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East Timor genocide refers to the "pacification campaigns" of
state sponsored terror by the Indonesian government during its
occupation of East Timor.
University of Oxford
University of Oxford held an academic
consensus calling the Indonesian Occupation of
East Timor a genocide
and Yale university teaches it as part of its
1 Initial Invasion
1.1 Resettlement and enforced starvation
2 Indonesian pacification operations
2.1 Operasi Keamanan: 1981–82
2.2 'Operation Clean-Sweep': 1983
3 Violence against women
4 Santa Cruz massacre
5 Number of deaths
6 Depictions in fiction
7 See also
From the start of the invasion in August 1975 onward, TNI forces
engaged in the wholesale massacre of Timorese civilians. At the
start of the occupation, FRETILIN radio sent the following broadcast:
"The Indonesian forces are killing indiscriminately. Women and
children are being shot in the streets. We are all going to be
killed.... This is an appeal for international help. Please do
something to stop this invasion." One Timorese refugee told later
of "rape [and] cold-blooded assassinations of women and children and
Chinese shop owners". Dili's bishop at the time, Martinho da Costa
Lopes, said later: "The soldiers who landed started killing everyone
they could find. There were many dead bodies in the streets – all we
could see were the soldiers killing, killing, killing." In one
incident, a group of fifty men, women, and children – including
Australian freelance reporter Roger East – were lined up on a cliff
outside of Dili and shot, their bodies falling into the sea. Many
such massacres took place in Dili, where onlookers were ordered to
observe and count aloud as each person was executed. It is
estimated that at least 2,000 Timorese were massacred in the first two
days of the invasion in Dili alone. In addition to FRETILIN
supporters, Chinese migrants were also singled out for execution; five
hundred were killed in the first day alone.
The mass killings continued unabated as Indonesian forces advanced on
the Fretilin-held mountain regions of East Timor. A Timorese guide for
a senior Indonesian officer told former Australian consul to
Portuguese Timor James Dunn that during the early months of the
fighting TNI troops "killed most Timorese they encountered."  In
February 1976 after capturing the village of Aileu - to the south of
Dili - and driving out the remaining Fretilin forces, Indonesian
troops machine gunned most of the town's population, allegedly
shooting everyone over the age of three. The young children who were
spared were taken back to Dili in trucks. At the time Aileu fell to
Indonesian forces, the population was around 5,000; by the time
Indonesian relief workers visited the village in September 1976 only
1,000 remained. In June 1976, TNI troops badly battered by a
Fretilin attack exacted retribution against a large refugee camp
housing 5-6,000 Timorese at Lamaknan near the West Timor border. After
setting several houses on fire, Indonesian soldiers massacred as many
as 2,000 men, women and children.
In March 1977 ex-Australian consul James Dunn published a report
detailing charges that since December 1975 Indonesian forces had
killed between 50,000 and 100,000 civilians in East Timor. This is
consistent with a statement made on 13 February 1976 by UDT leader
Lopez da Cruz that 60,000 Timorese had been killed during the previous
six months of civil war, suggesting a death toll of at least 55,000 in
the first two months of the invasion. A delegation of Indonesian
relief workers agreed with this statistic. A late 1976 report by
the Catholic Church also estimated the death toll at between 60,000
and 100,000. These figures were also corroborated by those in the
Indonesian government itself. In an interview on 5 April 1977 with the
Sydney Morning Herald, Indonesian Foreign Minister
Adam Malik said the
number of dead was "50,000 people or perhaps 80,000".
The Indonesian government presented its annexation of
East Timor as a
matter of anticolonial unity. A 1977 booklet from the Indonesian
Department of Foreign Affairs, entitled Decolonization in East Timor,
paid tribute to the "sacred right of self-determination" and
recognised APODETI as the true representatives of the East Timorese
majority. It claimed that FRETILIN's popularity was the result of a
"policy of threats, blackmail and terror". Later, Indonesian
Ali Alatas reiterated this position in his 2006
memoir The Pebble in the Shoe: The Diplomatic Struggle for East
Timor. The island's original division into east and west,
Indonesia argued after the invasion, was "the result of colonial
oppression" enforced by the Portuguese and Dutch imperial powers.
Thus, according to the Indonesian government, its annexation of the
27th province was merely another step in the unification of the
archipelago which had begun in the 1940s.
