group—commanded by Shintaro Hashimoto and consisting of ''Sendai'' and destroyers and ("C" on the maps)—sweeping along the east side of Savo Island, and destroyer ("B" on the maps) sweeping counterclockwise around the southwest side of Savo Island to check for the presence of Allied ships. The Japanese ships spotted Lee's force around 23:00, though Kondo misidentified the battleships as cruisers. Kondo ordered the ''Sendai'' group of ships—plus ''Nagara'' and four destroyers ("D" on the maps)—to engage and destroy the U.S. force before he brought the bombardment force of ''Kirishima'' and heavy cruisers ("E" on the maps) into Ironbottom Sound. The U.S. ships ("A" on the maps) detected the ''Sendai'' force on radar but did not detect the other groups of Japanese ships. Using radar targeting, the two U.S. battleships opened fire on the ''Sendai'' group at 23:17. Admiral Lee ordered a cease fire about five minutes later after the northern group disappeared from his ship's radar. ''Sendai'', ''Uranami'', and ''Shikinami'' were undamaged and circled out of the danger area.

US escort wiped out

Meanwhile, the four U.S. destroyers in the vanguard of the U.S. formation began engaging both ''Ayanami'' and the ''Nagara'' group of ships at 23:22. ''Nagara'' and her escorting destroyers responded effectively with accurate gunfire and torpedoes, and destroyers and were hit and sunk within 10 minutes with heavy loss of life. The destroyer had part of her bow blown off by a torpedo and had to retreat (she sank the next day), and destroyer was hit in her engine room and put out of the fight. The U.S. destroyers had completed their mission as screens for the battleships, absorbing the initial impact of contact with the enemy, although at great cost. Lee ordered the retirement of ''Benham'' and ''Gwin'' at 23:48.Frank, ''Guadalcanal'', p. 478.

''South Dakota'' in peril

''Washington'' passed through the area still occupied by the damaged and sinking U.S. destroyers and fired on ''Ayanami'' with her secondary batteries, setting her afire. Following close behind, ''South Dakota'' suddenly suffered a series of electrical failures, reportedly during repairs when her chief engineer locked down a circuit breaker in violation of safety procedures, causing her circuits repeatedly to go into series, making her radar, radios, and most of her gun batteries inoperable. Nonetheless, she continued to follow ''Washington'' towards the western side of Savo Island until 23:35, when ''Washington'' changed course left to pass to the southward behind the burning destroyers. ''South Dakota'' tried to follow but had to turn to starboard to avoid ''Benham'', which resulted in the ship being silhouetted by the fires of the burning destroyers and made her a closer and easier target for the Japanese.

Receiving reports of the destruction of the U.S. destroyers from ''Ayanami'' and his other ships, Kondo pointed his bombardment force towards Guadalcanal, believing that the U.S. warship force had been defeated. His force and the two U.S. battleships were now heading towards each other.

Almost blind and unable to effectively fire her main and secondary armament, ''South Dakota'' was illuminated by searchlights and targeted by gunfire and torpedoes by most of the ships of the Japanese force, including ''Kirishima'', beginning around midnight on 15 November. Although able to score a few hits on ''Kirishima'', ''South Dakota'' took 26 hits—some of which did not explode—that completely knocked out her communications and remaining gunfire control operations, set portions of her upper decks on fire, and forced her to try to steer away from the engagement. All of the Japanese torpedoes missed. Admiral Lee later described the cumulative effect of the gunfire damage to ''South Dakota'' as to, "render one of our new battleships deaf, dumb, blind, and impotent". ''South Dakota''s crew casualties were 39 killed and 59 wounded, and she turned away from the battle at 00:17 without informing Admiral Lee, though observed by Kondo's lookouts.

''Washington'' to the rescue

The Japanese ships continued to concentrate their fire on ''South Dakota'' and none detected ''Washington'' approaching to within . ''Washington'' was tracking a large target (''Kirishima'') for some time but refrained from firing since there was a chance it could be ''South Dakota''. ''Washington'' had not been able to track ''South Dakota''s movements because she was in a blind spot in ''Washington''s radar and Lee could not raise her on the radio to confirm her position. When the Japanese illuminated and fired on ''South Dakota'', all doubts were removed as to which ships were friend or foe. From this close range, ''Washington'' opened fire and quickly hit ''Kirishima'' with at least nine (and possibly up to 20) main battery shells and at least seventeen secondary ones, disabling all of ''Kirishima''s main gun turrets, causing major flooding, and setting her aflame. ''Kirishima'' was hit below the waterline and suffered a jammed rudder, causing her to circle uncontrollably to port.

At 00:25, Kondo ordered all of his ships that were able to, to converge and destroy any remaining U.S. ships. However, the Japanese ships still did not know where ''Washington'' was, and the other surviving U.S. ships had already departed the battle area. ''Washington'' steered a northwesterly course toward the Russell Islands to draw the Japanese force away from Guadalcanal and the presumably damaged ''South Dakota''. The Imperial ships finally sighted ''Washington'' and launched several torpedo attacks, but she avoided all of them and also avoided running aground in shallow waters. At length, believing that the way was clear for the transport convoy to proceed to Guadalcanal (but apparently disregarding the threat of air attack in the morning), Kondo ordered his remaining ships to break contact and retire from the area about 01:04, which most of the Japanese warships complied with by 01:30.

Aftermath

''Ayanami'' was scuttled by ''Uranami'' at 02:00, while ''Kirishima'' capsized and sank by 03:25 on 15 November. ''Uranami'' rescued survivors from ''Ayanami'' and destroyers ''Asagumo'', ''Teruzuki'', and ''Samidare'' rescued the remaining crew from ''Kirishima''. Three U.S. destroyers, ''Walke'', ''Benham'', and ''Preston'', were sunk during the battle. In the engagement, 242 U.S. and 249 Japanese sailors died. The engagement was one of only two battleship-against-battleship surface battles in the entire Pacific campaign of World War II, the other being at the Surigao Strait during the Battle of Leyte Gulf.

The four Japanese transports beached themselves at Tassafaronga on Guadalcanal by 04:00 on 15 November, and Tanaka and the escort destroyers departed and raced back up the Slot toward safer waters. The transports were attacked, beginning at 05:55, by U.S. aircraft from Henderson Field and elsewhere, and by field artillery from U.S. ground forces on Guadalcanal. Later, the destroyer approached and opened fire on the beached transports and surrounding area. These attacks set the transports afire and destroyed any equipment on them that the Japanese had not yet managed to unload. Only 2,000 to 3,000 of the embarked troops made it to Guadalcanal, and most of their ammunition and food were lost.

Yamamoto's reaction to Kondo's failure to accomplish his mission of neutralizing Henderson Field and ensuring the safe landing of troops and supplies was milder than his earlier reaction to Abe's withdrawal, perhaps because of Imperial Navy culture and politics. Kondo, who also held the position of second in command of the Combined Fleet, was a member of the upper staff and battleship "clique" of the Imperial Navy, while Abe was a career destroyer specialist. Admiral Kondo was not reprimanded or reassigned, but, instead, was left in command of one of the large ship fleets based at Truk.

Significance

The failure to deliver to Guadalcanal most of the troops and especially supplies in the convoy prevented the Japanese from launching another offensive to retake Henderson Field. Thereafter, the Imperial Navy was able to deliver only subsistence supplies and a few replacement troops to Japanese Army forces on Guadalcanal. Because of the continuing threat from Allied aircraft based at Henderson Field, plus nearby U.S. aircraft carriers, the Japanese had to continue to rely on Tokyo Express warship deliveries to their forces on Guadalcanal. These supplies and replacements were not enough to sustain Japanese troops on the island, who – by 7 December 1942 – were losing about 50 men each day from malnutrition, disease, and Allied ground and air attacks. On 12 December, the Japanese Navy proposed that Guadalcanal be abandoned. Despite opposition from Japanese Army leaders, who still hoped that Guadalcanal could be retaken from the Allies, Japan's Imperial General Headquarters—with approval from the Emperor—agreed on 31 December to the evacuation of all Japanese forces from the island and establishment of a new line of defense for the Solomons on New Georgia.

Thus, the Naval Battle of Guadalcanal was the last major attempt by the Japanese to seize control of the seas around Guadalcanal or to retake the island. In contrast, the U.S. Navy was thereafter able to resupply the U.S. forces at Guadalcanal at will, including the delivery of two fresh divisions by late December 1942. The inability to neutralize Henderson Field doomed the Japanese effort to successfully combat the Allied conquest of Guadalcanal. The last Japanese resistance in the Guadalcanal campaign ended on 9 February 1943, with the successful evacuation of most of the surviving Japanese troops from the island by the Japanese Navy in Operation Ke. Building on their success at Guadalcanal and elsewhere, the Allies continued their campaign against Japan, which culminated in Japan's defeat and the end of World War II. U.S. President Franklin Roosevelt, upon learning of the results of the battle, commented, "It would seem that the turning point in this war has at last been reached."

Historian Eric Hammel sums up the significance of the Naval Battle of Guadalcanal this way:

On November 12, 1942, the (Japanese) Imperial Navy had the better ships and the better tactics. After November 15, 1942, its leaders lost heart and it lacked the strategic depth to face the burgeoning U.S. Navy and its vastly improving weapons and tactics. The Japanese never got better while, after November 1942, the U.S. Navy never stopped getting better.

General Alexander Vandegrift, the commander of the troops on Guadalcanal, paid tribute to the sailors who fought the battle:

We believe the enemy has undoubtedly suffered a crushing defeat. We thank Admiral Kinkaid for his intervention yesterday. We thank Lee for his sturdy effort last night. Our own aircraft has been grand in its relentless hammering of the foe. All those efforts are appreciated but our greatest homage goes to Callaghan, Scott and their men who with magnificent courage against seemingly hopeless odds drove back the first hostile attack and paved the way for the success to follow. To them the men of Cactus lift their battered helmets in deepest admiration.The wording varies slightly from source to source
USS ''Cushing''




ttp://www.usshelena.org/communiques.html Communiqués

Notes

Footnotes

Citations

References

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Further reading

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Online views of selections of the book
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External links

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* Article on the battle of Friday the 13th that gives additional details on the demise of ''Hiei''.

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