Resettlement and enforced starvation
Monument with the
National emblem of Indonesia
National emblem of Indonesia in
As a result of the destruction of food crops, many civilians were
forced to leave the hills and surrender to the TNI. Often, when
surviving villagers came down to lower-lying regions to surrender, the
military would execute them. Those who were not killed outright by TNI
troops were sent to receiving centers which were prepared in advance.
These camps were located in close proximity to local military bases
where Indonesian forces "screened" the population in order to single
out members of the resistance, often with the aid of Timorese
collaborators. In these transit camps, the surrendered civilians were
registered and interrogated. Those who were suspected of being members
of the resistance were detained and killed.
These centers were often constructed of thatch huts with no toilets.
Additionally, the Indonesian military barred the Red Cross from
distributing humanitarian aid and no medical care was provided to the
detainees. As a result, many of the Timorese - weakened by starvation
and surviving on small rations given by their captors - died of
malnutrition, cholera, diarrhea and tuberculosis. By late 1979,
between 300,000 and 370,000 Timorese had passed through these
camps. After a period of three months, the detainees were
resettled in "strategic hamlets" where they were imprisoned and
subjected to enforced starvation. Those in the camps were
prevented from traveling and cultivating farmland and were subjected
to a curfew. The UN truth commission report confirmed the
Indonesian military's use of enforced starvation as a weapon to
exterminate the East Timorese civilian population, and that large
numbers of people were "positively denied access to food and its
sources". The report cited testimony from individuals who were denied
food, and detailed destruction of crops and livestock by Indonesian
soldiers. It concluded that this policy of deliberate starvation
resulted in the deaths of 84,200 to 183,000 Timorese. One church
worker reported five hundred East Timorese dying of starvation every
month in one district.
World Vision Indonesia visited
East Timor in October 1978 and claimed
that 70,000 East Timorese were at risk of starvation. An envoy
International Committee of the Red Cross
International Committee of the Red Cross reported in 1979
that 80 percent of one camp's population was malnourished, in a
situation that was "as bad as Biafra". The ICRC warned that "tens
of thousands" were at risk of starvation. Indonesia announced that
it was working through the government-run Indonesian Red Cross to
alleviate the crisis, but the NGO Action for World Development charged
that organisation with selling donated aid supplies.
Indonesian pacification operations
Operasi Keamanan: 1981–82
In 1981 the Indonesian military launched Operasi Keamanan (Operation
Security), which some have named the "fence of legs" program. During
this operation, Indonesian forces conscripted 50,000 to 80,000
Timorese men and boys to march through the mountains ahead of
advancing TNI troops as human shields to foreclose a FRETILIN
counterattack. The objective was to sweep the guerillas into the
central part of the region where they could be eradicated. Many of
those conscripted into the "fence of legs" died of starvation,
exhaustion or were shot by Indonesian forces for allowing guerillas to
slip through. As the "fence" converged on villages, Indonesian forces
massacred an unknown number of civilians. At least 400 villagers were
Lacluta by Battalion 744 of the Indonesian Army in
September 1981. An eyewitness who testified before the Australian
Senate stated that soldiers deliberately killed small children by
smashing their heads against a rock. The operation failed to crush
the resistance, and popular resentment toward the occupation grew
stronger than ever. As FRETILIN troops in the mountains continued
their sporadic attacks, Indonesian forces carried out numerous
operations to destroy them over the next ten years. In the cities and
villages, meanwhile, a non-violent resistance movement began to take
'Operation Clean-Sweep': 1983
The failure of successive Indonesian counterinsurgency campaigns led
the Indonesian military elite to instruct the commander of the
Dili-based Sub regional Military Resort Command, Colonel Purwanto to
initiate peace talks with FRETILIN commander Xanana Gusmão in a
FRETILIN-controlled area in March 1983. When Xanana sought to invoke
Portugal and the UN in the negotiations, ABRI Commander Benny Moerdani
broke the ceasefire by announcing a new counterinsurgency offensive
called "Operational Clean-Sweep" in August 1983, declairing, "This
time no fooling around. This time we are going to hit them without
The breakdown of the ceasefire agreement was followed by a renewed
wave of massacres, summary executions and "disappearances" at the
hands of Indonesian forces. In August 1983, 200 people were burned
alive in the village of Creras, with 500 others killed at a nearby
river. Between August and December 1983, Amnesty International
documented the arrests and "disappearances" of over 600 people in the
capital city alone. Relatives were told by Indonesian forces that the
"disappeared" were sent to Bali.
Those suspected of opposing integration were often arrested and
tortured. In 1983
Amnesty International published an Indonesian
manual it had received from
East Timor instructing military personnel
on how to inflict physical and mental anguish, and cautioning troops
to "Avoid taking photographs showing torture (of someone being given
electric shocks, stripped naked and so on)". In his 1997 memoir
East Timor's Unfinished Struggle: Inside the Timorese Resistance,
Constâncio Pinto describes being tortured by Indonesian soldiers:
"With each question, I would get two or three punches in the face.
When someone punches you so much and so hard, it feels as if your face
is broken. People hit me on my back and on my sides with their hands
and then kicked me.... [In another location] they psychologically
tortured me; they didn't hit me, but they made strong threats to kill
me. They even put a gun on the table." In Michele Turner's book
Telling East Timor: Personal Testimonies 1942–1992, a woman named
Fátima describes watching torture take place in a Dili prison: "They
make people sit on a chair with the front of the chair on their own
toes. It is mad, yes. The soldiers urinate in the food then mix it up
for the person to eat. They use electric shock and they use an
Violence against women
Indonesian military abuses against women in
East Timor were numerous
and well-documented. In addition to suffering arbitrary
detainment, torture, and extrajudicial execution, women faced rape and
sexual abuse—sometimes for the crime of being related to an
independence activist. The scope of the problem is difficult to
ascertain, owing to the intense military control imposed during the
occupation, compounded by the shame felt by victims. In a 1995 report
on violence against women in Indonesia and East Timor, Amnesty
International USA wrote: "Women are reluctant to pass on information
to non-governmental organizations about rape and sexual abuse, let
alone to report violations to the military or police authorities."
Other forms of violence against women took the form of harassment,
intimidation, and enforced marriage. The Amnesty report cites the case
of a woman forced to live with a commander in Baucau, then harassed
daily by troops after her release. Such "marriages" took place
regularly during the occupation. Women were also encouraged to
accept sterilisation procedures, and some were pressured to take the
contraceptive Depo Provera, sometimes without full knowledge of its
In 1999 researcher Rebecca Winters released the book Buibere: Voice of
East Timorese Women, which chronicles many personal stories of
violence and abuse dating to the earliest days of the occupation. One
woman tells of being interrogated while stripped half-naked, tortured,
molested, and threatened with death. Another describes being
chained at the hands and feet, raped repeatedly, and interrogated for
weeks. A woman who had prepared food for FRETILIN guerrillas was
arrested, burned with cigarettes, tortured with electricity, and
forced to walk naked past a row of soldiers into a tank filled with
urine and feces.
Santa Cruz massacre
Main article: Santa Cruz massacre
During a memorial mass on 12 November 1991 for a pro-independence
youth shot by Indonesian troops, demonstrators among the 2,500-strong
crowd unfurled the Fretlin flag and banners with pro-independence
slogans, and chanted boisterously but peacefully. Following a
brief confrontation between Indonesian troops and protesters, 200
Indonesian soldiers opened fire on the crowd killing at least 250
The testimonies of foreigners at the cemetery were quickly reported to
international news organisations, and video footage of the massacre
was widely broadcast internationally causing outrage. In
response to the massacre, activists around the world organised in
solidarity with the East Timorese, and a new urgency was brought to
calls for self-determination. TAPOL, a British organisation formed
in 1973 to advocate for democracy in Indonesia, increased its work
around East Timor. In the United States, the
East Timor Action Network
East Timor and Indonesia Action Network) was founded and soon
had chapters in ten cities around the country. Other solidarity
groups appeared in Portugal, Australia, Japan, Germany, Malaysia,
Ireland, and Brazil. Coverage of the massacre was a vivid example of
how growth of new media in Indonesia was making it increasingly
difficult for the "New Order" to control information flow in and out
of Indonesia, and that in the post-
Cold War 1990s, the government was
coming under increasing international scrutiny. A number of
pro-democracy student groups and their magazines began to openly and
critically discuss not just East Timor, but also the "New Order" and
the broader history and future of Indonesia.
Sharp condemnation of the military came not just from the
international community, but from within parts of the Indonesian
elite. The massacre ended the governments 1989 opening of the
territory and a new period of repression began. Warouw was removed
from his position and his more accommodating approach to Timorese
resistance rebuked by his superiors. Suspected Fretilin sympathisers
were arrested, human rights abuses rose, and the ban on foreign
journalists was reimposed. Hatred intensified amongst Timorese of the
Indonesian military presence. Major General Prabowo's, Kopassus
Group 3 trained militias gangs dressed in black hoods to crush the
Number of deaths
Precise estimates of the death toll are difficult to determine. The
2005 report of the UN's Commission for Reception, Truth and
East Timor (CAVR) reports an estimated minimum
number of conflict-related deaths of 102,800 (+/- 12,000). Of these,
the report says that approximately 18,600 (+/-1,000) were either
killed or disappeared, and that approximately 84,000 (+/-11,000) died
from hunger or illness in excess of what would have been expected due
to peacetime mortality. These figures represent a minimum conservative
estimate that CAVR says is its scientifically-based principal finding.
The report did not provide an upper bound, however, CAVR speculated
that the total number of deaths due to conflict-related hunger and
illness could have been as high as 183,000. The truth commission
held Indonesian forces responsible for about 70% of the violent
Ben Kiernan says that "a toll of 150,000 is likely close to
the truth," although one can throw out an estimate of 200,000 or
Center for Defense Information also estimated a total
close to 150,000. A 1974 Catholic church estimate of the
East Timor was 688,711 people; in 1982 the church
reported only 425,000. This led to an estimate of 200,000 people
killed during the occupation, which was widely reported around the
world. Other sources such as
Amnesty International and Human
Rights Watch also support an estimate of over 200,000 killed.
According to specialist Gabriel Defert on the basis of statistical
data available from the Portuguese and Indonesian authorities, and
from the Catholic Church, between December 1975 and December 1981,
approximately 308,000 Timorese lost their lives; this constituted
about 44% of the pre-invasion population.[page needed]
Similarly Indonesian Professor George Aditjondro, formerly of Salatiga
University in Java, concluded from his study of Indonesian Army data
that in fact 300,000 Timorese had been killed in the early years of
Robert Cribb of the
Australian National University
Australian National University argues that the
toll was significantly exaggerated. He argues that the 1980 census
that counted 555,350 Timorese, although "the most reliable source of
all," was probably a minimum rather than a maximum estimate for the
total population. "It is worth recalling that hundreds of thousands of
East Timorese disappeared during the violence of September 1999, only
to reappear later," he writes. The 1980 census becomes more improbable
in the face of the 1987 census that counted 657,411 Timorese – this
would require a growth rate of 2.5% per year, nearly identical to the
very high growth rate in
East Timor from 1970 to 1975, and a highly
unlikely one given the conditions of the brutal occupation, including
Indonesian efforts to discourage reproduction. Noting the relative
lack of personal accounts of atrocities or of traumatised Indonesian
soldiers, he further adds that
East Timor "does not appear—on the
basis of news reports and academic accounts—to be a society
traumatized by mass death...the circumstance leading up to the Dili
massacre of 1991...indicate a society which retained its vigor and
indignation in a way which would probably not have been possible if it
had been treated as Cambodia was treated under Pol Pot." Even
Indonesian military strategy was based on winning the "hearts and
minds" of the population, a fact that does not support charges of mass
Kiernan, starting from a base population of 700,000 Timorese in 1975
(based on the 1974 Catholic Church census) calculated an expected 1980
population of 735,000 Timorese (assuming a growth rate of only 1% per
year as a result of the occupation). Accepting the 1980 count that
Cribb regards as at least 10% (55,000) too low, Kiernan concluded that
as many as 180,000 may have died in the war. Cribb argued that the
3% growth rate suggested by the 1974 census was too high, citing the
fact that the church had previously postulated a growth rate of 1.8%,
which would have produced a figure in line with the Portuguese
population estimate of 635,000 for 1974.
Although Cribb maintained that the Portuguese census was almost
certainly an underestimate, he believed it to be more likely
correct than the church census, due to the fact that any church
attempt to extrapolate the size of the total population "must be seen
in light of its incomplete access to society" (less than half of
Timorese were Catholic). Assuming a growth rate in line with the other
nations of South East Asia, then, would yield a more accurate figure
of 680,000 for 1975, and an expected 1980 population of slightly over
775,000 (without accounting for the decline in the birth rate
resulting from the Indonesian occupation). The deficit remaining
would be almost exactly 200,000. According to Cribb, Indonesian
policies restricted the birth rate by up to 50% or more, thus around
45,000 of these were not born rather than killed; another 55,000 were
"missing" as a result of the Timorese evading the Indonesian
authorities who conducted the 1980 census. A variety of
factors—the exodus of tens of thousands from their homes to escape
FRETELIN in 1974-5; the deaths of thousands in the civil war; the
deaths of combatants during the occupation; killings by FRETELIN; and
natural disasters—diminish further still the civilian toll
attributable to Indonesian forces during this time. Considering
all this data, Cribb argues for a much lower toll of 100,000 or less,
with an absolute minimum of 60,000, and a mere tenth of the civilian
population dying unnaturally, for the years 1975–80.
Kiernan responded, however, by asserting that the influx of migrant
workers during the occupation and the increase in the population
growth rate typical of a mortality crisis justifies accepting the 1980
census as valid despite the 1987 estimate, and that the 1974 church
census—though a "possible maximum"—cannot be discounted because
the church's lack of access to society might well have resulted in an
undercount. He concluded that at least 116,000 combatants and
civilians were killed by all sides or died "unnatural" deaths from
1975–80 (if true, this would yield the result that about 15% of the
civilian population of
East Timor was killed from 1975–80). F.
Hiorth separately estimated that 13% (95,000 out of an expected
730,000 when accounting for the reduction in birth rates) of the
civilian population died during this period. Kiernan believes that
the deficit was most probably around 145,000 when accounting for the
reduction in birth rates, or 20% of East Timor's population. The
mid-value of the UN report is 146,000 deaths; R.J. Rummel, an analyst
of political killings, estimates 150,000.
Many observers have called the Indonesian military action in East
Timor an example of genocide. Oxford held an academic consensus
calling the event genocide and Yale university teaches it as part of
Genocide Studies" program. In a study of the word's legal
meaning and applicability to the occupation of East Timor, legal
Ben Saul concludes that because no group recognized under
international law was targeted by the Indonesian authorities, a charge
of genocide cannot be applied. However, he also notes: "The conflict
East Timor most accurately qualifies as genocide against a
‘political group’, or alternatively as ‘cultural genocide’,
yet neither of these concepts are explicitly recognised in
international law." The occupation has been compared to the
killings of the Khmer Rouge, the Yugoslav wars, and the Rwandan
Accurate numbers of Indonesian casualties are well-documented. The
complete names of around 2,300 Indonesian soldiers and pro-Indonesian
militias who died in action as well as from illness and accidents
during the entire occupation is engraved into the Seroja Monument
located in Armed Forces Headquarters in Cilangkap, south of
Depictions in fiction
Balibo (film) 2009
Genocide of Indigenous Peoples
^ a b Payaslian, Simon. "20th Century Genocides". Oxford
^ a b "
Genocide Studies Program: East Timor". Yale.edu.
^ Hill, p. 210.
^ Quoted in Budiardjo and Liong, p. 15.
^ Quoted in Ramos-Horta, p. 108.
^ Quoted in Taylor (1991), p. 68.
^ Ramos-Horta, pp. 101–02.
^ Taylor (1991), p. 68.
^ Taylor (1991), p. 69; Dunn (1996), p. 253.
^ Timor: A People Betrayed, James Dunn, 1983 p. 293, 303
^ Taylor (1991), p. 80-81
^ Dunn, p. 303
^ "A Quarter Century of US Support for Occupation: National Security
Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 174".
^ Taylor (1991), p. 71.
^ Dunn, p. 310, Notes on Timor
^ Quoted in Turner, p. 207.
^ Indonesia (1977), p. 16.
^ Indonesia (1977), p. 21.
^ Alatas, pp. 18–19.
^ Indonesia (1977), p. 19.
^ CAVR, ch. 7.3, pp. 41–44.
^ Deborah Mayersen, Annie Pohlman (2013).
Genocide and Mass Atrocities
in Asia: Legacies and Prevention. Routledge. p. 56.
^ a b CAVR, ch. 7, p. 50; Taylor, pp. 88–89; Dunn (1996), pp.
^ Taylor (1991), pp. 92–98.
^ CAVR, ch. 7.3, pp 146–147.
^ CAVR, ch. 7.3, p. 146.
^ a b Kohen and Taylor, pp. 54–56.
^ CAVR, ch. 7.3, p. 72.
^ Quoted in Taylor (1991), p. 97.
^ Taylor (1991), p. 203.
^ a b Taylor, pp. 101–102; Nevins, p. 30; Budiardjo and Liong, pp.
127–128; Amnesty (1985), p. 23; Dunn, p. 299.
^ Budiardjo and Liong, pp. 41–43; Dunn (1996), p. 301.
^ Dunn (1996), pp. 303–304.
^ Sinar Harapan, 17 August 1983, quoted in Taylor 1991: 142
^ East Timor, Violations of Human Rights: Extrajudicial Executions,
"Disappearances", Torture and Political Imprisonment, 1975–1984, p.
^ Amnesty (1985), pp. 53–59; Turner, p. 125; Kohen and Taylor, p.
90; Budiardjo and Liong, pp. 131–135.
^ Amnesty (1985), pp. 53–54.
^ Pinto, pp. 142–148.
^ Turner, p. 143.
^ Amnesty (1995); Winters; Budiardjo and Liong, p. 132; Jardine, pp.
33–34; Aditjondro (1998).
^ a b Amnesty (1995), p. 14.
^ Aditjondro (1998), pp. 256–260.
^ Taylor (1991), pp. 158–160.
^ Winters, pp. 11–12.
^ Winters, pp. 24–26.
^ Winters, pp. 85–90.
^ Schwarz (1994), p. 212
^ Two soldiers were stabbed under disputed circumstances.(Schwarz
(1994), p. 212; Pinto and Jardine, p. 191.) Soldiers said the attacks
were unprovoked. Stahl claims stabbed Officer Lantara had attacked a
girl carrying the flag of East Timor, and FRETILIN activist
Constâncio Pinto reports eyewitness accounts of beatings from
Indonesian soldiers and police. Kubiak, W. David. "20 Years of Terror:
Indonesia in Timor – An Angry Education with Max Stahl". Kyoto
Journal. 28. Reprinted at The Forum of Democratic Leaders in the
Asia-Pacific. Retrieved 14 February 2008.
^ Carey, p. 51; Jardine, p. 16. The Portuguese solidarity group A Paz
é Possível em Timor Leste compiled a careful survey of the
massacre's victims, listing 271 killed, 278 wounded, and 270
^ Schwarz (1994), p. 212-213
^ Jardine, pp. 16–17; Carey, pp. 52–53.
^ a b Jardine, pp. 67–69.
^ "About ETAN".
East Timor Action Network. Retrieved 18 February 2008.
^ a b Vickers (2005), pp. 200–201
^ CIIR, pp. 62–63; Dunn, p. 311.
^ a b Friend (2003), p. 433.
^ Schwarz (1994), pp. 216, 218, 219.
^ Conflict-related Deaths in Timor Leste, 1954–1999. The Findings of
the CAVR Report Chega!
^ Chega! The CAVR Report Archived May 13, 2012, at the Wayback
^ Kiernan, p. 594.
^ "Archived copy". Archived from the original on 2012-07-22. Retrieved
^ Dunn, pp. 283–285; Budiardjo and Liong, pp. 49–51
^ Asia Watch, Human Rights in Indonesia and East Timor, Human Rights
Watch, New York, 1989, p. 253.
^ Defert, Gabriel, Timor Est le
Genocide Oublié, L’Hartman, 1992.
^ CIIR Report, International Law and the Question of East Timor,
Catholic Institute of International Relations/IPJET, London, 1995.
^ How many deaths? Problems in the statistics of massacre in Indonesia
East Timor (1975–1980). Works.bepress.com (15
^ a b c d e f "Archived copy" (PDF). Archived from the original (PDF)
on 2009-02-27. Retrieved 2008-02-18.
^ a b c
^ http://works.bepress.com/robert_cribb/2/ How many deaths? Problems
in the statistics of massacre in Indonesia (1965–1966) and East
^ Jardine; Taylor (1991), p. ix; Nevins cites a wide variety of
sources discussing the question of genocide in East Timor, on p.
^ Saul, Ben. "Was the Conflict in
East Timor ‘Genocide’ and Why
Does It Matter?". Melbourne Journal of International Law. 2:2 (2001).
Retrieved 17 February 2008.
^ Budiardjo and Liong, p. 49; CIIR, p. 117.
^ "Selayang Pandang Monumen Seroja" [Seroja Monument at a Glance] (in
Indonesian). Pelita.or.id. Archived from the original on 24 November